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Internet Engineering Task Force Nevil Brownlee
INTERNET-DRAFT The University of Auckland
Feb
April 1996
Expires in six months
Expectations for Security Incident Response
<draft-ietf-grip-framework-irt-01.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and
its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working
documents as Internet Drafts. This Internet Draft is a product of the
Internet Accounting Working Group of the IETF.
Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months.
Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as a 'working draft' or
'work in progress.'
Please check the I-D abstract listing contained in the Internet-drafts
Shadow Directories on nic.ddn.mil, nnsc.nsf.net, nic.nordu.net,
ftp.nisc.sri.com or munnari.oz.au to learn the current status of this or
any other Internet Draft.
Abstract
This document explains what is expected intended to facilitate the setting of Incident expectations
regarding the operation of Security Incicident Response Teams
(IRTs), provides guidelines for IRTs, and recommends (SIRTs).
It describes the various important topics in the form of a "template" 'template,'
through which every IRT SIRT should describe itself and its functions. It
was produced by
SIRT clients have a legitimate need and right to fully understand the GRIP Working Group
policies and procedures of their Security Incident Response Team. A
SIRT's template supplies details for the IETF. various important topics which
clients must consider when selecting a SIRT.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
1.1 User Expectations Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Publishing IRT SIRT Templates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Establishing Peering Between SIRTs . 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
2 Description Template: Security Incident Response Team 4 6
3 Purpose of the Template 5 8
3.1 Other Related Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb 1996 8
4 Definitions 7
5 The Security Incident Response Team Template 9
5.1
4.1 Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Template Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1 Date 10
4.2.1Date of last update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.2 Distribution 10
4.2.2Distribution list for Template Updates . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2 10
4.3 Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1 Mission 10
4.3.1Mission Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.2 Constituency
4.3.2Constituency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.3 Sponsoring organization 11
4.3.3Sponsoring organisation / affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.4 Authority 11
4.3.4Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3
4.4 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.1 Types 12
4.4.1Types of incidents and level of support . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.2 Co-operation 12
4.4.2Co-operation and interaction with other organizations . . . 11
5.3.3 Reporting 12
4.4.3Reporting and Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.4 Communication 13
4.4.4Communication and authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4 14
4.5 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5 14
4.6 Incident reporting Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6 15
4.7 Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15
5 Secondary Purposes of this Document 16
6 Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions 14 16
7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams 15 17
8 Appendix C: Sample Incident Reporting Form 17
9 Security Considerations 15
9 Author's 25
10 Editor's Address 16 25
1 Introduction
The GRIP Working Group was formed to provide produce guidelines and
recommendations to facilitate the consistent handling of security
incidents in the Internet community. Although it is focused on the
Internet, many of the concepts discussed will also be useful for other
forms of local- and wide-area networks and internets.
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Many computer security incidents either originate outside local
community boundaries and potential threats of them usually extend beyond
institutional affect other 'outside' sites, or originate
outside the local community boundaries. "Consistent handling"
implies that any group calling itself an and affect hosts or users within it. The
handling of security incidents will therefore often involve multiple
Security Incident Response Team (IRT)
must react Teams. Because of this characteristic it is
important for every community to have a good security incidents or policy, and to threats of them
have a Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) in place to manage
communications across community boundaries in a consistent way.
In the past there have been misunderstandings regarding expectations of
response teams. The goal of this document is to provide a framework in ways
which to set expectations. By defining such a framework the community
can express areas and topics that need to addressed by any SIRT.
'Consistent handling' implies that any group calling itself a SIRT must
react to security incidents or to threats of them in ways which the
general
Internet community agrees to be in its general interest. Every SIRT
needs to define clearly the services they offer and the level at which
they are offered to the client. Such definitions will be particularly
important in contracts and/or agreements which SIRTs make with their
clients.
The "Expectations for Security Incident Response" document is seen as
resting on the work of individual IRTs SIRTs and the cooperation between
them.
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This document therefore It recommends a "template" 'template' through which every IRT SIRT should
describe itself and its functions. It further recommends that templates
should be accessible among teams, to make possible a fully effective
cooperative response framework for incidents or threats across the
entire domain affected by them.
1.1 User Expectations Definitions
This document provides section defines terms used in describing security incidents and
response teams. For the purpose of the GRIP documents only a detailed discussion limited
list is really needed. This should help maintain focus on the purpose
of all aspects the documents, and prevent a duplication of incident
response. It is also intended to provide other definitions or -
even worse - a common understanding proliferation of what
is involved in, and implied by, each section competing definitions.
Constituency
------------
Implicit in the purpose of an IRT's template.
An incident response team exists primarily to support a Security Incident Response Team is the users in its
existence of a constituency. It This is vital that those users understand what they should
expect the group of their team. Provided that an IRT has published its template,
a constituent/customer should be able to read clients, sites,
networks or organizations served by the template and discover
what to expect, team.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 3]
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Security Incident
-----------------
For the purpose of information, and whether this document:
'A computer security incident is any event which compromises
some aspect of computer or network security.'
The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but at
least the response team will be contacting
downstream sites. Users should certainly expect following categories are generally applicable:
* loss of confidentiality,
* compromise of integrity,
* denial of service,
* misuse,
* damage.
These are very general categories. For instance the forging of an IRT to provide
electronic mail message and a successful password attack are two
examples of 'compromise of integrity.'
Within the
services they detail in their IRT.
An important aspect definition of an incident response the word 'compromised' is used.
Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident. During the 'follow through' - every
incident should be investigated and appropriate actions taken. Users
should be encouraged by their IRT to report incidents so they can be
acted upon. It
handling of a call it must be emphasised that without active participation
(especially reporting) from users the effectiveness established whether or not an incident
really occurred.
Security Incident Response Team
-------------------------------
Based on two of the services they
depend on can be greatly diminished. As definitions given above:
'A Security Incident Response Team is a minimum, users need group authorized to
manage response to know
that they should report security incidents, and know how and where they
should report them.
1.2 Publishing IRT Templates
If templates are incidents that involve sites within
its defined constituency.'
In order to be accessible between IRTs, considered a central repository
will be needed for them. The GRIP Working Group believe that some of
the existing Internet archive areas could be used for this purpose.
Digital signatures should be used to protect the completed templates
against modifications. The keeper of each template repository will be
responsibly for verifying the identity of each IRT lodging SIRT, a template in
the repository.
Each team should be responsible group must:
* provide a channel for ensuring that its own template is
available receiving reports about suspected incidents,
* provide assistance to at least members of its own constituency and to any other groups it
needs to interact with frequently. These groups will include any
'up-stream' sites and/or IRTs which the team needs to report to. in handling these
incidents,
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Whether or not an IRT lodges a copy of its template in a repository, it
should publish one on its own
* disseminate incident-related information server so that users in to its constituency can easily find it. Templates published as pages in and to
other related parties.
Vendor
------
A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
technology, and is responsible for the
World Wide Web should technical content of that
technology. Examples of 'technology' include hardware (desktop
computers, routers, switches, etc.), and software (operating systems,
mail forwarding systems, etc.).
Note that the phrase 'IRT Template' in their title;
this will allow Web search engines to find them easily.
Individual users who observe supplier of a security incident should ask their technology is not necessarily the 'vendor'
of that technology. As an example, an Internet Service Services Provider for details (ISP)
might supply routers to each of its customers, but the most suitable IRT to report
it to.
Appendix B (below) provides some pointers to IRTs 'vendor' is the
manufacturer, being the entity responsible for the technical content of
the router, rather than the ISP.
Vulnerability
-------------
A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology which were known when can
be exploited to perpetrate a security incident. For example, if a
program allowed ordinary userss to execute operating system commands in
privileged mode, this document "feature" would be a vulnerability.
1.2 Publishing SIRT Templates
Every SIRT should publish information about its policies and services in
the form of a completed template. The simplest way for a SIRT to make
its template widely available is to publish it on its own information
server so that clients in its constituency can easily find it.
Templates published as pages in the World Wide Web should include the
phrase 'SIRT Template' in their title - this will allow Web search
engines to find them easily.
Whether or not templates are published in a repository, clients - and
potential clients - of a SIRT will need to be able to authenticate a
template (verify that it was published.
2 Description Template: indeed published by the SIRT) and check
that it has not been modified (for example by verifying a digital
signature for it).
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To facilitate interaction between SIRTs, it would be useful to have a
central repository for them. The Template is summarized GRIP Working Group believe that some
of the existing Internet archive areas could be used for this purpose.
The keeper of each template repository will be responsibly for verifying
the identity of each SIRT lodging a template in the section immediately below, repository.
1.3 Establishing Peering Between SIRTs
When a SIRT (SIRT A) wishes to establish a working relationship with
another SIRT (SIRT B), a responsible person from SIRT A will need to
contact a similarly responsible person at SIRT B. The SIRT B person then
has the problem: "how do I know who I'm talking to?"
It is very easy to send forged e-mail, and not hard to establish a
(false) identity by telephone. PGP provides an effective way of
securing e-mail, but securing voice communications is much harder. At
present call-back is probably the only simple authentication method.
This may change as technologies such as scrambled telephones, or
PGP-phone on the Internet become available.
PGP relies on a 'web of trust,' built up by having known (and trusted)
people sign PGP keys. This model could also be used for SIRTs. To
achieve this each SIRT should publish a list of the SIRTs they have
peering arrangements (i.e. working relationships) with, including PGP
public keys for them.
Note that there is a difference between a peering agreement, where the
SIRTs involved agree to work together and share information, and simple
co-operation, where SIRT B (or any other client) simply contacts SIRT A
and asks for help or advice. Note also that any client wanting direct
help in tracking an incident must be prepared to provide sufficient
information about the incident to make tracking possible.
2 Description Template: Security Incident Response Team
The Template is summarized in the section immediately below, and the
remainder of the document describes its components.
Contact Information
-------------------
* name of the team
* address
* time zone
* telephone number
* facsimile number
Nevil Brownlee [Page 6]
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* other telecommunication like STU-III, secure facsimile
* electronic mail address
* encryption methods for communication: PGP, PEM, MOSS, ..
* PGP public key (if PGP used)
Template Updates
----------------
* date of last update
* locations where this template may be found
Charter
-------
* mission statement
* constituency
* sponsor / affiliation
* authority
Policies
--------
* types of incidents
* level of support
* disclosure
- of compromised site's information
- the compromise of SIRT site to constituency
- incident reporting requirements
* cooperation & interaction with
- incident response teams
- vendors
- investigative agencies
- involved sites
- press
* communication & authentication
* point of customer contacts
Services
--------
* incident response
- verification
- understanding
- coping
- notification
* proactive activities
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Incident Reporting Forms
------------------------
Disclaimers
-----------
3 Purpose of the Template
The Template which this document proposes is expected to be used by a
response team to describe what it does, and in the process create
criteria against which its performance can be measured. The Template
does not attempt to specify a "correct" way for the team to operate, but
does recommend on specific policies and functions seen as necessary for
such a team to play a consistent role with other SIRTs throughout the
networking community. It also comments on additional roles a team might
include in the ambit of its operations.
The primary purposes of the Template are:
- to help SIRTs improve the way they operate;
- to improve interactions between different SIRTs, and between SIRTs
and other organizations such as vendors and law-enforcement
agencies;
- to note necessary interactions with their constituencies in setting
expectations and defining policies;
- to help new groups understand what it takes to "be" a SIRT.
A Template might appear to provide a marketing tool for comparing
different teams, but this kind of marketing use (or abuse) is strongly
discouraged by the GRIP Working Group.
3.1 Other Related Material
This 'Framework for Response Teams' document is the first produced by
the GRIP Working Group. A second document will set out guide-lines for
technology vendors to help them handle security incidents. The
definition of terms given in the next section applies to both documents.
Another relevant IETF document is RFC 1244, the Site Security Handbook,
produced by (and being updated by) the Site Security Handbook Working
Nevil Brownlee [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
Group (SSH). Site requirements and recommendations are covered by the
Handbook, while response team expectations and procedures are addressed
by the
remainder GRIP documents.
Other documents of interest for the document describes its components.
Contact Information
-------------------
* name discussion of the team
* address incident response
teams and their tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can
be found on:
* telephone ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/
cert-nl/docs/reports/R-92-01
Some especially interesting documents are:
* facsimile CERT-NL Framework
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/csir/docs/cert-nl.opframe.txt
* other telecommunication like STU-III FIRST potential members
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/newmemlt.txt
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/profile.txt
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/op`frame.txt
http://www.first.org/first
* electronic mail NRL Incident Response Manual
http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html
* encryption methods Bibliography
http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html
4 The Security Incident Response Team Template
This material which follows is addressed to those responsible for communication: PGP, PEM, MOSS, ..
* actual list
Security Incident Response Teams.
4.1 Contact Information
Full details of members on demand (optional) how to contact the SIRT should be listed here.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 9]
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4.2 Template Updates
----------------
*
Details of a Security IRT change with time, so the template must
indicate when it was last changed, who will be informed of future
changes, and (by implication) who will not. Without this, it is
inevitable that misunderstandings and misconceptions will arise over
time.
4.2.1 Date of last update
*
This should be sufficient to allow anyone interested to evaluate the
currency of the template.
4.2.2 Distribution list for Template Updates
Persons on this list are notified automatically whenever the template updates is
changed. The list might normally cover the constituency and any other
groups the SIRT has frequent interactions with. Readers not on the list
can then recognise that they should check the central repository (above)
for possible updates.
Digital signatures should be used for update messages sent by a SIRT to
those on its distribution list.
4.3 Charter
-------
Every SIRT must have a charter which specifying what it is to do, and
the authority under which it will do it. The charter should include at
least the following:
* mission statement
* constituency
* sponsor / affiliation
* authority
Policies
--------
* types of incidents
* level
4.3.1 Mission Statement
The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities,
already stated in the definition of support a SIRT. In order to be considered a
Security Incident Response Team, the team MUST provide incident
response, as defined in section 1.1.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 4] 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb April 1996
* disclosure
-
The goals and purposes of compromised site's information
- a team are especially important, and require
clear, succinct definition.
4.3.2 Constituency
A SIRT's constituency (as defined above) can be determined in many ways.
For example it could be a company's employees or its paid subscribers,
or it could be defined in terms of a technological focus, such as the compromise
users of IRT site to constituency
* cooperation & interaction with
- incident response teams
- vendors
- investigative agencies
- involved sites
- press
* communication & authentication
* point a particular operating system.
The definition of constituency should create a perimeter around the
group to whom the team will provide service. The policy section (below)
should explain how requests from outside the perimeter will be handled.
Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP supports a SIRT, but
delivers services to customer contacts
* incident reporting requirements
Services
--------
* incident response
- verification
- understanding
- coping
- notification
* proactive activities
Incident Reporting Forms
------------------------
Disclaimers
-----------
3 Purpose of sites which also have SIRTs. The
Authority section (below) should make such relationships clear.
People within the Template
The Template which this document proposes is expected constituency have to be used by learn that there is a
response team to describe what it does, and in Security
IRT for their purposes; the building of a trusted relationship with the
constituency is an on-going process create
criteria against which its performance can never ends.
4.3.3 Sponsoring organisation / affiliation
Any sponsoring organisations or affiliations, if they exist, must be measured. The Template
does not attempt
disclosed to specify a "correct" way for constituents. For example, the team to operate, but
does recommend on specific policies and functions seen as necessary CERT Coordination Centre's
sponsoring organisation is the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie
Mellon University; the sponsoring organisation for
such a team to play SIRT within a consistent role in large
coprporation would be the overall security framework.
It also comments on additional roles a team might include corporation itself. SIRTs within smaller
organisations may have no sponsoring organisation, in which case they
should specify 'none.'
4.3.4 Authority
SIRTs may not have authority to intervene in the ambit operation of its operations.
The primary purposes all the
systems within their perimeters. Each should identify the scope of its
control as distinct from the Template are:
- perimeter of its constituency; if other
SIRTs operate hierachically within this perimeter, they should be
identified.
For example, a corporate SIRT may have authority to help IRTs improve force the way they operate;
installation of software patches as the result of an incident. Other
SIRTs, such as a national SIRT, may only be able to advise that such
patches should be installed.
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- to improve interactions between different IRTs, and between IRTs
and other organizations such as vendors
4.4 Policies
4.4.1 Types of incidents and law-enforcement
agencies;
- level of support
The types of incident which the team is authorised to note necessary interactions address and the
level of support the team will contribute in assisting with their constituencies each type of
incident should be summarized here in setting
expectations and defining policies;
- to help new groups understand what list form. The Services section
(later) provides opportunity for more detailed definition.
The team should state whether it takes to "be" an IRT. will act on information it receives
about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future incidents.
A Template might appear commitment to provide a marketing tool for comparing
different teams, but this kind act on such information on behalf of marketing use (or abuse) its constituency is strongly
discouraged by the GRIP Working Group.
3.1 Other Related Material
This 'Framework
regarded as an optional pro-active service policy rather than a core
service requirement for Response Teams' document is a SIRT.
4.4.2 Co-operation and interaction with other organizations
This section should make explicit the first produced by related groups with which the GRIP Working Group. SIRT
routinely interacts. Examples of these are listed below.
Incident Response Teams: A second document SIRT will set out guide-lines for
technology vendors often need to help them handle security incidents. The
definition of terms given in the next section applies interact with
other SIRTs. For example a SIRT within a large company may need to both documents.
Another relevant IETF document
report incidents to a national SIRT, and a national SIRT may need to
report incidents to national SIRTs in other countries.
Vendors: The interaction here is RFC 1244, the Site Security Handbook,
produced by (and being updated by) in reporting vulnerabilities
discovered during an incident. If your SIRT has relationships with
product vendors, these should be described here. Larger vendors have
their own SIRTs, but smaller vendors may not. In such cases a SIRT will
need to work directly with a vendor.
Law-enforcement agencies: These include the Site Security Handbook Working
Group (SSH). Site requirements police and recommendations are covered by the
Handbook, while response team expectations other
investigative agencies. SIRTs and procedures are addressed
by the GRIP documents.
Other documents users of interest for the discussion of incident response
teams template should be
sensitive to local laws and their tasks are available by anonymous FTP. regulations, which may vary considerably in
different countries.
Press: A collection can SIRT may be found on:
* ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/
cert-nl/docs/reports/R-92-01
Some especially interesting documents are:
* CERT-NL Framework
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/csir/docs/cert-nl.opframe.txt
* FIRST potential members
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/newmemlt.txt
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/profile.txt
ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/op`frame.txt
http://www.first.org/first approached by the Press for information and
comment from time to time. This is discussed in more detail below
(Reporting and Disclosure).
Nevil Brownlee [Page 6] 12]
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* NRL Incident Response Manual
http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html
* Bibliography
http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html
4 Definitions
This section defines terms used in describing security incidents
4.4.3 Reporting and
response teams. For the purpose Disclosure
The default status of the GRIP documents any and all security-related information which a
team receives can only be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence to this
makes the team a limited
list is really needed. This 'black hole.' Its template should help maintain focus on define what
information it will report or disclose, to whom, and under what
circumstances.
Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal restraints
requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work in different
jurisdictions. In addition, they mave have reporting requirements
imposed by their sponsoring organisation, or they may be required by law
to report certain kinds of security incident. Each team's template
should specify any such restraints and requirements, both to clarify
clients' expectations and to inform other teams. As an example of such
restraints, the purpose Dutch equivalent of the documents, and prevent a duplication U.S. Federal Bureau of other definitions or -
even worse - a proliferation
Investigation (FBI) has some kinds of competing definitions.
Constituency
------------
Implicit in the purpose documents which may NOT be
recorded electronically.
Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also
restrain disclosure by a Security Incident Response Team is team; this document does not recommend on how
such conflicts should be addressed.
An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the
existence Press can be helpful,
particularly in clarifying the expectations of a SIRT's constituency. This is
'Disclosure' includes:
- reporting incidents within the group of users, sites,
networks or organizations served by constituency to other teams;
- handling incidents occurring within the team.
Security Incident
-----------------
For constituency, but reported
from outside it.
- reporting observations from within the purpose of this document:
'A computer security incident is any event which compromises
some aspect of computer constituency indicating
suspected or network security.'
The definition confirmed incidents outside it;
- acting on reports of an incident may vary between organizations, but at
least incidents occurring outside the following categories are generally applicable:
* loss of confidentiality,
* compromise of integrity,
* denial of service,
* misuse,
* damage.
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These are very general categories. For instance constituency;
- passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to Partner
SIRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or outside the forging of an
electronic mail message and a successful password attack are two
examples of 'compromise of integrity.'
Within
constituency;
- feed-back to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities;
- the definition provision of contact information relating to members of an incident the word 'compromised' is used.
Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident. During the
handling
constituency, members of a call it must be established whether other constituencies, other SIRTs or not an incident
really occurred.
law-enforcement agencies.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 13]
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-------------------------------
Based on two of April 1996
The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be the definitions given above:
'A Security Incident Response Team is
recipients of a group authorized SIRT's reports in each circumstance. It should also
note whether the team will expect to deal through another Security IRT
or directly with security incidents that occur within its defined constituency.'
It should provide a channel for receiving reports about suspected
incidents and for disseminating incident-related information to its member of another constituency over matters directly
involving that member.
A team will normally collect statistics. If they are distributed, the
template's reporting and to other related parties; it disclosure policy should also provide
assistance to members say so, and should
list the recipients.
4.4.4 Communication and authentication
Methods of its constituency in handling these incidents.
Vendor
------
A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
technology, secure and verifiable communication should be established.
This is responsible necessary for the technical content of that
technology. Examples of 'technology' include hardware (routers,
switches, etc.), communication between SIRTs and software (operating systems, mail forwarding
systems, etc.).
Note between a SIRT and
its constituents. The template should include public keys or pointers
to them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how to
use this information to check authenticity.
At the moment it is recommended that the supplier of every SIRT have, as a technology minimum, a
PGP key available, since PGP is not necessarily the 'vendor'
of that technology. As an example, available world-wide. Teams may also
make other mechanisms available, for example PEM.
For communication via telephone or facsimile a SIRT may keep secret
authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an Internet
agreed password or phrase.
4.5 Services Provider (ISP)
might supply routers to each
Services should be defined in two sections, as listed below.
* direct incident response
+ verification of its customers, but the 'vendor' is the
manufacturer, being the entity responsible for incident, i.e. help in determining whether
the problem really is caused by a security compromise
+ technical content of analysis assistance to understand the router, rather than nature of the ISP.
Vulnerability
-------------
A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic
compromise
+ notification of a piece other involved parties
+ guidance with eradication of technology which can
be exploited the incident, i.e. steps
to perpetrate a security incident. For example, if eliminate the compromise and prevent it recurring
+ guidance in recovery from the incident
* optional
+ vulnerability analysis outside of direct incident activity
+ information provision
- maintaining a vulnerability archive
- developing and supplying patches and resolutions
Nevil Brownlee [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb 1996
program allowed ordinary users to execute operating system commands in
privileged mode, this "feature" would be a vulnerability.
5 The Security Incident Response Team Template
This material which follows is addressed to those responsible for
Security Incident Response Teams.
5.1 Template Updates
Details of an IRT change with time, so the template must indicate when
it was last changed, who will be informed of future changes, 14]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
+ tool development and (by
implication) who will not. Without this, it is inevitable that
misunderstandings distribution
+ education
+ audit and misconceptions will arise over time.
5.1.1 Date consulting
+ product evaluation
Security Incident response Teams may provide different kinds of last update
This should services
to different sub-constituencies; this needs to be sufficient spelled out. For
example, 'we are willing to allow anyone interested provide direct incident response to evaluate the
currency other
communities as follows ..'
4.6 Incident reporting Forms
Samples of reporting forms used by the template.
5.1.2 Distribution list for Template Updates
Persons on SIRT (or pointers to them) should
be included at this list are notified automatically whenever point in a template. As an example, the template CERT
Coordination Centre's incident reporting form is
changed. The list might normally cover the constituency and any other
groups attached as Appendix C.
4.7 Disclaimers
Although the IRT has frequent interactions with. Readers template does not on constitute a contract, liability might
conceivably result from its descriptions of services and purposes. The
inclusion of a disclaimer at the list
can then recognise that they should check end of the central repository (above)
for possible updates.
Digital signatures template is recommended.
It should be used for update messages sent by an IRT noted that some forms of reporting or disclosure relating
to
those on its distribution list.
5.2 Charter
Every IRT specific incidents or vulnerabilities can imply liability, and SIRTs
should consider the inclusion of disclaimers in such material.
In situations where the original version of a template must have be
translated into another language, the translation should carry a charter which specifying what it is
disclaimer and a pointer to the original. For example:
Although we tried to do, carefully translate our German template
into English, we can not be certain that both documents express
the same thoughts in the same level of detail and correctness.
In all cases, where there is a difference between both
versions, the
authority under which it will do it. The charter should include at
least German version is the following: binding version for our
operation.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 9] 15]
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* mission statement
* constituency
* sponsor / affiliation
* authority
5.2.1 Mission Statement
5 Secondary Purposes of this Document
The mission statement should focus primary audience of this document are the administrators responsible
for communities of users, i.e. 'constituencies.' This section provides
some brief notes on what SIRT clients should expect of their teams.
An incident response team exists primarily to support the team's core activities,
already stated clients in the definition its
constituency. It is vital that those clients understand what they
should expect of an IRT. In order to be considered their team. Provided that a
Security Incident Response Team, SIRT has published its
template, a constituent/client should be able to read the team MUST provide incident
response, by definition.
The goals template and purposes
discover what to expect, for example in such areas as privacy and
confidentiality of a team are especially important, information, and require
clear, succinct definition.
5.2.2 Constituency
An IRT's constituency (as defined above) can whether the response team will be determined
contacting downstream sites. Clients should certainly expect a SIRT to
provide the services they detail in many ways.
For example it could their template.
An important aspect of incident response is the 'follow through' - every
incident should be a company's employees or its paid subscribers,
or it could investigated and appropriate actions taken. Clients
should be encouraged by their SIRT to report incidents so they can be defined in terms
acted upon. It must be emphasised that without active participation
(especially reporting) from clients the effectiveness of a technological focus, such as the services
they depend on can be greatly diminished. As a minimum, clients need to
know that they should report security incidents, and know how and where
they should report them.
Individual users (i.e. those who are not part of an organisation which
provides a particular operating system.
The definition of constituency should create SIRT for its members) who observe a perimeter around security incident should
ask their Internet Service Provider for details of the
group most suitable
SIRT to whom the team will provide service. The policy section report it to.
Appendix B (below)
should explain how requests from outside the perimeter will be handled.
Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP supports an IRT, but
delivers services provides some pointers to customer sites SIRTs which also have IRTs. The Authority
section (below) should make such relationships clear.
People within were known when
this document was published.
6 Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions
Policies and statements of services in the constituency template have to learn that there is an IRT for
their purposes; the building be
implemented as procedures, but descriptions of a trusted relationship with those procedures should
not be included in the
constituency is an on-going process which never ends.
5.2.3 Sponsoring organization / affiliation template.
The sponsoring organization, which authorises the actions following notes are intended to assist those seeking to form or to
improve their SIRTs.
* External
+ identify other response teams
+ define supported clients:
- by domain, through registration system, other means
+ establish secure communication practices
- use of the IRT,
should be given next. Defining the affiliation amounts to stating:
"Who is your God?". network, cell-phones, etc
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5.2.4 Authority
IRTs may not have authority to intervene in the operation of all the
systems within their perimeter. They should identify the scope
+ define information that a client site must/should provide
- use of their
control as distinct from reporting forms
* Internal
+ secure the perimeter of their constituency; if other
IRTs operate hierachically within their perimeter, these should be
identified.
5.3 Policies
5.3.1 Types team's infrastructure
+ protect information servers
+ protect sensitive data
+ define expiry of incidents sensitive data
+ define disposal practice for sensitive data
+ establish methods for gathering and level keeping statistics
+ establish 'knowledge base' of support
The types lessons learned from past incidents
+ create practical implementations of incident which the team is authorised disclosure policies
+ document explicit practices for disclosure to address and the
level of support the team will contribute in assisting with each type of
incident should be summarized here in list form. The Services section
(later) provides opportunity for more detailed definition. Press
The team should state whether it will act on information it receives
about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future incidents.
A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its constituency Site Security Handbook is
regarded as an optional pro-active service policy rather than a core
service requirement for an IRT.
5.3.2 Co-operation and interaction with other organizations
This section should make explicit the related groups with which first resource to consult in securing a
team's infrastructure. SIRT-specific security measures may evolve
later.
7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams
FIRST is the IRT
routinely interacts. Examples Forum of these are listed below. Incident Response Teams: An IRT will often need and Security Teams. Information
about FIRST can be found via their World Wide Web home page:
http://www.first.org/first
This page contains pointers to interact 'Team Contact Information' for SIRTs who
are FIRST members, and to 'Teams with
other IRTs. For example an IRT within a large company may need WWW Servers.'
8 Appendix C: Sample Incident Reporting Form
The following is the form which clients should use to report incidents
to a national IRT, and a national IRT may need to
report incidents the CERT Co-ordination Centre:
version 3.0
February 28, 1996
CERT(sm) Coordination Center
Incident Reporting Form
Nevil Brownlee [Page 17]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has developed the following
form in an effort to national IRTs gather incident information. We would appreciate
your completing the form below in other countries.
Vendors: Larger vendors have their own IRTs, as much detail as possible. The
information is optional, but smaller vendors may
not. In such cases an IRT will from our experience we have found that
having the answers to all the questions enables us to provide the best
assistance. Completing the form also helps avoid delays while we get
back to you requesting the information we need in order to work directly with a vendor.
Law-enforcement agencies: These include help you.
Sites have told us, as well, that filling out the police and other
investigative agencies. IRTs and users of form has helped them
work through the template should be
sensitive incident.
Note that our policy is to local laws keep any information specific to your site
confidential unless we receive your permission to release that
information.
Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return
this form to cert@cert.org. If you are unable to email this form,
please send it by FAX. The CERT/CC FAX number is
+1 412 268 6989
Thank you for your cooperation and regulations, which may vary considerably in
different countries.
Press: An IRT may help.
............................................................................
1.0. General Information
1.1. Incident number (to be approached assigned by the Press CERT/CC): CERT#
1.2. Reporting site information
1.2.1. Name (e.g., CERT Coordination Center):
1.2.2. Domain Name (e.g., cert.org):
1.2.3. Brief description of the organization:
1.2.4. Is your site an Internet Service Provider (Yes/No):
2.0. Contact Information
2.1. Your contact information
2.1.1. Name:
2.1.2. Email address:
2.1.3. Telephone number:
2.1.4. FAX number:
2.1.5. Pager number:
2.1.6. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
only):
2.1.7. Secure communication channel (e.g., PGP, PEM, DES,
secure telephone/FAX) [NOTE -- we will call to
obtain the secure communication channel
information] (Yes/No):
Nevil Brownlee [Page 18]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
2.2. Additional contact information and
comment from time to time. This is discussed (if available)
2.2.1. Name:
2.2.2. Email address:
2.2.3. Telephone number:
2.2.4. FAX number:
2.2.5. Pager number:
2.2.6. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
only):
2.2.7. Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
2.3. Site security contact information (if applicable)
2.3.1. Name:
2.3.2. Email address:
2.3.3. Telephone number:
2.3.4. FAX number:
2.3.5. Pager number:
2.3.6. Home telephone number (for our internal use only):
2.3.7. Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
2.4. Contact information for other site(s) involved in more detail below
(Reporting and Disclosure). this
incident (if available)
2.4.1. Site name:
2.4.2. Contact person name:
2.4.3. Email address:
2.4.4. Telephone number:
2.4.5. FAX number:
2.4.6. Pager number:
2.4.7. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
only):
2.4.8. Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
2.5. Contact information for any other incident response team(s)
(IRTs) that has/have been notified (if available)
2.5.1. IRT name:
2.5.2. Constituency domain:
2.5.3. Contact person name:
2.5.4. Email address:
2.5.5. Telephone number:
2.5.6. FAX number:
2.5.7. Pager number:
2.5.8. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
only):
2.5.9. Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
2.5.10. IRT reference number:
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INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb April 1996
5.3.3 Reporting and Disclosure
The default status of
2.6. Contact information for any and all security-related law enforcement agency(ies) that
has/have been notified (if available)
2.6.1. Law enforcement agency name:
2.6.2. Contact person name:
2.6.3. Email address:
2.6.4. Telephone number:
2.6.5. FAX number:
2.6.6. Pager number:
2.6.7. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
only):
2.6.8. Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
2.6.9. Law enforcement agency reference number:
3.0. Contacting Sites Involved
3.1. We ask that reporting sites contact other sites involved in
incident activity. Please let us know if you need assistance
in obtaining contact information which a
team receives can only be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence to this
makes for the team site(s) involved.
When contacting the other sites, we would very much
appreciate a 'black hole.' Its template should define what
information it will report or disclose, cc to whom, the "cert@cert.org" alias. This helps
us identify connections between incidents and when.
Different teams are likely to be understand
the scope of intruder activity. We would also appreciate
your including our incident number in the subject line of
any correspondence relating to different legal restraints
requiring or limiting disclosure, especially this incident if they work in different
jurisdictions. Each team's template should specify any such restraints,
both one
has been assigned (see item 1.1.).
If you are unable to clarify users' expectations and contact the involved sites, please get
in touch with us to inform other teams.
Conflicts discuss how we can assist you.
3.2. Disclosure information -- may we give the following types of interest, particularly
information to
3.2.1. the sites involved in this incident
3.2.1.1. your domain (Yes/No):
3.2.1.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
3.2.1.3. your contact information (Yes/No):
3.2.2. incident response teams, for sites from their
constituencies involved in commercial matters, may also
restrain disclosure by this incident
3.2.2.1. your domain (Yes/No):
3.2.2.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
3.2.2.3. your contact information (Yes/No):
3.2.3. law enforcement agency(ies) if there is a team; the present Draft does not recommend legal
investigation
Nevil Brownlee [Page 20]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
3.2.3.1. your domain (Yes/No):
3.2.3.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
3.2.3.3. your contact information (Yes/No):
4.0. Host Information
4.1. Host(s) involved at your site. Please provide information
on
how such conflicts should be addressed.
An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the Press can be helpful,
particularly all host(s) involved in clarifying this incident at the expectations time of an IRT's constituency.
'Disclosure' includes:
- reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams;
- handling incidents occurring within
incident (one entry per host please)
4.1.1. Hostname:
4.1.2. IP address(es):
4.1.3. Vendor hardware, OS, and version:
4.1.4. Security patches applied/installed as currently
recommended by the constituency, but reported
from outside it.
- reporting observations from within vendor and the constituency indicating
suspected or confirmed incidents outside it;
- acting on reports CERT/CC
(Yes/No/Unknown):
4.1.5. Function(s) of incidents occurring outside the constituency;
- passing involved host
4.1.5.1. Router (Yes/No):
4.1.5.2. Terminal server (Yes/No):
4.1.5.3. Other (e.g. mail hub, information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to Partner
IRTs or directly to affected sites lying within server,
DNS [external or outside internal], etc.):
4.1.6. Where on the
constituency;
- feed-back to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities;
- network is the provision involved host (e.g.
backbone, subnet):
4.1.7. Nature of contact the information relating to members at risk on the involved
host (e.g. router configuration, proprietary,
personnel, financial, etc.):
4.1.8. Timezone of the
constituency, members involved host (relative to GMT):
4.1.9. In the attack, was the host the source, the victim,
or both:
4.1.10. Was this host compromised as a result of this attack
(Yes/No):
4.2. Host(s) involved at other constituencies, other IRTs or law-
enforcement agencies.
The reporting sites (one entry per host
please)
4.2.1. Hostname:
4.2.2. IP address(es):
4.2.3. Vendor hardware, OS, and disclosure policy should make clear who will be version:
4.2.4. Has the
recipients of an IRT's reports in each circumstance. It should also
note whether site been notified (Yes/No):
4.2.5. In the team will expect to deal through another IRT or
directly with attack, was the host the source, the victim, or
both:
4.2.6. Was this host compromised as a member result of another constituency over matters directly
involving that member. this attack
(Yes/No):
5.0. Incident Categories
5.1. Please mark as many categories as are appropriate to
Nevil Brownlee [Page 12] 21]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb April 1996
A team will normally collect statistics. If they are distributed, the
template's reporting and disclosure policy should say so, and should
list
this incident
5.1.1. Probe(s):
5.1.2. Scan(s):
5.1.3. Prank:
5.1.4. Scam:
5.1.5. Email Spoofing:
5.1.6. Email bombardment:
5.1.6.1. was this denial-of-service attack successful
(Yes/No):
5.1.7. Sendmail attack:
5.1.7.1. did this attack result in a compromise
(Yes/No):
5.1.8. Break-in
5.1.8.1. Intruder gained root access (Yes/No):
5.1.8.2. Intruder installed Trojan horse program(s)
(Yes/No):
5.1.8.3. Intruder installed packet sniffer (Yes/No):
5.1.8.3.1. What was the recipients.
5.3.4 Communication and authentication
Methods full pathname(s) of secure and verifiable communication should be established.
This is necessary for communication between IRTs and between an IRT and
its constituents. The template should include public keys or pointers
to them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how
the sniffer output file(s):
5.1.8.3.2. How many sessions did the sniffer
log (use "grep -c 'DATA'
<filename>" to
use obtain this information to check authenticity.
At the moment it is recommended that every IRT have, as a minimum, a PGP
key available, since PGP is available world-wide. Teams may also make
other mechanisms available, for example PEM.
For communication via telephone
information):
5.1.8.4. NIS (yellow pages) attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.5. NFS attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.6. TFTP attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.7. FTP attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.8. Telnet attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.9. Rlogin or facsimile an IRT may keep secret
authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an
agreed rsh attack (Yes/No):
5.1.8.10. Cracked password or phrase.
5.4 Services
Services should be defined in two sections, as listed below.
* direct incident response
+ verification (Yes/No):
5.1.8.11. Easily-guessable password (Yes/No):
5.1.9. Anonymous FTP abuse (Yes/No):
5.1.10. IP spoofing (Yes/No):
5.1.11. Product vulnerability (Yes/No):
5.1.11.1. Vulnerability exploited:
5.1.12. Configuration error (Yes/No):
5.1.12.1. Type of configuration error:
5.1.13. Misuse of host(s) resources (Yes/No):
Nevil Brownlee [Page 22]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response April 1996
5.1.14. Worm (Yes/No):
5.1.15. Virus (Yes/No):
5.1.16. Other (please specify):
6.0. Security Tools
6.1. At the time of incident
+ technical assistance analysis to understand compromise
+ notification the incident, were you any using the following
security tools (Yes/No; How often)
Network Monitoring tools
6.1.1. Argus:
6.1.2. netlog (part of other involved parties
+ eradication
+ recovery
* optional
+ information provision
- vulnerability archive
- patches and resolutions
+ the TAMU Security Package):
Authentication/Password tools
6.1.3. Crack:
6.1.4. One-time passwords:
6.1.5. Proactive password checkers:
6.1.6. Shadow passwords:
6.1.7. Kerberos:
Service filtering tools
6.1.8. Host access control via modified daemons or
wrappers:
6.1.9. Drawbridge (part of the TAMU Security Package):
6.1.10. Firewall (what product):
6.1.11. TCP access control using packet filtering:
Tools to scan hosts for known vulnerabilities
6.1.12. ISS:
6.1.13. SATAN:
Multi-purpose tools
+ education
+ audit and consulting
+ product evaluation
6.1.14. C2 security:
6.1.15. COPS:
6.1.16. Tiger (part of the TAMU Security Package):
File Integrity Checking tools
6.1.17. MD5:
6.1.18. Tripwire:
Other tools
6.1.19. lsof:
6.1.20. cpm:
6.1.21. smrsh:
6.1.22. append-only file systems:
Additional tools (please specify):
6.2. At the time of the incident, which of the following logs were
you using, if any (Yes/No)
Nevil Brownlee [Page 13] 23]
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5.5 Incident reporting Forms
Samples of reporting forms used by the IRT (or pointers
6.2.1. syslog:
6.2.2. utmp:
6.2.3. wtmp:
6.2.4. TCP wrapper:
6.2.5. process accounting:
6.3. What do you believe to them) should be included at this point in a template.
5.6 Disclaimers
Although the template does not constitute a contract, liability might
conceivably result from its descriptions of services reliability and purposes. The
inclusion of a disclaimer at the end integrity of
these logs (e.g., are the template is recommended.
It should be noted that some forms of reporting logs stored offline or disclosure relating
to specific incidents or vulnerabilities can imply liability, and IRTs
should consider the inclusion of disclaimers in such material.
In situations where the original version of on a template must be
translated into another language,
different host):
7.0. Detailed description of the translation should carry a
disclaimer incident
7.1. Please complete in as much detail as possible
7.1.1. Date and a pointer duration of incident:
7.1.2. How you discovered the incident:
7.1.3. Method used to the original. For example:
Although we tried gain access to carefully translate our German template
into English, we can not be certain that both documents express the same thoughts affected host(s):
7.1.4. Details of vulnerabilities exploited that are
not addressed in the same level previous sections:
7.1.5. Other aspects of detail and correctness.
In all cases, where there is a difference between both
versions, the German version is the binding version for our
operation.
6 Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions
Policies and statements "attack":
7.1.6. Hidden files/directories:
7.1.7. The source of services in the template have attack (if known):
7.1.8. Steps taken to be
implemented as procedures, but descriptions of those procedures should
not be included in address the incident (e.g., binaries
reinstalled, patches applied):
7.1.9. Planned steps to address the template.
The following notes are intended incident (if any):
7.1.10. Do you plan to assist those seeking start using any of the tools listed
above in question 6.0 (please list tools expected
to form use):
7.1.11. Other:
7.2. Please append any log information or directory listings and
timezone information (relative to
improve their IRTs.
* External
+ identify other response teams
+ define supported clients:
- GMT).
7.3. Please indicate if any of the following were left on your
system by domain, through registration system, the intruder (Yes/No):
7.3.1. intruder tool output (such as packet sniffer output
logs):
7.3.2. tools/scripts to exploit vulnerabilities:
7.3.3. source code programs (such as Trojan horse programs,
sniffer programs):
7.3.4. binary code programs (such as Trojan horse programs,
sniffer programs):
7.3.5. other means
+ establish secure communication practices
- use of network, cell-phones, etc
+ define information that a client site must/should provide
- use files:
If you answered yes to any of reporting forms the last 5 questions, please
call the CERT/CC hotline (+1 412 268 7090) for instructions
on uploading files to us by FTP. Thanks.
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* Internal
+ secure
7.4. What assistance would you like from the team's infrastructure
+ protect information servers
+ protect sensitive data
+ define expiry of sensitive data
+ define disposal practice for sensitive data
+ establish methods for gathering CERT/CC?
Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University.
This form may be reproduced and keeping statistics
+ establish 'knowledge base' of lessons learned from past incidents
+ create practical implementations of disclosure policies
+ document explicit practices distributed without permission
provided it is used for disclosure to noncommercial purposes and the Press
The Site Security Handbook CERT
Coordination Center is a first resource to consult in securing a
team's infrastructure. IRT-specific security measures may evolve later.
7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams
FIRST acknowledged.
CERT is the Forum a service mark of Incident Response and Security Teams. Information
about FIRST can be found via their World Wide Web home page:
http://www.first.org/first
This page contains pointers to 'Team Contact Information' for IRTs who
are FIRST members, and to 'Teams with WWW Servers.'
8 Carnegie Mellon University.
9 Security Considerations
This document discusses the operation of Security Incident Response
Teams, and is therefore not directly concerned with the security of
protocols or network systems themselves.
Nonetheless, it is vital that IRTs SIRTs establish secure communication
channels with other teams, and with members of their constituency. They
must also secure their own systems and infrastructure.
Nevil Brownlee [Page 15]
INTERNET-DRAFT Expectations for Security Incident Response Feb 1996
9 Author's
10 Editor's Address
Nevil Brownlee
ITSS Technology Developmenta
The University of Auckland
Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941
E-mail: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz
Nevil Brownlee [Page 16] 25]
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