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Internet Engineering Task Force Jamie Jason
INTERNET DRAFT Intel Corporation
August-2002
March-2003 Lee Rafalow
IBM
Eric Vyncke
Cisco Systems
IPsec Configuration Policy Information Model
draft-ietf-ipsp-config-policy-model-06.txt
draft-ietf-ipsp-config-policy-model-07.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract
This document presents an object-oriented information model of IPsec
(IP Security protocol) [COMP, ESP, AH] policy designed to:
o facilitate agreement about the content and semantics of IPsec
policy
o enable derivations of task-specific representations of IPsec
policy such as storage schema, distribution representations,
and policy specification languages used to configure IPsec-
enabled endpoints
The information model described in this document models the
configuration parameters defined by the IP Security protocol [COMP,
ESP, AH]. IPSec. The information model
also covers the parameters found by the Internet Key Exchange [DOI,
IKE] protocol. Other key exchange protocols could be easily added to
the information model by a simple extension. Other extensions can
further be added easily due to the object-oriented nature of the
model.
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This information model is based upon the core policy classes as
defined in the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) [PCIM] and on
the Policy Core Information Model Extensions (PCIMe) [PCIME].
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Table of Contents
Status of this Memo..............................................1
Abstract.........................................................1 Memo................................................1
Abstract...........................................................1
Table of Contents................................................2
1. Introduction.................................................10 Contents..................................................3
1. Introduction.................................................10 Introduction....................................................8
2. UML Conventions..............................................10 Conventions.................................................8
3. IPsec Policy Model Inheritance Hierarchy......................11 Hierarchy........................9
4. Policy Classes...............................................16 Classes.................................................15
4.1. The Class IPsecPolicyGroup..................................17
4.2. The Class SARule...........................................18
4.2.1. SARule.............................................16
4.1.1. The Properties PolicyRuleName, Enabled, ConditionListType,
RuleUsage, Mandatory, SequencedActions, PolicyRoles, and
PolicyDecisionStrategy..........................................18
4.2.2
PolicyDecisionStrategy............................................17
4.1.2. The Property ExecutionStrategy............................18
4.2.3 ExecutionStrategy.............................17
4.1.3 The Property LimitNegotiation.............................20
4.3. LimitNegotiation..............................19
4.2. The Class IKERule..........................................21
4.3.1. IKERule............................................20
4.2.1. The Property IdentityContexts.............................21
4.4. IdentityContexts..............................20
4.3. The Class IPsecRule........................................22
4.5. IPsecRule..........................................21
4.4. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint................22
4.5.1. IPsecPolicyForEndpoint.................21
4.4.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................22
4.5.2. Antecedent...................................22
4.4.2. The Reference Dependent...................................22
4.6. Dependent....................................22
4.5. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForSystem..................22
4.6.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................23
4.6.2. The Reference Dependent...................................23
4.7. The Aggregation Class SARuleInPolicyGroup...................23
4.7.1. The Property Priority.....................................23
4.7.2. IPsecPolicyForSystem...................22
4.5.1. The Reference GroupComponent..............................23
4.7.3. Antecedent...................................22
4.5.2. The Reference PartComponent...............................23
4.8. Dependent....................................22
4.6. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule.....................24
4.8.1. SAConditionInRule......................23
4.6.1. The Properties GroupNumber and ConditionNegated...........24
4.8.2. ConditionNegated............23
4.6.2. The Reference GroupComponent..............................24
4.8.3. GroupComponent...............................23
4.6.3. The Reference PartComponent...............................25
4.9. PartComponent................................23
4.7. The Aggregation Class PolicyActionInSARule..................25
4.9.1. PolicyActionInSARule...................23
4.7.1. The Reference GroupComponent..............................25
4.9.2. GroupComponent...............................24
4.7.2. The Reference PartComponent...............................25
4.9.3. PartComponent................................24
4.7.3. The Property ActionOrder..................................25 ActionOrder...................................24
5. Condition and Filter Classes..................................26 Classes...................................25
5.1. The Class SACondition......................................26 SACondition........................................25
5.2. The Class IPHeadersFilter...................................27 IPHeadersFilter....................................26
5.3. The Class CredentialFilterEntry.............................27 CredentialFilterEntry..............................26
5.3.1. The Property MatchFieldName...............................27 MatchFieldName................................27
5.3.2. The Property MatchFieldValue..............................28 MatchFieldValue...............................27
5.3.3. The Property CredentialType...............................28 CredentialType................................28
5.4. The Class IPSOFilterEntry...................................28 IPSOFilterEntry....................................28
5.4.1. The Property MatchConditionType...........................29 MatchConditionType............................28
5.4.2. The Property MatchConditionValue..........................29 MatchConditionValue...........................28
5.5. The Class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry..........................29 PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry...........................29
5.5.1. The Property MatchIdentityType............................30 MatchIdentityType.............................29
5.5.2. The Property MatchIdentityValue...........................30 MatchIdentityValue............................30
5.6. The Association Class FilterOfSACondition...................31 FilterOfSACondition....................30
5.6.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................31 Antecedent...................................31
5.6.2. The Reference Dependent...................................31 Dependent....................................31
5.7. The Association Class AcceptCredentialFrom..................31 AcceptCredentialFrom...................31
5.7.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................32 Antecedent...................................32
5.7.2. The Reference Dependent...................................32 Dependent....................................32
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6. Action Classes...............................................33 Classes.................................................32
6.1. The Class SAAction.........................................34 SAAction...........................................34
6.1.1. The Property DoActionLogging..............................34 DoActionLogging...............................34
6.1.2. The Property DoPacketLogging..............................34 DoPacketLogging...............................34
6.2. The Class SAStaticAction....................................35
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6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds..............................35 LifetimeSeconds...............................35
6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction.................................35 IPsecBypassAction..................................36
6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction................................35 IPsecDiscardAction.................................36
6.5. The Class IKERejectAction...................................36 IKERejectAction....................................36
6.6. The Class PreconfiguredSAAction.............................36 PreconfiguredSAAction..............................36
6.6.1. The Property LifetimeKilobytes............................36 LifetimeKilobytes.............................37
6.7. The Class PreconfiguredTransportAction......................37 PreconfiguredTransportAction.......................38
6.8. The Class PreconfiguredTunnelAction.........................37 PreconfiguredTunnelAction..........................38
6.8.1. The Property DFHandling...................................37 DFHandling....................................38
6.9. The Class SANegotiationAction...............................37 SANegotiationAction................................39
6.10. The Class IKENegotiationAction.............................38 IKENegotiationAction..............................39
6.10.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds..........................38 MinLifetimeSeconds...........................39
6.10.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes........................38 MinLifetimeKilobytes.........................40
6.10.3. The Property IdleDurationSeconds.........................39 IdleDurationSeconds..........................40
6.11. The Class IPsecAction.....................................40 IPsecAction.......................................40
6.11.1. The Property UsePFS.....................................40 UsePFS.......................................41
6.11.2. The Property UseIKEGroup.................................40 UseIKEGroup..................................41
6.11.3. The Property GroupId.....................................40 GroupId......................................41
6.11.4. The Property Granularity.................................41 Granularity..................................42
6.11.5. The Property VendorID....................................41 VendorID.....................................42
6.12. The Class IPsecTransportAction.............................41 IPsecTransportAction..............................42
6.13. The Class IPsecTunnelAction................................41 IPsecTunnelAction.................................42
6.13.1. The Property DFHandling..................................42 DFHandling...................................43
6.14. The Class IKEAction.......................................42 IKEAction.........................................43
6.14.1. The Property ExchangeMode................................42 ExchangeMode.................................43
6.14.2. The Property UseIKEIdentityType..........................43 UseIKEIdentityType...........................44
6.14.3. The Property VendorID....................................43 VendorID.....................................44
6.14.4. The Property AggressiveModeGroupId.......................43 AggressiveModeGroupId........................44
6.15. The Class PeerGateway.....................................43 PeerGateway.......................................44
6.15.1. The Property Name.......................................44 Name.........................................45
6.15.2. The Property PeerIdentityType............................44 PeerIdentityType.............................45
6.15.3. The Property PeerIdentity................................44 PeerIdentity.................................45
6.16. The Association Class PeerGatewayForTunnel.................44 PeerGatewayForTunnel..................45
6.16.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................45 Antecedent..................................46
6.16.2. The Reference Dependent..................................45 Dependent...................................46
6.16.3. The Property SequenceNumber..............................45 SequenceNumber...............................46
6.17. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal....................45 ContainedProposal.....................46
6.17.1. The Reference GroupComponent.............................46 GroupComponent..............................47
6.17.2. The Reference PartComponent..............................46 PartComponent...............................47
6.17.3. The Property SequenceNumber..............................46 SequenceNumber...............................47
6.18. The Association Class HostedPeerGatewayInformation.........46 HostedPeerGatewayInformation..........47
6.18.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................46 Antecedent..................................48
6.18.2. The Reference Dependent..................................46 Dependent...................................48
6.19. The Association Class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction.......46 TransformOfPreconfiguredAction........48
6.19.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................47 Antecedent..................................48
6.19.2. The Reference Dependent..................................47 Dependent...................................48
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6.19.3. The Property SPI........................................47 SPI..........................................48
6.19.4. The Property Direction...................................47 Direction....................................49
6.20 The Association Class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel......47 PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel......49
6.20.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................48 Antecedent..................................49
6.20.2. The Reference Dependent..................................48 Dependent...................................49
7. Proposal and Transform Classes................................49 Classes.................................50
7.1. The Abstract Class SAProposal...............................49 SAProposal................................50
7.1.1. The Property Name........................................49 Name..........................................50
7.2. The Class IKEProposal......................................49 IKEProposal........................................51
7.2.1. The Property CipherAlgorithm..............................50 CipherAlgorithm...............................51
7.2.2. The Property HashAlgorithm................................50 HashAlgorithm.................................51
7.2.3. The Property PRFAlgorithm.................................50 PRFAlgorithm..................................51
7.2.4. The Property GroupId.....................................51 GroupId.......................................52
7.2.5. The Property AuthenticationMethod.........................51 AuthenticationMethod..........................52
7.2.6. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds...........................51 MaxLifetimeSeconds............................52
7.2.7. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes.........................52
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7.2.8. The Property VendorID.....................................52 VendorID......................................53
7.3. The Class IPsecProposal.....................................52 IPsecProposal......................................53
7.4. The Abstract Class SATransform..............................52 SATransform...............................54
7.4.1. The Property CommonName...................................52 CommonName....................................54
7.4.2. The Property VendorID.....................................53 VendorID......................................54
7.4.3. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds...........................53 MaxLifetimeSeconds............................54
7.4.4. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes.........................53 MaxLifetimeKilobytes..........................55
7.5. The Class AHTransform......................................53 AHTransform........................................55
7.5.1. The Property AHTransformId................................54 AHTransformId.................................55
7.5.2. The Property UseReplayPrevention..........................54 UseReplayPrevention...........................56
7.5.3. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize...................54 ReplayPreventionWindowSize....................56
7.6. The Class ESPTransform.....................................54 ESPTransform.......................................56
7.6.1. The Property IntegrityTransformId.........................54 IntegrityTransformId..........................56
7.6.2. The Property CipherTransformId............................55 CipherTransformId.............................57
7.6.3. The Property CipherKeyLength..............................55 CipherKeyLength...............................57
7.6.4. The Property CipherKeyRounds..............................55 CipherKeyRounds...............................57
7.6.5. The Property UseReplayPrevention..........................55 UseReplayPrevention...........................57
7.6.6. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize...................55 ReplayPreventionWindowSize....................58
7.7. The Class IPCOMPTransform...................................56 IPCOMPTransform....................................58
7.7.1. The Property Algorithm....................................56 Algorithm.....................................58
7.7.2. The Property DictionarySize...............................56 DictionarySize................................58
7.7.3. The Property PrivateAlgorithm.............................56 PrivateAlgorithm..............................59
7.8. The Association Class SAProposalInSystem....................56 SAProposalInSystem.....................59
7.8.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................57 Antecedent...................................59
7.8.2. The Reference Dependent...................................57 Dependent....................................59
7.9. The Aggregation Class ContainedTransform....................57 ContainedTransform.....................59
7.9.1. The Reference GroupComponent..............................57 GroupComponent...............................60
7.9.2. The Reference PartComponent...............................57 PartComponent................................60
7.9.3. The Property SequenceNumber...............................57 SequenceNumber................................60
7.10. The Association Class SATransformInSystem..................58 SATransformInSystem...................60
7.10.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................58 Antecedent..................................61
7.10.2. The Reference Dependent..................................58 Dependent...................................61
8. IKE Service and Identity Classes..............................59 Classes...............................62
8.1. The Class IKEService.......................................60 IKEService.........................................63
8.2. The Class PeerIdentityTable.................................60 PeerIdentityTable..................................63
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8.2.1. The Property Name........................................60 Name..........................................63
8.3. The Class PeerIdentityEntry.................................60 PeerIdentityEntry..................................64
8.3.1. The Property PeerIdentity.................................61 PeerIdentity..................................64
8.3.2. The Property PeerIdentityType.............................61 PeerIdentityType..............................64
8.3.3. The Property PeerAddress..................................61 PeerAddress...................................65
8.3.4. The Property PeerAddressType..............................61 PeerAddressType...............................65
8.4. The Class AutostartIKEConfiguration.........................61 AutostartIKEConfiguration..........................65
8.5. The Class AutostartIKESetting...............................62 AutostartIKESetting................................65
8.5.1. The Property Phase1Only...................................62 Phase1Only....................................66
8.5.2. The Property AddressType..................................62 AddressType...................................66
8.5.3. The Property SourceAddress................................63 SourceAddress.................................66
8.5.4. The Property SourcePort...................................63 SourcePort....................................67
8.5.5. The Property DestinationAddress...........................63 DestinationAddress............................67
8.5.6. The Property DestinationPort..............................63 DestinationPort...............................67
8.5.7. The Property Protocol.....................................63 Protocol......................................67
8.6. The Class IKEIdentity......................................63 IKEIdentity........................................68
8.6.1. The Property IdentityType.................................64 IdentityType..................................68
8.6.2. The Property IdentityValue................................64 IdentityValue.................................68
8.6.3. The Property IdentityContexts.............................64 IdentityContexts..............................68
8.7. The Association Class HostedPeerIdentityTable...............65 HostedPeerIdentityTable................69
8.7.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................65 Antecedent...................................69
8.7.2. The Reference Dependent...................................65 Dependent....................................69
8.8. The Aggregation Class PeerIdentityMember....................65 PeerIdentityMember.....................70
8.8.1. The Reference Collection..................................66 Collection...................................70
8.8.2. The Reference Member.....................................66 Member.......................................70
8.9. The Association Class IKEServicePeerGateway.................66 IKEServicePeerGateway..................70
8.9.1. The Reference Antecedent..................................66
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8.9.2. The Reference Dependent...................................66 Dependent....................................71
8.10. The Association Class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable..........66 IKEServicePeerIdentityTable...........71
8.10.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................67 Antecedent..................................71
8.10.2. The Reference Dependent..................................67 Dependent...................................71
8.11. The Association Class IKEAutostartSetting..................67 IKEAutostartSetting...................71
8.11.1. The Reference Element....................................67 Element.....................................72
8.11.2. The Reference Setting....................................67 Setting.....................................72
8.12. The Aggregation Class AutostartIKESettingContext...........67 AutostartIKESettingContext............72
8.12.1. The Reference Context....................................67 Context.....................................72
8.12.2. The Reference Setting....................................68 Setting.....................................72
8.12.3. The Property SequenceNumber..............................68 SequenceNumber...............................73
8.13. The Association Class IKEServiceForEndpoint................68 IKEServiceForEndpoint.................73
8.13.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................68 Antecedent..................................73
8.13.2. The Reference Dependent..................................68 Dependent...................................73
8.14. The Association Class IKEAutostartConfiguration............68 IKEAutostartConfiguration.............73
8.14.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................69 Antecedent..................................74
8.14.2. The Reference Dependent..................................69 Dependent...................................74
8.14.3. The Property Active.....................................69 Active.......................................74
8.15. The Association Class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService....69 IKEUsesCredentialManagementService....74
8.15.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................70 Antecedent..................................75
8.15.2. The Reference Dependent..................................70 Dependent...................................75
8.16. The Association Class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity..........70 EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity...........75
8.16.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................70 Antecedent..................................75
8.16.2. The Reference Dependent..................................70 Dependent...................................76
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8.17. The Association Class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity........70 CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity.........76
8.17.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................71 Antecedent..................................76
8.17.2. The Reference Dependent..................................71 Dependent...................................76
8.18. The Association Class IKEIdentitysCredential...............71 IKEIdentitysCredential................76
8.18.1. The Reference Antecedent.................................71 Antecedent..................................77
8.18.2. The Reference Dependent..................................71 Dependent...................................77
9. Implementation Requirements...................................71 Requirements....................................77
10. Security Considerations.....................................75 Considerations.......................................81
11. Intellectual Property.......................................75 Property.........................................81
12. Acknowledgments.............................................76 Acknowledgments...............................................82
13. Normative References..........................................82
13. References..................................................76 Informative References........................................83
14. Disclaimer..................................................77 Disclaimer....................................................83
15. Authors' Addresses..........................................77 Addresses............................................83
16. Full Copyright Statement.....................................77 Statement......................................84
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1. Introduction
IP security (IPsec) policy may assume a variety of forms as it
travels from storage to distribution point to decision point. At
each step, it needs to be represented in a way that is convenient
for the current task. For example, the policy could exist as, but
is not limited to:
o a A Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [LDAP] schema in
a directory
o an An on-the-wire representation over a transport protocol like the
Common Object Policy Service (COPS) [COPS, COPSPR]
o a A text-based policy specification language suitable for editing
by an administrator
o an An Extensible Markup Language (XML) document
Each of these task-specific representations should be derived from a
canonical representation that precisely specifies the content and
semantics of the IPsec policy. This document captures this concept
and introduces a task-independent canonical representation for IPsec
policies.
In order to have a simple information model, this
This document focuses mainly on the existing protocols [COMP, ESP,
AH, DOI, IKE]. The model can easily be extended if needed due to
its object-oriented nature.
This document is organized as follows:
o Section 2 provides a quick introduction to the Unified Modeling
Language (UML) graphical notation conventions used in this
document.
o Section 3 provides the inheritance hierarchy that describes
where the IPsec policy classes fit into the policy class
hierarchy already defined by the Policy Core Information Model
(PCIM) and Policy Core Information Model Extensions (PCIMe).
o Sections 4 through 8 describes the class that make up the IPsec
policy model.
o Section 9 presents the implementation requirements for the
classes in the model (i.e., the MUST/MAY/SHOULD status).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
2. UML Conventions
For this document, a UML static class diagram was chosen as the
canonical representation for the IPsec policy model. The reason
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behind this decision is that UML provides a graphical, task-
independent way to model systems. A treatise on the graphical
notation used in UML is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
given the use of ASCII drawing for UML static class diagrams, a
description of the notational conventions used in this document is
in order:
o Boxes represent classes, with class names in brackets ([])
representing an abstract class.
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o A line that terminates with an arrow (<, >, ^, v) denotes
inheritance. The arrow always points to the parent class.
Inheritance can also be called generalization or specialization
(depending upon the reference point). A base class is a
generalization of a derived class, and a derived class is a
specialization of a base class.
o Associations are used to model a relationship between two
classes. Classes that share an association are connected using
a line. A special kind of association is also used: an
aggregation. An aggregation models a whole-part relationship
between two classes. Associations, and therefore aggregations,
can
are also be modeled as classes.
o A line that begins with an "o" denotes aggregation. Aggregation
denotes containment in which the contained class and the
containing class have independent lifetimes.
o Next to At each end of a line representing an association appears a
cardinality.
cardinality (i.e., each association has 2 cardinalities).
Cardinalities indicate the constraints on the number of object
instances in a set of relationships. Every
association instance has a single set of references. The cardinality on a given
end of an association indicates the number of different object
instances of that class that may refer to be associated with a given single
object instance. The cardinality may be:
- a range in the instance of the class on the other end of the
association. The cardinality may be:
- a range in the form "lower bound..upper bound" indicating the
minimum and maximum number of objects.
- a number that indicates the exact number of objects.
- an asterisk indicating any number of objects, including zero.
Using an asterisk is shorthand for 0..n.
- the letter n indicating from 1 to many. Using the letter n is
shorthand for 1..n.
o A class that has an association may have a "w" next to the line
representing the association. This is called a weak association
and is discussed in [PCIM].
It should be noted that the UML static class diagram presented is a
conceptual view of IPsec policy designed to aid in understanding.
It does not necessarily get translated class for class into another
representation. For example, an LDAP implementation may flatten out
the representation to fewer classes (because of the inefficiency of
following references).
3. IPsec Policy Model Inheritance Hierarchy
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Like PCIM and PCIMe from which it is derived, the IPsec
Configuration Policy Model derives from and uses classes defined in
the DMTF [DMTF] Common Information Model (CIM). The following tree
represents the inheritance hierarchy for the IPsec policy model
classes and how they fit into PCIM, PCIMe and the other DMTF models
(see Appendices for descriptions of classes that are not being
introduced as part of IPsec model). CIM classes that are not used
as a superclass from which to derive new classes but are only
referenced are not included this inheritance hierarchy, but can be
found in the appropriate DMTF
document document: Core Model [CIMCORE], User
Model [CIMUSER] or or, Network Model [CIMNETWORK].
ManagedElement (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
+--Collection (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
| +--PeerIdentityTable
|
+--ManagedSystemElement (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
| +--LogicalElement (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
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| +--FilterEntryBase (DMTF Network Model - [CIMNETWORK]) Model)
| | |
| | +--CredentialFilterEntry
| | |
| | +--IPHeadersFilter (PCIMe)
| | |
| | +--IPSOFilterEntry
| | |
| | +--PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
| |
| +--PeerGateway
| |
| +--PeerIdentityEntry
| |
| +--Service (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
| +--IKEService
|
+--OrganizationalEntity (DMTF User Model - [CIMUSER]) Model)
| |
| +--UserEntity (DMTF User Model - [CIMUSER]) Model)
| |
| +--UsersAccess (DMTF User Model - [CIMUSER]) Model)
| |
| +--IKEIdentity
|
+--Policy (PCIM)
| |
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| +--PolicyAction (PCIM)
| | |
| | +--CompoundPolicyAction (PCIMe)
| | |
| | +--SAAction
| | |
| | +--SANegotiationAction
| | | |
| | | +--IKENegotiationAction
| | | |
| | | +--IKEAction
| | | |
| | | +--IPsecAction
| | | |
| | | +--IPsecTransportAction
| | | |
| | | +--IPsecTunnelAction
| | |
| | +--SAStaticAction
| | |
| | +--IKERejectAction
| | |
| | +--IPsecBypassAction
| | |
| | +--IPsecDiscardAction
| | |
| | +--PreconfiguredSAAction
| | |
| | +--PreconfiguredTransportAction
| | |
| | +--PreconfiguredTunnelAction
| |
| +--PolicyCondition (PCIM)
| | |
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| | +--SACondition
| |
| +--PolicySet (PCIMe)
| | |
| | +--PolicyGroup (PCIM & PCIMe)
| | |
| | | | +--IPsecPolicyGroup
| | |
| | +--PolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
| | |
| | +--SARule
| | |
| | +--IKERule
| | |
| | +--IPsecRule
| |
| +--SAProposal
| | |
| | +--IKEProposal
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| | |
| | +--IPsecProposal
| |
| +--SATransform
| |
| +--AHTransform
| |
| +--ESPTransform
| |
| +--IPCOMPTransform
|
+--Setting (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
| +--SystemSetting (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
| |
| +--AutostartIKESetting
|
+--SystemConfiguration (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
+--AutostartIKEConfiguration
The following tree represents the inheritance hierarchy of the IPsec
policy model association classes and how they fit into PCIM and the
other DMTF models (see Appendices for description of associations association
classes that are not being introduced as part of IPsec model).
Dependency (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
+--AcceptCredentialsFrom
|
+--ElementAsUser (DMTF User Model - [CIMUSER]) Model)
| |
| +--EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
| |
| +--CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
|
+--FilterOfSACondition
|
+--HostedPeerGatewayInformation
|
+--HostedPeerIdentityTable
|
+--IKEAutostartConfiguration
|
+--IKEServiceForEndpoint
|
+--IKEServicePeerGateway
|
+--IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
|
+--IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
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|
+--IKEServiceForEndpoint
|
+--IKEServicePeerGateway
|
+--IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
|
+--IKEUsesCredentialManagementService March 2003
|
+--IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
|
+--IPsecPolicyForSystem
|
+--PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
|
+--PeerGatewayForTunnel
|
+--PolicyInSystem (PCIM)
| |
| +--SAProposalInSystem
| |
| +--SATransformInSystem
|
+--TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
|
+--UsersCredential (DMTF User Model - [CIMUSER]) Model)
|
+--IKEIdentitysCredential
ElementSetting (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
+--IKEAutostartSetting
MemberOfCollection (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
+--PeerIdentityMember
PolicyComponent (PCIM)
|
+--ContainedProposal
|
+--ContainedTransform
|
+--PolicyActionStructure (PCIMe)
| |
| +--PolicyActionInPolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
| |
| +--PolicyActionInSARule
|
+--PolicyConditionStructure (PCIMe)
| |
| +--PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
| |
| +--SAConditionInRule
|
+--PolicySetComponent (PCIMe)
|
+--SARuleInPolicyGroup
SystemSettingContext (DMTF Core Model - [CIMCORE]) Model)
|
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+--AutostartIKESettingContext
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4. Policy Classes
The IPsec policy classes represent the set of policies that are
contained on a system.
+--------------+
| PolicySet [PolicySet] |*
| ([PCIMe]) ([PCIME]) |o--+
+--------------+ |
^ *| |(a)
| +------+
+--------------------------+
|
+--------------------+ +-------------+
| IPProtocolEndpoint |
+-------------+ +--------------+
| PolicyGroup |0..1 |
| ([CIMNETWORK]) | PolicyRule |*
| ([PCIM]) |-----+ |
+--------------------+ ([PCIM]) |o--+
+-------------+
|* | +--------------+ |(d)
0..1| | ^
+-----------------+ |
|(b) | | |*
*| |
|0..1 |
+------------------+0..1 (c) *+------------+ +---------------------------+
+--------------------+ |(c) | IPsecPolicyGroup |-----------| System |
+------------------+ PolicyTimePeriodCondition | ([CIMCORE])|
1 o +------------+
(d)
|
+-----------------+ IPProtocolEndpoint | | +---------------------------+ | | PolicyTimePeriodCondition ([PCIM]) |
| ([CIMNETWORK]) | ([PCIM]) | | +---------------------------+
+--------------------+ | |
+------------+ | *|
+-------------+ |(e)
*| o*
+-------------+n *+----------+* n+--------------+
| SACondition |----o| System |----+ +-o| SARule |o-------| PolicyAction |o-------+
|
+-------------+ (f) +----------+ (g) ([CIMCORE])|* | ([PCIM]) +----------+ |(f)
+------------+ | ^ |
(e)| | |n
+-------------+n | | +--------------+
| SACondition |--------+ | |[PolicyAction]|
+-------------+ | | ([PCIM]) |
| +--------------+
| *| ^
| |(h) |(g) |
| | +-------+
| *o |
+-----------------+ |
| +----------------------+ |
| | CompoundPolicyAction | |
| | ([PCIMe]) ([PCIME]) | |
| +----------------------+ |
| |
+---------+----+ +---------+
| | |
+---------+ +-----------+ +----------+
| IKERule | | IPsecRule | | SAAction |
+---------+ +-----------+ +----------+
(a) PolicySetComponent ([PCIMe]) ([PCIME])
(b) IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
(c) IPsecPolicyForSystem
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(d) SARuleInPolicyGroup
(e) PolicyRuleValidityPeriod ([PCIM])
(f)
(e) SAConditionInRule
(g)
(f) PolicyActionInSARule
(h)
(g) PolicyActionInPolicyAction ([PCIMe])
An IPsecPolicyGroup ([PCIME])
A PolicyGroup represents the set of policies that are used on an
interface. This IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup SHOULD be associated either directly
with the IPProtocolEndpoint class instance that represents
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interface (via the IPsecPolicyForEndpoint association) or indirectly
(via the IPsecPolicyForSystem association) associated with the
System that hosts the interface.
The IKE and IPsec rules are used to build or to negotiate the IPsec
SADB. The IPsec rules represent the Security Policy Database. The
SADB itself is not modeled by this document.
The IKE and IPsec rules usage can be described as (see also section
6 about actions):
o an An egress unprotected packet will first be checked against the
IPsec rules. If a match is found, the SADB will be checked. If
there is no corresponding IPsec SA in the SADB and if IKE
negotiation is required by the IPsec rule, the corresponding IKE
rules will be used. The negotiated or preconfigured SA will then
be installed in the SADB.
o An ingress unprotected packet will first be checked against the
IPsec rules. If a match is found, the SADB will be checked for a
corresponding IPsec SA. If there is no corresponding IPsec SA
and a preconfigured SA exists, this preconfigured SA will be
installed in the IPsec SADB. This behavior should only apply to
bypass and discard actions.
o An ingress protected packet will first be checked against the
IPsec rules. If a match is found, the SADB will be checked for a
corresponding IPsec SA. If there is no corresponding IPsec SA
and a preconfigured SA exists, this preconfigured SA will be
installed in the IPsec SADB.
o An ingress IKE negotiation packet, which is not part of an
existing IKE SA, will be checked against the IKE rules. The
SACondition for the IKERule will usually be composed of a
PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry (typically for a an aggressive mode IKE
negotiation) or a an IPHeadersFilter. The negotiated SA will then
be installed in the SADB.
It is expected that when a an IKE negotiation has to be initiated when
required by an IPsec rule, the set of IKE rules will be checked. The
IKE rules check will be based on the outgoing IKE packet using
IPHeadersFilter entries (typically using the HdrDstAddress
property).
4.1. The Class IPsecPolicyGroup
The class IPsecPolicyGroup serves as a container of either other
IPsecPolicyGroups or a set of SARules. The class definition for
IPsecPolicyGroup is as follows:
NAME IPsecPolicyGroup
DESCRIPTION Either a set of IPsecPolicyGroups or a set of SARules.
DERIVED FROM PolicyGroup (see [PCIM] & [PCIMe])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES PolicyGroupName (from PolicyGroup)
PolicyDecisionStrategy (from PolicySet)
PolicyRoles (from PolicySet)
NOTE: for derivations of the schema that are used for policy
distribution to an IPsec device (for example, COPS-PR), the server
may follow all of PolicySetComponent associations and create one
policy group which is simply a set of all of the IKE rules and a set
of all of the IPsec rules. See the section on the
PolicySetComponent aggregation for information on merging multiple
IPsecPolicyGroups. SARule
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4.2. The Class SARule March 2003
The class SARule serves as a base class for IKERule and IPsecRule.
Even though the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated. It
defines a common connection point for associations to conditions and
actions for both types of rules. Through its derivation from
PolicyRule, a an SARule (and therefore IKERule and IPsecRule) also has
the PolicyRuleValidityPeriod association.
Each valid IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup MUST contain SARules that each have a unique
associated priority number in PolicySetComponent.Priority. The
class definition for SARule is as follows:
NAME SARule
DESCRIPTION A base class for IKERule and IPsecRule.
DERIVED FROM PolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIMe]) [PCIME])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES PolicyRuleName (from PolicyRule)
Enabled (from PolicyRule)
ConditionListType (from PolicyRule)
RuleUsage (from PolicyRule)
Mandatory (from PolicyRule)
SequencedActions (from PolicyRule)
ExecutionStrategy (from PolicyRule)
PolicyRoles (from PolicySet)
PolicyDecisionStrategy (from PolicySet)
LimitNegotiation
4.2.1.
4.1.1. The Properties PolicyRuleName, Enabled, ConditionListType,
RuleUsage, Mandatory, SequencedActions, PolicyRoles, and
PolicyDecisionStrategy
For a description of these properties, see [PCIM] and [PCIME].
In SARule subclass instances:
- if the property Mandatory exists, it MUST be set to "true"
- if the property SequencedActions exists, it MUST be set to
"mandatory"
- the property PolicyRoles is not used in the device-level model
- if the property PolicyDecisionStrategy exists, it must be set to
"FirstMatching"
4.2.2
4.1.2. The Property ExecutionStrategy
The ExecutionStrategy properties in the PolicyRule subclasses (and
in the CompoundPolicyAction class) determine the behavior of the
contained actions. It defines the strategy to be used in executing
the sequenced actions aggregated by a rule or a compound action. In
the case of actions within a rule, the PolicyActionInSARule
aggregation is used to collect the actions into an ordered set; in
the case of a compound action, the PolicyActionInPolicyAction
aggregation is used to collect the actions into an ordered subset.
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There are three execution strategies: do until success, do all and
do until failure.
"Do Until Success" causes the execution of actions according to the
ActionOrder property in the aggregation instances until a successful
execution of a single action. These actions may be evaluated to
determine if they are appropriate to execute rather than blindly
trying each of the actions until one succeeds. For an initiator,
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they are tried in the ActionOrder until the list is exhausted or one
completes successfully. For example, an IKE initiator may have
several IKEActions for the same SACondition. The initiator will try
all IKEActions in the order defined by ActionOrder. I.e. it will
possibly try several phase 1 negotiations possibly with different
modes (main mode then aggressive mode) and/or with possibly multiple
IKE peers. For a responder, when there is more than one action in
the rule with "do until success" condition clause this provides
alternative actions depending on the received proposals. For
example, the same IKERule may be used to handle aggressive mode and
main mode negotiations with different actions. The responder uses
the first appropriate action in the list of actions.
"Do All" causes the execution all of the actions in aggregated set
according to their defined order. The execution continues regardless
of failures.
"Do Until Failure" causes the execution of all actions according to
predefined order until the first failure in execution of an action
instance. Please note that if all actions are successful then the
aggregated result is a failure. This execution strategy is
inherited from [PCIME] and is not expected to be of any use for
IPsec configuration.
For example, in a nested SAs case the actions of an initiator's rule
might be structured as:
IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy='Do All'
|
+---1--- IPsecTunnelAction // set up SA from host to gateway
|
+---2--- IPsecTransportAction // set up SA from host through
// tunnel to remote host
Another example, showing a rule with fallback actions might be
structured as:
IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy='Do Until Success'
|
+---6--- IPsecTransportAction // negotiate SA with peer
|
+---9--- IPsecBypassAction // but if you must, allow in the clear
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The CompoundPolicyAction class (See [PCIME]) may be used in
constructing the actions of IKE and IPsec rules when those rules
specify both multiple actions and fallback actions. The
ExecutionStrategy property in CompoundPolicyAction is used in
conjunction with that in the PolicyRule.
For example, in nesting SAs with a fallback security gateway, the
actions of a rule might be structured as:
IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy='Do All'
|
+---1--- CompoundPolicyAction.ExecutionStrategy='Do Until Success'
| |
| +---1--- IPsecTunnelAction // set up SA from host to
| | // gateway1
| |
| +---2--- IPsecTunnelAction // or set up SA to gateway2
|
+---2--- IPsecTransportAction // then set up SA from host
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// through tunnel to remote
// host
In the case of "Do All", a couple of actions can be executed
successfully before a subsequent action fails. In this case, some
IKE or IPsec actions may have resulted in SAs creation. Even if the
net effect of the aggregated actions is failure, those created SAs
MAY be kept or MAY be deleted.
In the case of "Do All", the IPsec selectors to be used during IPsec
SA negotiation are:
- for the last IPsecAction of the aggregation (i.e. usually the
innermost IPsec SA): this is the combination of the IPHeadersFilter
class and of the Granularity property of the IPsecAction; IPsecAction.
- for all other IPsecActions of the aggregation: the selector is the
source IP address being the local IP address and the destination IP
address being the PeerGateway IP address of the following
IPsecAction of the "Do All" aggregation. NB: the granularity is IP
address to IP address.
If the above behavior is not desirable, the alternative is to define
several SARules one for each IPsec SA to be built. This will allow
the definition of specific IPsec selectors for all IPsecActions.
4.2.3
4.1.3 The Property LimitNegotiation
The property LimitNegotiation is used as part of processing either
an IKE or an IPsec rule.
Before proceeding
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Before proceeding with a phase 1 negotiation, this property is
checked to determine if the negotiation role of the rule matches
that defined for the negotiation being undertaken (e.g., Initiator,
Responder, or Both). If this check fails (e.g. the current role is
IKE responder while the rule specifies IKE initiator), then the IKE
negotiation is stopped. Note that this only applies to new IKE phase
1 negotiations and has no effect on either renegotiation or refresh
operations with peers for which an established SA already exists.
Before proceeding with a phase 2 negotiation, the LimitNegotiation
property of the IPsecRule is first checked to determine if the
negotiation role indicated for the rule matches that of the current
negotiation (Initiator, Responder, or Either). Note that this limit
applies only to new phase 2 negotiations. It is ignored when an
attempt is made to refresh an expiring SA (either side can initiate
a refresh operation). The IKE system can determine that the
negotiation is a refresh operation by checking to see if the
selector information matches that of an existing SA. If
LimitNegotiation does not match and the selector corresponds to a
new SA, the negotiation is stopped.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME LimitNegotiation
DESCRIPTION Limits the role to be undertaken during negotiation.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - initiator-only
2 - responder-only
3 - both
4.3.
4.2. The Class IKERule
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The class IKERule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1
negotiations. The class definition for IKERule is as follows:
NAME IKERule
DESCRIPTION Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1
negotiations.
DERIVED FROM SARule
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES same as SARule, plus
IdentityContexts
4.3.1.
4.2.1. The Property IdentityContexts
The IKE service of a security endpoint may have multiple identities
for use in different situations. The combination of the interface
(represented by the IPProtocolEndpoint or by a collection of
IPProtocolEndpoints), the identity type (as specified in the
IKEAction) and the IdentityContexts specifies a unique identity.
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The IdentityContexts property specifies the context to select the
relevant IKE identity to be used during the further IKEAction. A
context may be a VPN name or other identifier for selecting the
appropriate identity for use on the protected IPProtocolEndpoint (or
collection of IPProtocolEndpoints).
IdentityContexts is an array of strings. The multiple values in the
array are logically ORÆd ORed together in evaluating the
IdentityContexts. Each value in the array may be the composition of
multiple context names. So, a single value may be a single context
name (e.g., "CompanyXVPN") or it may be combination of contexts.
When an array value is a composition, the individual values are
logically ANDÆd ANDed together for evaluation purposes and the syntax is:
<ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
where the individual context names appear in alphabetical order
(according to the collating sequence for UCS-2). So, for example,
the values "CompanyXVPN", "CompanyYVPN&&TopSecret",
"CompanyZVPN&&Confidential" means that, for the appropriate
IPProtocolEndpoint and IdentityType, the contexts are matched if the
identity specifies "CompanyXVPN" or "CompanyYVPN&&TopSecret" or
"CompanyZVPN&&Confidential".
The property is defined as follows:
NAME IdentityContexts
DESCRIPTION Specifies the context in which to select the IKE
identity.
SYNTAX string array
4.4.
4.3. The Class IPsecRule
The class IPsecRule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase
2 negotiations for the IPsec DOI. The class definition for
IPsecRule is as follows:
NAME IPsecRule
DESCRIPTION Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 2
negotiations for the IPsec DOI.
DERIVED FROM SARule
ABSTRACT FALSE
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PROPERTIES same as SARule
4.5.
4.4. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
The class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint associates an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup with a
specific network interface. If an IPProtocolEndpoint of a system
does not have an IPsecPolicyForEndpoint-associated IPsecPolicyGroup, PolicyGroup, then
the IPsecPolicyForSystem associated IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup is used for that
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endpoint. The class definition for IPsecPolicyForEndpoint is as
follows:
NAME IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
DESCRIPTION Associates a policy group to a network interface.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref IPProtocolEndpoint[0..n]]
Dependent[ref IPsecPolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.5.1. PolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.4.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup instance may be associated
with zero or more IPProtocolEndpoint instances.
4.5.2.
4.4.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup instance. The [0..1]
cardinality indicates that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance may have
an association to at most one IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup instance.
4.6.
4.5. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForSystem
The class IPsecPolicyForSystem associates an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup with a
specific system. If an IPProtocolEndpoint of a system does not have
an IPsecPolicyForEndpoint-associated IPsecPolicyGroup, PolicyGroup, then the
IPsecPolicyForSystem associated IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup is used for that
endpoint. The class definition for IPsecPolicyForSystem is as
follows:
NAME IPsecPolicyForSystem
DESCRIPTION Default policy group for a system.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref System[0..n]]
Dependent[ref IPsecPolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.6.1. PolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.5.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a System instance. The [0..n] cardinality
indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup instance may have an association to
zero or more System instances.
4.6.2.
4.5.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IPsecPolicyGroup a PolicyGroup instance. The [0..1]
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cardinality indicates that a System instance may have an association
to at most one IPsecPolicyGroup PolicyGroup instance.
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4.7.
4.6. The Aggregation Class SARuleInPolicyGroup SAConditionInRule
The class SARuleInPolicyGroup SAConditionInRule associates a an SARule with the
IPsecPolicyGroup
SACondition instance(s) that contains trigger(s) it. The class definition
for
SARuleInPolicyGroup SAConditionInRule is as follows:
NAME SARuleInPolicyGroup SAConditionInRule
DESCRIPTION Associates a an SARule with the IPsecPolicyGroup SACondition instance(s)
that
contains trigger(s) it.
DERIVED FROM PolicySetComponent PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIME])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Priority GroupNumber (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
ConditionNegated (from PolicySetComponent) PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
GroupComponent [ref IPsecPolicyGroup SARule [0..n]]
PartComponent [ref SARule [0..n]]
Note: an implementation can easily partition the set of SARules
aggregated by a SARuleInPolicyGroup instance into one IKERule
instances subset and into one IPsecRule instances subset based on the
class type of the component instances (being either IKERule or
IPsecRule instances).
4.7.1. SACondition [1..n]]
4.6.1. The Property Priority Properties GroupNumber and ConditionNegated
For a description of this property, these properties, see [PCIME].
4.7.2. [PCIM].
4.6.2. The Reference GroupComponent
The property GroupComponent is inherited from PolicyRuleInPolicyGroup
PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an IPsecPolicyGroup SARule
instance. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that a SARule an SACondition
instance may be shared
across multiple IPsecPolicyGroups).
4.7.3. contained in zero or more SARule instances.
4.6.3. The Reference PartComponent
The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyRuleInPolicyGroup
PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to a SARule an
SACondition instance. The [0..n] [1..n] cardinality indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup
SARule instance may MUST contain
zero or more SARule instances.
4.8. at least one SACondition instance.
4.7. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule PolicyActionInSARule
The class SAConditionInRule associates an SARule with the SACondition
instance(s) that trigger(s) it. The class definition for
SAConditionInRule is as follows:
NAME SAConditionInRule
DESCRIPTION Associates an SARule with the SACondition instance(s)
that trigger(s) it.
DERIVED FROM PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIMe])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES GroupNumber (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
ConditionNegated (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
GroupComponent [ref SARule [0..n]]
PartComponent [ref SACondition [1..n]]
4.8.1. The Properties GroupNumber and ConditionNegated
For a description of these properties, see [PCIM].
4.8.2. The Reference GroupComponent
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The property GroupComponent is inherited from
PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an SARule
instance. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SACondition
instance may be contained in zero or more SARule instances.
Note: the 0 cardinality allows SACondition instances to exist
without being contained in a SARule.
4.8.3. The Reference PartComponent
The property PartComponent is inherited from
PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an
SACondition instance. The [1..n] cardinality indicates that an
SARule instance MUST contain at least one SACondition instance.
4.9. The Aggregation Class PolicyActionInSARule
The PolicyActionInSARule PolicyActionInSARule class associates an SARule with one or more
PolicyAction instances. In all cases where an SARule is being used,
the contained actions MUST be either subclasses of SAAction or
instances of CompoundPolicyAction. For an IKERule, the contained
actions MUST be related to phase 1 processing, i.e., IKEAction or
IKERejectAction. Similarly, for an IPsecRule, contained actions
MUST be related to phase 2 or preconfigured SA processing, e.g.,
IPsecTransportAction, IPsecBypassAction, etc. The class definition
for PolicyActionInSARule is as follows:
NAME PolicyActionInSARule
DESCRIPTION Associates an SARule with its PolicyAction(s).
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DERIVED FROM PolicyActionInPolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIMe]) [PCIME])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES GroupComponent [ref SARule [0..n]]
PartComponent [ref PolicyAction [1..n]]
ActionOrder (from PolicyActionInPolicyRule)
4.9.1.
4.7.1. The Reference GroupComponent
The property GroupComponent is inherited from
PolicyActionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an SARule
instance. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SAAction
instance may be contained in zero or more SARule instances.
4.9.2.
4.7.2. The Reference PartComponent
The property PartComponent is inherited from
PolicyActionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an SAAction
or CompoundPolicyAction instance. The [1..n] cardinality indicates
that an SARule instance MUST contain at least one SAAction or
CompoundPolicyAction instance.
4.9.3.
4.7.3. The Property ActionOrder
The property ActionOrder is inherited from the superclass
PolicyActionInPolicyRule. It specifies the relative position of
this PolicyAction in the sequence of actions associated with a
PolicyRule. The ActionOrder MUST be unique so as to provide a
deterministic order. In addition, the actions in an SARule are
executed as follows. See section 4.2.2 ExecutionStrategy for a
discussion on the use of the ActionOrder property.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME ActionOrder
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DESCRIPTION Specifies the order of actions.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Any value between 1 and 2^16-1 inclusive. Lower values
have higher precedence (i.e., 1 is the highest
precedence). The merging order of two SAActions with
the same precedence is undefined.
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5. Condition and Filter Classes
The IPsec condition and filter classes are used to build the "if"
part of the IKE and IPsec rules.
*+-------------+
+--------------------| SACondition |
| +-------------+
| * |
| |(a)
| 1 |
| +---------------+
| | FilterList |
| |([CIMNETWORK]) |
| +---------------+
| 1 o
|(b) |(c)
| * |
| +-----------------+
| | FilterEntryBase |
| | ([CIMNETWORK]) |
| +-----------------+
| ^
| |
| +-----------------+ | +-----------------------+
| | IPHeadersFilter |----+----| CredentialFilterEntry |
| | ([PCIME]) | | +-----------------------+
| +-----------------+ |
| |
| +-----------------+ | +--------------------------+
| | IPSOFilterEntry |----+----| PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry |
| +-----------------+ +--------------------------+
|
| *+-----------------------------+
+------------| CredentialManagementService |
| ([CIMUSER]) |
+-----------------------------+
(a) FilterOfSACondition
(b) AcceptCredentialsFrom
(c) EntriesInFilterList (see [CIMNETWORK])
5.1. The Class SACondition
The class SACondition defines the conditions of rules for IKE and
IPsec negotiations. Conditions are associated with policy rules via
the SAConditionInRule aggregation. It is used as an anchor point to
associate various types of filters with policy rules via the
FilterOfSACondition association. It also defines whether Credentials
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can be accepted for a particular policy rule via the
AcceptCredentialsFrom association.
Associated objects represent components of the condition that may or
may not apply at a given rule evaluation. For example, an
AcceptCredentialsFrom evaluation is only performed when a credential
is available to be evaluated against the list of trusted credential
management services. Similarly, a PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry may only
be evaluated when an IDPayload value is available to compare with
the filter. Condition components that do not have corresponding
values with which to evaluate are evaluated as TRUE unless the
protocol has completed without providing the required information.
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The class definition for SACondition is as follows:
NAME SACondition
DESCRIPTION Defines the preconditions for IKE and IPsec
negotiations.
DERIVED FROM PolicyCondition (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES PolicyConditionName (from PolicyCondition)
5.2. The Class IPHeadersFilter
The class IPHeadersFilter is defined in [PCIMe] [PCIME] with the following
note:
1) to specify 5-tuple filters that are to apply symmetrically (i.e.,
matches traffic in both directions of the same flows which is
quite typical for SPD entries for ingress and egress traffic),
the Direction property of the FilterList SHOULD be set to
"Mirrored".
5.3. The Class CredentialFilterEntry
The class CredentialFilterEntry defines an equivalence class that
match credentials of IKE peers. Each CredentialFilterEntry includes
a MatchFieldName that is interpreted according to the
CredentialManagementService(s) associated with the SACondition
(AcceptCredentialsFrom).
These credentials can be X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, or
other types of credentials obtained during the Phase 1 exchange.
Note: this filter entry will probably be checked while the IKE
negotiation takes place. If the check is a failure, then the IKE
negotiation MUST be stopped, and the result of the IKEAction which
triggered this negotiation is a failure.
The class definition for CredentialFilterEntry is as follows:
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NAME CredentialFilterEntry
DESCRIPTION Specifies a match filter based on the IKE credentials.
DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Name (from FilterEntryBase)
IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
MatchFieldName
MatchFieldValue
CredentialType
5.3.1. The Property MatchFieldName
The property MatchFieldName specifies the sub-part of the credential
to match against MatchFieldValue. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME MatchFieldName
DESCRIPTION Specifies which sub-part of the credential to match.
SYNTAX string
VALUE This is the string representation of a X.509
certificate attribute, e.g.:
- "serialNumber"
- "signatureAlgorithm"
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- "issuerName"
- "subjectName"
- "subjectAltName"
- ...
5.3.2. The Property MatchFieldValue
The property MatchFieldValue specifies the value to compare with the
MatchFieldName in a credential to determine if the credential
matches this filter entry. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MatchFieldValue
DESCRIPTION Specifies the value to be matched by the
MatchFieldName.
SYNTAX string
VALUE NB: If the CredentialFilterEntry corresponds to a
DistinguishedName, this value in the CIM class is
represented by an ordinary string value. However, an
implementation must convert this string to a DER-encoded DER-
encoded string before matching against the values
extracted from credentials at runtime.
A wildcard mechanism can may be used for MatchFieldNames that contain
character strings. The MatchFieldValue may contain a wildcard
character, '*', in the MatchFieldValue string. E.g., pattern match specification. For example, if
the MatchFieldName is "subjectName" then a MatchFieldValue of
"cn=*,ou=engineering,o=foo,c=be" will match successfully a
certificate whose subject attribute is "cn=Jane
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Doe,ou=engineering,o=foo,c=be". The wildcard character '*' can be used
to represent 0 or several characters. more characters as would be displayed to the user
(i.e., a wildcard pattern match operates on displayable character
boundaries).
5.3.3. The Property CredentialType
The property CredentialType specifies the particular type of
credential that is being matched. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME CredentialType
DESCRIPTION Defines the type of IKE credentials.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - X.509 Certificate
2 - Kerberos Ticket
5.4. The Class IPSOFilterEntry
The class IPSOFilterEntry is used to match traffic based on the IP
Security Options [IPSO] header values (ClassificationLevel and
ProtectionAuthority) as defined in RFC1108. This type of filter
entry is used to adjust the IPsec encryption level according to the
IPSO classification of the traffic (e.g., secret, confidential,
restricted, etc. The class definition for IPSOFilterEntry is as
follows:
NAME IPSOFilterEntry
DESCRIPTION Specifies the a match filter based on IP Security
Options.
DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Name (from FilterEntryBase)
IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
MatchConditionType
MatchConditionValue
5.4.1. The Property MatchConditionType
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The property MatchConditionType specifies the IPSO header field that
will be matched (e.g., traffic classification level or protection
authority). The property is defined as follows:
NAME MatchConditionType
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IPSO header field to be matched.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - ClassificationLevel
2 - ProtectionAuthority
5.4.2. The Property MatchConditionValue
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The property MatchConditionValue specifies the value of the IPSO
header field to be matched against. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME MatchConditionValue
DESCRIPTION Specifies the value of the IPSO header field to be
matched against.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE The values MUST be one of values listed in RFC 1108 (or
any further IANA Assigned Numbers document). Some
examples for ClassificationLevel are:
61 - TopSecret
90 - Secret
150 - Confidential
171 - Unclassified
For ProtectionAuthority, some examples are:
0 - GENSER
1 - SIOP-ESI
2 - SCI
3 - NSA
4 - DOE
5.5. The Class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
The class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry defines filters used to match ID
payload values from the IKE protocol exchange.
PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry permits the specification of certain ID
payload values such as "*@company.com" "*@example.com" or "193.190.125.0/24". "192.0.2.0/24".
Obviously this filter applies only to IKERules when acting as a
responder. Moreover, this filter can be applied immediately in the
case of aggressive mode but its application is to be delayed in the
case of main mode. The class definition for
PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry is as follows:
NAME PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
DESCRIPTION Specifies a match filter based on IKE identity.
DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Name (from FilterEntryBase)
IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
MatchIdentityType
MatchIdentityValue
5.5.1. The Property MatchIdentityType
The property MatchIdentityType specifies the type of identity
provided by the peer in the ID payload. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME MatchIdentityType
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NAME MatchIdentityType March 2003
DESCRIPTION Specifies the ID payload type.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
5.5.2. The Property MatchIdentityValue
The property MatchIdentityValue specifies the filter value for
comparison with the ID payload, e.g., "*@company.com". "*@example.com". The property
is defined as follows:
NAME MatchIdentityValue
DESCRIPTION Specifies the ID payload value.
SYNTAX string
VALUE NB: The syntax may need to be converted for comparison.
If the PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry type is a
DistinguishedName, the name in the MatchIdentityValue
property is represented by an ordinary string value,
but this value must be converted into a DER-encoded
string before matching against the values extracted
from IKE ID payloads at runtime. The same applies to
IPv4 & IPv6 addresses.
Different wildcard mechanisms can be used depending on the ID
payload:
- a MatchIdentityValue of "*@company.com" "*@example.com" will match a user FQDN ID
payload of "JDOE@COMPANY.COM" "JDOE@EXAMPLE.COM"
- a MatchIdentityValue of "*.company.com" "*.example.com" will match a FQDN ID
payload of "WWW.COMPANY.COM" "WWW.EXAMPLE.COM"
- a MatchIdentityValue of "cn=*,ou=engineering,o=company,c=us" will
match a DER DN ID payload of "cn=John
Doe,ou=engineering,o=company,c=us"
- a MatchIdentityValue of "193.190.125.0/24" will match an IPv4
address ID payload of 193.190.125.10
- a MatchIdentityValue of "193.190.125.*" will also match an IPv4
address ID payload of 193.190.125.10.
The above wildcard mechanisms MUST be supported for all ID payloads
supported by the local IKE entity. The character '*' replaces 0 or
multiple instances of any character. character as restricted by the type
specified by MatchIdentityType.
5.6. The Association Class FilterOfSACondition
The class FilterOfSACondition associates an SACondition with the
filter specifications (FilterList) that make up the condition. The
class definition for FilterOfSACondition is as follows:
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NAME FilterOfSACondition
DESCRIPTION Associates a condition with the filter list that makes
up the individual condition elements.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref FilterList[1..1]]
Dependent [ref SACondition[0..n]]
5.6.1. The Reference Antecedent
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The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a FilterList instance. The [1..1]
cardinality indicates that an SACondition instance MUST be
associated with one and only one FilterList instance.
5.6.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an SACondition instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a FilterList instance may be associated
with zero or more SACondition instances.
5.7. The Association Class AcceptCredentialFrom
The class AcceptCredentialFrom specifies which credential management
services (e.g., a CertificateAuthority or a Kerberos service) are to
be trusted to certify peer credentials. This is used to assure that
the credential being matched in the CredentialFilterEntry is a valid
credential that has been supplied by an approved
CredentialManagementService. If a CredentialManagementService is
specified and a corresponding CredentialFilterEntry is used, but the
credential supplied by the peer is not certified by that
CredentialManagementService (or one of the
CredentialManagementServices in its trust hierarchy), the
CredentialFilterEntry is deemed not to match. If a credential is
certified by a CredentialManagementService in the
AcceptCredentialsFrom list of services but there is no
CredentialFilterEntry, this is considered equivalent to a
CredentialFilterEntry that matches all credentials from those
services.
The class definition for AcceptCredentialFrom is as follows:
NAME AcceptCredentialFrom
DESCRIPTION Associates a condition with the credential management
services to be trusted.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref CredentialManagementService[0..n]]
Dependent [ref SACondition[0..n]]
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5.7.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a CredentialManagementService instance. The
[0..n] cardinality indicates that an SACondition instance may be
associated with zero or more CredentialManagementService instances.
5.7.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a SACondition instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a CredentialManagementService instance
may be associated with zero or more SACondition instances.
6. Action Classes
The action classes are used to model the different actions an IPsec
device may take when the evaluation of the associated condition
results in a match.
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+----------+
| SAAction |
+----------+
^
|
+-----------+--------------+
| |
| +---------------------+
| | SaNegotiationAction |
| +---------------------+
| ^
| |
*+----------------+
+----------------+ +----------------------+*
| SAStaticAction | | IKENegotiationAction |o----+
+----------------+ +----------------------+ |
^ ^ |
| | |
| +-----------+-------+ |
| | | |
+-------------------+ | +-------------+ +-----------+ |
| IPsecBypassAction |---+ | IPsecAction | | IKEAction | |
+-------------------+ | +-------------+ +-----------+ |
| ^ |
+--------------------+ | | +----------------------+ |
| IPsecDiscardAction |---+ +----| IPsecTransportAction | |
+--------------------+ | | +----------------------+ |
| | |
+-----------------+ | | +-------------------+ |
| IKERejectAction |---+ +----| IPsecTunnelAction | |
+-----------------+ | +-------------------+ |
| *| |
| +--------------+ |
| | |
+-----------------------+ | | +--------------+n |
| PreconfiguredSAAction |---+ |(a) | [SAProposal] |-------+
+-----------------------+ | +--------------+ (b)
*| ^ |
| | | *+-------------+
| | +-------| PeerGateway |
| | +-------------+
| | +-----------------------------+ |0..1 *w|
| +--| PreconfiguredTransportAction| | |(c)
| | +-----------------------------+ | 1|
| | | +--------------+
| | +---------------------------+ * | | System |
| +--| PreconfiguredTunnelAction |-----+ | ([CIMCORE]) |
| +---------------------------+ (e) +--------------+
|
| 2..6+---------------+
+-------| [SATransform] |
(d) +---------------+
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(a) PeerGatewayForTunnel
(b) ContainedProposal
(c) HostedPeerGatewayInformation
(d) TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
(e) PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
6.1. The Class SAAction
The class SAAction is abstract and serves as the base class for IKE
and IPsec actions. It is used for aggregating different types of
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actions to IKE and IPsec rules. The class definition for SAAction
is as follows:
NAME SAAction
DESCRIPTION The base class for IKE and IPsec actions.
DERIVED FROM PolicyAction (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES PolicyActionName (from PolicyAction)
DoActionLogging
DoPacketLogging
6.1.1. The Property DoActionLogging
The property DoActionLogging specifies whether a log message is to
be generated when the action is performed. This applies for
SANegotiationActions with the meaning of logging a message when the
negotiation is attempted (with the success or failure result). This
also applies for SAStaticAction only for PreconfiguredSAAction with
the meaning of logging a message when the preconfigured SA is
actually installed in the SADB. The property is defined as follows:
NAME DoActionLogging
DESCRIPTION Specifies the whether to log when the action is
performed.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE true - a log message is to be generated when action is
performed.
false - no log message is to be generated when action
is performed.
6.1.2. The Property DoPacketLogging
The property DoPacketLogging specifies whether a log message is to
be generated when the resulting security association is used to
process the packet. If the SANegotiationAction successfully
executes and results in the creation of one or several security
associations or if the PreconfiguredSAAction executes, the value of
DoPacketLogging SHOULD be propagated to an optional field of SADB.
This optional field should be used to decide whether a log message
is to be generated when the SA is used to process a packet. For
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SAStaticActions, a log message is to be generated when the
IPsecBypassAction, IPsecDiscardAction, IKERejectAction are executed.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME DoPacketLogging
DESCRIPTION Specifies the whether to log when the resulting
security association is used to process the packet.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE true - a log message is to be generated when the
resulting security association is used to process the
packet.
false - no log message is to be generated.
6.2. The Class SAStaticAction
The class SAStaticAction is abstract and serves as the base class
for IKE and IPsec actions that do not require any negotiation. The
class definition for SAStaticAction is as follows:
NAME SAStaticAction
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DESCRIPTION The base class for IKE and IPsec actions that do not
require any negotiation.
DERIVED FROM SAAction
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES LifetimeSeconds
6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds
The property LifetimeSeconds specifies how long the security
association derived from this action should be used. The property
is defined as follows:
NAME LifetimeSeconds
DESCRIPTION Specifies the amount of time (in seconds) that a
security association derived from this action should be
used.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there is not a lifetime
associated with this action (i.e., infinite lifetime).
A non-zero value is typically used in conjunction with
alternate SAActions performed when there is a
negotiation failure of some sort.
Note: if the referenced SAStaticAction object is a
PreconfiguredSAAction associated to several SATransforms, then the
actual lifetime of the preconfigured SA will be the lesser of the
value of this LifetimeSeconds property and of the value of the
MaxLifetimeSeconds property of the associated SATransform. If the
value of this LifetimeSeconds property is zero, then there will be
no lifetime associated to this SA.
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Note: while some SA negotiation protocols [IKE] can negotiate the
lifetime as an arbitrary length field, the authors have assumed that
a 64-bit integer will be sufficient.
It is expected that most SAStaticAction instances will have their
LifetimeSeconds properties set to zero (meaning no expiration of the
resulting SA).
6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction
The class IPsecBypassAction is used when packets are allowed to be
processed without applying IPsec encapsulation to them. This is the
same as stating that packets are allowed to flow in the clear. The
class definition for IPsecBypassAction is as follows:
NAME IPsecBypassAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies that packets are to be allowed to pass in the
clear.
DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction
The class IPsecDiscardAction is used when packets are to be
discarded. This is the same as stating that packets are to be
denied. The class definition for IPsecDiscardAction is as follows:
NAME IPsecDiscardAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies that packets are to be discarded.
DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
6.5. The Class IKERejectAction
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The class IKERejectAction is used to prevent attempting an IKE
negotiation with the peer(s). The main use of this class is to
prevent some denial of service attacks when acting as IKE responder.
It goes beyond a plain discard of UDP/500 IKE packets because the
SACondition can be based on specific PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry (when
aggressive mode is used). The class definition for IKERejectAction
is as follows:
NAME IKERejectAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies that an IKE negotiation should not even be
attempted or continued.
DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
6.6. The Class PreconfiguredSAAction
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The class PreconfiguredSAAction is used to create a security
association using preconfigured, hard-wired algorithms and keys.
Notes:
- the SPI for a PreconfiguredSAAction is contained in the
association, TransformOfPreconfiguredAction;
- the session key (if applicable) is contained in an instance of
the class SharedSecret (see [CIMUSER]). The session key is
stored in the property Secret, the property protocol contains
either "ESP-encrypt", "ESP-auth" or "AH", the property
algorithm contains the algorithm used to protect the secret
(can be "PLAINTEXT" if the IPsec entity has no secret storage),
the value of property RemoteID is the concatenation of the
remote IPsec peer IP address in dotted decimal, of the
character "/", of "IN" (respectively "OUT") for inbound SA
(respectively outbound SA), of the character "/" and of the
hexadecimal representation of the SPI.
Although the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated. The
class definition for PreconfiguredSAAction is as follows:
NAME PreconfiguredSAAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
information for creation of a security association.
DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES LifetimeKilobytes
6.6.1. The Property LifetimeKilobytes
The property LifetimeKilobytes specifies a traffic limit in
kilobytes that can be consumed before the SA is deleted.. The
property is defined as follows:
NAME LifetimeKilobytes
DESCRIPTION Specifies the SA lifetime in kilobytes.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there is not a lifetime
associated with this action (i.e., infinite lifetime).
A non-zero value is used to indicate that after this
number of kilobytes has been consumed the SA must be
deleted from the SADB.
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Note: the actual lifetime of the preconfigured SA will be the lesser
of the value of this LifetimeKilobytes property and of the value of
the MaxLifetimeSeconds property of the associated SATransform. If
the value of this LifetimeKilobytes property is zero, then there
will be no lifetime associated with this action.
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Note: while some SA negotiation protocols [IKE] can negotiate the
lifetime as an arbitrary length field, the authors have assumed that
a 64-bit integer will be sufficient.
It is expected that most PreconfiguredSAAction instances will have
their LifetimeKilobyte properties set to zero (meaning no expiration
of the resulting SA).
6.7. The Class PreconfiguredTransportAction
The class PreconfiguredTransportAction is used to create an IPsec
transport-mode security association using preconfigured, hard-wired
algorithms and keys. The class definition for
PreconfiguredTransportAction is as follows:
NAME PreconfiguredTransportAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
information for creation of an IPsec transport security
association.
DERIVED FROM PreconfiguredSAAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
6.8. The Class PreconfiguredTunnelAction
The class PreconfiguredTunnelAction is used to create an IPsec
tunnel-mode security association using preconfigured, hard-wired
algorithms and keys. The class definition for PreconfiguredSAAction
is as follows:
NAME PreconfiguredTunnelAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
information for creation of an IPsec tunnel-mode
security association.
DERIVED FROM PreconfiguredSAAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES DFHandling
6.8.1. The Property DFHandling
The property DFHandling specifies how the Don't Fragment bit of the
internal IP header is to be handled during IPsec processing. The
property is defined as follows:
NAME DFHandling
DESCRIPTION Specifies the processing of the DF bit.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - Copy the DF bit from the internal IP header to the
external IP header.
2 - Set the DF bit of the external IP header to 1.
3 - Clear the DF bit of the external IP header to 0.
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6.9. The Class SANegotiationAction
The class SANegotiationAction specifies an action requesting
security policy negotiation.
This is an abstract class. Currently, only one security policy
negotiation protocol action is subclassed from SANegotiationAction:
the IKENegotiationAction class. It is nevertheless expected that
other security policy negotiation protocols will exist and the
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negotiation actions of those new protocols would be modeled as a
subclass of SANegotiationAction.
NAME SANegotiationAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies a negotiation action .
DERIVED FROM SAAction
ABSTRACT TRUE
6.10. The Class IKENegotiationAction
The class IKENegotiationAction is abstract and serves as the base
class for IKE and IPsec actions that result in a IKE negotiation.
The class definition for IKENegotiationAction is as follows:
NAME IKENegotiationAction
DESCRIPTION A base class for IKE and IPsec actions that specifies
the parameters that are common for IKE phase 1 and IKE
phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiations.
DERIVED FROM SANegotiationAction
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES MinLifetimeSeconds
MinLifetimeKilobytes
IdleDurationSeconds
6.10.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds
The property MinLifetimeSeconds specifies the minimum seconds
lifetime that will be accepted from the peer. MinLifetimeSeconds is
used to prevent certain denial of service attacks where the peer
requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations
with expensive Diffie-Hellman operations. The property is defined
as follows:
NAME MinLifetimeSeconds
DESCRIPTION Specifies the minimum acceptable seconds lifetime.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum
value. A non-zero value specifies the minimum seconds
lifetime.
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Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
6.10.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes
The property MinLifetimeKilobytes specifies the minimum kilobytes
lifetime that will be accepted from the peer. MinLifetimeKilobytes
is used to prevent certain denial of service attacks where the peer
requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations
with correspondingly expensive Diffie-Hellman operations. Note that
there has been considerable debate regarding the usefulness of
applying kilobyte lifetimes to IKE phase 1 security associations, so
it is likely that this property will only apply to the sub-class
IPsecAction. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MinLifetimeKilobytes
DESCRIPTION Specifies the minimum acceptable kilobytes lifetime.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum
value. A non-zero value specifies the minimum
kilobytes lifetime.
Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
6.10.3. The Property IdleDurationSeconds
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The property IdleDurationSeconds specifies how many seconds a
security association may remain idle (i.e., no traffic protected
using the security association) before it is deleted. The property
is defined as follows:
NAME IdleDurationSeconds
DESCRIPTION Specifies how long, in seconds, a security association
may remain unused before it is deleted.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that idle detection should
not be used for the security association (only the
seconds and kilobyte lifetimes will be used). Any non-zero non-
zero value indicates the number of seconds the security
association may remain unused.
6.11. The Class IPsecAction
The class IPsecAction serves as the base class for IPsec transport
and tunnel actions. It specifies the parameters used for an IKE
phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiation. The class definition for IPsecAction
is as follows:
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NAME IPsecAction
DESCRIPTION A base class for IPsec transport and tunnel actions
that specifies the parameters for IKE phase 2 IPsec DOI
negotiations.
DERIVED FROM IKENegotiationAction
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES UsePFS
UseIKEGroup
GroupId
Granularity
VendorID
6.11.1. The Property UsePFS
The property UsePFS specifies whether or not perfect forward secrecy
should be used when refreshing keys. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME UsePFS
DESCRIPTION Specifies the whether or not to use PFS when refreshing
keys.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE A value of true indicates that PFS should be used. A
value of false indicates that PFS should not be used.
6.11.2. The Property UseIKEGroup
The property UseIKEGroup specifies whether or not phase 2 should use
the same key exchange group as was used in phase 1. UseIKEGroup is
ignored if UsePFS is false. The property is defined as follows:
NAME UseIKEGroup
DESCRIPTION Specifies whether or not to use the same GroupId for
phase 2 as was used in phase 1. If UsePFS is false,
then UseIKEGroup is ignored.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE A value of true indicates that the phase 2 GroupId
should be the same as phase 1. A value of false
indicates that the property GroupId will contain the
key exchange group to use for phase 2.
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6.11.3. The Property GroupId
The property GroupId specifies the key exchange group to use for
phase 2. GroupId is ignored if (1) the property UsePFS is false, or
(2) the property UsePFS is true and the property UseIKEGroup is
true. If the GroupID number is from the vendor-specific range (32768-
65535),
(32768-65535), the property VendorID qualifies the group number.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME GroupId
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DESCRIPTION Specifies the key exchange group to use for phase 2
when the property UsePFS is true and the property
UseIKEGroup is false.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [IKE] for valid values.
6.11.4. The Property Granularity
The property Granularity specifies how the selector for the security
association should be derived from the traffic that triggered the
negotiation. The property is defined as follows:
NAME Granularity
DESCRIPTION Specifies the how the proposed selector for the
security association will be created.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - subnet: the source and destination subnet masks of
the filter entry are used.
2 - address: only the source and destination IP
addresses of the triggering packet are used.
3 - protocol: the source and destination IP addresses
and the IP protocol of the triggering packet are used.
4 - port: the source and destination IP addresses and
the IP protocol and the source and destination layer 4
ports of the triggering packet are used.
6.11.5. The Property VendorID
The property VendorID is used together with the property GroupID
(when it is in the vendor-specific range) to identify the key
exchange group. VendorID is ignored unless UsePFS is true and
UseIKEGroup is false and GroupID is in the vendor-specific range
(32768-65535). The property is defined as follows:
NAME VendorID
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE Vendor ID.
SYNTAX string
6.12. The Class IPsecTransportAction
The class IPsecTransportAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is
used to specify use of an IPsec transport-mode security association.
The class definition for IPsecTransportAction is as follows:
NAME IPsecTransportAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies that an IPsec transport-mode security
association should be negotiated.
DERIVED FROM IPsecAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
6.13. The Class IPsecTunnelAction
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The class IPsecTunnelAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is
used to specify use of an IPsec tunnel-mode security association.
The class definition for IPsecTunnelAction is as follows:
NAME IPsecTunnelAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies that an IPsec tunnel-mode security
association should be negotiated.
DERIVED FROM IPsecAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES DFHandling
6.13.1. The Property DFHandling
The property DFHandling specifies how the tunnel should manage the
Don't Fragment (DF) bit. The property is defined as follows:
NAME DFHandling
DESCRIPTION Specifies how to process the DF bit.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - Copy the DF bit from the internal IP header to the
external IP header.
2 - Set the DF bit of the external IP header to 1.
3 - Clear the DF bit of the external IP header to 0.
6.14. The Class IKEAction
The class IKEAction specifies the parameters that are to be used for
IKE phase 1 negotiation. The class definition for IKEAction is as
follows:
NAME IKEAction
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE phase 1 negotiation parameters.
DERIVED FROM IKENegotiationAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES ExchangeMode
UseIKEIdentityType
VendorID
AggressiveModeGroupId
6.14.1. The Property ExchangeMode
The property ExchangeMode specifies which IKE mode should be used
for IKE phase 1 negotiations. The property is defined as follows:
NAME ExchangeMode
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE negotiation mode for phase 1.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - base mode
2 - main mode
4 - aggressive mode
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6.14.2. The Property UseIKEIdentityType
The property UseIKEIdentityType specifies what IKE identity type
should be used when negotiating with the peer. This information is
used in conjunction with the IKE identities available on the system
and the IdentityContexts of the matching IKERule. The property is
defined as follows:
NAME UseIKEIdentityType
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE identity to use during negotiation.
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SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
6.14.3. The Property VendorID
The property VendorID specifies the value to be used in the Vendor
ID payload. The property is defined as follows:
NAME VendorID
DESCRIPTION Vendor ID Payload.
SYNTAX string
VALUE A value of NULL means that Vendor ID payload will be
neither generated nor accepted. A non-NULL value means
that a Vendor ID payload will be generated (when acting
as an initiator) or is expected (when acting as a
responder).
6.14.4. The Property AggressiveModeGroupId
The property AggressiveModeGroupId specifies which group ID is to be
used in the first packets of the phase 1 negotiation. This property
is ignored unless the property ExchangeMode is set to 4 (aggressive
mode). If the AggressiveModeGroupID number is from the vendor-
specific range (32768-65535), the property VendorID qualifies the
group number. The property is defined as follows:
NAME AggressiveModeGroupId
DESCRIPTION Specifies the group ID to be used for aggressive mode.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
6.15. The Class PeerGateway
The class PeerGateway specifies the security gateway with which the
IKE services negotiates. The class definition for PeerGateway is as
follows:
NAME PeerGateway
DESCRIPTION Specifies the security gateway with which to negotiate.
DERIVED FROM LogicalElement (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
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PROPERTIES Name
PeerIdentityType
PeerIdentity
Note: the class PeerIdentityEntry contains more information about
the peer (namely its IP address).
6.15.1. The Property Name
The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for this security
gateway. The property is defined as follows:
NAME Name
DESCRIPTION Specifies a user-friendly name for this security
gateway.
SYNTAX string
6.15.2. The Property PeerIdentityType
The property PeerIdentityType specifies the IKE identity type of the
security gateway. The property is defined as follows:
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NAME PeerIdentityType
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE identity type of the security
gateway.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
6.15.3. The Property PeerIdentity
The property PeerIdentity specifies the IKE identity value of the
security gateway. A Based upon the storage chosen for the task-
specific mapping of the information model, a conversion may be
needed between from the stored representation of the PeerIdentity string representation and to
the real value used in the ID payload (e.g. IP address is to be
converted from a dotted decimal string into 4 bytes). The property
is defined as follows:
NAME PeerIdentity
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IKE identity value of the security
gateway.
SYNTAX string
6.16. The Association Class PeerGatewayForTunnel
The class PeerGatewayForTunnel associates IPsecTunnelActions with an
ordered list of PeerGateways. The class definition for
PeerGatewayForTunnel is as follows:
NAME PeerGatewayForTunnel
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DESCRIPTION Associates IPsecTunnelActions with an ordered list of
PeerGateways.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref PeerGateway[0..n]]
Dependent [ref IPsecTunnelAction[0..n]]
SequenceNumber
6.16.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that there an IPsecTunnelAction instance may
be associated with zero or more PeerGateway instances.
Note: the cardinality 0 has a specific meaning:
- when the IKE service acts as a responder, this means that
the IKE service will accept phase 1 negotiation with any
other security gateway;
- when the IKE service acts as an initiator, this means that
the IKE service will use the destination IP address (of
the IP packets which triggered the SARule) as the IP
address of the peer IKE entity.
6.16.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IPsecTunnelAction instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a PeerGateway instance may be associated
with zero or more IPsecTunnelAction instances.
6.16.3. The Property SequenceNumber
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The property SequenceNumber specifies the ordering to be used when
evaluating PeerGateway instances for a given IPsecTunnelAction. The
property is defined as follows:
NAME SequenceNumber
DESCRIPTION Specifies the order of evaluation for PeerGateways.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Lower values are evaluated first.
6.17. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal
The class ContainedProposal associates an ordered list of
SAProposals with the IKENegotiationAction that aggregates it. If
the referenced IKENegotiationAction object is an IKEAction, then the
referenced SAProposal object(s) must be IKEProposal(s). If the
referenced IKENegotiationAction object is an IPsecTransportAction or
an IPsecTunnelAction, then the referenced SAProposal object(s) must
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be IPsecProposal(s). The class definition for ContainedProposal is
as follows:
NAME ContainedProposal
DESCRIPTION Associates an ordered list of SAProposals with an
IKENegotiationAction.
DERIVED FROM PolicyComponent (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES GroupComponent[ref IKENegotiationAction[0..n]]
PartComponent[ref SAProposal[1..n]]
SequenceNumber
6.17.1. The Reference GroupComponent
- The property GroupComponent is inherited from
PolicyComponent and is overridden to refer to an
IKENegotiationAction instance. The [0..n] cardinality
indicates that an SAProposal instance may be associated with
zero or more IKENegotiationAction instances.
6.17.2. The Reference PartComponent
The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
overridden to refer to an SAProposal instance. The [1..n]
cardinality indicates that an IKENegotiationAction instance MUST be
associated with at least one SAProposal instance.
6.17.3. The Property SequenceNumber
The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for
the SAProposals. The property is defined as follows:
NAME SequenceNumber
DESCRIPTION Specifies the preference order for the SAProposals.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Lower-valued proposals are preferred over proposals
with higher values. For ContainedProposals that
reference the same IKENegotiationAction, SequenceNumber
values must be unique.
6.18. The Association Class HostedPeerGatewayInformation
The class HostedPeerGatewayInformation weakly associates a
PeerGateway with a System. The class definition for
HostedPeerGatewayInformation is as follows:
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NAME HostedPeerGatewayInformation
DESCRIPTION Weakly associates a PeerGateway with a System.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
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PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref System[1..1]]
Dependent [ref PeerGateway[0..n] [weak]]
6.18.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a System instance. The [1..1] cardinality
indicates that a PeerGateway instance MUST be associated with one
and only one System instance.
6.18.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
zero or more PeerGateway instances.
6.19. The Association Class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
The class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction associates a
PreconfiguredSAAction with two, four or six SATransforms that will
be applied to the inbound and outbound traffic. The order of
application of the SATransforms is implicitly defined in [IPSEC].
The class definition for TransformOfPreconfiguredAction is as
follows:
NAME TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
DESCRIPTION Associates a PreconfiguredSAAction with from one to
three SATransforms.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref SATransform[2..6]]
Dependent[ref PreconfiguredSAAction[0..n]]
SPI
Direction
6.19.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an SATransform instance. The [2..6]
cardinality indicates that an PreconfiguredSAAction instance may be
associated with from two to six SATransform instances.
6.19.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PreconfiguredSAAction instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an SATransform instance may be associated
with zero or more PreconfiguredSAAction instances.
6.19.3. The Property SPI
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The property SPI specifies the SPI to be used by the pre-configured
action for the associated transform. The property is defined as
follows:
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NAME SPI
DESCRIPTION Specifies the SPI to be used with the SATransform.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer
6.19.4. The Property Direction
The property Direction specifies whether the SPI property is for
inbound or for outbound traffic. The property is defined as follows:
NAME Direction
DESCRIPTION Specifies whether the SA is for inbound or outbound
traffic.
SYNTAX unsigned 8-bit integer
VALUE 1 - this SA is for inbound traffic
2 - this SA is for outbound traffic
6.20 The Association Class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
The class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel associates zero or one
PeerGateway with multiple PreconfiguredTunnelActions. The class
definition for PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel is as follows:
NAME PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
DESCRIPTION Associates a PeerGateway with multiple
PreconfiguredTunnelAction.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref PeerGateway[0..1]]
Dependent[ref PreconfiguredTunnelAction[0..n]]
6.20.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an PeerGateway instance. The [0..1]
cardinality indicates that an PreconfiguredTunnelAction instance may
be associated with one PeerGteway instance.
6.20.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PreconfiguredTunnelAction instance. The
[0..n] cardinality indicates that an PeerGateway instance may be
associated with zero or more PreconfiguredSAAction instances.
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7. Proposal and Transform Classes
The proposal and transform classes model the proposal settings an
IPsec device will use during IKE phase 1 and 2 negotiations.
+--------------+*w 1+--------------+
| [SAProposal] |--------| System |
+--------------+ (a) | ([CIMCORE]) |
^ +--------------+
| |1
+----------------------+ |
| | |
+-------------+ +---------------+ |
| IKEProposal | | IPsecProposal | |
+-------------+ +---------------+ |
*o |
|(b) |(c)
n| |
+---------------+*w |
| [SATransform] |----+
+---------------+
^
|
+--------------------+-----------+---------+
| | |
+-------------+ +--------------+ +----------------+
| AHTransform | | ESPTransform | |IPCOMPTransform |
+-------------+ +--------------+ +----------------+
(a) SAProposalInSystem
(b) ContainedTransform
(c) SATransformInSystem
7.1. The Abstract Class SAProposal
The abstract class SAProposal serves as the base class for the IKE
and IPsec proposal classes. It specifies the parameters that are
common to the two proposal types. The class definition for
SAProposal is as follows:
NAME SAProposal
DESCRIPTION Specifies the common proposal parameters for IKE and
IPsec security association negotiation.
DERIVED FROM Policy ([PCIM])
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES Name
7.1.1. The Property Name
The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for the SAProposal.
The property is defined as follows:
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NAME Name
DESCRIPTION Specifies a user-friendly name for this proposal.
SYNTAX string
7.2. The Class IKEProposal
The class IKEProposal specifies the proposal parameters necessary to
drive an IKE security association negotiation. The class definition
for IKEProposal is as follows:
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NAME IKEProposal
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposal parameters for IKE security
association negotiation.
DERIVED FROM SAProposal
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES CipherAlgorithm
HashAlgorithm
PRFAlgorithm
GroupId
AuthenticationMethod
MaxLifetimeSeconds
MaxLifetimeKilobytes
VendorID
7.2.1. The Property CipherAlgorithm
The property CipherAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
association encryption algorithm. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME CipherAlgorithm
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposed encryption algorithm for the
phase 1 security association.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [IKE] for valid values.
7.2.2. The Property HashAlgorithm
The property HashAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
association hash algorithm. The property is defined as follows:
NAME HashAlgorithm
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposed hash algorithm for the phase 1
security association.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [IKE] for valid values.
7.2.3. The Property PRFAlgorithm
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The property PRFAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
association pseudo-random function. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME PRFAlgorithm
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposed pseudo-random function for the
phase 1 security association.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Currently none defined in [IKE], if [IKE, DOI] are
extended, then the values of [IKE, DOI] are to be used
for values of PRFAlgorithm.
7.2.4. The Property GroupId
The property GroupId specifies the proposed phase 1 security
association key exchange group. This property is ignored for all
aggressive mode exchanges. If the GroupID number is from the vendor-
specific
vendor-specific range (32768-65535), the property VendorID qualifies
the group number. The property is defined as follows:
NAME GroupId
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposed key exchange group for the phase
1 security association.
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SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [IKE] for valid values.
Note: the value of this property is to be ignored when doing
aggressive mode.
7.2.5. The Property AuthenticationMethod
The property AuthenticationMethod specifies the proposed phase 1
authentication method. The property is defined as follows:
NAME AuthenticationMethod
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposed authentication method for the
phase 1 security association.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 0 - a special value that indicates that this particular
proposal should be repeated once for each
authentication method that corresponds to the
credentials installed on the machine. For example, if
the system has a pre-
shared pre-shared key and a certificate, a
proposal list could be constructed which includes a
proposal that specifies pre-shared key and proposals
for any of the public-key authentication methods.
Consult [IKE] for valid values.
7.2.6. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds
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The property MaxLifetimeSeconds specifies the maximum time, in
seconds, to propose that a security association will remain valid
after its creation. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MaxLifetimeSeconds
DESCRIPTION Specifies the maximum time to propose a security
association remain valid.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that the default of 8 hours
be used. A non-zero value indicates the maximum
seconds lifetime.
Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
7.2.7. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes
The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies the maximum kilobyte
lifetime to propose that a security association will remain valid
after its creation. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MaxLifetimeKilobytes
DESCRIPTION Specifies the maximum kilobyte lifetime to propose a
security association remain valid.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there should be no
maximum kilobyte lifetime. A non-zero value specifies
the desired kilobyte lifetime.
Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
7.2.8. The Property VendorID
The property VendorID further qualifies the key exchange group. The
property is ignored unless the exchange is not in aggressive mode
and the property GroupID is in the vendor-specific range. The
property is defined as follows:
NAME VendorID
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DESCRIPTION Specifies the Vendor ID to further qualify the key
exchange group.
SYNTAX string
7.3. The Class IPsecProposal
The class IPsecProposal adds no new properties, but inherits
proposal properties from SAProposal as well as aggregating the
security association transforms necessary for building an IPsec
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proposal (see the aggregation class ContainedTransform). The class
definition for IPsecProposal is as follows:
NAME IPsecProposal
DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposal parameters for IPsec security
association negotiation.
DERIVED FROM SAProposal
ABSTRACT FALSE
7.4. The Abstract Class SATransform
The abstract class SATransform serves as the base class for the
IPsec transforms that can be used to compose an IPsec proposal or to
be used as a pre-configured action. The class definition for
SATransform is as follows:
NAME SATransform
DESCRIPTION Base class for the different IPsec transforms.
ABSTRACT TRUE
PROPERTIES CommonName (from Policy)
VendorID
MaxLifetimeSeconds
MaxLifetimeKilobytes
7.4.1. The Property CommonName
The property CommonName is inherited from Policy [PCIM] and
specifies a user-friendly name for the SATransform. The property is
defined as follows:
NAME CommonName
DESCRIPTION Specifies a user-friendly name for this Policy-related
object.
SYNTAX string
7.4.2. The Property VendorID
The property VendorID specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined
transforms. The property is defined as follows:
NAME VendorID
DESCRIPTION Specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined transforms.
SYNTAX string
VALUE An empty VendorID string indicates that the transform
is a standard one.
7.4.3. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds
The property MaxLifetimeSeconds specifies the maximum time, in
seconds, to propose that a security association will remain valid
after its creation. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MaxLifetimeSeconds
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NAME MaxLifetimeSeconds
DESCRIPTION Specifies the maximum time to propose a security
association remain valid.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that the default of 8 hours
be used. A non-zero value indicates the maximum
seconds lifetime.
7.4.4. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes
The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies
Note: while IKE can negotiate the maximum kilobyte lifetime to as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
7.4.4. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes
The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies the maximum kilobyte
lifetime to propose that a security association will remain valid
after its creation. The property is defined as follows:
NAME MaxLifetimeKilobytes
DESCRIPTION Specifies the maximum kilobyte lifetime to propose a
security association remain valid.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit 64-bit integer
VALUE A value of zero indicates that there should be no
maximum kilobyte lifetime. A non-zero value specifies
the desired kilobyte lifetime.
Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
sufficient.
7.5. The Class AHTransform
The class AHTransform specifies the AH algorithm to propose during
IPsec security association negotiation. The class definition for
AHTransform is as follows:
NAME AHTransform
DESCRIPTION Specifies the AH algorithm to propose.
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES AHTransformId
UseReplayPrevention
ReplayPreventionWindowSize
7.5.1. The Property AHTransformId
The property AHTransformId specifies the transform ID of the AH
algorithm to propose. The property is defined as follows:
NAME AHTransformId
DESCRIPTION Specifies the transform ID of the AH algorithm.
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SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
7.5.2. The Property UseReplayPrevention
The property UseReplayPrevention specifies whether replay prevention
detection is to be used. The property is defined as follows:
NAME UseReplayPrevention
DESCRIPTION Specifies whether to enable replay prevention
detection.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE true - replay prevention detection is enabled.
false - replay prevention detection is disabled.
7.5.3. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize
The property ReplayPreventionWindowSize specifies, in bits, the
length of the sliding window used by the replay prevention detection
mechanism. The value of this property is meaningless if
UseReplayPrevention is false. It is assumed that the window size
will be power of 2. The property is defined as follows:
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NAME ReplayPreventionWindowSize
DESCRIPTION Specifies the length of the window used by replay
prevention detection mechanism.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer
7.6. The Class ESPTransform
The class ESPTransform specifies the ESP algorithms to propose
during IPsec security association negotiation. The class definition
for ESPTransform is as follows:
NAME ESPTransform
DESCRIPTION Specifies the ESP algorithms to propose.
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES IntegrityTransformId
CipherTransformId
CipherKeyLength
CipherKeyRounds
UseReplayPrevention
ReplayPreventionWindowSize
7.6.1. The Property IntegrityTransformId
The property IntegrityTransformId specifies the transform ID of the
ESP integrity algorithm to propose. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME IntegrityTransformId
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DESCRIPTION Specifies the transform ID of the ESP integrity
algorithm.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
7.6.2. The Property CipherTransformId
The property CipherTransformId specifies the transform ID of the ESP
encryption algorithm to propose. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME CipherTransformId
DESCRIPTION Specifies the transform ID of the ESP encryption
algorithm.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Consult [DOI] for valid values.
7.6.3. The Property CipherKeyLength
The property CipherKeyLength specifies, in bits, the key length for
the ESP encryption algorithm. For encryption algorithms that use
fixed-length keys, this value is ignored. The property is defined
as follows:
NAME CipherKeyLength
DESCRIPTION Specifies the ESP encryption key length in bits.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
7.6.4. The Property CipherKeyRounds
The property CipherKeyRounds specifies the number of key rounds for
the ESP encryption algorithm. For encryption algorithms that use
fixed number of key rounds, this value is ignored. The property is
defined as follows:
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NAME CipherKeyRounds
DESCRIPTION Specifies the number of key rounds for the ESP
encryption algorithm.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Currently, key rounds are not defined for any ESP
encryption algorithms.
7.6.5. The Property UseReplayPrevention
The property UseReplayPrevention specifies whether replay prevention
detection is to be used. The property is defined as follows:
NAME UseReplayPrevention
DESCRIPTION Specifies whether to enable replay prevention
detection.
SYNTAX boolean
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VALUE true - replay prevention detection is enabled.
false - replay prevention detection is disabled.
7.6.6. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize
The property ReplayPreventionWindowSize specifies, in bits, the
length of the sliding window used by the replay prevention detection
mechanism. The value of this property is meaningless if
UseReplayPrevention is false. It is assumed that the window size
will be power of 2. The property is defined as follows:
NAME ReplayPreventionWindowSize
DESCRIPTION Specifies the length of the window used by replay
prevention detection mechanism.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer
7.7. The Class IPCOMPTransform
The class IPCOMPTransform specifies the IP compression (IPCOMP)
algorithm to propose during IPsec security association negotiation.
The class definition for IPCOMPTransform is as follows:
NAME IPCOMPTransform
DESCRIPTION Specifies the IPCOMP algorithm to propose.
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Algorithm
DictionarySize
PrivateAlgorithm
7.7.1. The Property Algorithm
The property Algorithm specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP
compression algorithm to propose. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME Algorithm
DESCRIPTION Specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP compression
algorithm.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 1 - OUI: a vendor specific algorithm is used and
specified in the property PrivateAlgorithm. Consult
[DOI] for other valid values.
7.7.2. The Property DictionarySize
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The property DictionarySize specifies the log2 maximum size of the
dictionary for the compression algorithm. For compression
algorithms that have pre-defined dictionary sizes, this value is
ignored. The property is defined as follows:
NAME DictionarySize
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DESCRIPTION Specifies the log2 maximum size of the dictionary.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
7.7.3. The Property PrivateAlgorithm
The property PrivateAlgorithm specifies a private vendor-specific
compression algorithm. This value is only used when the property
Algorithm is 1 (OUI). The property is defined as follows:
NAME PrivateAlgorithm
DESCRIPTION Specifies a private vendor-specific compression
algorithm.
SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer
7.8. The Association Class SAProposalInSystem
The class SAProposalInSystem weakly associates SAProposals with a
System. The class definition for SAProposalInSystem is as follows:
NAME SAProposalInSystem
DESCRIPTION Weakly associates SAProposals with a System.
DERIVED FROM PolicyInSystem (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref System [1..1]]
Dependent[ref SAProposal[0..n] [weak]]
7.8.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
overridden to refer to a System instance. The [1..1] cardinality
indicates that an SAProposal instance MUST be associated with one
and only one System instance.
7.8.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
overridden to refer to an SAProposal instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
zero or more SAProposal instances.
7.9. The Aggregation Class ContainedTransform
The class ContainedTransform associates an IPsecProposal with the
set of SATransforms that make up the proposal. If multiple
transforms of the same type are in a proposal, then they are to be
logically ORed and the order of preference is dictated by the
SequenceNumber property. Sets of transforms of different types are
logically ANDed. For example, if the ordered proposal list were
ESP = { (HMAC-MD5, 3DES), (HMAC-MD5, DES) }
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AH = { MD5, SHA-1 }
then the one sending the proposal would want the other side to pick
one from the ESP transform (preferably (HMAC-MD5, 3DES)) list AND
one from the AH transform list (preferably MD5).
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The class definition for ContainedTransform is as follows:
NAME ContainedTransform
DESCRIPTION Associates an IPsecProposal with the set of
SATransforms that make up the proposal.
DERIVED FROM PolicyComponent (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES GroupComponent[ref IPsecProposal[0..n]]
PartComponent[ref SATransform[1..n]]
SequenceNumber
7.9.1. The Reference GroupComponent
The property GroupComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
overridden to refer to an IPsecProposal instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an SATransform instance may be associated
with zero or more IPsecProposal instances.
7.9.2. The Reference PartComponent
The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
overridden to refer to an SATransform instance. The [1..n]
cardinality indicates that an IPsecProposal instance MUST be
associated with at least one SATransform instance.
7.9.3. The Property SequenceNumber
The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for
the SATransforms of the same type. The property is defined as
follows:
NAME SequenceNumber
DESCRIPTION Specifies the preference order for the SATransforms of
the same type.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE Lower-valued transforms are preferred over transforms
of the same type with higher values. For
ContainedTransforms that reference the same
IPsecProposal, SequenceNumber values must be unique.
7.10. The Association Class SATransformInSystem
The class SATransformInSystem weakly associates SATransforms with a
System. The class definition for SATransformInSystem System is as
follows:
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NAME SATransformInSystem
DESCRIPTION Weakly associates SATransforms with a System.
DERIVED FROM PolicyInSystem (see [PCIM])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent[ref System[1..1]]
Dependent[ref SATransform[0..n] [weak]]
7.10.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
overridden to refer to a System instance. The [1..1] cardinality
indicates that an SATransform instance MUST be associated with one
and only one System instance.
7.10.2. The Reference Dependent
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The property Dependent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
overridden to refer to an SATransform instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
zero or more SATransform instances.
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8. IKE Service and Identity Classes
+--------------+ +-------------------+
| System | | PeerIdentityEntry |
| ([CIMCORE]) | +-------------------+
+--------------+ |*w
1| (a) (b) |
+---+ +------------+
| |
|*w 1 o
+-------------+ +-------------------+ +---------------------+
| PeerGateway | | PeerIdentityTable | | AutostartIKESetting |
+-------------+ +-------------------+ +---------------------+
*| *| *| *|
+----------------------+ |(d) +----------+ |
(c) *| *| *| (e) |
*+------------+* |(f)
+-----------------| IKEService |-----+ |
| (g) +------------+ |(h) |
0..1| *| *| *o
+--------------------+ | +---------------------------+
| IPProtocolEndpoint | | | AutostartIKEConfiguration |
| ([CIMNETWORK]) | (i)| +---------------------------+
+--------------------+ |
0..1| |
|(j) +----------------+
*| |*
+-------------+* (k) +------------+ +-----------------------------+
| IKEIdentity |-------| Collection | | CredentialManagementService |
+-------------+ 0..1| ([CIMCORE])| | ([CIMUSER]) |
*| +------------+ +-----------------------------+
|(l)
*|
+--------------+
| Credential |
| ([CIMUSER]) |
+--------------+
(a) HostedPeerIdentityTable
(b) PeerIdentityMember
(c) IKEServicePeerGateway
(d) IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
(e) IKEAutostartSetting
(f) AutostartIKESettingContext
(g) IKEServiceForEndpoint
(h) IKEAutostartConfiguration
(i) IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
(j) EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
(k) CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
(l) IKEIdentitysCredential
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This portion of the model contains additional information that is
useful in applying the policy. The IKEService class MAY be used to
represent the IKE negotiation function in a system. The IKEService
uses the various tables that contain information about IKE peers as
well as the configuration for specifying security associations that
are started automatically. The information in the PeerGateway,
PeerIdentityTable and related classes is necessary to completely
specify the policies.
An interface (represented by an IPProtocolEndpoint) has an
IKEService that provides the negotiation services for that
interface. That
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associations automatically started at the time the IKE service is
initialized.
The IKEService also has a set of identities that it may use in
negotiations with its peers. Those identities are associated with
the interfaces (or collections of interfaces).
8.1. The Class IKEService
The class IKEService represents the IKE negotiation function. An
instance of this service may provide that negotiation service for
one or more interfaces (represented by the IPProtocolEndpoint class)
of a System. There may be multiple instances of IKE services on a
System but only one per interface. The class definition for
IKEService is as follows:
NAME IKEService
DESCRIPTION IKEService is used to represent the IKE negotiation
function.
DERIVED FROM Service (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
8.2. The Class PeerIdentityTable
The class PeerIdentityTable aggregates the table entries that
provide mappings between identities and their addresses. The class
definition for PeerIdentityTable is as follows:
NAME PeerIdentityTable
DESCRIPTION PeerIdentityTable aggregates PeerIdentityEntry
instances to provide a table of identity-address
mappings.
DERIVED FROM Collection (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Name
8.2.1. The Property Name
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The property Name uniquely identifies the table. The property is
defined as follows:
NAME Name
DESCRIPTION Name uniquely identifies the table.
SYNTAX string
8.3. The Class PeerIdentityEntry
The class PeerIdentityEntry specifies the mapping between peer
identity and their IP address. The class definition for
PeerIdentityEntry is as follows:
NAME PeerIdentityEntry
DESCRIPTION PeerIdentityEntry provides a mapping between a peer's
identity and address.
DERIVED FROM LogicalElement (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES PeerIdentity
PeerIdentityType
PeerAddress
PeerAddressType
The pre-shared key to be used with this peer (if applicable) is
contained in an instance of the class SharedSecret (see [CIMUSER]).
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The pre-shared key is stored in the property Secret, the property
protocol contains "IKE", the property algorithm contains the
algorithm used to protect the secret (can be "PLAINTEXT" if the
IPsec entity has no secret storage), the value of property RemoteID
must match the PeerIdentity property of the PeerIdentityEntry
instance describing the IKE peer.
8.3.1. The Property PeerIdentity
The property PeerIdentity contains a string encoding of the Identity
payload for the IKE peer. The property is defined as follows:
NAME PeerIdentity
DESCRIPTION The PeerIdentity is the ID payload of a peer.
SYNTAX string
8.3.2. The Property PeerIdentityType
The property PeerIdentityType is an enumeration that specifies the
type of the PeerIdentity. The property is defined as follows:
NAME PeerIdentityType
DESCRIPTION PeerIdentityType is the type of the ID payload of a
peer.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE The enumeration values are specified in [DOI] section
4.6.2.1.
8.3.3. The
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VALUE The enumeration values are specified in [DOI] section
4.6.2.1.
8.3.3. The Property PeerAddress
The property PeerAddress specifies the string representation of the
IP address of the peer formatted according to the appropriate
convention as defined in the PeerAddressType property (e.g., dotted
decimal notation). The property is defined as follows:
NAME PeerAddress
DESCRIPTION PeerAddress is the address of the peer with the ID
payload.
SYNTAX string
VALUE String representation of an IPv4 or IPv6 address.
8.3.4. The Property PeerAddressType
The property PeerAddressType specifies the format of the PeerAddress
property value. The property is defined as follows:
NAME PeerAddressType
DESCRIPTION PeerAddressType is the type of address in PeerAddress.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 0 - Unknown
1 - IPv4
2 - IPv6
8.4. The Class AutostartIKEConfiguration
The class AutostartIKEConfiguration groups AutostartIKESetting
instances into configuration sets. When applied, the settings cause
an IKE service to automatically start (negotiate or statically set
as appropriate) the Security Associations. The class definition for
AutostartIKEConfiguration is as follows:
NAME AutostartIKEConfiguration
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DESCRIPTION A configuration set of AutostartIKESetting instances to
be automatically started by the IKE service.
DERIVED FROM SystemConfiguration (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
8.5. The Class AutostartIKESetting
The class AutostartIKESetting is used to automatically initiate IKE
negotiations with peers (or statically create an SA) as specified in
the AutostartIKESetting properties. Appropriate actions are
initiated according to the policy that matches the setting
parameters. The class definition for AutostartIKESetting is as
follows:
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NAME AutostartIKESetting
DESCRIPTION AutostartIKESetting is used to automatically initiate
IKE negotiations with peers or statically create an SA.
DERIVED FROM SystemSetting (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Phase1Only
AddressType
SourceAddress
SourcePort
DestinationAddress
DestinationPort
Protocol
8.5.1. The Property Phase1Only
The property Phase1Only is used to limit the IKE negotiation to a
phase 1 SA establishment only. When set to False, both phase 1 and
phase 2 SAs are negotiated.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME Phase1Only
DESCRIPTION Used to indicate which security associations to attempt
to establish (phase 1 only, or phase 1 and 2).
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE true - attempt to establish a phase 1 security
association
false - attempt to establish phase 1 and phase 2
security associations
8.5.2. The Property AddressType
The property AddressType specifies type of the addresses in the
SourceAddress and DestinationAddress properties. The property is
defined as follows:
NAME AddressType
DESCRIPTION AddressType is the type of address in SourceAddress and
DestinationAddress properties.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE 0 - Unknown
1 - IPv4
2 - IPv6
8.5.3. The Property SourceAddress
The property SourceAddress specifies the dotted-decimal or colon-
decimal formatted IP address used as the source address in comparing
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with policy filter entries and used in any phase 2 negotiations.
The property is defined as follows:
NAME SourceAddress
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DESCRIPTION The source address to compare with the filters to
determine the appropriate policy rule.
SYNTAX string
VALUE dotted-decimal or colon-decimal formatted IP address
8.5.4. The Property SourcePort
The property SourcePort specifies the port number used as the source
port in comparing with policy filter entries and used in any phase 2
negotiations. The property is defined as follows:
NAME SourcePort
DESCRIPTION The source port to compare with the filters to
determine the appropriate policy rule.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
8.5.5. The Property DestinationAddress
The property DestinationAddress specifies the dotted-decimal or
colon-decimal formatted IP address used as the destination address
in comparing with policy filter entries and used in any phase 2
negotiations. The property is defined as follows:
NAME DestinationAddress
DESCRIPTION The destination address to compare with the filters to
determine the appropriate policy rule.
SYNTAX string
VALUE dotted-decimal or colon-decimal formatted IP address
8.5.6. The Property DestinationPort
The property DestinationPort specifies the port number used as the
destination port in comparing with policy filter entries and used in
any phase 2 negotiations. The property is defined as follows:
NAME DestinationPort
DESCRIPTION The destination port to compare with the filters to
determine the appropriate policy rule.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
8.5.7. The Property Protocol
The property Protocol specifies the protocol number used in
comparing with policy filter entries and used in any phase 2
negotiations. The property is defined as follows:
NAME Protocol
DESCRIPTION The protocol number used in comparing with policy
filter entries.
SYNTAX unsigned 8-bit integer
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8.6. The Class IKEIdentity
The class IKEIdentity is used to represent the identities that may
be used for an IPProtocolEndpoint (or collection of
IPProtocolEndpoints) to identify the IKE Service in IKE phase 1
negotiations. The policy IKEAction.UseIKEIdentityType specifies
which type of the available identities to use in a negotiation
exchange and the
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to be used, along with the local address, in selecting the
appropriate identity for a negotiation. The ElementID property value
(defined in the parent class, UsersAccess) should be that of either
the IPProtocolEndpoint or Collection of endpoints as appropriate.
The class definition for IKEIdentity is as follows:
NAME IKEIdentity
DESCRIPTION IKEIdentity is used to represent the identities that
may be used for an IPProtocolEndpoint (or collection of
IPProtocolEndpoints) to identify the IKE Service in IKE
phase 1 negotiations.
DERIVED FROM UsersAccess (see [CIMUSER])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES IdentityType
IdentityValue
IdentityContexts
8.6.1. The Property IdentityType
The property IdentityType is an enumeration that specifies the type
of the IdentityValue. The property is defined as follows:
NAME IdentityType
DESCRIPTION IdentityType is the type of the IdentityValue.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
VALUE The enumeration values are specified in [DOI] section
4.6.2.1.
8.6.2. The Property IdentityValue
The property IdentityValue contains a string encoding of the
Identity payload. For IKEIdentity instances that are address types
(i.e. IPv4 or IPv6 addresses), the IdentityValue string value MAY be
omitted; then the associated IPProtocolEndpoint (or appropriate
member of the Collection of endpoints) is used as the identity
value. The property is defined as follows:
NAME IdentityValue
DESCRIPTION IdentityValue contains a string encoding of the
Identity payload.
SYNTAX string
8.6.3. The Property IdentityContexts
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The IdentityContexts property is used to constrain the use of
IKEIdentity instances to match that specified in the
IKERule.IdentityContexts. The IdentityContexts are formatted as
policy roles and role combinations [PCIM] & [PCIMe]. [PCIME]. Each value
represents one context or context combination. Since this is a
multi-valued property, more than one context or combination of
contexts can be associated with a single IKEIdentity. Each value is
a string of the form: <ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
where the individual context names appear in alphabetical order
(according to the collating sequence for UCS-2). If one or more
values in the IKERule.IdentityContexts array match one or more
IKEIdentity.IdentityContexts then the identity's context matches.
(That is, each value of the IdentityContext array is an ORed
condition.) In combination with the address of the
IPProtocolEndpoint and IKEAction.UseIKEIdentityType, there SHOULD be
exactly one IKEIdentity. The property is defined as follows:
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NAME IdentityContexts
DESCRIPTION The IKE service of a security endpoint may have
multiple identities for use in different situations.
The combination of the interface (represented by
the IPProtocolEndpoint), the identity type (as
specified in the IKEAction) and the IdentityContexts
selects a unique identity.
SYNTAX string array
VALUE string of the form <ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
8.7. The Association Class HostedPeerIdentityTable
The class HostedPeerIdentityTable provides the name scoping
relationship for PeerIdentityTable entries in a System. The
PeerIdentityTable is weak to the System. The class definition for
HostedPeerIdentityTable is as follows:
NAME HostedPeerIdentityTable
DESCRIPTION The PeerIdentityTable instances are weak (name scoped
by) the owning System.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref System[1..1]]
Dependent [ref PeerIdentityTable[0..n] [weak]]
8.7.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a System instance. The [1..1] cardinality
indicates that a PeerIdentityTable instance MUST be associated in a
weak relationship with one and only one System instance.
8.7.2. The Reference Dependent
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The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
zero or more PeerIdentityTable instances.
8.8. The Aggregation Class PeerIdentityMember
The class PeerIdentityMember aggregates PeerIdentityEntry instances
into a PeerIdentityTable. This is a weak aggregation. The class
definition for PeerIdentityMember is as follows:
NAME PeerIdentityMember
DESCRIPTION PeerIdentityMember aggregates PeerIdentityEntry
instances into a PeerIdentityTable.
DERIVED FROM MemberOfCollection (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Collection [ref PeerIdentityTable[1..1]]
Member [ref PeerIdentityEntry [0..n] [weak]]
8.8.1. The Reference Collection
The property Collection is inherited from MemberOfCollection and is
overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance. The [1..1]
cardinality indicates that a PeerIdentityEntry instance MUST be
associated with one and only one PeerIdentityTable instance (i.e.,
PeerIdentityEntry instances are not shared across
PeerIdentityTables).
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8.8.2. The Reference Member
The property Member is inherited from MemberOfCollection and is
overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityEntry instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a PeerIdentityTable instance may be
associated with zero or more PeerIdentityEntry instances.
8.9. The Association Class IKEServicePeerGateway
The class IKEServicePeerGateway provides the association between an
IKEService and the list of PeerGateway instances that it uses in
negotiating with security gateways. The class definition for
IKEServicePeerGateway is as follows:
NAME IKEServicePeerGateway
DESCRIPTION Associates an IKEService and the list of PeerGateway
instances that it uses in negotiating with security
gateways.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref PeerGateway[0..n]]
Dependent [ref IKEService[0..n]]
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8.9.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
with zero or more PeerGateway instances.
8.9.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a PeerGateway instance may be associated
with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.10. The Association Class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
The class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable provides the relationship
between an IKEService and a PeerIdentityTable that it uses to map
between addresses and identities as required. The class definition
for IKEServicePeerIdentityTable is as follows:
NAME IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
DESCRIPTION IKEServicePeerIdentityTable provides the relationship
between an IKEService and a PeerIdentityTable that it
uses.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref PeerIdentityTable[0..n]]
Dependent [ref IKEService[0..n]]
8.10.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
with zero or more PeerIdentityTable instances.
8.10.2. The Reference Dependent
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The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a PeerIdentityTable instance may be
associated with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.11. The Association Class IKEAutostartSetting
The class IKEAutostartSetting associates an AutostartIKESetting with
an IKEService that may use it to automatically start an IKE
negotiation or create a static SA. The class definition for
IKEAutostartSetting is as follows:
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NAME IKEAutostartSetting
DESCRIPTION Associates a AutostartIKESetting with an IKEService.
DERIVED FROM ElementSetting (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Element [ref IKEService[0..n]]
Setting [ref AutostartIKESetting[0..n]]
8.11.1. The Reference Element
The property Element is inherited from ElementSetting and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates an AutostartIKESetting instance may be
associated with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.11.2. The Reference Setting
The property Setting is inherited from ElementSetting and is
overridden to refer to an AutostartIKESetting instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
with zero or more AutostartIKESetting instances.
8.12. The Aggregation Class AutostartIKESettingContext
The class AutostartIKESettingContext aggregates the settings used to
automatically start negotiations or create a static SA into a
configuration set. The class definition for
AutostartIKESettingContext is as follows:
NAME AutostartIKESettingContext
DESCRIPTION AutostartIKESettingContext aggregates the
AutostartIKESetting instances into a configuration set.
DERIVED FROM SystemSettingContext (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Context [ref AutostartIKEConfiguration [0..n]]
Setting [ref AutostartIKESetting [0..n]]
SequenceNumber
8.12.1. The Reference Context
The property Context is inherited from SystemSettingContext and is
overridden to refer to an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance. The
[0..n] cardinality indicates that an AutostartIKESetting instance
may be associated with zero or more AutostartIKEConfiguration
instances (i.e., a setting may be in multiple configuration sets).
8.12.2. The Reference Setting
The property Setting is inherited from SystemSettingContext and is
overridden to refer to an AutostartIKESetting instance. The [0..n]
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cardinality indicates that an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance may
be associated with zero or more AutostartIKESetting instances.
8.12.3. The Property SequenceNumber
The property SequenceNumber specifies indicates the ordering to be
used when starting negotiations or creating a static SA. A zero
value indicates that order is not significant and settings may be
applied in parallel with other settings. All other settings in the
configuration are executed in sequence from lower values to high.
Sequence numbers need not be unique in an AutostartIKEConfiguration
and order is not significant for settings with the same sequence
number. The property is defined as follows:
NAME SequenceNumber
DESCRIPTION The sequence in which the settings are applied within a
configuration set.
SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
8.13. The Association Class IKEServiceForEndpoint
The class IKEServiceForEndpoint provides the association showing
which IKE service, if any, provides IKE negotiation services for
which network interfaces. The class definition for
IKEServiceForEndpoint is as follows:
NAME IKEServiceForEndpoint
DESCRIPTION Associates an IPProtocolEndpoint with an IKEService
that provides negotiation services for the endpoint.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref IKEService[0..1]]
Dependent [ref IPProtocolEndpoint[0..n]]
8.13.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..1]
cardinality indicates that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance MUST by
associated with at most one IKEService instance.
8.13.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint that is associated with
at most one IKEService. The [0..n] cardinality indicates an
IKEService instance may be associated with zero or more
IPProtocolEndpoint instances.
8.14. The Association Class IKEAutostartConfiguration
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The class IKEAutostartConfiguration provides the relationship
between an IKEService and a configuration set that it uses to
automatically start a set of SAs. The class definition for
IKEAutostartConfiguration is as follows:
NAME IKEAutostartConfiguration
DESCRIPTION IKEAutostartConfiguration provides the relationship
between an IKEService and an AutostartIKEConfiguration
that it uses to automatically start a set of SAs.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
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PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref AutostartIKEConfiguration [0..n]]
Dependent [ref IKEService [0..n]]
Active
8.14.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance. The
[0..n] cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be
associated with zero or more AutostartIKEConfiguration instances.
8.14.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance may
be associated with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.14.3. The Property Active
The property Active specifies indicates whether the
AutostartIKEConfiguration set is currently active for the associated
IKEService. That is, at boot time, the active configuration is used
to automatically start IKE negotiations and create static SAs. The
property is defined as follows:
NAME Active
DESCRIPTION Active indicates whether the AutostartIKEConfiguration
set is currently active for the associated IKEService.
SYNTAX boolean
VALUE true - AutostartIKEConfiguration is currently active
for associated IKEService.
false - AutostartIKEConfiguration is currently inactive
for associated IKEService.
8.15. The Association Class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
The class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService defines the set of
CredentialManagementService(s) that are trusted sources of
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credentials for IKE phase 1 negotiations. The class definition for
IKEUsesCredentialManagementService is as follows:
NAME IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
DESCRIPTION Associates the set of CredentialManagementService(s)
that are trusted by the IKEService as sources of
credentials used in IKE phase 1 negotiations.
DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref CredentialManagementService [0..n]]
Dependent [ref IKEService [0..n]]
8.15.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to a CredentialManagementService instance. The
[0..n] cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be
associated with zero or more CredentialManagementService instances.
8.15.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is
overridden to refer to an IKEService instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates
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may be associated with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.16. The Association Class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
The class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity associates an
IPProtocolEndpoint with a set of IKEIdentity instances that may be
used in negotiating security associations on the endpoint. An
IKEIdentity MUST be associated with either an IPProtocolEndpoint
using this association or with a collection of IKEIdentity instances
using the CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity association. The class
definition for EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity is as follows:
NAME EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
DESCRIPTION EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity associates an
IPProtocolEndpoint with a set of IKEIdentity instances.
DERIVED FROM ElementAsUser (see [CIMUSER])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref IPProtocolEndpoint [0..1]]
Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.16.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
overridden to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint instance. The [0..1]
cardinality indicates that an IKEIdentity instance MUST be
associated with at most one IPProtocolEndpoint instance.
8.16.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from
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8.16.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance may be
associated with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
8.17. The Association Class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
The class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity associates a Collection of
IPProtocolEndpoint instances with a set of IKEIdentity instances
that may be used in negotiating SAs for endpoints in the collection.
An IKEIdentity MUST be associated with either an IPProtocolEndpoint
using the EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity association or with a
collection of IKEIdentity instances using this association. The
class definition for CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity is as follows:
NAME CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
DESCRIPTION CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity associates a collection
of IPProtocolEndpoint instances with a set of
IKEIdentity instances.
DERIVED FROM ElementAsUser (see [CIMUSER])
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref Collection [0..1]]
Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.17.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
overridden to refer to a Collection instance. The [0..1]
cardinality indicates that an IKEIdentity instance MUST be
associated with at most one Collection instance.
8.17.2. The Reference Dependent
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The property Dependent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a Collection instance may be associated
with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
8.18. The Association Class IKEIdentitysCredential
The class IKEIdentitysCredential is an association that relates a
set of credentials to their corresponding local IKE Identities. The
class definition for IKEIdentitysCredential is as follows:
NAME IKEIdentitysCredential
DESCRIPTION IKEIdentitysCredential associates a set of credentials
to their corresponding local IKEIdentity.
DERIVED FROM UsersCredential (see [CIMCORE])
ABSTRACT FALSE
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PROPERTIES Antecedent [ref Credential [0..n]]
Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.18.1. The Reference Antecedent
The property Antecedent is inherited from UsersCredential and is
overridden to refer to a Credential instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that IKEIdentity instance may be associated
with zero or more Credential instances.
8.18.2. The Reference Dependent
The property Dependent is inherited from UsersCredential and is
overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance. The [0..n]
cardinality indicates that a Credential instance may be associated
with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
9. Implementation Requirements
The following table specifies which classes, properties,
associations and aggregations MUST or SHOULD or MAY be implemented.
4. Policy Classes
4.1. The Class IPsecPolicyGroup...............................MUST
4.2. The Class SARule........................................MUST
4.2.1. SARule..........................................MUST
4.1.1. The Property PolicyRuleName.............................MAY
4.2.1. PolicyRuleName..............................MAY
4.1.1. The Property Enabled..................................MUST
4.2.1. Enabled....................................MUST
4.1.1. The Property ConditionListType.........................MUST
4.2.1. ConditionListType..........................MUST
4.1.1. The Property RuleUsage..................................MAY
4.2.1. RuleUsage...................................MAY
4.1.1. The Property Mandatory..................................MAY
4.2.1. Mandatory...................................MAY
4.1.1. The Property SequencedActions..........................MUST
4.2.1. SequencedActions...........................MUST
4.1.1. The Property PolicyRoles................................MAY
4.2.1. PolicyRoles.................................MAY
4.1.1. The Property PolicyDecisionStrategy.....................MAY
4.2.2 PolicyDecisionStrategy......................MAY
4.1.2 The Property ExecutionStrategy.........................MUST
4.2.3 ExecutionStrategy..........................MUST
4.1.3 The Property LimitNegotiation...........................MAY
4.3. LimitNegotiation............................MAY
4.2. The Class IKERule.......................................MUST
4.3.1. IKERule.........................................MUST
4.2.1. The Property IdentityContexts...........................MAY IdentityContexts............................MAY
4.3. The Class IPsecRule.......................................MUST
4.4. The Association Class IPsecRule.....................................MUST IPsecPolicyForEndpoint...............MAY
4.4.1. The Reference Antecedent................................MUST
4.4.2. The Reference Dependent.................................MUST
4.5. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint..............MAY IPsecPolicyForSystem.................MAY
4.5.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
4.5.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST Dependent.................................MUST
4.6. The Association Aggregation Class IPsecPolicyForSystem................MAY SAConditionInRule...................MUST
4.6.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Property GroupNumber..............................SHOULD
4.6.1. The Property ConditionNegated.........................SHOULD
4.6.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST GroupComponent............................MUST
4.6.3. The Reference PartComponent.............................MUST
4.7. The Aggregation Class SARuleInPolicyGroup................MUST PolicyActionInSARule................MUST
4.7.1. The Reference GroupComponent............................MUST
4.7.2. The Reference PartComponent.............................MUST
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4.7.1. The Property Priority................................SHOULD
4.7.2. The Reference GroupComponent...........................MUST March 2003
4.7.3. The Reference PartComponent............................MUST
4.8. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule..................MUST
4.8.1. The Property GroupNumber.............................SHOULD
4.8.1. The Property ConditionNegated........................SHOULD
4.8.2. The Reference GroupComponent...........................MUST
4.8.3. The Reference PartComponent............................MUST
4.9. The Aggregation Class PolicyActionInSARule...............MUST
4.9.1. The Reference GroupComponent...........................MUST
4.9.2. The Reference PartComponent............................MUST
4.9.3. The Property ActionOrder.............................SHOULD ActionOrder..............................SHOULD
5. Condition and Filter Classes
5.1. The Class SACondition...................................MUST SACondition.....................................MUST
5.2. The Class IPHeadersFilter..............................SHOULD IPHeadersFilter...............................SHOULD
5.3. The Class CredentialFilterEntry...........................MAY CredentialFilterEntry............................MAY
5.3.1. The Property MatchFieldName............................MUST MatchFieldName.............................MUST
5.3.2. The Property MatchFieldValue...........................MUST MatchFieldValue............................MUST
5.3.3. The Property CredentialType............................MUST CredentialType.............................MUST
5.4. The Class IPSOFilterEntry.................................MAY IPSOFilterEntry..................................MAY
5.4.1. The Property MatchConditionType........................MUST MatchConditionType.........................MUST
5.4.2. The Property MatchConditionValue.......................MUST MatchConditionValue........................MUST
5.5. The Class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry........................MAY PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry.........................MAY
5.5.1. The Property MatchIdentityType.........................MUST MatchIdentityType..........................MUST
5.5.2. The Property MatchIdentityValue........................MUST MatchIdentityValue.........................MUST
5.6. The Association Class FilterOfSACondition..............SHOULD FilterOfSACondition...............SHOULD
5.6.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
5.6.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST Dependent.................................MUST
5.7. The Association Class AcceptCredentialFrom................MAY AcceptCredentialFrom.................MAY
5.7.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
5.7.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST Dependent.................................MUST
6. Action Classes
6.1. The Class SAAction......................................MUST SAAction........................................MUST
6.1.1. The Property DoActionLogging............................MAY DoActionLogging.............................MAY
6.1.2. The Property DoPacketLogging............................MAY DoPacketLogging.............................MAY
6.2. The Class SAStaticAction.................................MUST SAStaticAction..................................MUST
6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds...........................MUST LifetimeSeconds............................MUST
6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction............................SHOULD IPsecBypassAction.............................SHOULD
6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction...........................SHOULD IPsecDiscardAction............................SHOULD
6.5. The Class IKERejectAction.................................MAY IKERejectAction..................................MAY
6.6. The Class PreconfiguredSAAction..........................MUST PreconfiguredSAAction...........................MUST
6.6.1. The Property LifetimeKilobytes.........................MUST LifetimeKilobytes..........................MUST
6.7. The Class PreconfiguredTransportAction...................MUST PreconfiguredTransportAction....................MUST
6.8. The Class PreconfiguredTunnelAction......................MUST PreconfiguredTunnelAction.......................MUST
6.8.1. The Property DFHandling................................MUST DFHandling.................................MUST
6.9. The Class SANegotiationAction............................MUST SANegotiationAction.............................MUST
6.10. The Class IKENegotiationAction..........................MUST IKENegotiationAction...........................MUST
6.10.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds........................MAY MinLifetimeSeconds.........................MAY
6.10.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes......................MAY MinLifetimeKilobytes.......................MAY
6.10.3. The Property IdleDurationSeconds.......................MAY IdleDurationSeconds........................MAY
6.11. The Class IPsecAction..................................MUST IPsecAction....................................MUST
6.11.1. The Property UsePFS..................................MUST UsePFS....................................MUST
6.11.2. The Property UseIKEGroup...............................MAY UseIKEGroup................................MAY
6.11.3. The Property GroupId..................................MUST GroupId...................................MUST
6.11.4. The Property Granularity............................SHOULD Granularity.............................SHOULD
6.11.5. The Property VendorID..................................MAY VendorID...................................MAY
6.12. The Class IPsecTransportAction..........................MUST IPsecTransportAction...........................MUST
6.13. The Class IPsecTunnelAction.............................MUST IPsecTunnelAction..............................MUST
6.13.1. The Property DFHandling...............................MUST DFHandling................................MUST
6.14. The Class IKEAction....................................MUST IKEAction......................................MUST
6.14.1. The Property ExchangeMode ...........................MUST ............................MUST
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6.14.2. The Property UseIKEIdentityType.......................MUST UseIKEIdentityType........................MUST
6.14.3. The Property VendorID..................................MAY VendorID...................................MAY
6.14.4. The Property AggressiveModeGroupId.....................MAY AggressiveModeGroupId......................MAY
6.15. The Class PeerGateway..................................MUST PeerGateway....................................MUST
6.15.1. The Property Name..................................SHOULD Name....................................SHOULD
6.15.2. The Property PeerIdentityType.........................MUST PeerIdentityType..........................MUST
6.15.3. The Property PeerIdentity.............................MUST PeerIdentity..............................MUST
6.16. The Association Class PeerGatewayForTunnel..............MUST PeerGatewayForTunnel...............MUST
6.16.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
6.16.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
6.16.3. The Property SequenceNumber.........................SHOULD SequenceNumber..........................SHOULD
6.17. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal.................MUST ContainedProposal..................MUST
6.17.1. The Reference GroupComponent..........................MUST GroupComponent...........................MUST
6.17.2. The Reference PartComponent...........................MUST PartComponent............................MUST
6.17.3. The Property SequenceNumber...........................MUST SequenceNumber............................MUST
6.18. The Association Class HostedPeerGatewayInformation.......MAY HostedPeerGatewayInformation........MAY
6.18.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
6.18.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
6.19. The Association Class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction....MUST TransformOfPreconfiguredAction.....MUST
6.19.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
6.19.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
6.19.3. The Property SPI.....................................MUST SPI.......................................MUST
6.19.4. The Property Direction................................MUST Direction.................................MUST
6.20. The Association Class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel..MUST
6.20.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
6.20.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
7. Proposal and Transform Classes
7.1. The Abstract Class SAProposal............................MUST SAProposal.............................MUST
7.1.1. The Property Name...................................SHOULD
7.2. Name.....................................SHOULD
7.2 The Class IKEProposal...................................MUST IKEProposal......................................MUST
7.2.1. The Property CipherAlgorithm...........................MUST CipherAlgorithm............................MUST
7.2.2. The Property HashAlgorithm.............................MUST HashAlgorithm..............................MUST
7.2.3. The Property PRFAlgorithm...............................MAY PRFAlgorithm................................MAY
7.2.4. The Property GroupId..................................MUST GroupId....................................MUST
7.2.5. The Property AuthenticationMethod......................MUST AuthenticationMethod.......................MUST
7.2.6. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds........................MUST MaxLifetimeSeconds.........................MUST
7.2.7. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes......................MUST MaxLifetimeKilobytes.......................MUST
7.2.8. The Property VendorID...................................MAY VendorID....................................MAY
7.3. The Class IPsecProposal..................................MUST IPsecProposal...................................MUST
7.4. The Abstract Class SATransform...........................MUST SATransform............................MUST
7.4.1. The Property TransformName...........................SHOULD TransformName............................SHOULD
7.4.2. The Property VendorID...................................MAY VendorID....................................MAY
7.4.3. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds........................MUST MaxLifetimeSeconds.........................MUST
7.4.4. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes......................MUST MaxLifetimeKilobytes.......................MUST
7.5. The Class AHTransform...................................MUST AHTransform.....................................MUST
7.5.1. The Property AHTransformId.............................MUST AHTransformId..............................MUST
7.5.2. The Property UseReplayPrevention........................MAY UseReplayPrevention.........................MAY
7.5.3. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize.................MAY ReplayPreventionWindowSize..................MAY
7.6. The Class ESPTransform..................................MUST ESPTransform....................................MUST
7.6.1. The Property IntegrityTransformId......................MUST IntegrityTransformId.......................MUST
7.6.2. The Property CipherTransformId.........................MUST CipherTransformId..........................MUST
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7.6.3. The Property CipherKeyLength............................MAY CipherKeyLength.............................MAY
7.6.4. The Property CipherKeyRounds............................MAY CipherKeyRounds.............................MAY
7.6.5. The Property UseReplayPrevention........................MAY UseReplayPrevention.........................MAY
7.6.6. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize.................MAY ReplayPreventionWindowSize..................MAY
7.7. The Class IPCOMPTransform.................................MAY IPCOMPTransform..................................MAY
7.7.1. The Property Algorithm.................................MUST Algorithm..................................MUST
7.7.2. The Property DictionarySize.............................MAY DictionarySize..............................MAY
7.7.3. The Property PrivateAlgorithm...........................MAY PrivateAlgorithm............................MAY
7.8. The Association Class SAProposalInSystem..................MAY SAProposalInSystem...................MAY
7.8.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
7.8.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST
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7.9. The Aggregation Class ContainedTransform.................MUST ContainedTransform..................MUST
7.9.1. The Reference GroupComponent...........................MUST GroupComponent............................MUST
7.9.2. The Reference PartComponent............................MUST PartComponent.............................MUST
7.9.3. The Property SequenceNumber............................MUST SequenceNumber.............................MUST
7.10. The Association Class SATransformInSystem................MAY SATransformInSystem.................MAY
7.10.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
7.10.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8. IKE Service and Identity Classes
8.1. The Class IKEService.....................................MAY IKEService.......................................MAY
8.2. The Class PeerIdentityTable...............................MAY PeerIdentityTable................................MAY
8.3.1. The Property Name...................................SHOULD Name.....................................SHOULD
8.3. The Class PeerIdentityEntry...............................MAY PeerIdentityEntry................................MAY
8.3.1. The Property PeerIdentity............................SHOULD PeerIdentity.............................SHOULD
8.3.2. The Property PeerIdentityType........................SHOULD PeerIdentityType.........................SHOULD
8.3.3. The Property PeerAddress.............................SHOULD PeerAddress..............................SHOULD
8.3.4. The Property PeerAddressType.........................SHOULD PeerAddressType..........................SHOULD
8.4. The Class AutostartIKEConfiguration.......................MAY AutostartIKEConfiguration........................MAY
8.5. The Class AutostartIKESetting.............................MAY AutostartIKESetting..............................MAY
8.5.1. The Property Phase1Only.................................MAY Phase1Only..................................MAY
8.5.2. The Property AddressType.............................SHOULD AddressType..............................SHOULD
8.5.3. The Property SourceAddress.............................MUST SourceAddress..............................MUST
8.5.4. The Property SourcePort................................MUST SourcePort.................................MUST
8.5.5. The Property DestinationAddress........................MUST DestinationAddress.........................MUST
8.5.6. The Property DestinationPort...........................MUST DestinationPort............................MUST
8.5.7. The Property Protocol..................................MUST Protocol...................................MUST
8.6. The Class IKEIdentity....................................MAY IKEIdentity......................................MAY
8.6.1. The Property IdentityType..............................MUST IdentityType...............................MUST
8.6.2. The Property IdentityValue.............................MUST IdentityValue..............................MUST
8.6.3. The Property IdentityContexts...........................MAY IdentityContexts............................MAY
8.7. The Association Class HostedPeerIdentityTable.............MAY HostedPeerIdentityTable..............MAY
8.7.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
8.7.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST Dependent.................................MUST
8.8. The Aggregation Class PeerIdentityMember..................MAY PeerIdentityMember...................MAY
8.8.1. The Reference Collection...............................MUST Collection................................MUST
8.8.2. The Reference Member..................................MUST Member....................................MUST
8.9. The Association Class IKEServicePeerGateway...............MAY IKEServicePeerGateway................MAY
8.9.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST Antecedent................................MUST
8.9.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST Dependent.................................MUST
8.10. The Association Class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable........MAY IKEServicePeerIdentityTable.........MAY
8.10.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
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8.10.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.11. The Association Class IKEAutostartSetting................MAY IKEAutostartSetting.................MAY
8.11.1. The Reference Element.................................MUST Element..................................MUST
8.11.2. The Reference Setting.................................MUST Setting..................................MUST
8.12. The Aggregation Class AutostartIKESettingContext.........MAY AutostartIKESettingContext..........MAY
8.12.1. The Reference Context.................................MUST Context..................................MUST
8.12.2. The Reference Setting.................................MUST Setting..................................MUST
8.12.3. The Property SequenceNumber.........................SHOULD SequenceNumber..........................SHOULD
8.13. The Association Class IKEServiceForEndpoint..............MAY IKEServiceForEndpoint...............MAY
8.13.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.13.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.14. The Association Class IKEAutostartConfiguration..........MAY IKEAutostartConfiguration...........MAY
8.14.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.14.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.14.3. The Property Active................................SHOULD Active..................................SHOULD
8.15. The Association Class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService..MAY
8.15.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.15.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.16. The Association Class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity........MAY EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity.........MAY
8.16.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.16.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.17. The Association Class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity......MAY
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8.17.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.17.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
8.18. The Association Class IKEIdentitysCredential.............MAY IKEIdentitysCredential..............MAY
8.18.1. The Reference Antecedent..............................MUST Antecedent...............................MUST
8.18.2. The Reference Dependent...............................MUST Dependent................................MUST
10. Security Considerations
This document only describes a schema an information model for IPsec policy.
It does not detail security requirements for storage or delivery of
said schema.
Storage and delivery security requirements should be detailed in a
comprehensive information.
Physical models derived from this information model MUST implement
the relevant security policy architecture document.
11. Intellectual Property
The IETF takes for storage and delivery. Most of the classes
(e.g. IpHeadersFilter, SAAction,...) MUST at least provided the
integrity service; other pieces of information MUST also receive the
confidentiality service (e.g. SharedSecret as described in the
classes PeerIdentityEntry and PreconfiguredSAAction).
11. Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
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IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.
Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Mike Jeronimo, Ylian Saint-Hilaire,
Vic Lortz, William Dixon, Man Li, Wes Hardaker and Ricky Charlet for
their contributions to this IPsec policy model.
Additionally, this draft document would not have been possible without the
preceding IPsec schema drafts. For that, thanks go out to Rob
Adams, Partha Bhattacharya, William Dixon, Roy Pereira, and Raju
Rajan.
13. Normative References
[IKE] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[COMP] Shacham, A., and R. Monsour, R. Pereira, M. Thomas, "IP
Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 2393, August 1998.
[ESP] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[AH] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC
2402, November 1998.
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[DOI] Piper, D., "The Internet Draft IPsec Configuration Policy Model August 2002 IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[IKE] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[PCIM] Moore, B., and E. Ellesson, J. Strassner, "Policy Core
Information Model -- Version 1 Specification", RFC 3060, February
2001.
[PCIME] Moore, B., Rafalow, L., Ramberg, Y., Snir, Y., Westerinen,
A., Chadha, R., Brunner, M., Cohen, R. and Strassner, J., Editor, "Policy Core Information Model
Extensions", draft-ietf-policy-pcim-ext-
05.txt, October 2001 RFC 3460, January 2003.
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[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in progress
[DOI] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[CIMCORE] DMTF Common Information Model - Core Model v2.5 which can
be found at
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/CIM_Schema25/CIM_Core25.mof
[CIMUSER] DMTF Common Information Model - User-Security Model v2.5
which can be found at
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/CIM_Schema25/CIM_User25.mof
[CIMNETWORK] DMTF Common Information Model - Network Model v2.5
which can be found at
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/CIM_Schema25/CIM_Network25.mof
[IPSO] Kent, S., "U.S. Department of Interpretation Defense Security Options for ISAKMP",
the Internet Protocol", RFC 2407, 1108, November 1991.
[IPSEC] Kent, S., and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
13. Informative References
[LDAP] Wahl, M., and T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
[COPS] Boyle, J., and R. Cohen, D. Durham, S. Herzog, R. Rajan, A.
Sastry, "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service) Protocol", RFC 2748,
January 2000. Internet-Draft work in progress.
[COPSPR] Chan, K., and D. Durham, S. Gai, S. Herzog, K. McCloghrie,
F. Reichmeyer, J. Seligson, A. Smith, R. Yavatkar, "COPS Usage for
Policy Provisioning", draft-ietf-rap-pr-05.txt, October 2000.
Internet-Draft work in progress.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 3084, March 1997.
[IPSO] Kent, S., "U.S. Department of Defense Security Options for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 1108, November 1991.
[IPSEC] Kent, S., and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. 2001.
[DMTF] Distributed Management Task Force, http://www.dmtf.org/
[CIMCORE] DMTF Common Information Model - Core Model v2.6 which can
be found at http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim_schema_v26.php
[CIMUSER] DMTF Common Information Model - User-Security Model v2.6
which can be found at
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim_schema_v26.php
[CIMNETWORK] DMTF Common Information Model - Network Model v2.6 which
can be found at http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim_schema_v26.php
14. Disclaimer
The views and specification herein are those of the authors and are
not necessarily those of their employer. The authors and their
employer specifically disclaim responsibility for any problems
arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use of this
specification.
15. Authors' Addresses
Jamie Jason
Intel Corporation
MS JF3-206
2111 NE 25th Ave.
Hillsboro, OR 97124
E-Mail: jamie.jason@intel.com
Lee Rafalow
IBM Corporation, BRQA/502
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Hillsboro, OR 97124
E-Mail: jamie.jason@intel.com
Lee Rafalow
IBM Corporation, BRQA/502
4205 So. Miami Blvd.
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
E-mail: rafalow@watson.ibm.com
Eric Vyncke
Cisco Systems
Avenue Marcel Thiry, 77
B-1200 Brussels
7 De Kleetlaan
B-1831 Diegem
Belgium
E-mail: evyncke@cisco.com
16. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it maybe copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other then
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
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TASK FORCE DISCLIAMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMAITON
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTEIS OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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