WDIFF

draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-04.txt --> draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-05.txt

DNS Operations WG A. Durand
Internet-Draft SUN Microsystems, Inc.
Expires: July 1, September 30, 2004 J. Ihren
Autonomica
P. Savola
CSC/FUNET
Jan
Apr 2004

Operational Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS
draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-04.txt
draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-dns-issues-05.txt

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft

By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
and is any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in full conformance accordance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
RFC 3668.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 1, September 30, 2004.

Abstract

This memo presents operational considerations and issues with IPv6
Domain Name System (DNS), including a summary of special IPv6
addresses, documentation of known DNS implementation misbehaviour,
recommendations and considerations on how to perform DNS naming for
service provisioning and for DNS resolver IPv6 support,
considerations for DNS updates for both the forward and reverse
trees, and miscellaneous issues. This memo is aimed to include a
summary of information about IPv6 DNS considerations for those who
have experience with IPv4 DNS.

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summary of information about IPv6 DNS considerations for those who
have experience with IPv4 DNS.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Representing IPv6 Addresses in DNS Records . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Independence of DNS Transport and DNS Records . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Avoiding IPv4/IPv6 Name Space Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . 4
2. DNS Considerations about Special IPv6 Addresses . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Limited-scope Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Privacy (RFC3041) Address Temporary Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 5
2.3 6to4 Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Observed DNS Implementation Misbehaviour . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Misbehaviour of DNS Servers and Load-balancers . . . . . . . . 5 6
3.2 Misbehaviour of DNS Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Recommendations for Service Provisioning using DNS . . . . . . 6
4.1 Use of Service Names instead of Node Names . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2 Separate vs the Same Service Names for IPv4 and IPv6 . . . . . 7
4.3 Adding the Records Only when Fully IPv6-enabled . . . . . 8
4.4 Behaviour of Additional Data in IPv4/IPv6 Environments . . 7
4.4 8
4.5 The Use of TTL for IPv4 and IPv6 RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5 Behaviour of Glue in Mixed IPv4/IPv6 Environments . . . . . . 8 9
4.6 IPv6 Transport Guidelines for DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . 9 10
5. Recommendations for DNS Resolver IPv6 Support . . . . . . . . 9 10
5.1 DNS Lookups May Query IPv6 Records Prematurely . . . . . . . . 9 10
5.2 Recursive Obtaining a List of DNS Resolver Discovery . . . . . . . . Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . 11 12
5.3 IPv6 Transport Guidelines for Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13
6. Considerations about Forward DNS Updating . . . . . . . . . . 11 13
6.1 Manual or Custom DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13
6.2 Dynamic DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13
7. Considerations about Reverse DNS Updating . . . . . . . . . . 13 14
7.1 Applicability of Reverse DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14
7.2 Manual or Custom DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15
7.3 DDNS with Stateless Address Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . 14 15
7.4 DDNS with DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 16
7.5 DDNS with Dynamic Prefix Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 17
8. Miscellaneous DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 18
8.1 NAT-PT with DNS-ALG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 18
8.2 Renumbering Procedures and Applications' Use of DNS . . . . . 15 18
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 18
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. References . . 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 19
11.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 22
A. Site-local Addressing Considerations for DNS . . . . . . . . . 19 23
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 21 24

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1. Introduction

This memo presents operational considerations and issues with IPv6
DNS; it is meant to be an extensive summary and a list of pointers
for more information about IPv6 DNS considerations for those with
experience with IPv4 DNS.

The purpose of this document is to give information about various
issues and considerations related to DNS operations with IPv6; it is
not meant to be a normative specification or standard for IPv6 DNS.

The first section gives a brief overview of how IPv6 addresses and
names are represented in the DNS, how transport protocols and
resource records (don't) relate, and what IPv4/IPv6 name space
fragmentation means and how to avoid it; all of these are described
at more length in other documents.

The second section summarizes the special IPv6 address types and how
they relate to DNS. The third section describes observed DNS
implementation misbehaviours which have a varying effect on the use
of IPv6 records with DNS. The fourth section lists recommendations
and considerations for provisioning services with DNS. The fifth
section in turn looks at recommendations and considerations about
providing IPv6 support in the resolvers. The sixth and seventh
sections describe considerations with forward and reverse DNS
updates, respectively. The eighth section introduces several
miscellaneous IPv6 issues relating to DNS for which no better place
has been found in this memo. Appendix A looks briefly at the
requirements for site-local addressing.

1.1 Representing IPv6 Addresses in DNS Records

In the forward zones, IPv6 addresses are represented using AAAA
records. In the reverse zones, IPv6 address are represented using
PTR records in the nibble format under the ip6.arpa. -tree. tree. See [1]
for more about IPv6 DNS usage, and [2] or [4] for background
information.

In particular one should note that the use of A6 records, DNAME records in the reverse tree,
forward tree or Bitlabels in the reverse tree is not recommended [2].
Using DNAME records is not recommended in the reverse tree in
conjunction with A6 records; the document did not mean to take a
stance on any other use of DNAME records [5].

1.2 Independence of DNS Transport and DNS Records

DNS has been designed to present a single, globally unique name space
[6].
[7]. This property should be maintained, as described here and in

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Section 1.3.

In DNS, the IP version used to transport the queries and responses is
independent of the records being queried: AAAA records can be queried
over IPv4, and A records over IPv6. The DNS servers must not make any
assumptions about what data to return for Answer and Authority

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sections.

However, there is some debate whether the addresses in Additional
section could be selected or filtered using hints obtained from which
transport was being used; this has some obvious problems because in
many cases the transport protocol does not correlate with the
requests, and because a "bad" answer is in a way worse than no answer
at all (consider the case where the client is led to believe that a
name received in the additional record does not have any AAAA records
to begin with).

As stated in [1]:

The IP protocol version used for querying resource records is
independent of the protocol version of the resource records; e.g.,
IPv4 transport can be used to query IPv6 records and vice versa.

1.3 Avoiding IPv4/IPv6 Name Space Fragmentation

To avoid the DNS name space from fragmenting into parts where some
parts of DNS are only visible using IPv4 (or IPv6) transport, the
recommendation is to always keep at least one authoritative server
IPv4-enabled, and to ensure that recursive DNS servers support IPv4.
See DNS IPv6 transport guidelines [3] for more information.

2. DNS Considerations about Special IPv6 Addresses

There are a couple of IPv6 address types which are somewhat special;
these are considered here.

2.1 Limited-scope Addresses

The IPv6 addressing architecture [5] [6] includes two kinds of local-use
addresses: link-local (fe80::/10) and site-local (fec0::/10). The
site-local addresses are being deprecated [7], [8], and are only discussed
in Appendix A.

Link-local addresses should never be published in DNS, DNS (whether in
forward or reverse tree), because they have only local (to the
connected link) significance [8]. [9].

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2.2 Privacy (RFC3041) Address

Privacy Temporary Addresses

Temporary addresses (RFC3041 [9]) defined in RFC3041 [10] (sometimes called
"privacy addresses") use a random number as the interface identifier.
Publishing DNS records relating to such addresses would defeat the
purpose of the mechanism and is not recommended. If absolutely
necessary, a mapping could be made to some non-identifiable name, as
described in [9].

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2.3 6to4 Addresses

6to4 [10] [11] specifies an automatic tunneling mechanism which maps a
public IPv4 address V4ADDR to an IPv6 prefix 2002:V4ADDR::/48.
Providing reverse DNS delegation path for such addresses is a
challenge.

Note that similar difficulties don't surface it does not seem feasible to provide reverse DNS with the
other automatic tunneling mechanisms (in particular, providing
reverse DNS information for mechanism, Teredo [11] hosts whose [12]; this is because the
IPv6 address includes is based on the IPv4 address and UDP port of the current
NAT binding does not seem reasonable). mapping which is likely to be relatively short-lived.

If the reverse DNS population would be desirable (see Section 7.1 for
applicability), there are a number of ways to tackle the delegation
path problem [12], [13], some more applicable than the others.

The main proposal [13] [14] has been to allocate 2.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. to RIRs
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and let them do subdelegations in
accordance to the delegations of the respective IPv4 address space.
This has a major practical drawback: those ISPs and IPv4 address
space holders where 6to4 is being used do not, in general, provide
any IPv6 services -- as otherwise, most people would not have to use
6to4 to begin with -- and it is improbable that the reverse
delegation chain would be completed either. In most cases, creating
such delegation chains might just lead to latencies caused by lookups
for (almost always) non-existent DNS records.

Another proposal [15] aims to design an autonomous reverse-delegation
system that anyone being capable of communicating using a specific
6to4 address would be able to set up a reverse delegation to the
corresponding 6to4 prefix. This could be deployed by e.g., RIRs.
This is a more practical solution, but may have some scalability
concerns.

3. Observed DNS Implementation Misbehaviour

Several classes of misbehaviour in DNS servers, load-balancers and
resolvers have been observed. Most of these are rather generic, not
only applicable to IPv6 -- but in some cases, the consequences of

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this misbehaviour are extremely severe in IPv6 environments and
deserve to be mentioned.

3.1 Misbehaviour of DNS Servers and Load-balancers

There are several classes of misbehaviour in certain DNS servers and
load-balancers which have been noticed and documented [14]: [16]: some
implementations silently drop queries for unimplemented DNS records
types, or provide wrong answers to such queries (instead of a proper
negative reply). While typically these issues are not limited to
AAAA records, the problems are aggravated by the fact that AAAA
records are being queried instead of (mainly) A records.

The problems are serious because when looking up a DNS name, typical
getaddrinfo() implementations, with AF_UNSPEC hint given, first try
to query the AAAA records of the name, and after receiving a
response, query the A records. This is done in a serial fashion -- if
the first query is never responded to (instead of properly returning

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a negative answer), significant timeouts will occur.

In consequence, this is an enormous problem for IPv6 deployments, and
in some cases, IPv6 support in the software has even been disabled
due to these problems.

The solution is to fix or retire those misbehaving implementations,
but that is likely not going to be effective. There are some
possible ways to mitigate the problem, e.g. by performing the lookups
somewhat in parallel and reducing the timeout as long as at least one
answer has been received; but such methods remain to be investigated;
slightly more on this is included in Section 5.

3.2 Misbehaviour of DNS Resolvers

Several classes of misbehaviour have also been noticed in DNS
resolvers [15]. [17]. However, these do not seem to directly impair IPv6
use, and are only referred to for completeness.

4. Recommendations for Service Provisioning using DNS

When names are added in the DNS to facilitate a service, there are
several general guidelines to consider to be able to do it as
smoothly as possible.

4.1 Use of Service Names instead of Node Names

When a node includes multiple services, one should keep them
logically separate in the DNS. This can be done by the use of
service names instead of node names (or, "hostnames"). This

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operational technique is not specific to IPv6, but required to
understand the considerations described in Section 4.2 and Section
4.3.

For example, assume a node named "pobox.example.com" provides both
SMTP and IMAP service. Instead of configuring the MX records to
point at "pobox.example.com", and configuring the mail clients to
look up the mail via IMAP from "pobox.example.com", one should use
e.g. "smtp.example.com" for SMTP (for both message submission and
mail relaying between SMTP servers) and "imap.example.com" for IMAP.
Note that in the specific case of SMTP relaying, the server itself
must typically also be configured to know all its names to ensure
loops do not occur. DNS can provide a layer of indirection between
service names and where the service actually is, and using which
addresses.

This is a good practice with IPv4 as well, because it provides more
flexibility and enables easier migration of services from one host to
another. A specific reason why this is relevant for IPv6 is that the
different services may have a different level of IPv6 support -- that
is, one node providing multiple services might want to enable just

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one service to be IPv6-visible while keeping some others as
IPv4-only. Using service names enables more flexibility with
different IP versions as well.

4.2 Separate vs the Same Service Names for IPv4 and IPv6

The service naming can be achieved in basically two ways: when a
service is named "service.example.com" for IPv4, the IPv6-enabled
service could be either added to "service.example.com", or added
separately to a sub-domain, like, "service.ipv6.example.com".

Both methods have different characteristics. Using a sub-domain
allows for easier service piloting, minimizing the disturbance to the
"regular" users of IPv4 service; however, the service would not be
used without explicitly asking for it (or, within a restricted
network, modifying the DNS search path) -- so it will not actually be
used that much. Using the same service name is the "long-term"
solution, but may degrade performance for those clients whose IPv6
performance is lower than IPv4, or does not work as well (see the
next subsection for more).

In most cases, it makes sense to pilot or test a service using
separate service names, and move to the use of the same name when
confident enough that the service level will not degrade for the
users unaware of IPv6.

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4.3 Adding the Records Only when Fully IPv6-enabled

The recommendation is that AAAA records for a service should not be
added to the DNS until all of following are true:

1. The address is assigned to the interface on the node.

2. The address is configured on the interface.

3. The interface is on a link which is connected to the IPv6
infrastructure.

In addition, if the AAAA record is added for the node, instead of
service as recommended, all the services of the node should be
IPv6-enabled prior to adding the resource record.

For example, if an IPv6 node is isolated from an IPv6 perspective
(e.g., it is not connected to IPv6 Internet) constraint #3 would mean
that it should not have an address in the DNS.

Consider the case of two dual-stack nodes, which both have IPv6
enabled, but the server does not have (global) IPv6 connectivity. As

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the client looks up the server's name, only A records are returned
(if the recommendations above are followed), and no IPv6
communication, which would have been unsuccessful, is even attempted.

The issues are not always so black-and-white. Usually it's important
if the service offered using both protocols is of roughly equal
quality, using the appropriate metrics for the service (e.g.,
latency, throughput, low packet loss, general reliability, etc.) --
this is typically very important especially for interactive or
real-time services. In many cases, the quality of IPv6 connectivity
is not yet equal to that of IPv4, at least globally -- this has to be
taken into consideration when enabling services [16]. [18].

4.4 The Use of TTL for IPv4 and IPv6 RRs

The behaviour of DNS caching when different TTL values are used for
different records of the same name requires explicit discussion. For
example, let's consider a part of a zone:

example.com. 300 IN MX foo.example.com.
foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
foo.example.com. 100 IN AAAA 2001:db8::1

Now, when a caching resolver asks for the MX record of example.com,
it gets both A and AAAA records of foo.example.com. Then, after 100
seconds, the AAAA record is removed from the cache because its TTL
expired. Now, subsequent queries only result in the cache returning
the A record; after 200 seconds the A record is purged as well. So,
in this particular case, there is a window of 200 seconds when
incomplete information is returned from the cache.

Therefore, when the same name refers to both A and AAAA records,
these records should have the same TTL. Otherwise, the caches may
return incomplete information about the queried names. More issues
with caching and A/AAAA records is presented in the next section.

4.5 Behaviour of Glue Additional Data in Mixed IPv4/IPv6 Environments

In the previous section, we discussed the effect of impartial data
returned from the caches when the TTLs are not kept the same. Now,
we present another problem highlighted in the mixed IPv4/IPv6
environments.

Consider the thes case where the query name is so long or long, the number of the
additional ("glue") records (originated from "glue") is so high high, or for other
reasons that the response must either be truncated (leading to a
retry with TCP) or some of the additional data removed from the
reply. Further, resource record sets are However, note that if too much additional information that is
not strictly necessary would be added, one should remove unnecessary
information instead of setting TC bit for this "courtesy" information
[19]. Further, resource record sets are never "broken up", so if a
name has 4 A records and 5 AAAA records, you can either return all 9,
all 4 A records, all 5 AAAA records or nothing.

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either return all 9, all 4 A records, all 5 AAAA records or nothing.

In the case of too much additional data, it might be tempting to not
return the AAAA records if the transport for DNS query was IPv4, or
not return the A records, if the transport was IPv6. However, this
breaks the model of independence of DNS transport and resource
records, as noted in Section 1.2.

This temptation would have significant problems in multiple areas.
Remember that often the end-node, which will be using the records, is
not the same one as the node requesting them from the authorative authoritative
DNS server (or even a caching resolver). So, whichever version the
requestor ("the middleman") uses makes no difference to the ultimate
user of the records. This might result in e.g., inappropriately
returning A records to an IPv6-only node, going through a
translation, or opening up another IP-level session (e.g., a PDP
context [31]). [20]).

The problem of too much additional data seems to be an operational
one: the zone administrator entering too many records which will be
returned either truncated or impartial to the users. A protocol fix
for this is using EDNS0 [32] [40] to signal the capacity for larger UDP
packet sizes, pushing up the relevant threshold. The operational fix
for this is having the DNS server implementations return a warning
when the administrators create the zones which would result in too
much additional data being returned.

4.6 IPv6 Transport Guidelines

4.5 The Use of TTL for DNS Servers

As described in Section 1.3 and [3], there should continue to be at
least one authorative IPv4 DNS server for every zone, even if the
zone has only and IPv6 records. (Note that obviously, having more servers
with robust connectivity would be preferable, but this is RRs

In the minimum
recommendation; also see [17].)

5. Recommendations for DNS Resolver IPv6 Support

When IPv6 is enabled on previous section, we discussed a node, there are several things danger with queries,
potentially leading to consider omitting records information from the
additional section. This section describes another problem leading
to ensure that omitting records in cached data, highlighted in the process is as smooth as possible.

5.1 DNS Lookups May Query IPv6 Records Prematurely IPv4/IPv6
environment.

The system library that implements the getaddrinfo() function behaviour of DNS caching when different TTL values are used for
looking up names is
different records of the same name requires explicit discussion. For
example, let's consider a critical piece when considering part of a zone:

example.com. 300 IN MX foo.example.com.
foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.1
foo.example.com. 100 IN AAAA 2001:db8::1

When a caching resolver asks for the robustness MX record of enabling IPv6; example.com, it
gets back "foo.example.com". It may come in basically three flavours:

1. The system library does not know whether IPv6 has been enabled also get back either one or both
of the A and AAAA records in the kernel of additional section. So, there are
three cases about returning records for the operating system: it may start looking up MX in the additional
section:

1. We get back no A or AAAA records: this is the simplest case,

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records with getaddrinfo() and AF_UNSPEC hint when the system is
upgraded

because then we have to a system library version query which supports IPv6. information is required
explicitly, guaranteeing that we get all the information we're
interested in.

2. The system library might start We get back all the records: this is an optimization as there is
no need to perform IPv6 queries with
getaddrinfo() only when IPv6 has been enabled in the kernel. more queries, causing lower latency. However, this does not
it is impossible to guarantee that there exists any useful
IPv6 connectivity (e.g., the node could be isolated from in fact we would always get
back all the
other IPv6 networks, records (the only having link-local addresses).

3. The system library might implement a toggle which would apply
some heuristics way to ensure that is to send a
AAAA query for the "IPv6-readiness" of name after getting the node before
starting cached reply); however,
one could try to perform queries; for example, work in the direction to try to ensure it could check whether as far
as possible.

3. We only link-local IPv6 address(es) exists, get back A or if at least one
global IPv6 address exists.

First, let us consider generic implications of unnecessary queries
for AAAA records: when looking up all the records even if both existed: this is
indistinguishable from the previous case, and problematic as
described in the DNS, next section.

So, we assume we get back both A and AAAA records are typically tried first, and then A records. These are
done of foo.example.com,
or the resolver explicitly asks, in serial, two separate queries, both A and
AAAA records. After 100 seconds, the A query is not performed until a response AAAA record is
received removed from the
cache because its TTL expired. It would be useful for the cache to
re-query the AAAA query. Considering record or discard the misbehaviour of DNS
servers and load-balancers, as described in Section 3.1, A record when the look-up
delay shorter TTL
(in this case, for the AAAA may incur additional unnecessary latency, and
introduce record) expires; this would avoid the
situation where there would be a component window of unreliability.

One option here could be 200 seconds when
incomplete information is returned from the cache. However, this is
not mandated or mentioned by the specification(s).

To simplify the situation, it is recommended to do use the queries partially in parallel; same TTL for
example, if
all the final response records referring to the AAAA query same name. However, there are some
scenarios (e.g., when renumbering IPv6 but keeping IPv4 intact) where
a different strategy is not received in
0.5 seconds, start performing the A query while waiting preferable.

4.6 IPv6 Transport Guidelines for the
result (immediate parallelism might DNS Servers

As described in Section 1.3 and [3], there should continue to be unoptimal without information
sharing between at
least one authoritative IPv4 DNS server for every zone, even if the look-up threads, as
zone has only IPv6 records. (Note that obviously, having more servers
with robust connectivity would probably lead to
duplicate non-cached delegation chain lookups).

An additional concern be preferable, but this is the address selection, which may, in some
circumstances, prefer AAAA records over A records, even when the node
does not have any minimum
recommendation; also see [21].)

5. Recommendations for DNS Resolver IPv6 connectivity [18]. In some cases, the
implementation may attempt to connect or send a datagram Support

When IPv6 is enabled on a
physical link [19], incurring very long protocol timeouts, instead of
quickly failing back node, there are several things to IPv4.

Now, we can consider the issues specific to each of the three
possibilities:

In the first case, the node performs a number of completely useless
DNS lookups as it will not be able
to use ensure that the returned AAAA records
anyway. (The only exception process is where the application desires to know
what's in the DNS, but not use the result for communication.) One
should be able to disable these unnecessary queries, for both latency
and reliability reasons. However, as smooth as possible.

5.1 DNS Lookups May Query IPv6 has not been enabled, Records Prematurely

The system library that implements the
connections to IPv6 addresses fail immediately, and if getaddrinfo() function for
looking up names is a critical piece when considering the robustness

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application is programmed properly, the application can fall
gracefully back to IPv4 [20].

The second case is similar to the first, except it happens to a
smaller set

of nodes when enabling IPv6; it may come in basically three flavours:

1. The system library does not know whether IPv6 has been enabled but connectivity has
not been provided yet; similar considerations apply, with in
the
exception that IPv6 records, when returned, will be actually tried
first which kernel of the operating system: it may typically lead to long timeouts.

The third case is a bit more complex: optimizing away the DNS lookups
with only link-locals is probably safe (but may be desirable start looking up AAAA
records with
different lookup services which getaddrinfo() may support), as the
link-locals are typically automatically generated and AF_UNSPEC hint when IPv6 the system is
enabled, and do not indicate any form of
upgraded to a system library version which supports IPv6.

2. The system library might start to perform IPv6 connectivity. That
is, performing DNS lookups queries with
getaddrinfo() only when a non-link-local address IPv6 has been configured on any interface could be beneficial -- enabled in the kernel.
However, this would be
an indication does not guarantee that either there exists any useful
IPv6 connectivity (e.g., the address has been configured either node could be isolated from the
other IPv6 networks, only having link-local addresses).

3. The system library might implement a router advertisement, DHCPv6, or manually. Each toggle which would indicate at
least apply
some form heuristics to the "IPv6-readiness" of the node before
starting to perform queries; for example, it could check whether
only link-local IPv6 connectivity, even though there would not be
guarantees address(es) exists, or if at least one
global IPv6 address exists.

First, let us consider generic implications of it. unnecessary queries
for AAAA records: when looking up all the records in the DNS, AAAA
records are typically tried first, and then A records. These issues should be analyzed at more depth, are
done in serial, and the fixes found
consensus on, perhaps in a separate document.

5.2 Recursive DNS Resolver Discovery

Recursive IPv6 DNS resolver discovery A query is not performed until a subject of active debate
at the moment: the main proposed mechanisms include the use of
well-known addresses [21], the use of Router Advertisements response is
received to convey the information [22], and using DHCPv6 (or AAAA query. Considering the stateless subset misbehaviour of it
[23]) for DNS resolver configuration. No consensus has been reached
yet.

Note that IPv6 DNS resolver discovery, while an important topic, is
not required for dual-stack nodes in dual-stack networks: IPv6 DNS
records can very well be queried over IPv4
servers and load-balancers, as well.

5.3 IPv6 Transport Guidelines for Resolvers

As described in Section 1.3 and [3], 3.1, the recursive resolvers should
be IPv4-only or dual-stack to be able to reach any IPv4-only DNS
server. Note that this requirement is also fulfilled by an IPv6-only
stub resolver pointing to look-up
delay for AAAA may incur additional unnecessary latency, and
introduce a dual-stack recursive DNS resolver.

6. Considerations about Forward DNS Updating

While the topic how component of unreliability.

One option here could be to enable updating do the forward DNS, i.e., queries partially in parallel; for
example, if the
mapping from names final response to the correct new addresses, AAAA query is not specific to

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IPv6, it bears thinking about especially due to adding Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration [24] to the mix.

Typically forward DNS updates are more manageable than doing them received in
0.5 seconds, start performing the reverse DNS, because A query while waiting for the updater can, typically,
result (immediate parallelism might be assumed unoptimal without information
sharing between the look-up threads, as that would probably lead to
"own" a certain DNS name -- and we
duplicate non-cached delegation chain lookups).

An additional concern is the address selection, which may, in some
circumstances, prefer AAAA records over A records, even when the node
does not have any IPv6 connectivity [22]. In some cases, the
implementation may attempt to connect or send a datagram on a
physical link [23], incurring very long protocol timeouts, instead of
quickly failing back to IPv4.

Now, we can consider the issues specific to each of the three
possibilities:

In the first case, the node performs a number of completely useless
DNS lookups as it will not be able to use the returned AAAA records
anyway. (The only exception is where the application desires to know

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what's in the DNS, but not use the result for communication.) One
should be able to disable these unnecessary queries, for both latency
and reliability reasons. However, as IPv6 has not been enabled, the
connections to IPv6 addresses fail immediately, and if the
application is programmed properly, the application can fall
gracefully back to IPv4 [24].

The second case is similar to the first, except it happens to a
smaller set of nodes when IPv6 has been enabled but connectivity has
not been provided yet; similar considerations apply, with the
exception that IPv6 records, when returned, will be actually tried
first which may typically lead to long timeouts.

The third case is a bit more complex: optimizing away the DNS lookups
with only link-locals is probably safe (but may be desirable with
different lookup services which getaddrinfo() may support), as the
link-locals are typically automatically generated when IPv6 is
enabled, and do not indicate any form of IPv6 connectivity. That
is, performing DNS lookups only when a non-link-local address has
been configured on any interface could be beneficial -- this would be
an indication that either the address has been configured either from
a router advertisement, DHCPv6 [25], or manually. Each would
indicate at least some form of IPv6 connectivity, even though there
would not be guarantees of it.

These issues should be analyzed at more depth, and the fixes found
consensus on, perhaps in a separate document.

5.2 Obtaining a List of DNS Recursive Resolvers

In scenarios where DHCPv6 is available, a host can discover a list of
DNS recursive resolvers through DHCPv6 "DNS Recursive Name Server"
option [29]. This option can be passed to a host through a subset of
DHCPv6 [28].

The IETF is considering the development of alternative mechanisms for
obtaining the list of DNS recursive name servers when DHCPv6 is
unavailable or inappropriate. No decision about taking on this
development work has been reached as of this writing (April 2004).

In scenarios where DHCPv6 is unavailable or inappropriate, mechanisms
under consideration for development of dnsop WG include the use of
well-known addresses [26], the use of Router Advertisements to convey
the information [27].

Note that even though IPv6 DNS resolver discovery is a recommended
procedure, it is not required for dual-stack nodes in dual-stack
networks as IPv6 DNS records can be queried over IPv4 as well as

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IPv6.

5.3 IPv6 Transport Guidelines for Resolvers

As described in Section 1.3 and [3], the recursive resolvers should
be IPv4-only or dual-stack to be able to reach any IPv4-only DNS
server. Note that this requirement is also fulfilled by an IPv6-only
stub resolver pointing to a dual-stack recursive DNS resolver.

6. Considerations about Forward DNS Updating

While the topic how to enable updating the forward DNS, i.e., the
mapping from names to the correct new addresses, is not specific to
IPv6, it bears thinking about especially due to adding Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration [30] to the mix.

Typically forward DNS updates are more manageable than doing them in
the reverse DNS, because the updater can, typically, be assumed to
"own" a certain DNS name -- and we can create a form of security
relationship with the DNS name and the node allowed to update it to
point to a new address.

A more complex form of DNS updates -- adding a whole new name into a
DNS zone, instead of updating an existing name -- is considered out
of scope for this memo. Adding a new name in the forward zone is a
problem which is still being explored with IPv4, and IPv6 does not
seem to add much new in that area.

6.1 Manual or Custom DNS Updates

The DNS mappings can be maintained by hand, in a semi-automatic
fashion or by running non-standardized protocols. These are not
considered at more length in this memo.

6.2 Dynamic DNS

Dynamic DNS updates (DDNS) [31][32] is a standardized mechanism for
dynamically updating the DNS. It works equally well with stateless
address autoconfiguration (SLAAC), DHCPv6 or manual address
configuration. The only (minor) twist is that with SLAAC, the DNS
server cannot tie the authentication of the user to the IP address,
and stronger mechanisms must be used [32]. As relying on IP
addresses for Dynamic DNS is rather insecure at best, stronger
authentication should always be used; however, this requires that the
authorization keying will be explicitly configured using unspecified
operational methods.

Note that with DHCP it is also possible that the DHCP server updates

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the DNS, not the host. The host might only indicate in the DHCP
exchange which hostname it would prefer, and the DHCP server would
make the appropriate updates. Nonetheless, while this makes setting
up a secure channel between the updater and the DNS server easier, it
does not help much with "content" security, i.e., whether the
hostname was acceptable -- if the DNS server does not include
policies, they must be included in the DHCP server (e.g., a regular
host should not be able to state that its name is "www.example.com").
DHCP-initiated DDNS updates have been extensively described in [33],
[34] and [35].

The nodes must somehow be configured with the information about the
servers where they will attempt to update their addresses, sufficient
security material for authenticating themselves to the server, and
the hostname they will be updating. Unless otherwise configured, the
first could be obtained by looking up the authoritative name servers
for the hostname; the second must be configured explicitly unless one
chooses to trust the IP address-based authentication (not a good
idea); and lastly, the nodename is typically pre-configured somehow
on the node, e.g. at install time.

Care should be observed when updating the addresses not to use longer
TTLs for addresses than are preferred lifetimes for the
autoconfigured addresses, so that if the node is renumbered in a
managed fashion, the amount of stale DNS information is kept to the
minimum. That is, if the preferred lifetime of an address expires,
the TTL of the record needs be modified unless it was already done
before the expiration. For better flexibility, the DNS TTL should be
much shorter (e.g., a half or a third) than the lifetime of an
address; that way, the node can create start lowering the DNS TTL if it
seems like the address has not been renewed/refreshed in a while.
Some discussion on how an administrator could manage the DNS TTL is
included in [37]; this could be applied to (smart) hosts as well.

7. Considerations about Reverse DNS Updating

Updating the reverse DNS zone may be difficult because of the split
authority over an address. However, first we have to consider the
applicability of reverse DNS in the first place.

7.1 Applicability of Reverse DNS

Today, some applications use reverse DNS to either look up some hints
about the topological information associated with an address (e.g.
resolving web server access logs), or as a weak form of a security
association
check, to get a feel whether the user's network administrator has
"authorized" the use of the address (on the premises that adding a
reverse record for an address would signal some form of

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authorization).

One additional, maybe slightly more useful usage is ensuring the
reverse and forward DNS contents match and correspond to a configured
name or domain. As a security check, it is typically accompanied by
other mechanisms, such as a user/password login; the main purpose of
the DNS check is to weed out the majority of unauthorized users, and
if someone managed to bypass the node allowed checks, he would still need to update
authenticate "properly".

It is not clear whether it makes sense to
point require or recommend that
reverse DNS records be updated. In many cases, it would just make
more sense to use proper mechanisms for security (or topological
information lookup) in the first place. At minimum, the applications
which use it as a new address.

A more complex form of DNS updates -- adding generic authorization (in the sense that a whole new name record
exists at all) should be modified as soon as possible to a
DNS zone, instead of updating an existing name -- is considered
out-of-scope: this avoid such
lookups completely.

The applicability is not an IPv6-specific problem, and one still
being explored.

6.1 discussed at more length in [38].

7.2 Manual or Custom DNS Updates

The

Reverse DNS mappings can of course be maintained by hand, in a semi-automatic
fashion updated using manual or by running non-standardized protocols. custom methods.
These are not
considered at more length in this memo.

6.2 Dynamic DNS

Dynamic DNS updates (DDNS) [25][26] is a standardized mechanism further described here, except for
dynamically updating the DNS. It works equally well with stateless
address autoconfiguration (SLAAC), DHCPv6 one special case.

One way to deploy reverse DNS would be to use wildcard records, for
example, by configuring one name for a subnet (/64) or manual address
configuration. The only (minor) twist is that with SLAAC, a site (/48).
As a concrete example, a site (or the DNS
server cannot tie site's ISP) could configure the authentication
reverses of the user prefix 2001:db8:f00::/48 to the IP address,
and stronger mechanisms must point to one name using a
wildcard record like "*.0.0.f.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. IN PTR
site.example.com." Naturally, such a name could not be used. Actually, relying on IP
addresses for Dynamic DNS is rather insecure verified from
the forward DNS, but would at best, so this is
probably not a significant problem (but requires least provide some form of "topological
information" or "weak authorization" if that the
authorization keying will is really considered to
be explicitly configured). useful. Note that with DHCP, it this is also possible that the DHCP server updates
the DNS, not actually updating the host. The host might only indicate in the DHCP
exchange which hostname it would prefer, and the DHCP server would
make DNS as such,
as the appropriate updates. Nonetheless, while this makes setting
up whole point is to avoid DNS updates completely by manually
configuring a secure channel between the updater and the generic name.

7.3 DDNS with Stateless Address Autoconfiguration

Dynamic DNS server easier, it
does not help much with "content" security, i.e., whether the
hostname was acceptable -- if the SLAAC simpler than forward DNS server does not include
policies, they must be included updates in the DHCP server (e.g., a regular
host should not be able to state that its name is "www.example.com"). some
regard, while being more difficult in another.

The nodes must somehow be configured with the information about address space administrator decides whether the
servers where they will attempt hosts are trusted
to update their addresses, reverse DNS records or not. If they are, a simple
address-based authorization is typically sufficient
security material for authenticating themselves to (i.e., check that
the server, and DNS update is done from the hostname they will be updating. Unless otherwise configured, same IP address as the
first could record being
updated); stronger security can also be obtained by looking up the authorative name servers
for the hostname; used [32]. If they aren't
allowed to update the second must be configured explicitly unless one reverses, no update can occur.

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chooses to trust the IP address -based authentication (not a good
idea); and lastly, the nodename

Address-based authorization is typically pre-configured somehow
on the node, e.g. at install time.

Care should be observed when updating the addresses not to use longer
TTLs for addresses than are preferred lifetimes for the
autoconfigured addresses, so that if the node simpler with reverse DNS (as there is renumbered in
a
managed fashion, connection between the amount record and the address) than with forward
DNS. However, when stronger form of stale DNS information security is kept to the
minimum. Actually, the used, forward DNS TTL should be much shorter (e.g., a half
or a third) than
updates are simpler to manage because the lifetime of an address; that way, host knows the node record it's
updating, and can
start lowering the DNS TTL if it seems like the address has not be
renewed/refreshed in a while. Some discussion on how assumed to manage the
DNS TTL is included in [28].

7. Considerations about Reverse DNS Updating

Forward DNS updating is rather straightforward; reverse DNS is
significantly trickier especially have an association with certain mechanisms. However,
first it makes sense the domain.
Note that the user may roam to look at different networks, and does not
necessarily have any association with the applicability owner of that address space
-- so, assuming stronger form of authorization for reverse DNS in
updates than an address association is generally unfeasible.

Moreover, the first place.

7.1 Applicability of Reverse DNS

Today, some applications use reverse DNS to either look zones must be cleaned up some hints
about the topological information associated with by an address (e.g.
resolving web server access logs), or as unspecified
janitorial process: the node does not typically know a weak form of priori that it
will be disconnected, and cannot send a security
check, DNS update using the correct
source address to get remove a feel whether record.

A problem with defining the user's network administrator has
"authorized" clean-up process is that it is difficult
to ensure that a specific IP address and the use of corresponding record are
no longer being used. Considering the huge address (on space, and the premises that adding
unlikelihood of collision within 64 bits of the interface
identifiers, a
reverse record for an address process which would signal some form remove the record after no traffic
has been seen from a node in a long period of
authorization). time (e.g., a month or
year) might be one possible approach.

To insert or update the record, the node must discover the DNS server
to send the update to somehow, similar to as discussed in Section
6.2. One additional, maybe slightly more useful usage way to automate this is ensuring looking up the
reverse and forward DNS contents match and correspond to a configured
name or domain. As a server
authoritative (e.g., through SOA record) for the IP address being
updated, but the security check, it material (unless the IP address-based
authorization is typically accompanied trusted) must also be established by some other mechanisms, such as a user/password login; the main purpose of
means.

7.4 DDNS with DHCP

With DHCPv4, the reverse DNS check name is typically already inserted to weed out
the majority of unauthorized users, and
if someone managed DNS that reflects to bypass the checks, he name (e.g., "dhcp-67.example.com"). One
can assume similar practice may become commonplace with DHCPv6 as
well; all such mappings would still need to
authenticate "properly".

It is not clear whether it makes sense to require or recommend that
reverse DNS records be updated. In many cases, it pre-configured, and would just make
more sense to use proper mechanisms for security (or topological
information lookup) in the first place. At minimum, the applications
which use it as a generic authorization (in the sense that require no
updating.

If a record
exists at all) should be modified as soon as possible to avoid such
lookups completely.

The applicability is discussed at more length in [29].

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with IPv6 DNS Jan 2004

7.2 Manual or Custom DNS Updates

Reverse DNS can of course be updated using manual or custom methods.
These are not further described here, SLAAC apply, except for the fact that typically one special case.

One way to deploy must update
a reverse DNS would be to use wildcard records, for
example, by configuring one name for a subnet (/64) or a site (/48).
Naturally, such a name could not be verified from the forward DNS,
but would at least provide some form of "topological information" or
"weak authorization" if record instead of inserting one (if an address
assignment policy that reassigns disused addresses is really considered adopted) and
updating a record seems like a slightly more difficult thing to
secure. However, it is yet uncertain how DHCPv6 is going to be useful. used
for address assignment.

Note that this is not actually updating when using DHCP, either the DNS as such, as host or the whole
point is to avoid DNS updates completely by manually configuring a
generic name.

7.3 DDNS DHCP server could

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Dynamic IPv6 DNS with SLAAC is a bit complicated, but manageable with a
rather low form of security with some implementation.

Every node on a link must then be allowed Apr 2004

perform the DNS updates; see the implications in Section 6.2.

If disused addresses were to insert its own be reassigned, host-based DDNS reverse
updates would need policy considerations for DNS record in modification,
as noted above. On the other hand, if disused address were not to be
assigned, host-based DNS reverse zone. However, updates would have similar
considerations as SLAAC in Section 7.3. Server-based updates have
similar properties except that the typical case, there
can janitorial process could be no stronger form
integrated with DHCP address assignment.

7.5 DDNS with Dynamic Prefix Delegation

In cases where a prefix, instead of authentication between the nodes an address, is being used and
updated, one should consider what is the
server than location of the source IP address (the user may roam to other
administrative domains as well, requiring server where
DDNS updates to foreign DNS
servers), which might make attacks more lucrative.

Moreover, the reverse zones must be cleaned up by some janitorial
process: the node does not typically know a priori that it will be
disconnected, and cannot send a are made. That is, where the DNS update using server is located:

1. At the correct source
address to remove a record.

To insert or update same organization as the record, prefix delegator.

2. At the node must discover site where the prefixes are delegated to. In this case,
the authority of the DNS server reverse zone corresponding to send the update to somehow, similar to as discussed in Section
6.2. One way
delegated prefix is also delegated to automate the site.

3. Elsewhere; this is looking up implies a relationship between the site and where
DNS server
authoritative for is located, and such a relationship should be rather
straightforward to secure as well. Like in the IP address being updated, but previous case, the security
material (unless
authority of the IP address -based authorization DNS reverse zone is trusted) must also be established by some other means.

7.4 DDNS with DHCP

With DHCP, delegated.

In the first case, managing the reverse DNS name (delegation) is typically already inserted to simpler
as the DNS that reflects to server and the name (e.g., "dhcp-67.example.com"). This prefix delegator are in the same
administrative domain (as there is
pre-configured, and requires no updating.

If a more explicit control is required, similar considerations as
with SLAAC apply, except for need to delegate anything at
all); alternatively, the fact that typically one must update
a prefix delegator might forgo DDNS reverse DNS record instead of inserting one -- due to a denser
address assignment policy -- and updating a record seems like a

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Internet-Draft Considerations
capability altogether, and Issues with IPv6 DNS Jan 2004

slightly use e.g., wildcard records (as described
in Section 7.2). In the other cases, it can be slighly more difficult thing to secure.

Note that when using DHCP, either
difficult, particularly as the host or site will have to configure the DHCP DNS
server could
perform to be authoritative for the delegated reverse zone, implying
automatic configuration of the DNS updates; see server -- as the prefix may be
dynamic.

Managing the implications in Section 6.2.

7.5 DDNS with Dynamic Prefix Delegation

In cases where more than one address reverse updates is being used and updated, one
should consider where typically simple in the second
case, as the updated server resides. That is, whether
the prefixes have been delegated to a node in is located at the local site, or
whether they reside elsewhere, e.g., at the ISP. The reverse DNS
updates are typically easier to manage if they can be done within a
single administrative entity -- and therefore,
arguably IP address-based authentication could be sufficient (or if a reverse DNS
delegation has been made, it may
not, setting up security relationships would be easier simpler). As there
is an explicit (security) relationship between the parties in the
third case, setting up the security relationships to enable allow reverse DNS at
DDNS updates should be rather straightforward as well. In the site, e.g. by first
case, however, setting up and managing such relationships might be a wildcard record, or by some
lot more difficult.

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8. Miscellaneous DNS Considerations

This section describes miscellaneous considerations about DNS which
seem related to IPv6, for which no better place has been found in
this document.

8.1 NAT-PT with DNS-ALG

NAT-PT [27] [36] DNS-ALG is a critical component (unless something
replacing that functionality is specified) which mangles A records to
look like AAAA records to the IPv6-only nodes. Numerous problems have
been identified with DNS-ALG [30]. [39].

8.2 Renumbering Procedures and Applications' Use of DNS

One of the most difficult problems of systematic IP address
renumbering procedures [28] [37] is that an application which looks up a
DNS name disregards information such as TTL, and uses the result
obtained from DNS as long as it happens to be stored in the memory of
the application. For applications which run for a long time, this
could be days, weeks or even months; some applications may be clever
enough to organize the data structures and functions in such a manner
that look-ups get refreshed now and then.

While the issue appears to have a clear solution, "fix the
applications", practically this is not reasonable immediate advice;
the TTL information is not typically available in the APIs and
libraries (so, the advice becomes "fix the applications, APIs and
libraries"), and a lot more analysis is needed on how to practically
go about to achieve the ultimate goal of avoiding using the names
longer than expected.

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9. Acknowledgements

Some recommendations (Section 4.3, Section 5.1) about IPv6 service
provisioning were moved here from [33] [41] by Erik Nordmark and Bob
Gilligan. Havard Eidnes and Michael Patton provided useful feedback
and improvements. Scott Rose, Rob Austein, Masataka Ohta, and Mark
Andrews helped in clarifying the issues regarding additional data and
the use of TTL. Jefsey Morfin, Ralph Droms, Peter Koch, Jinmei
Tatuya, and Iljitsch van Beijnum provided useful feedback during the
WG last call.

10. Security Considerations

This document reviews the operational procedures for IPv6 DNS
operations and does not have security considerations in itself.

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However, it is worth noting that in particular with Dynamic DNS
Updates, security models based on the source address validation are
very weak and cannot be recommended. On the other hand, it should be
noted that setting up an authorization mechanism (e.g., a shared
secret, or public-private keys) between a node and the DNS server has
to be done manually, and may require quite a bit of time and
expertise.

To re-emphasize which was already stated, reverse DNS checks provide
very weak security at best, and the only (questionable)
security-related use for them may be in conjunction with other
mechanisms when authenticating a user.

11. References

11.1 Normative References

[1] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V. and M. Souissi, "DNS
Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003.

[2] Bush, R., Durand, A., Fink, B., Gudmundsson, O. and T. Hain,
"Representing Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) Addresses in
the Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 3363, August 2002.

[3] Durand, A. and J. Ihren, "DNS IPv6 transport operational
guidelines", draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-transport-guidelines-01 draft-ietf-dnsop-ipv6-transport-guidelines-02 (work
in progress), October 2003. March 2004.

11.2 Informative References

[4] Bush, R., "Delegation of IP6.ARPA", BCP 49, RFC 3152, August
2001.

[5] Austein, R., "Tradeoffs in Domain Name System (DNS) Support for
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3364, August 2002.

[6] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.

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[6]

[7] Internet Architecture Board, "IAB Technical Comment on the
Unique DNS Root", RFC 2826, May 2000.

[7]

[8] Huitema, C. and B. Carpenter, "Deprecating Site Local
Addresses", draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-02 draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-03 (work in
progress), November 2003.

[8] March 2004.

[9] Hazel, P., "IP Addresses that should never appear in the public
DNS", draft-ietf-dnsop-dontpublish-unreachable-03 (work in

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progress), February 2002.

[9]

[10] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

[10]

[11] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via
IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

[11]

[12] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through NATs",
draft-huitema-v6ops-teredo-00
draft-huitema-v6ops-teredo-01 (work in progress), June 2003.

[12] February
2004.

[13] Moore, K., "6to4 and DNS", draft-moore-6to4-dns-03 (work in
progress), October 2002.

[13]

[14] Bush, R. and J. Damas, "Delegation of 2.0.0.2.ip6.arpa",
draft-ymbk-6to4-arpa-delegation-00 (work in progress), February
2003.

[14]

[15] Huston, G., "6to4 Reverse DNS",
draft-huston-6to4-reverse-dns-02 (work in progress), April
2004.

[16] Morishita, Y. and T. Jinmei, "Common Misbehavior against DNS
Queries for IPv6 Addresses",
draft-morishita-dnsop-misbehavior-against-aaaa-00
draft-ietf-dnsop-misbehavior-against-aaaa-01 (work in
progress), June 2003.

[15] April 2004.

[17] Larson, M. and P. Barber, "Observed DNS Resolution
Misbehavior", draft-ietf-dnsop-bad-dns-res-01 (work in
progress), June 2003.

[16]

[18] Savola, P., "Moving from 6bone to IPv6 Internet",
draft-savola-v6ops-6bone-mess-01 (work in progress), November
2002.

[17]

[19] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS Specification",
RFC 2181, July 1997.

[20] Wiljakka, J., "Analysis on IPv6 Transition in 3GPP Networks",
draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-analysis-09 (work in progress), March
2004.

[21] Elz, R., Bush, R., Bradner, S. and M. Patton, "Selection and
Operation of Secondary DNS Servers", BCP 16, RFC 2182, July
1997.

[18]

[22] Roy, S., "Dual Stack IPv6 on by Default",
draft-ietf-v6ops-v6onbydefault-00 (work in progress), October
2003.

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Jan Apr 2004

[19]

draft-ietf-v6ops-v6onbydefault-01 (work in progress), February
2004.

[23] Roy, S., "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery On-Link Assumption Considered
Harmful", draft-ietf-v6ops-onlinkassumption-00 draft-ietf-v6ops-onlinkassumption-01 (work in
progress), October 2003.

[20] March 2004.

[24] Shin, M., "Application Aspects of IPv6 Transition",
draft-ietf-v6ops-application-transition-00
draft-ietf-v6ops-application-transition-02 (work in progress),
December
March 2004.

[25] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and M.
Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
(DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

[21]

[26] Ohta, M., "Preconfigured DNS Server Addresses",
draft-ohta-preconfigured-dns-00
draft-ohta-preconfigured-dns-01 (work in progress), July 2003.

[22] February
2004.

[27] Jeong, J., "IPv6 DNS Discovery based on Router Advertisement",
draft-jeong-dnsop-ipv6-dns-discovery-00
draft-jeong-dnsop-ipv6-dns-discovery-01 (work in progress),
July 2003.

[23]
February 2004.

[28] Droms, R., "Stateless DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP) Service for IPv6",
draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-stateless-04 (work in progress), January RFC 3736, April 2004.

[24]

[29] Droms, R., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646, December
2003.

[30] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.

[25]

[31] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136,
April 1997.

[26]

[32] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

[27]

[33] Stapp, M., "Resolution of DNS Name Conflicts Among DHCP
Clients", draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-06 (work in progress),
October 2003.

[34] Stapp, M. and Y. Rekhter, "The DHCP Client FQDN Option",
draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-06 (work in progress), October 2003.

[35] Stapp, M., Lemon, T. and A. Gustafsson, "A DNS RR for encoding

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Apr 2004

DHCP information (DHCID RR)", draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-07
(work in progress), October 2003.

[36] Tsirtsis, G. and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address Translation -
Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766, February 2000.

[28]

[37] Baker, F., Lear, E. and R. Droms, "Procedures for Renumbering
an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day",
draft-baker-ipv6-renumber-procedure-01 (work in progress),
October 2003.

[29]

[38] Senie, D., "Requiring DNS IN-ADDR Mapping",
draft-ietf-dnsop-inaddr-required-03 (work in progress), March
2002.

[30]

[39] Durand, A., "Issues with NAT-PT DNS ALG in RFC2766",
draft-durand-v6ops-natpt-dns-alg-issues-00 (work in progress),
February 2003.

[31] Wiljakka, J., "Analysis on IPv6 Transition in 3GPP Networks",
draft-ietf-v6ops-3gpp-analysis-07 (work in progress), October
2003.

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Jan 2004

[32]

[40] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2671,
August 1999.

[33]

[41] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms for
IPv6 Hosts and Routers", draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-01 draft-ietf-v6ops-mech-v2-02 (work in
progress), October 2003. February 2004.

[42] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", draft-ietf-ipv6-unique-local-addr-03 (work in
progress), February 2004.

Authors' Addresses

Alain Durand
SUN Microsystems, Inc.
17 Network circle UMPL17-202
Menlo Park, CA 94025
USA

EMail: Alain.Durand@sun.com

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Apr 2004

Johan Ihren
Autonomica
Bellmansgatan 30
SE-118 47 Stockholm
Sweden

EMail: johani@autonomica.se

Pekka Savola
CSC/FUNET

Espoo
Finland

EMail: psavola@funet.fi

Appendix A. Site-local Addressing Considerations for DNS

As site-local addressing is being deprecated, and it is not yet clear
whether an addressing-based replacement (and which kind) is devised, the considerations for
site-local addressing are discussed briefly here. Unique local
addressing format [42] has been proposed as a replacement, but being
work-in-progress, it is not considered further.

The interactions with DNS come in two flavors: forward and reverse
DNS.

To actually use site-local addresses within a site, this implies the
deployment of a "split-faced" or a fragmented DNS name space, for the

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Jan 2004
zones internal to the site, and the outsiders' view to it. The
procedures to achieve this are not elaborated here. The implication
is that site-local addresses must not be published in the public DNS.

To faciliate reverse DNS (if desired) with site-local addresses, the
stub resolvers must look for DNS information from the local DNS
servers, not e.g. starting from the root servers, so that the
site-local information may be provided locally. Note that the
experience of private addresses in IPv4 has shown that the root
servers get loaded for requests for private address lookups in any. any
case.

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Internet-Draft Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS Jan 2004 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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