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draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-03.txt --> draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-04.txt

PKI4IPSEC Working Group
Internet Draft Chris Bonatti, IECA
draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-03.txt
draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-04.txt Sean Turner, IECA
July
February 20, 2005 2006 Gregory Lebovitz, Juniper
Expires February August 20, 2006

Requirements for an IPsec Certificate Management Profile

Status of this Memo

By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February August 20, 2006.

Abstract

This informational document describes and identifies the requirements
for transactions to handle Public Key Certificate (PKC) lifecycle
transactions between Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Systems using Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
(versions 1 and 2) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Systems. These
requirements are designed to meet the needs of enterprise scale IPsec
VPN deployments. It is intended that a standards track profile of a
management protocol will be created to address many of these
requirements.

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1 Introduction

This document contains requirements for a transaction-based
approach. Other models are conceivable, for example a directory-
centric approach, but their requirements are beyond the scope of
this document.

This document enumerates requirements for Public Key Certificate
(PKC) lifecycle transactions between different VPN System and PKI
System products in order to better enable large scale, PKI-enabled
IPsec deployments with a common set of transactions. Requirements for
both the IPsec and the PKI products are discussed. The requirements
are carefully designed to achieve security without compromising ease
of management and deployment, even where the deployment involves tens
of thousands of IPsec users and devices.

The requirements address transactions for the entire PKC lifecycle
for PKI-enabled VPN System: authorization (of PKC issuance),
generation (public-private key pair and PKC request), enrollment (PKC
request, PKC response, and confirmation), maintenance (rekey, renew,
update, revoke, and confirm), and repository lookups. These
transactions enable a VPN Operator to:

- Use a VPN Administration function (Admin), which is introduced in
this document, to manage PKC authorization and possibly act as
the sole interface for the VPN System and the PKI System.

- Authorize individual or batches of PKC issuances based on a pre-
agreed template (i.e., both types of authorization requests
refer to the pre-agreed template). These authorizations can
occur either prior to the enrollment or in the same transaction
as the enrollment.

- Provision PKI-based user or machine identity to IPsec Peers, on a
large scale.

- Set the corresponding gateway or client authorization policy for
remote access and site-to-site connections.

- Establish policies for automatic PKC renewal, updates, or rekeys.

- Ensure timely revocation information is available for PKCs used
in IKE exchanges.

These requirements will be used to profile a certificate management
protocol that the VPN System will use to communicate with the PKI
System. Note that this profile will be in another document. The
certificate management profile will also clarify and constrain

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existing PKIX and IPsec standards to limit the complexity of
deployment. Some requirements may require either a new protocol, or
changes or extensions to an existing protocol.

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The desired outcome of the requirements and profile documents is that
both IPsec and PKI vendors create interoperable products to enable
large-scale IPsec System deployments, and do so as quickly as
possible. For example, a VPN Operator should be able to use any
conforming IPsec implementation (VPN Admin or IPsec Peer) of the
certificate management profile with any conforming PKI vendorÆs vendor’s
implementation to perform the VPN rollout and management.

1.1 Scope

The document address requirements on transactions between the VPN
Systems and the PKI Systems and between the VPN Administration and
IPsec Peers. The requirements strive to meet eighty percent of the
market needs for large-scale deployments (i.e., VPNs including
hundreds or thousands of managed VPN gateways or VPN remote access
clients). Environments will understandably exist in which large-scale
deployment tools are desired, but local security policy stringency
will not allow for the use of such commercial tools. The solution
will possibly miss the needs of the highest ten percent of stringency
and lowest ten percent of convenience requirements. Use cases will be
considered or rejected based upon this eighty percent rule. The needs
of small deployments are a stated non-goal, however service providers
employing the scoped solution and applying it to many smaller
deployments in aggregate may address them.

Gateway-to-gateway access and end-user remote access (to a gateway)
are both covered. End-to-end communications are not necessarily
excluded but are intentionally not a focus.

Only VPN-PKI transactions that ease and enable scalable PKI-enabled
IPsec deployments are addressed.

1.2 Non-Goals

The scenario for PKC cross-certification will not be addressed.

The protocol specification for the VPN-PKI interactions will not be
addressed.

The protocol specification for the VPN Administrator to Peer
transactions will not be addressed. These interactions are considered
vendor proprietary. These interactions may be standardized later to
enable interoperability between VPN Administration function stations

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and IPsec Peers from different vendors, but is far beyond the scope
of this current effort, and will described as opaque transactions in
this document.

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The protocol specification for RA-CA, CA-Repository, and RA-
Repository interactions will not be addressed.

1.3 Definitions

VPN System
The VPN System is comprised of the VPN Administration function
(defined below), the IPsec Peers, and the communication mechanism
between the VPN Administration and the IPsec Peers. VPN System is
defined in more detail in section 2.1.

PKI System
The PKI System, or simply PKI, is the set of functions needed to
authorize, issue, and manage PKCs. PKI System is defined in more
detail in section 2.2.

(VPN) Operator
The Operator is the person or group of people that define security
policy and configure the VPN System to enforce that policy, with the
VPN Administration function.

IPsec Peer (Gateway or Client)
For the purposes of this document, an IPsec Peer, or simply "Peer",
is any VPN System component that communicates IKE and IPsec to
another Peer in order to create a secure tunnel for communications.
It can be either a traditional security gateway (with two network
interfaces, one for the protected network and one for the unprotected
network), or it can be an IPsec client (with a single network
interface). In both cases, the Peer can pass traffic with no IPsec
protection, and can add IPsec protection to chosen traffic streams.
See Section 2.1.1 for more details.

(VPN) Admin
The Admin is the VPN System function that interacts with the PKI
System to establish PKC provisioning for the VPN connections. See
Section 2.1.2 for more details.

End Entity
An end entity is the entity or subject that is identified in a PKC.
The end entity is the one entity that will finally use a private key
associated with a PKC to digitally sign data. In this document, an
IPsec Peer is certainly an end entity, but the VPN Admin can also
constitute an end entity. Note that end entities can have different

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PKCs for different purposes (e.g., signature vs. key exchange, Admin-
functions vs. Peer-functions).

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PKC Renewal
The acquisition of a new PKC with the same public key due to the
expiration of an existing PKC. Renewal occurs prior to the expiration
of the existing PKC to avoid any connection outages. A renewal
process can rely on the existing key pair to bootstrap authentication
for the new enrollment.

PKC Update
A special case of a renewal-like occurrence where a PKC needs to be
changed prior to expiration due to some change in its subjectÆs subject’s
information. Examples might include change in the address, telephone
number, or name change due to marriage of the end entity. An update
process can rely on the existing key pair to bootstrap authentication
for the new enrollment.

PKC Rekey
The routine procedure for replacement of a PKC with a new PKC with a
new public key for the same subject name. A rekey process can rely
on the existing key pair to bootstrap authentication for the new
enrollment.

Registration Authority (RA)
An optional entity in a PKI System given responsibility for
performing some of the administrative tasks necessary in the
registration of end entities, such as confirming the subjectÆs subject’s
identity and verifying that the subject has possession of the private
key associated with the public key requested for a PKC.

Certificate Authority (CA)
An authority in a PKI System that is trusted by one or more users to
create and sign PKCs. It is important to note that the CA is
responsible for the PKCs during their whole lifetime, not just for
issuing them.

Repository
An Internet-accessible server in a PKI System that stores and makes
available for retrieval PKCs and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).

Root CA/Trust Anchor
A CA that is directly trusted by an end entity; that is, securely
acquiring the value of a Root CA public key requires some out-of-band
step(s). This term is not meant to imply that a Root CA is
necessarily at the top of any hierarchy, simply that the CA in
question is trusted directly.

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Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
A CRL is a CA-signed, time stamped list identifying revoked PKCs and
made freely available in a repository. Peers retrieve the CRL to

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verify that a PKC being presented to them as the identity in an IKE
transaction has not been revoked.

CRL Distribution Point (CDP)
The CDP is a PKC extension that identifies the location from which
end entities should retrieve CRLs to check status information.

Authority Info Access (AIA)
The AIA is a PKC extension that indicates how to access CA
information and services for the issuer of the PKC in which the
extension appears. Information and services may include on-line
validation services and Certificate Policy (CP) data.

1.4 Requirements Terminology

Though this document is not an Internet Draft, we use the convention
that the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in [MUSTSHOULD].

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2. Architecture

This section describes the overall architecture for a PKI-supported
IPsec VPN deployment. First, an explanation of the VPN System is
presented. Second, key points about the PKI System are stated. Third,
the VPN-PKI architecture is presented.

2.1 VPN System

The VPN System consists of the IPsec Peers and the VPN Administration
function, as depicted in Figure 1.

+---------------------------------------------------+
| |
| +----------+ |
| | VPN | |
| +---------->| Admin |<-------+ |
| | | Function | | |
| | +----------+ | |
| v v |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| | IPsec | | IPsec | |
| | Peer 1 |<=======================>| Peer 2 | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| |
| VPN System |
+---------------------------------------------------+

Figure 1: VPN System

2.1.1 IPsec Peer(s)

The Peers are two entities between which require an IPsec tunnel
establishment. Two Peers are shown in Figure 1, but implementations
can support an actual number in the hundreds or thousands. The Peers
can be gateway-to-gateway, remote-access-host-to-gateway, or a mix of
both. The Peers authenticate themselves in the IKE negotiation using
digital signatures generated with PKCs for a PKI System.

2.1.2 VPN Administration Function (Admin)

This document defines the notion of a VPN Administration function,
hereafter referred to as Admin, and gives the Admin great
responsibility within the VPN System. The Admin is a centralized
function used by the Operator to interact with the PKI system to
establish PKI policy (e.g., algorithms, key lengths, lifecycle

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options, and PKC fields) for groups of IPsec Peers. The Admin also
authorizes PKC issuance and it can act as the Peer's PKI System
interface, which allows the Admin to perform many RA-like functions.

It is important to note that, within this document, the Admin is
neither a device nor a person rather it is a function. Every large-
scale VPN deployment will contain the Admin function. The function
can be performed on a stand-alone workstation, on a gateway, or on an
administration software component. The Admin function can also be one
in the same as the gateway or client device or software. They are
represented in the architectural diagram as different functions, but
they need not be different physical entities. As such, the AdminÆs Admin’s
architecture and the means by which it interacts with the
participating IPsec Peers will vary widely from implementation to
implementation. However, some basic functions of the Admin are
assumed.

- It and not the PKI will define the Certificate Policy (CP)
[FRAME] for use in a VPN System. The PKC's characteristics and
contents are a function of the CP. In VPN Systems, the Operator
chooses to strengthen the VPN by using PKI; PKI is a bolt-on to
the VPN System. The Operator will configure local security
policy in part through the Admin and its authorized PKI-enabled
Peers.

- It will interact directly with the PKI System to initiate
authorization for end entity PKCs by sending the parameters and
contents for individual PKCs or batches of PKCs based on a pre-
agreed template (i.e., both types of authorization requests
refer to the pre-agreed template). Templates will be agreed in
an out-of-band mechanism by the VPN Operator and the PKI
Operator. It will receive back from the PKI a unique tuple of
authorization identifiers and one-time authorization tokens that
will authorize Peers to request a PKC.

- It will deliver instructions to the IPsec Peers, and the Peers
will carry out those instructions (e.g., Admin passes Peer
information necessary to generate keys and PKC request).

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2.2 PKI System

The PKI System, as depicted in Figure 2, can be set up and operated
by the Operator (in-house), be provided by third party PKI providers
to which connectivity is available at the time of provisioning
(managed PKI service), or be integrated with the VPN product.

+---------------------------------------------+
| +-------------------------+ |
| v | |
| +--------------+ v |
| | Repository | +----+ +----+ |
| | Certs & CRLs |<-> | CA |<->| RA | |
| +--------------+ +----+ +----+ |
| |
+---------------------------------------------+

Figure 2: PKI System

This framework assumes that all components of the VPN obtain PKCs
from a single PKI community. An IPsec Peer can accept a PKC from a
Peer that is from a CA outside of the PKI community, but the auto
provision and life cycle management for such a PKC or its trust
anchor PKC fall out of scope.

The PKI System contains a mechanism for handling AdminÆs Admin’s
authorization requests and PKC enrollments. These mechanisms are
referred to as the RA. The PKI System contains a Repository for Peers
to retrieve each otherÆs other’s PKCs and revocation information. Last, the
PKI System contains the core function of a CA that uses a public and
private key pair and signs PKCs.

2.3 VPN-PKI Interaction

The interaction between the VPN System and the PKI System is the key
focus of this requirements document, as shown in Figure 3. It is
therefore sensible to consider the steps necessary to set up, use and
manage PKCs for one Peer to establish an association with another
Peer.

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+-----------------------------------------------+
| PKI System |
| |
| +--------------+ |
| | Repository | +----+ +----+ |
| | Certs & CRLs | | CA | | RA | |
| +--------------+ +----+ +----+ |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
^ ^ ^
|[G] |[A] |[G]
|[E] |[G] |[E]
|[L] |[E] |[L]
|[R] |[R] |[R]
| |[L] |
+-----+------------------+-------------------+-------+
| | v | |
| | +----------+ | |
| | [G][E][L][R]| VPN |[G][E][L][R] | |
| | +---------->| Admin |<----------+ | |
| | | | Function | | | |
| | | +----------+ | | |
| v v v v |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| | IPsec | [I] | IPsec | |
| | Peer 1 |<========================>| Peer 2 | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| |
| VPN System |
+----------------------------------------------------+

[A] = Authorization: PKC issuance
[G] = Generation: Public key, and private key, and PKC request
[E] = Enrollment: Sending PKC request, verifying PKC response, and
confirming PKC response
[I] = IKE and IPsec communication
[L] = Lifecycle: Rekey, renewal, update, revocation, and
confirmation
[R] = Repository: Posting and lookups

Figure 3. Architectural Framework for VPN-PKI Interaction

Requirements for each of the interactions, [A], [G], [E], [L], and
[R], are addressed in paragraphs 3.2-3.6. However, only requirement
for [A], [E], [L], and [R] will be addressed by the certificate
management profile. Requirements for [I] transactions are beyond the
scope of this document. Additionally, the act of certification (i.e.,
binding the public key to the name) is performed at the CA and is not
shown in the Figure.

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3 Requirements

3.1 General Requirements

3.1.1 One Protocol

The target profile, to be based on this requirements document, MUST
call for ONE PROTOCOL or ONE USE PROFILE for each main element of the
[A], [E], [L], and [R] interactions. It is a specific goal to avoid
multiple competing protocols or profiles to solve the same
requirement whenever possible to reduce complexity and improve
interoperability.

Meeting some of the requirements may necessitate the creation of a
new protocol or new extension for an existing protocol; however, the
later is much preferred.

3.1.2 Secure Transactions

The target certificate management profile MUST specify the [A], [E],
[L], and [R] transactions between VPN and PKI Systems. To support
these transactions, the Admin and PKI MUST exchange policy details,
identities, and keys. As such, the method of communication for [A],
[E], and [L] transactions MUST be secured in a manner that ensures
privacy, authentication, and message data integrity. The
communication method MUST require that mutual trust be established
between the PKI and the Admin. See paragraph 3.7.1. [R] transactions
do not require authentication or message data integrity because the
responses (i.e., PKCs and CRLs) are already digital signed. Whether
[R] transactions require privacy is determined by the local security
policy.

The target certificate management profile will not specify [G]
transactions; however, these transactions MUST be secured in a manner
that that ensures privacy, authentication, and message data integrity
because these transactions are the basis for the other transactions.

3.1.3 Admin Availability

The Admin MUST be reachable by the Peers. Most implementations will
meet this requirement by ensuring Peers can connect to the Admin from
anywhere on the network or Internet. However, communication between
the Admin and Peers can be "off-line". It can, in some environments,
be "moving media" (i.e., the configuration or data is loaded on to a
floppy disk or other media and physically moved to the IPsec Peers).

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Likewise, it can be entered directly on the IPsec Peer via a User
Interface (UI). In this case, the Admin function is co-located on the
Peer device itself. Most requirements and scenarios in this document
assume on-line availability of the Admin for the life of the VPN
System.

3.1.3 PKI Availability

Availability is REQUIRED initially for authorization transactions
between the PKI and Admin. Further availability is required in most
cases, but the extent of this availability is a decision point for
the Operator. Most requirements and scenarios in this document assume
on-line availability of the PKI for the life of the VPN System.

Off-line interaction between the VPN and PKI Systems (i.e., where
physical media is used as the transport method) is beyond the scope
of this document.

3.1.4 End-User Transparency

PKI interactions are to be transparent to the user. Users SHOULD NOT
even be aware that PKI is in use. First time connections SHOULD
consist of no more than a prompt for some identification and pass
phrase, and a status bar notifying the user that setup is in
progress.

3.1.5 PKC Profile for PKI Interaction

A PKC used for identity in VPN-PKI transactions MUST include all the
[CERTPROFILE] mandatory fields. It MUST also contain contents
necessary to support path validation and certificate status checking.

It is preferable that the PKC profiles for IPsec transactions
[IKECERTPROFILE] and VPN-PKI transactions (in the certificate
management profile) are the same so that one PKC could be used for
both transaction sets. If the profiles are inconsistent then
different PKCs (and perhaps different processing requirements) might
be required. However, failure to achieve PKC profile consensus MUST
NOT hold up the standardization effort.

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3.1.5.1 Identity

PKCs MUST support identifying (i.e., naming) Peers and Admins. The
following name forms MUST be supported:

- Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
- RFC 822 (also called USER FQDN)
- IPv4 Address
- IPv6 Address

3.1.5.2 Key Usage

PKCs MUST support indicating the purposes for which the key (i.e.,
digital signature) can be used. Further, PKCs MUST always indicate
that relying parties (i.e., Peers) need to understand the indication.

3.1.5.3 Extended Key Usage

Extended Key Usage (EKU) indications are not required. The presence
or lack of an EKU MUST NOT cause an implementation to fail an IKE
connection.

3.1.5.4 Revocation Information Location

PKCs MUST indicate the location of CRL such that any Peer who holds
the PKC locally will know exactly where to go and how to request the
CRL.

3.1.6 Error Handling

The protocol for the VPN-PKI transactions MUST specify error handling
for each transaction. Thorough error condition descriptions and
handling instructions will greatly aid interoperability efforts
between the PKI and VPN System products.

3.2 Authorization

This section refers to the [A] elements labeled in Figure 3.

3.2.1 One Protocol

One protocol MUST be specified for these Admin to PKI (RA/CA)
interaction. This protocol MUST support privacy, authorization,

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authentication, and integrity. PKCs for authorization of the Admin
can be initialized through an out-of-band mechanism.

The transport used to carry the authorization SHOULD be reliable
(TCP).

The protocol SHOULD be as lightweight as possible.

3.2.2 Bulk Authorization

Bulk authorization MUST be supported by the certificate management
profile. Bulk authorization occurs when the Admin requests of the PKI
that authorization be established for several different subjects with
almost the same contents. A minimum of one value (more is also
acceptable) differs per subject. Because the authorizations may occur
before any keys have been generated, the only way to ensure unique
authorization identifiers are issued is to have at least one value
differ per subject.

Authorization can occur prior to a PKC enrollment request, or the
authorization and the PKC enrollment request can be presented to the
PKI at the same time. Both of these authorization scenarios MUST be
supported.

A bulk authorization SHOULD occur in one single connection to the PKI
(RA/CA), with the number of subjects being one or greater.
Implementations SHOULD be able to handle one thousand subjects in a
batch authorization.

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3.2.3 Authorization Scenario

The authorization scenario for VPN-PKI transactions involves a two-
step process: an authorization request and an authorization
response. Figure 4 shows the salient interactions to perform
authorization transactions.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+
^
| 1
2 |
v
+-------+
| Admin |
+-------+

Figure 4. Authorization Transactions

1) Authorization [A]. Admin sends a list of identities and PKC
contents for the PKI System to authorize enrollment. The PKI returns
a list of unique authorization identifiers and one-time authorization
tokens to be used for the enrollment of each PKC. See paragraph
3.2.4.

2) Authorization Response [A]. The PKI System acknowledges the
authorizations provided in (1). Response may indicate success,
failure, or errors for any particular authorization. See paragraph
3.2.5.

3.2.4 Authorization Request

3.2.4.1 Specifying Fields within the PKC

The Admin authorizes individual PKCs or batches of PKC issuances
based on a pre-agreed template. This template is agreed by the VPN
Operator and PKI Operator and is referred to in each authorization

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request. This allows the authorization requests to include the
minimal amount of information necessary to support a VPN System.

The Admin can send the PKI System the set of PKC contents that it
wants the PKI to issue to a group of IPsec Peers. In other words, it
tells the PKI System, "if you see a PKC request that looks like this,
from this person, process it and issue the PKC."

Requirements for PKC fields used in IPsec transactions are specified
in [IKECERTPROFILE].

Requirements for PKC fields used in VPN-PKI transactions are
specified in paragraph 3.1.5.

3.2.4.2 Authorizations for Renewal, Update, and Rekey

When the VPN Operator and PKI Operator pre-agree on a template, they
MUST also agree on the local policy regarding PKC renewal and PKC
update. These are:

- Admin MUST specify if automatic renewals are allowed, that is,
the Admin authorizes the PKI to process a future renewal for the
specified Peer PKC.

- Admin MUST specify if PKC update is allowed, that is, the Admin
authorizes the PKI to accept a future request for a new PKC with
changes to non-key-related fields.

If a PKC renewal is authorized, the Admin MUST further specify:

- Who can renew, that is, can only the Admin send a renewal request
or can the Peer send a request directly to the PKI, or either.

- Specify at how long before the PKC expiration date the PKI will
accept and process a renewal (i.e., N% of validity period, or
the UTC time after which renewal is permitted).

If PKC update is authorized, the Admin MUST further specify:

- The aspects of non-key-related fields that are changeable.

- The entity that can send the PKC Update request, that is, only
the Admin, only the Peer, or either.

- Specify at how long before the PKC expiration date the PKI will
accept and process an update (i.e., N% of validity period, or
the UTC time after which update is permitted).

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A new authorization by the Admin is REQUIRED for PKC rekey. No
parameters of prior authorizations need be considered.

3.2.4.3 Other Authorization Elements

The Admin MUST have the ability to specify the format for the
authorization ID and one-time authorization token. The one-time
authorization token SHOULD be unique per authorization ID. The more
randomness that can be achieved in the relationship between an
authorization ID and its one-time authorization token the better. The
one-time authorization token MUST be in UTF8 format to avoid
incompatibilities that may occur due to international characters. It
MUST support normalization as in (certificate management profile).
The Admin MUST have the ability to constrain the UTF8 character set.

There MUST be an option to specify a validation period for the
authorization ID and its one-time authorization token. If such a
validation period is set, any PKC requests using this authorization
ID and one-time authorization token that arrive at the PKI outside of
the validation period MUST be dropped and the event logged.

The Protocol SHOULD consider what happens when Admin requested
information conflicts with PKI settings such that the Admin request
cannot be issued as requested (e.g., Admin requests validation period
= 3 weeks and CA is configured to only allow validation periods = 1
week). Proper conflict handling MUST be specified.

3.2.4.4 Cancel Capability

Either the Admin or the Peer can send a cancel authorization message
to PKI. The canceling entity MUST provide the authorization ID and
one-time authorization token in order to cancel the authorization. At
that point, the authorization will be erased from the PKI, and a log
entry of the event written.

After the cancellation has been verified (a Cancel, Cancel ACK, ACK
type of a process is REQUIRED to cover a lost connections scenario),
the PKI will accept a new authorization request with the exact same
contents as the canceled one, except that the identifier MUST be new.
The PKI MUST NOT process duplicate authorization requests.

Note that if the PKI has already issued a PKC associated with an
authorization, then cancellation of the authorization is not
possible and the authorization request SHOULD be refused by the PKI.
Once a PKC has been issued it MUST be revoked in accordance with
clause 3.6.

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3.2.5 Authorization Response

If the authorization is acceptable, the PKI will respond to the Admin
with a unique authorization identifier per subject authorization
requested and a one-time authorization token per authorization ID.
See paragraph 3.2.4.3 for additional authorization ID and one-time
authorization token requirements.

The PKI can alter parameters of the authorization request submitted
by the Admin. In that event, the PKI MUST return all the contents of
the authorization request (as modified) to the Admin with the
confirmation of authorization success. This will allow the Admin to
perform an "operational test" to verify that the issued PKCs will
meet its requirements. If the Admin determines that the modified
parameters are unacceptable, then the authorization should be
cancelled in accordance with clause 3.2.4.4.

After receiving a bulk authorization request from the Admin, the PKI
MUST be able to reply YES to those individual PKC authorizations that
it has satisfied and NO or FAILED for those requests that cannot be
satisfied, along with sufficient reason or error codes.

A method is REQUIRED to identify if there is a change in PKI setting
between the time the authorization is granted and PKC request occurs,
and what to do about the discrepancy.

3.2.5.1 Error Handling for Authorization

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions MUST
be provided to the Admin for each transaction in the authorization
process. Providing such error codes will greatly aid interoperability
efforts between the PKI and IPsec products.

3.3 Generation

This section refers to the [G] elements labeled in Figure 3.

Once the PKI System has responded with authorization identifiers and
authorization tokens (see paragraph 3.2), and this information is
received at the Admin, the next step is to generate public and
private key pairs and to construct PKC requests using those key
pairs. The key generations can occur at one of three places,
depending on local requirements: at the IPsec Peer, at the Admin, or
at the PKI. The PKC request can come from either the IPsec Peer, a
combination of the Peer and the Admin, or not at all.

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3.3.1 Generation Method 1: IPsec Peer Generates Key Pair, Constructs
PKC Request, and Signs PKC Request

This option will be used most often in the field. This is the most
secure method for keying, as the keys are generated on the end entity
and the private key never leaves the end entity. However, it is the
most computationally intensive for the Peer as it must be "ASN.1
aware" to support generating and digitally signing the PKC request.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+

+-------+
+------>| Admin |
| +-------+
|
| 1
V
+--------------------+ +--------+
2 | IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 5. Generation Interactions:
IPsec Peer Generates Key Pair and Constructs PKC Request

1) Opaque transaction. Admin sends authorization identifier, one-time
authorization token, and any other parameters needed by the Peer to
generate the PKC request, including key type and size.

2) Generation [G]. Peer receives authorization identifier, one-time
authorization token, and any parameters. Peer generates key pair and
constructs PKC request.

Steps prior to these can be found in paragraph 3.2. The next step,
enrollment, can occur either directly between the Peer and PKI (see
paragraph 3.4.5) or through the Admin (see paragraph 3.4.6).

3.3.2 Generation Method 2: IPsec Peer Generates Key Pair, Admin
Constructs PKC Request, Admin Signs PKC Request

This option also supports IPsec Peer generation of key pair, but
removes the requirement for the Peer to be ASN.1 aware because it

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does not have to construct or digitally sign the PKC request. The
drawback is that the key pair does need to be provided to the Admin.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+

3 +-------+
+------>| Admin | 4
| +-------+
|
| 1
V
+--------------------+ +--------+
2 | IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 6. Generation Interactions:
IPsec Peer Generates Key Pair, Admin Constructs PKC Request

1) Opaque transaction. Admin sends command to Peer to generate key
pair, based on parameters provided in the command.

2) Generation [G]. Peer generates key pair.

3) Opaque transaction [G]. Peer returns key pair to Admin.

4) Generation [G]. Admin constructs and digitally signs PKC request.

Steps prior to these can be found in paragraph 3.2. The next step,
enrollment, occurs through the Admin (see paragraph 3.4.7).

3.3.3 Generation Method 3: Admin Generates Key Pair, Constructs PKC
Request, and Signs PKC Request

This option exists for deployments where Peers cannot generate their
own key pairs. Some examples are for PDAs and handsets where to
generate an RSA key would be operationally impossible due to
processing and battery constraints. Another case covers key recovery
requirements, where the same PKCs are used for other functions in
addition to IPsec, and key recovery is required (e.g. local data
encryption), therefore key escrow is needed off the Peer. If key
escrow is performed then the exact requirements and procedures for it
are beyond the scope of this document.

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+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+

+-------+
| Admin | 1
+-------+

Figure 7. Generation Interactions:
Admin Generates Key Pair and Constructs PKC Request

1) Generation [G]. Admin generates key pair, constructs PKC request,
and digitally signs PKC request.

Steps prior to these can be found in paragraph 3.2. The next step,
enrollment, occurs through the Admin (see paragraph 3.4.8).

Note that separate authorizations step are still of value even though
the Admin is the also performing the key generation. The PKC
template, Subject fields, SubjectAltName fields and more are part of
the request, and must be communicated in some way from the Admin to
the PKI. Instead of creating a new mechanism, the authorization
schema can be reused. This also allows for the feature of role-based
administration, where Operator 1 is the only one allowed to have the
Admin function pre-authorize PKCs, but Operator 2 is the one doing
batch enrollments and VPN device configurations.

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3.3.4 Method 4: PKI Generates Key Pair

This option exists for deployments where end entities cannot generate
their own key pairs and the Admin function is minimal implementation.
The PKI and Admin pre-agree to have the PKI generate key pairs and
PKCs. This is, in all likelihood, the easiest way to deploy PKCs,
though it sacrifices some security since both the CA and the Admin
have access to the private key. However, in cases where key escrow is
required, this may be acceptable. The Admin effectively acts as a
proxy for the Peer in the PKC enrollment process.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA | 1
+--------------+ +-----------------------+

+-------+
| Admin |
+-------+

Figure 8. Generation Interactions:
IPsec Peer Generates Key Pair, Admin Constructs PKC Request

1) Generation [G] The PKI generates the key pair.

Steps prior to these can be found in paragraph 3.2. The next step,
enrollment, occurs through the Admin (see paragraph 3.4.9).

3.3.5 Error Handling for Generation

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions MUST
be provided for each transaction in the key generation and PKC
request construction process. Providing such error codes will greatly
aid interoperability efforts between the PKI and IPsec products.

Error conditions MUST be communicated to the Admin regardless of who
generated the key or PKC request.

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3.4 Enrollment

This section refers to the [E] elements labeled in Figure 3.

Regardless of where the keys were generated and the PKC request
constructed, an enrollment process will need to occur to request that
the PKI issue a PKC and the corresponding PKC be returned.

The protocol MUST be exactly the same regardless of whether the
enrollment occurs from the Peer to the PKI or from the Admin to the
PKI.

3.4.1 One protocol

One protocol MUST be specified for enrollment requests, responses,
and confirmations.

3.4.2 On-line protocol

The protocol MUST support enrollment that occurs over the Internet
and without the need for manual intervention.

3.4.3 Single Connection with Immediate Response

Enrollment requests and responses MUST be able to occur in one on-
line connection between the Admin on behalf of the Peer or the Peer
itself and the PKI (RA/CA).

3.4.4 Manual Approval Option

Manual approval of PKC enrollments is too time consuming for large
scale implementations is therefore not required.

3.4.5 Enrollment Method 1: Peer Enrolls to PKI Directly

In this case, the IPsec Peer only communicates with the PKI after
being commanded to do so by the Admin. This enrollment mode is
depicted in Figure 9 and the letters in the following description
refer to Figure 3. Prior authorization (see paragraph 3.2) and
generation (see paragraph 3.3.1) steps are not shown.

Most IPsec Systems have enough CPU power to generate a public and
private key pair of sufficient strength for secure IPsec. In this
case, the end entity needs to prove to the PKI that they have such a

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key pair; this is normally done by the PKI sending the end entity a
nonce, which the end entity signs and returns to the Admin along with
the end entityÆs entity’s public key.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+
^
1,3 |
|
|
| +-------+
| | Admin |
| +-------+
|
2,4 |
v
+--------------------+ +--------+
| IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 9. VPN-PKI Interaction Steps:
IPsec Peer Generates Keys and PKC Request,
Enrolls Directly with PKI

1) Enrollment Request [E]. The IPsec Peer sends PKC requests from the
PKI, providing the generated public key.

2) Enrollment Response [E]. The PKI responds to the enrollment
request, providing either the new PKC that was generated or a
suitable error indication.

3) Enrollment Confirmation [E]. Peer positively acknowledges receipt
of new PKC.

4) Enrollment Confirmation Receipt [E]. PKI sends enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Peer.

3.4.6 Enrollment Method 2a: Peer Enrolls through Admin

In this case, the IPsec Peer has generated the key pair and the PKC
request, but does not enroll directly to the PKI System. Instead, it
automatically sends its request to the Admin, and the Admin redirects
the enrollment to the PKI System. The PKI System does not care where
the enrollment comes from, as long as it is a valid enrollment. Once

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the Admin receives the PKC response, it automatically forwards it to
the IPsec Peer.

Most IPsec Systems have enough CPU power to generate a public and
private key pair of sufficient strength for secure IPsec. In this
case, the end entity needs to prove to the Admin that they have such
a key pair; this is normally done by the Admin sending the end entity
a nonce, which the end entity signs and returns to the Admin along
with the end entityÆs entity’s public key.

This enrollment mode is depicted in Figure 10 and the letters in the
following description refer to Figure 3. Prior authorization (see
paragraph 3.2) and generation (see paragraph 3.3.1) steps are not
shown.

+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+
^ 2,6
|
|
v 3,7
1,5 +-------+
+> | Admin |
| +-------+
|
|
4,8 v
+--------------------+ +--------+
| IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 10. VPN-PKI Interaction Steps:
IPsec Peer Generates Keys and PKC Request,
Enrolls Through Admin

1) Opaque Transaction [E]. The IPsec Peer requests a PKC from the
Admin, providing the generated public key.

2) Enrollment [E]. The Admin forwards the enrollment request to the
PKI.

3) Enrollment Response [E]. The PKI responds to the enrollment
request, providing either the new PKC that was generated or a
suitable error indication.

4) Opaque Transaction [E]. The Admin forwards the enrollment response
back to the IPsec Peer.

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5) Opaque Transaction [E]. Peer must positively acknowledge receipt
of new PKC back to the Admin.

6) Enrollment Confirmation [E]. Admin forwards enrollment
confirmation back to the PKI.

7) Enrollment Confirmation Receipt [E]. PKI sends enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Admin.

8) Opaque Transaction [E]. Admin forwards PKI's enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Peer.

3.4.7 Enrollment Method 2b: Peer Enrolls Through Admin

In this case, the IPsec Peer has generated the key pair, but the PKC
request is constructed and signed by the Admin. The PKI System does
not care where the enrollment comes from, as long as it is a valid
enrollment. Once the Admin retrieves the PKC, it then automatically
forwards it to the IPsec Peer along with the key pair.

Some IPsec Systems do not have enough CPU power to generate a public
and private key pair of sufficient strength for secure IPsec. In this
case, the Admin needs to prove to the PKI that they have such a key
pair; this is normally done by the PKI sending the Admin a nonce,
which the Admin signs and returns to the PKI along with the end
entityÆs
entity’s public key.

This enrollment mode is depicted in Figure 11 and the letters in the
following description refer to Figure 3. Prior authorization (see
paragraph 3.2) and generation (see paragraph 3.3.2) steps are not
shown.

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+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+
^ 1,5
|
|
v 2,6
4 +-------+
+->| Admin |
| +-------+
|
|
3,7 v
+--------------------+ +--------+
| IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 11. VPN-PKI Interaction Steps:
IPsec Peer Generates Keys, Admin Constructs and
Signs PKC Request, Enrolls Through Admin

1) Enrollment [E]. The Admin requests a PKC from the PKI, providing
the generated public key.

2) Enrollment Response [E]. The PKI responds to the enrollment
request, providing either the new PKC that was generated or a
suitable error indication.

3) Opaque Transaction [E]. The Admin forwards the enrollment response
back to the IPsec Peer.

4) Opaque Transaction [E]. Peer positively acknowledge receipt of new
PKC back to the Admin.

5) Enrollment Confirmation [E]. Admin forwards enrollment
confirmation back to the PKI.

6) Enrollment Confirmation Receipt [E]. PKI sends enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Admin.

7) Opaque Transaction [E]. Admin forwards PKI's enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Peer.

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3.4.8 Enrollment Method 3a: Admin Authorizes and Enrolls Directly to
PKI

In this case, the Admin generates the key pair, PKC request, and
digitally signs the PKC request. The PKI System does not care where
the enrollment comes from, as long as it is a valid enrollment. Once
the Admin retrieves the PKC, it then automatically forwards it to the
IPsec Peer along with the key pair.

This enrollment mode is depicted in Figure 12 and the letters in the
following description refer to Figure 3. Prior authorization (see
paragraph 3.2) and generation (see paragraph 3.3.3) steps are not
shown.

Figure 12. VPN-PKI Interaction Steps:
Admin Generates Keys, PKC Request, and Enrolls Directly
with PKI

1) Enrollment [E]. The Admin requests a PKC from the PKI, providing
the generated public key.

2) Enrollment Response [E]. The PKI responds to the enrollment
request, providing either the new PKC that was generated or a
suitable error indication.

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3) Opaque Transaction [E]. The Admin forwards the enrollment response
back to the IPsec Peer, along with the keys.

4) Opaque Transaction [E]. Peer positively acknowledge receipt of new
PKC back to the Admin.

5) Enrollment Confirmation [E]. Admin forwards enrollment
confirmation back to the PKI.

6) Enrollment Confirmation Receipt [E]. PKI sends enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Admin.

7) Opaque Transaction [E]. Admin forwards PKI's enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Peer.

3.4.9 Enrollment Method 3b: Admin Authorizes and Enrolls Directly to
PKI

In this instance, the PKI and Admin have previously agreed to have
the PKI generate key and certificates when the PKI receives an
authorization request. The PKI returns to the IPsec Peer through the
Admin, the final product of a key pair and PKC. Again, the mechanism
for the Peer to Admin communication is opaque.

This enrollment mode is depicted in Figure 13 and the letters in the
following description refer to Figure 3. Prior authorization (see
paragraph 3.2) and generation (see paragraph 3.3.4) steps are not
shown.

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+--------------+ +-----------------------+
| Repository | | CA/RA |
+--------------+ +-----------------------+
^ 4
|
|
v 1,5
3 +-------+
+->| Admin |
| +-------+
|
|
2,6 v
+--------------------+ +--------+
| IPsec | | IPsec |
| Peer 1 | | Peer 2 |
+--------------------+ +--------+

Figure 13. VPN-PKI Interaction Steps:
PKI Generates Keys,

1) Enrollment Response [E]. The PKI responds to the authorization
request sent, providing either the new PKC and public-private key
pair that were generated or a suitable error indication.

2) Opaque Transaction [E]. The Admin forwards the enrollment response
back to the IPsec Peer, along with the keys.

3) Opaque Transaction [E]. Peer positively acknowledge receipt of new
PKC back to the Admin.

4) Enrollment Confirmation [E]. Admin forwards enrollment
confirmation back to the PKI.

5) Enrollment Confirmation Receipt [E]. PKI sends enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Admin.

6) Opaque Transaction [E]. Admin forwards PKI's enrollment
confirmation receipt back to the Peer.

3.4.10 Confirmation Handshake

Any time a new PKC is issued by the PKI, a confirmation of PKC
receipt MUST be sent back to the PKI by the Peer or the Admin
(forwarding the PeerÆs Peer’s confirmation).

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Operationally, the Peer MUST send a confirmation to the PKI verifying
that it has received the PKC, loaded it, and can use it effectively
in an IKE exchange. This requirement exists so that:

- The PKI does not publish the new PKC in the repository for others
until that PKC is able to be used effectively by the Peer, and;

- A revocation may be invoked if the PKC is not received and
operational within an allowable window of time.

To assert such proof the Peer MUST sign a portion of data with the
new key. The result MUST be sent to the PKI. The entity that actually
sends the result to the PKI MAY be either the Peer (sending it
directly to the PKI) or Admin (the Peer would send it to Admin, and
Admin can in turn send it to the PKI).

The Admin MUST acknowledge the successful receipt of the
confirmation, thus signaling to the Peer that it may proceed using
this PKC in IKE connections. The PKI MUST complete all processing
necessary to enable the PeerÆs Peer’s operational use of the new PKC (for
example, writing the PKC to the repository) before sending the
confirmation acknowledgement. The Peer MUST NOT begin using the PKC
until the PKIÆs PKI’s confirmation acknowledgement has been received.

3.4.11 Error Handling for Enrollment

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions are
REQUIRED for each transaction in the enrollment process. Providing
such error codes will greatly aid interoperability efforts between
the PKI and IPsec products.

The profile will clarify what happens if the request and retrieval
fails for some reason. The following cases MUST be covered:

- Admin or Peer cannot send the request.

- Admin or Peer sent the request but the PKI did not receive the
request.

- PKI received the request but could not read it effectively.

- PKI received and read the request, but some contents of the
request violated the PKIÆs PKI’s configured policy such that the PKI
was unable to generate the PKC.

- The PKI System generated the PKC, but could not send it.

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- The PKI sent the PKC, but the requestor (Admin or Peer) did not
receive it.

- The Requestor (Admin or Peer) received the PKC, but could not
process it due to incorrect contents, or other PKC-construction-
related problem.

- The Requestor failed trying to generate the confirmation.

- The Requestor failed trying to send the confirmation.

- The Requestor sent the confirmation, but the PKI did not receive
it.

- The PKI received the confirmation but could not process.

In each case the following questions MUST be addressed:

- What does Peer do?
- What does Admin do?
- What does PKI do?
- Is Authorization used?

If a failure occurs after the PKI sends the PKC and before the Peer
receives it, then the Peer MUST re-request with the same
authorization ID and one-time authorization token, and the PKI,
seeing the authorization ID and authorization token, MUST send the
PKC again.

Enrollment errors MUST be sent to the Admin regardless of entity that
generated the enrollment request.

3.5 Lifecycle

This section refers to the [L] elements labeled in Figure 3.

Once the PKI has issued a PKC for the end entity Peer, the Peer MUST
be able to either contact the PKI directly or through the Admin for
any subsequent renewals, updates, rekeys, or revocations. The PKI
MUST support either case for renewals, updates, and revocations.
Rekeys are Admin initiated therefore Peer initiated rekeys MUST be
transferred via the Admin.

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3.5.1 One Protocol

One protocol MUST be specified for rekey, renew, and update
requests, responses, and confirmations. It MUST be the same protocol
as is specified in paragraph 3.4.

Revocation requests can be the same protocol as rekey, renew, and
update operations. Revocation requests can also occur via email,
telephone, Instant Messaging, etc.

3.5.2 PKC Rekeys, Renewals, and Updates

Renewals, updates, and rekeys are variants of a PKC enrollment
request scenario with unique operational and management requirements.

- A PKC rekey replaces an end entity's PKC with a new PKC that has a
new public key for the same SubjectName and SubjectAltName
contents before the end entityÆs entity’s currently held PKC expires.

- A PKC renewal replaces an end entity's PKC with the same public key
for the same SubjectName and SubjectAlternativeName contents as
an existing PKC before the end entityÆs entity’s currently held PKC
expires.

- A PKC update is defined as a new PKC issuance with the same public
for an altered SubjectName or SubjectAlternativeName before
expiration of the end entityÆs entity’s current PKC.

When sending renew, update, or rekey requests, the entire contents of
the PKC request needs to be sent to the PKI, just as in the case of
the original enrollment.

The renew, update and rekey requests MUST be signed by the private
key of the old PKC. This will allow the PKI to verify the identity of
the requestor, and ensure that an attacker does not submit a request
and receive a PKC with another end entityÆs entity’s identity.

Whether or not a new key is used for the new PKC in a renew or update
scenario is a matter of local security policy, and MUST be specified
by the Admin to the PKI in the original authorization request. Re-
using the same key is permitted, but not encouraged. If a new key is
used, the update or renew request must be signed by both the old key
-- to prove the right to make the request -- and the new key -- to
use for the new PKC.

The new PKC resulting from a renew, update or rekey will be retrieved
in-band, using the same mechanism as a new PKC request.

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For the duration of time after a renew, update, or rekey has been
processed and before PKI has received confirmation of the PeerÆs Peer’s
successful receipt of the new PKC both PKCs, the old and the new, for
the end entity will be valid. This will allow the Peer to continue
with uninterrupted IKE connections with the previous PKC while the
renewal, update, or rekey process occurs.

After the renewal, update or rekey occurs, the question now exists
for the PKI of what to do about the old PKC. If the old PKC is to be
made unusable, the PKI will need to add it to the revocation list,
removed from the repository; however this should only occur once all
connections that used the old PKC have expired. The decision about if
the old PKC should be made unusable is a decision of local policy.
Either the PKI or the Admin MUST specify this parameter during the
authorization phase. In this case, the specifying party, either the
Admin or the PKI, MUST also specify during authorization the length
of time after the PKI receives the end entity PeerÆs Peer’s confirmation (of
receipt of the PKC) that will pass before the old PKC is made
unusable.

In the case where the new keys were generated for a renew or update
request and for rekey requests, once the Peer receives the
confirmation acknowledgement from the PKI, it is good practice for
the old key pair be destroyed as soon as possible. Deletion can occur
once all connections that used the old PKC have expired.

If a PKC has been revoked, it MUST NOT be allowed a renewal, update
or rekey.

Should the PKC expire without renewal, update or rekey, an entirely
new request MUST be made.

3.5.2.1 Rekey Request

Admins manage rekeys to ensure uninterrupted use of the VPN by Peers
with new keys. Rekeys can occur automatically if the Admin is
configured to initiate a new authorization for the rekey.

Scenarios for rekey are omitted as they use the same scenarios used
in the original PKC enrollment from sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

3.5.2.1 Renew Request

Admins manage renewals to ensure uninterrupted use of the VPN by
Peers with the same key pair.

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At the time of authorization, certain details about renewal
acceptance will be conveyed by the Admin to the PKI, as stated in
section 3.2.4.2. The renewal request MUST match the conditions that
were specified in the original authorization for:

- Keys: New, existing, or either
- Requestor: End entity Peer, Admin, either
- Period: How soon before PKC expiry.
- Time: Length of time before making the old PKC unusable.

If any of these conditions are not met, the PKI must reject the
renewal and log the event.

Scenarios for renewal are omitted as they use the same scenarios used
in the original PKC enrollment from sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

3.5.2.2 Update Request

An update to the contents of a PKC will be necessary when details
about an end entity PeerÆs Peer’s identity change, but the Operator does not
want to generate a new PKC from scratch, requiring a whole new
authorization. For example, a gateway device may be moved from one
site to another. Its IPv4 Address will change in the SubjectAltName
extension, but all other information could stay the same. Another
example is an end user who gets married and changes the last name or
moves from one department to another. In either case, only one field
(the Surname or OU in the DN) need change.

An update differs from renewal and rekeys in a few ways:

- A new key is not necessary

- The timing of the update event is not predictable, as is the case
with a scheduled renewal or rekey

- The update request may occur at any time during a PKCÆs PKC’s period of
validity

- Once the update is completed, and the new PKC is confirmed, the
old PKC should cease to be usable, as its contents no longer
accurately describe the subject

At the time of authorization, certain details about update acceptance
can be conveyed by the Admin to the PKI, as stated in section
3.2.4.2. The update request MUST match the conditions that were
specified in the original authorization for:

- Keys: new or existing or either

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- Requestor: End entity Peer, Admin, either
- The fields in the Subject and SubjectAltName that are changeable
- Length of time before making the old PKC unusable

If any of these conditions are not met, the PKI MUST reject the
update and log the event.

If an update authorization was not made at the time of original
authorization, one can be made from Admin to the PKI at any time
during the PKCÆs PKC’s valid life. When such an update is desired, Admin
must notify the PKI System that an update is authorized for the end
entity, and to expect it coming, and specify the new contents. Admin
then initiates the update request with the given contents in whatever
mechanism the VPN System employs (direct from end entity to PKI, from
end entity through Admin, or directly from Admin).

Scenarios for update are omitted as they use the same scenarios used
in the original PKC enrollment from sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

3.5.2.3 Error Handling for Rekey, Renewal, and Update

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions are
required for each transaction in the renewal, update or rekey
process. Providing such error codes will greatly aid interoperability
efforts between the PKI and IPsec products.

3.5.2.4 Confirmation Handshakes

The confirmation handshake requirements are the same as in clauses
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 except that depending on the
the PKI MUST also issue a revocation on the original PKC before
sending the confirmation response.

3.5.3 Revocation

The Peer MUST be able to initiate revocation for its own PKC. In this
case the revocation request MUST be signed by the PeerÆs Peer’s current key
pair for the PKC it wishes to revoke. Whether the actual revocation
request transaction occurs directly with the PKI or is first sent to
Admin who proxies or forwards the request to the PKI is a matter of
implementation.

The Admin MUST be able to initiate revocation for any PKC issued
under a template it controls. The Admin will identify itself to the
PKI by use of its own PKC; it MUST sign any revocation request to the
PKI with the private key from its own PKC. The PKI MUST have the

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ability to configure Admin(s) with revocation authority, as
identified by its PKC. Any PKC authorizations must specify if said
PKC may be revoked by the Admin (see section 3.2.3.2 for more
details).

The profile MUST identify the one protocol or transaction within a
protocol to be used for both Peer and Admin initiated revocations.

The profile MUST identify the size of CRL the client will be prepared
to support.

Below are guidelines for revocation in specific transactions:

- AFTER RENEW, BEFORE EXPIRATION: The PKI MUST be responsible for
the PKC revocation during a renew transaction. PKI MUST revoke
the PKC after receiving the confirm notification from the Peer,
and before sending the confirm-ack to the Peer. The Peer MUST
NOT revoke its own PKC in this case.

- AFTER UPDATE, BEFORE EXPIRATION: The PKI MUST be responsible for
the PKC revocation during an update transaction. PKI MUST revoke
the PKC after receiving the confirm notification from the Peer,
and before sending the confirm-ack to the Peer. The Peer MUST
NOT revoke its own PKC in this case.

3.6 Repositories

This section refers to the [R] elements labeled in Figure 3.

3.6.1 Lookups

The PKI System SHOULD be built so that lookups resolve directly and
completely at the URL indicated in a CDP or AIA. The PKI SHOULD be
built such that URL contents do not contain referrals to other hosts
or URLs, as such referral lookups will increase the time to complete
the IKE negotiation, and can cause implementations to timeout.

CDP MUST be flagged as required in the authorization request. The
method MUST also be specified; HTTP is the MUST method, LDAP is MAY.

The complete hierarchical PKC chain (except the trust anchor) MUST be
able to be searched in their respective repositories. The information
to accomplish these searches MUST be adequately communicated in the
PKCs sent during the IKE transaction.

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All PKCs must be retrievable through a single protocol. The final
specification will identify one protocol as a "MUST", others MAY be
listed as "OPTIONAL".

The general requirements for the retrieval protocol include:

- The protocol can be easily Firewalled (including NAT or PAT).

- The protocol can easily perform some query against a remote
repository on a specific ID element that was given to it in a
standard PKC field.

Other considerations include:

- Relative speed
- Relative ease of administration
- Scalability

Intermediate PKCs will be needed for the case of re-keying of the CA,
or a PKI System where multiple CAs exist.

PKCs MAY have extendedKeyusage to help identify the proper PKC for
IPsec, though the default behavior is to not use them (see 3.1.5.3).

IPsec Peers MUST be able to resolve Internet domain names and support
the mandatory repository access protocol at the time of starting up
so they can perform the PKC lookups.

IPsec Peers should cache PKCs to reduce latency in setting up Phase
1. Note that this is an operational issue, not an interoperability
issue.

The use case for accomplishing lookups when PKCs are not sent in IKE
is a stated non-goal of the profile at this time.

3.6.2 Error Handling for Repository Lookups

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions are
required for each transaction in the repository lookup process.
Providing such error codes will greatly aid interoperability efforts
between the PKI and IPsec products.

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3.7 Trust

3.7.1 Trust Anchor PKC Acquisition

The root PKC MUST arrive on the Peer via one of two methods:

(a) Peer can get the root PKC via its secure communication with
Admin. This requires the Peer to know less about interaction with the
PKI.

(b) Admin can command Peer to retrieve the root cert directly from
the PKI. How retrieval of the root cert takes place is beyond scope,
but is assumed to occur via an unauthenticated but confidential
enrollment protocol.

3.7.2 Certification Path Validation

The IPsec Peer MUST perform identity verification based on the fields
of the PKC and parameters applicable to the VPN tunnel. The fields of
the PKC used for verification MAY include either the X.500
Distinguished Name (DN) within the Subject Name, or a specific field
within the Extension SubjectAltName (per [DOI] 4.6.2.1 Identification
Type Values). Usage descriptions for each follow.

The Peers or a SCVP server MUST validate the certification path, as
per RFC3280. The contents necessary in the PKC to allow this will be
enumerated in the profile document.

The Peer MAY have the ability to construct the certification path
itself, however Admin MUST be able to supply Peers with the trust
anchor and any chaining PKCs necessary. The Admin MAY ensure the
template uses the AIA extension in PKCs as a means of facilitating
path validation.

DNS SHOULD be supported by the Peers in order to support resolving
URLs present in CDPs and AIA extensions.

3.7.3 Revocation Checking and Status Information

The PKI System MUST provide a mechanism whereby Peers can check the
revocation status of PKCs that are presented to it for IKE identity.
The mechanism should allow for access to extremely fresh revocation
information. CRLs have been chosen as the mechanism for communicating
this information. Operators are RECOMMENDED to refresh CRLs as often
as logistically possible.

A single mandatory protocol mechanism for performing CRL lookups MUST
be specified by the final specification.

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All PKCs used in IKE MUST have cRLDistributionPoint and
authorityInfoAccess fields populated with valid URLs. This will allow
all recipients of the PKC to know immediately how revocation is to be
accomplished, and where to find the revocation information. The AIA
is needed in an environment where multiple layers of CAs exist and
for the case of a CA key roll-over.

IPsec Systems have an OPTION to turn off revocation checking. Such
may be desired when the two Peers are communicating over a network
without access to the CRL service, such as at a trade show, in a lab,
or in a demo environment. If revocation checking is OFF, the
implementation MUST proceed to use the PKC as valid identity in the
exchange and need not perform any check.

If the revocation of a PKC is used as the only means of deactivation
of access authorization for the Peer (or user), then the speed of
deactivation will be as rapid as the refresh rate of the CRL issued
and published by the PKI. If more immediate deactivation of access is
required than the CRL refreshing can provide, then another mechanism
for authorization that provides more immediate access deactivation
should be layered into the VPN deployment. Such a second mechanism is
out of the scope of this profile. (Examples are Xauth, L2TPÆs L2TP’s
authentication, etc.).

3.7.3 Error Handling in Revocation Checking and Certificate Path
Validation

Thorough error condition descriptions and handling instructions are
required for each transaction in the revocation checking and path
validation process. Providing such error codes will greatly aid
interoperability efforts between the PKI and IPsec products.

4. Security Considerations

This requirements document does not specify a concrete solution, and
as such has no system-related security considerations per se.
However, the PKI4IPSEC model requires profiling and use of concrete
protocols for certificate management (e.g., CMC, CMS, CRMF). The
individual security considerations of these protocols should be
carefully considered in the profiling effort.

In addition, this document allows significant flexibility in the
allocation of functions between the roles of Peer and Admin. This
functional allocation is crucial both to achieving successful
deployment, and to maintaining the integrity of the PKI enrollment
and management processes. However, much of the responsibility for
this allocation necessarily falls to product implementers and system

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operators through the selection of applicable use cases and
development of security policy constraints. These factors must be
carefully considered to ensure the security of PKI4IPSEC certificate
management. Appendix E catalogs some key system operator choices
that are not constrained by this document, and frames their possible
impacts.

A References

A.1 Normative References

None

A.2 Non-Normative References

[STDPROCESS] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process û – Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

[MUSTSHOULD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[CERTPROFILE] Housley, R., et. al. "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

[DOI] Piper, D., "Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for
ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

[FRAME] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., Wu. S.,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate Policy and
Certificate Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003.

[GLOSSARY] Shirey, R., ôInternet “Internet Security Glossaryö, Glossary”, RFC 2828, May
2000.

[IKECERTPROFILE] Korver, B., ôThe “The Internet IP Security PKI Profile
of IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIXö,draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-ikecert-
profile-03, 30 September 2004. PKIX”,draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-ikecert-
profile-06, 12 November 2005.

B. Acknowledgements

This draft is substantially based on a prior draft draft-dploy-
requirements-00 developed by Project Dploy. The principle editor of
that draft was Gregory M. Lebovitz (NetScreen Technologies).
Contributing authors included Lebovitz, Paul Hoffman (VPN
Consortium), Hank Mauldin (Cisco Systems), and Jussi Kukkonen (SSH
Communications Security). Substantial editorial contributions were

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made by Leo Pluswick (ICSA), Tim Polk (NIST), Chris Wells (SafeNet),
Thomas Hardjono(VeriSign), Carlisle Adams (Entrust), and Michael
Shieh (NetScreen).

Once brought to pki4ipsec, the following people made substantial
contributions: [TBD] ... Jim Schaad and Stefan Santesson.

C. EditorÆs Editor’s Address

Chris Bonatti
IECA, Inc.
15309 Turkey Foot Road
Darnestown, MD 20878-3640 USA
bonattic@ieca.com

Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
1421 T Street NW #8
Washington, DC 20009 USA
turners@ieca.com

Gregory M. Lebovitz
NetScreen Technologies, Inc.
gregory@netscreen.com

D. Summary Change History

2006-February Draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-04

This issue of Requirements

TBD - EDITORÆS NOTE: Plan to add a summary table similar the document attempts to those close out all issues as
perceived after IETF #63.

- Added text in
RFCs 1122, 1123, and 2975. Table will briefly describe requirement, introduction to state the requirement level (i.e., "MAY", "SHOULD", "MUST", etc.),
and cite the applicable paragraph that there are other models
not addressed in this draft.

E. System Operator Choices

This appendix catalogs some key choices that must be made by product
implementers and system operators. These choices are not constrained
by this document, but can have profound impacts on PKI4IPSEC
certificate management operation and overall security. Where
possible we attempt to frames the specific security document and operational
impacts associated with these choices.

1. Whether or not PKCs they are allowed to be renewed or whether new
PKCs need to be issued.

2. Certificate renewal initiated by the VPN Peer or beyond the VPN Admin

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F. Change History scope of
this document

- Removed requirements summary (Annex D).

- Removed operator choices (Annex E).

2005-March Draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-03

This issue of the document attempts to close out all non-contentious
issues as perceived after IETF #62.

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- The term "non-repudiation" was removed from the document, as non-
repudiation support is supported by authentication.

- IPSec replaced with IPsec.

- The requirement for a "community realm" was removed from the
document.

- The requirement for an "update type" field was removed from the
document.

- Clarified requirements language û – many MAYs were changed to can.

- Changed abstract, 1, and 1.2 to indicate that Admin-Peer
transaction's requirements, which were in the document from its
initial version, are within scope of the document.

- Reworded paras 1, 1.1, and 1.2 to remove duplication.

- Added in 1.2 statements to clarify protocol specifications to are
byond the scope of the document for any requirement addressed in
the document (i.e., this is a requirements document not a
protocol document).

- Clarified para 2.1.2 first para. The last paragraph in para
2.1.2 was moved to 3.1.3 Admin Availability requirements. First
bullet in second para of 2.1.2 was reworded to clarify PKCs are
part of the local security policy. The second bullet was
reworded to more fully define how the Admin uses templates. The
requirements for secure Admin-Peer interactions was moved to
para 3.1.2.

- In para 2.3: added [G] and [M] interactions between PKI and
Peers/Admin, [G], [E], [M], [R] transactions between Peer and
Admin, renamed [M] Management to [L] Lifecycle, changed [E] to
be sending PKC request, verifying response, and confirming PKC
response, placed validation with confirmation in [L], swapped
renwal, update, and rekey with repository lookups, add new last
para to explain remaining organization.

- Moved 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 to later sections.

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- Reorganized document based on general requirements and
requirements for [A], [G], [E], [L], and [R] requirements.

- Clarified the secure transaction requirements. [A], [E], [G], [L]
require secure transactions, while [R] repository lookup is an
operator decision (PKCs and CRLs are signed don't necessarily
need privacy for their retrieval).

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- Moved requirements for a VPN-PKI PKC (para 3.5) to general
requirements (3.1.5). Changed para to indicate it is the
requirements for VPN-PKI PKC and not the IKE PKC. Identity
requirements reduced to indicate name forms that need to be
supported. Path validation requirements moved to later in the
profile. Changed key usage requirements to indicate the
requirement vice the field that must be supported. EKU
requirement changed to indicate EKUs are not required and
presence must not cause implementations to fail. Renamed pointer
to revocation checking to revocation information location and
reduced wording to say "must have location of revocation
location." Note that the PKC profile for VPN-PKI interactions
will be addressed in the certificate management profile.

- Indicated manual approval for enrollment requests will not be
supported.

- Renamed "protocol preference for authorization" to "one
authorization protocol". Removed redundant text describing PKI-
Admin interactions (it gets covered later). Moved "batch"
requirements to bulk authorizations.

- Clarified that DNS is supported to resolve IP addresses.

- Clarified that a PKC update can include a rekey.

- Clarified that Admin can initiate revocations for any PKC issued
under a template it controls, which supports the case where
multiple Admins are used.

- Added one protocol for Lifecycle requirements. One for rekey,
renew, update; revocation may be the same. Rekey, renew, update
must be same as enrollment protocol.

- Removed notion of update ôtypeö. “type”.

- Added that rekeys are initiated by Admin and that the PKI need
not support direct interaction on rekey requests.

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- Trust anchor acquisition, path validation, and revocation
checking were grouped together under a new paragraph called
Trust.

2004-December Draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-02

This issue of the document attempts to close out all non-contentious
issues as perceived after IETF #61. Numerous clarifications to

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technical content were introduced, as well as revision to language
for purposes of internal consistency and consistency with the
[IKECERTPROFILE]. The following changes were introduced:

- Description of PKC ôrenewalö “renewal” was clarified IAW [GLOSSARY].

- Replaced term ôchangeö “change” with ôupdateö “update” IAW [GLOSSARY].

- Added description of PKC ôrekeyö “rekey” to complete the terminology set
employed in [GLOSSARY].

- Added [GLOSSARY] to the set of Non-Normative References.

- Updated use of the terminology throughout the document to align
with the above.

- Scrubbed instances of ambiguous requirements terminology in favor
of statements compliant with [MUSTSHOULD].

- Added reference to [IKECERTPROFILE] in several introductory text.

- Resolved editorÆs editor’s note concerning renewal parameters in 3.2.3.1
and related text in 3.2.3.2.

- Clarified that any non-key-related field might be changed in a
PKC update operation.

- Resolved editorÆs editor’s note concerning canceling authorizations in
3.2.4 so that either the Admin or the Peer may issue a
cancellation.

- Resolved editorÆs editor’s note concerning replay attacks in 3.2.4 so
duplicate authorization request MUST have a new identifier.

- Clarified the scenario in 3.2.5 for the PKI modifying the
requested PKC template submitted by the Admin.

- Renumbered previous clauses 3.3.1 through 3.3.4 as subsections of
a new 3.3.1 entitled ôKey “Key Generation Scenariosö.

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- Moved and renumbered the existing clause 3.3.5 as a new clause
3.10 since the topic of trust anchor acquisition applies
generically, and is not specifically subject to key generation
or PKC request construction.

- Added new key generation scenario as 3.3.1.5 in which the Peer
initiates a PKC request without a prior authorization exchange
between the Admin and the PKI.

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- Added new Figures 7 through 11 to clauses 3.3.1.1 through 3.3.1.5
respectively to illustrate the steps of the different key
generation scenarios.

- Clarified in several places that the delivery of the requested
PKC is expected to occur directly as an in-band response, not
via lookup in the certificate repository.

- Resolved editorÆs editor’s note in 3.5.3 concerning key usage so that only
the ôdigialSignatureö “digialSignature” bit will be required to be set based on
the understanding that this does not preclude a system from
using digital signatures as a part of a non-repudiation service.

- Added new text to section 4 on Security Considerations.

- Corrected paragraph numbering on Non-Normative Reference section.

- Incorporated a new Appendix E to summarize choices that must be
made by VPN implementers and VPN system operators, and describe
some of the potential impact of these decisions.

- Applied numerous minor editorial corrections throughout the
document.

2004-October Draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-01

This issue of the document addresses comments identified at IETF #60.
The bulk of the changes were editorial, but some residual technical
impact may have resulted. The following changes were introduced:

- Acronym fixes

- Clarification of PKC Change definition

- Rearranged and consolidated references

- Clarified what ôoff-lineö “off-line” communication (out of band) entails.

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2004-August Draft-ietf-pki4ipsec-mgmt-profile-rqts-00

This issue of the document was merely a reposting of draft-bonatti-
pki4ipsec-profile-reqts-01 to bring the document under the WG
auspices after the I-D repository opened. No significant changes
were introduced.

2004-July Draft-bonatti-pki4ipsec-profile-reqts-01

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This document was submitted as an individual draft in order to meet a
publication deadline though it has been accepted in to the working
group. The following salient changes were introduced:

- A new Figure 1 was added in section 2.1 to depict just the VPN
System.

- A new Figure 2 was added to depict 2.2 to depict just the PKI
System.

- The old Figure 1 was moved to section 2.3.

- Section 2.3 was split in to three sections to depict the New PKC,
Renewal, and Revocation. Also the text was modified to indicate
that the pictures are only for IPsec Peers generating key pairs
and requesting PKCs.

- Text and a Figure was added to Section 3.4.6 to show the
architectural difference for IPsec Peers enrolling through an
Admin.

- Text and a Figure was added to Section 3.4.7 to show the
architectural difference for Admins performing the entire
enrollment.

2004-January Draft-bonatti-pki4ipsec-profile-reqts-00

This is a revised requirements document based on the existing Project
Dploy requirements draft. It adapts the revisions to adapt the Dploy
requirements to the scope of the proposed charter for an IETF
PKI4IPSEC WG. It is submitted as an individual draft in anticipation
of formation of the WG. The following salient changes were
introduced:

- Rewrote the abstract to focus on the document rather than the
project.

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- Rewrote and trimmed introduction to fit proposed scope of
deliverable (2) from IETF PKI4IPSEC charter.

- Rewrote sentences throughout to genericize the document for the
IETF and remove references to Project Dploy objectives.

- Removed reference to the Dploy Business Case.

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- Removed the "Audience" subsection of the introduction because it
was redundant with other aspects of the introduction, and
unnecessary with the context of the proposed PKI4IPSEC WG.

- Added definition of Community Realm (used in 3.2.3.3) to the
"Definitions" subsection.

- Added definition of CRL Distribution Points (CDP) and Authority
Info Access (AIA) to the "Definitions" subsection.

- Restructured the "Architecture" section to bring the presentation
of Figure 1 to the front to go along with the overview of the
section, and to add a new step diagram to the "VPN-PKI
Interaction" subsection.

- Added a new subsection 2.1.2 to describe the VPN peer. Text of
the new subsection will be supplied in a subsequent draft.

- Added an editorÆs editor’s note to subsection 3.1.2 noting that further
elaboration on the nature of "policy details" may be required.

- Subsection 3.2 was deleted to maintain the focus on generic
requirements agreed in Minneapolis. Selection of specific
protocols will be done in the deliverable (3) profile.

- Delete the requirement from 3.2.3.1 to include the maximum CRL
size in the certificate template. This may need to be specified
in the profile, but not be in the certificate itself.

- Revised 3.3.3 to clarify that key escrow requirements and any key
transport between the VPN admin and the peer are beyond scope.

- Adopted consistent spelling "enrollment" vs. "enrolment"
throughout.

- Replaced instances of "and/or" and other slashed terminology with
less ambiguous statements to clarify the requirements.

- Revised the text of 3.5.1 to clarify the proposed requirement in
terms of SHALL and MAY terms.

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- Re-titled 3.5.2 as "Path Validation" instead of "Chaining".

- Added AIA extension as a MAY requirement in 3.5.2.

- Added an editorÆs editor’s note to subsection 3.5.3 to question whether
additional keyUsage bits should be set in the certificate.

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- Removed the requirement for HTTP support in favor of a
requirement for a single mandatory protocol to be specified in
the profile.

- Removed subsection on "Intra-IKE Considerations" as these should
be dealt with in the existing deliverable (1) PKI profiles.

- Deleted existing sections 5 and 6 dealing with the participating
vendors in Project Dploy.

- Added new section 4 on "Security Considerations". Text of the new
subsection will be supplied in a subsequent draft.

- Revised the "Acknowledgements" section to reflect this revision,
and provide appropriate credit to Project DPloy.

- Normalized "References" section with the ID-Nits promulgated by
the IESG.

- Added a stub for a proposed new Annex D to provide a requirements
summary table. Content of the annex will be supplied in a
subsequent draft.

2002-March Draft-dploy-requirements-00

- First public draft of the document released.

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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Expires February August 20, 2006

Bonatti, Turner, Lebovitz 50

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