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Internet Draft                                   Daniel Brown, Certicom 
Intended Status: Standard Track                   Kelvin Yiu, Microsoft 
Updates: 3279 (once approved)              Russ Housley, Vigil Security 
Expires: April 26, May 21, 2009                                    Tim Polk, NIST 
                                                       October 26, 
                                                      November 21, 2008 
                                      
                                      
        Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information 
                 draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo-09.txt 
                 draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo-10.txt 


Status of this Memo 

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, May 21, 2009. 

Copyright Notice 

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 

Abstract 

   This document specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject 
   Public Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic 
   Curve Cryptography.  This document updates Sections 2.3.5, 3, 5, and 5 the 
   ASN.1 module of RFC 3279. 

 
 
 
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Table of Contents 

   1. Introduction...................................................2 Introduction................................................. 2 
      1.1. Terminology...............................................3 Terminology............................................. 3 
   2. Subject Public Key Information Fields..........................3 Fields........................ 3 
      2.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography Public Key Algorithm 
           Identifiers...............................................4 
           Identifiers............................................. 3 
         2.1.1. Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters.....5 Parameters... 4 
            2.1.1.1. Named Curve................................... 5 
         2.1.2. Restricted Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters......8 Parameters.... 6 
      2.2. Subject Public Key........................................9 Key...................................... 7 
   3. Key Usage Bits................................................10 Bits............................................... 7 
   4. Security Considerations.......................................11 Considerations...................................... 8 
   5. ASN.1 Considerations..........................................13 Considerations........................................ 10 
   6. IANA Considerations...........................................13 Considerations......................................... 11 
   7. Acknowledgements..............................................14 Acknowledgements............................................ 11 
   8. References....................................................14 References.................................................. 11 
      8.1. Normative References.....................................14 References................................... 11 
      8.2. Informative References...................................15 References................................. 12 
   Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules........................................15 
      A.1. Curve Object Identifiers.................................16 
      A.2. Algorithm Identifiers....................................18 
      A.3. 1988 ASN.1 Module for ECParameters.......................23 
      A.4. 2004 ASN.1 Module........................................24 Module....................................... 13 
    
1. Introduction 

   This document specifies the format of the subjectPublicKeyInfo field 
   in X.509 certificates [PKI] that use Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
   (ECC).  It updates [PKI-ALG]. This document specifies the encoding 
   formats for public keys used with the following ECC algorithms: 

      o Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA); 

      o Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) family schemes; and, 

      o Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) family schemes. 

   Two methods for specifying the algorithms that can be used with the 
   subjectPublicKey are defined.  One method does not restrict the 
   algorithms the key can be used with while the other method does 
   restrict the algorithms the key can be used with.  To promote 
   interoperability, this document indicates which is required to 
   implement. 

   Two methods 

   This ASN.1 module in this document includes ASN.1 for specifying the algorithm's parameters are ECC algorithms.  
   It also 
   defined.  One allows included ASN.1 for the Elliptic Curve (EC) to be identified by 
   an object identifier non-ECC algorithms defined in [PKI-ALG] 
   and one allows for [PKI-ADALG] even though the EC to be inherited associated text is unaffected.  By 
   updating all of the ASN.1 from [PKI-ALG] in this document, 
   implementers only need to use the module found in this document. 

 
 
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   the issuer's certificate. To promote interoperability, this document 
   indicates which options are required to implement. 
    

1.1. Terminology 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUSTSHOULD]. 

2. Subject Public Key Information Fields 

   In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the 
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax: 

     SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  { 
       algorithm         AlgorithmIdentifier 
                           { PUBLIC-KEY{ PKIXAlgs-PublicKeys } },         AlgorithmIdentifier, 
       subjectPublicKey  BIT STRING 
     } 

   The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings: 

      o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and algorithm parameters 
        for the ECC public key.  See Section 2.1. 

      o subjectPublicKey is the ECC public key.  See Section 2.2. 

   The AlgorithmIdentifier type type, which is parametrized by PKIXAlgs-
      PublicKeys, a set of instances of the class PUBLIC-KEY.  This 
      class included for convenience 
   [PKI], is defined in [PKI-ASN]: 

     PUBLIC-KEY as follows: 

      AlgorithmIdentifier  ::= CLASS  SEQUENCE  { 
       &id 
        algorithm   OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
       &Params         OPTIONAL, 
       &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT required, 
       &KeyValue, 
       &PrivateKey 
        parameters  ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL 
      } 
     WITH SYNTAX { 
       IDENTIFIER &id 
       KEY &KeyValue 
       [PARAMS TYPE [&Params] ARE &paramPresence] 
       [PRIVATE KEY &PrivateKey] 
     } 



 
 
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    ParamOptions ::= ENUMERATED { 
      required,        -- Parameters MUST be encoded in structure 
      preferedPresent, -- Parameters SHOULD be encoded in structure 
      preferedAbsent,  -- Parameters SHOULD NOT be encoded in structure 
      absent,          -- Parameters MUST NOT be encoded in structure 
      notPresent, 
      inheritable      -- Parameters are inherited if not present 
      } 

   The type AlgorithmIdentifier is parameterized to allow legal sets of 
   values to be specified by constraining fields in AlgorithmIdentifer have the type with an information 
   object set. 

   When defining a PUBLIC-KEY type: following meanings: 

      o &id is algorithm identifies the cryptographic algorithm with an object identifier assigned to the public-key type. 
        identifier.  See Section 2.1. 

      o &Params, parameters, which is are optional, is are the associated parameters 
        for the public-
        key type. 

      o &paramPresence specifies the parameter presence requirements. 

      o &KeyValue contains the type for the public key value. 

      o &PrivateKey is algorithm identifier in the associated private key format. algorithm field.  See 
        Section 2.1.1.  

2.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography Public Key Algorithm Identifiers 

   The algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure [PKI] 
   indicates the algorithm and any associated parameters for the ECC 
   public key (see Section 2.2).   The algorithms  Three algorithm identifiers are restricted to the  
   PKIXAlgs-PublicKeys parameterized type with the following ASN.1 
   definition: 

     PKIXAlgs-PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
       pk-ec | 
       pk-ecDH | 
       pk-ecMQV, 
       ... -- Extensible 
     } 

   The algorithms 
   defined are as follows: in this document: 

 
 
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      o pk-ec id-ecPublicKey indicates that the algorithms that can be used 
        with the subject public key are not restricted (i.e., they are 
        unrestricted). is unrestricted.   The key is only 
        restricted by the values indicated in the key usage certificate 
        extension.  The pk-ec 
 
 
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        CHOICE  id-ecPublicKey MUST be supported.  See Section 
        2.1.1. This value is also used when a key is used with ECDSA. 

      o pk-ecDH id-ecDH indicates that the algorithm that can be used with the 
        subject public key is restricted to the Elliptic Curve Diffie-
        Hellman algorithm.  See Section 2.1.2.  This choice  id-ecDH MAY be 
        supported. 

      o pk-ecMQV id-ecMQV indicates that the algorithm that can be used with the 
        subject public key is restricted to the Elliptic Curve Menezes-
        Qu-Vanstone key agreement algorithm.  See Section 2.1.2.    
        This choice    id-
        ecMQV MAY be supported. 

2.1.1. Unrestricted Algorithm Identifier and Parameters 

   The "unrestricted" algorithm is defined as follows: 

     pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
       IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey 
       KEY ECPoint 
       PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
     } 

   The algorithm identifier is: 

     id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } 

   The public key (ECPoint) syntax is described in Section 2.2. 

   The parameters parameter for id-ecPublicKey are is as follows and they MUST always be 
   present: 

     ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 
       namedCurve      CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}),         OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
       -- implicitCurve   NULL,   NULL 
       -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain 
       ... -- Extensible 
     } 
       -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 
       -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 
       -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 
       -- with ASNI ANSI X.9. 




 
 
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   The fields in ECParameters have the following meanings: 

      o namedCurve allows identifies all the required values for a particular 
        set of elliptic curve domain parameters to be represented by an 
        object identifier.  This choice MUST be supported. See Section 
        2.1.1.1. 

      o implicitCurve allows the elliptic curve parameters to be 
        inherited.  This choice MAY MUST NOT be used. 


 
 
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      o specifiedCurve, which is SpecifiedECDomain type is defined in 
        [X9.62], allows all of the curve parameters to be explicitly 
        specified.  This choice MUST NOT be used.  See the ASN.1 
        Considerations section. 

   The addition of any new choices in ECParameters ought needs to be 
   coordinated with ANSI X9. 

   The AlgorithmIdentifier within subjectPublicKeyInfo is the only place 
   within a certificate where the domain parameters may be used.  If the 
   ECDSA, ECMQV, or ECDH algorithm parameters are omitted from the 
   subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the 
   subject certificate using ECDSA, then the certificate issuer's ECDSA 
   parameters apply to the subject's ECDSA, ECMQV, and ECDH key.  If the 
   ECDSA domain parameters are omitted from the subjectPublicKeyInfo 
   AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using a 
   signature algorithm other than ECDSA, then the subject's ECDSA, 
   ECMQV, and ECDH domain parameters are distributed by other means. If 
   the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field omits the 
   parameters component, the CA signed the subject with a signature 
   algorithm other than ECDSA, and the subject's ECDSA, ECMQV, and ECDH 
   parameters are not available through other means, present, then clients MUST reject the certificate. 

2.1.1.1. Named Curve 

   The namedCurve field in ECParameters uses the class CURVE object identifiers to 
   constrain name 
   well known curves.  This document publishes curve identifiers for the set of legal values from NamedCurve, which are object 
   identifiers: 

     CURVE ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE } 
       WITH SYNTAX { ID &id } 





 
 
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   The NamedCurve parameterized type is defined as follows: 

     NamedCurve CURVE ::= { 
      { ID secp192r1 } | { ID sect163k1 } | { ID sect163r2 } | 
      { ID secp224r1 } | { ID sect233k1 } | { ID sect233r1 } | 
      { ID secp256r1 } | { ID sect283k1 } | { ID sect283r1 } | 
      { ID secp384r1 } | { ID sect409k1 } | { ID sect409r1 } | 
      { ID secp521r1 } | { ID sect571k1 } | { ID sect571r1 }, 
      ... -- Extensible 
     } 

   The curve identifiers are the fifteen NIST recommended curves 
   [FIPS186-3]: 

     -- Note that in [X9.62] the curves 
   fifteen NIST recommended curves [FIPS186-3].  Other document can 
   publish other name curve identifiers.  The NIST named cures are: 

     -- Note that in [X9.62] the curves are referred to as 'ansiX9' as 
     -- opposed to 'sec'. For example secp192r1 is the same curve as 
     -- ansix9p192r1. 

     -- Note that in [PKI-ALG] the secp192r1 curve was referred to as 
     -- prime192v1 and the secp256v1 curve was referred to as secp256r1.   

     -- Note that [FIPS186-3] refers to secp192r1 as P-192, secp224r1 as 
     -- P-224, secp256r1 as P-256, secp384r1 as P-384, and secp521r1 as 
     -- P-521. 

     secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
       prime(1) 1 } 

     sect163k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 1 } 

     sect163r2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 15 } 

     secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } 

     sect233k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 26 } 


 
 
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     sect233r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 27 } 

     secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
       prime(1) 7 } 
 
 
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     sect283k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 16 } 

     sect283r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 17 } 

     secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } 

     sect409k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 36 } 

     sect409r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 37 } 

     secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } 

     sect571k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 38 } 

     sect571r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 39 } 

2.1.2. Restricted Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters 

   Algorithms used with elliptic curve cryptography fall in two 
   different categories: signature and key agreement algorithms.  ECDSA 
   uses the pk-ec identifier described in 2.1.1. 

   Two sets of key 
   agreement "restricted" algorithms are identified herein: defined for key agreement algorithms: 
   the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme and the 
   Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement scheme. All Both 
   algorithms are identified by an object identifier and have 
   parameters.  The object identifier varies based on the algorithm but 
   the parameters are always ECParameters and they MUST always be 
   present (see Section 2.1.1). 

   The ECDH is defined as follows: 

     pk-ecDH PUBLIC-KEY algorithm uses the following object identifier: 

     id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       IDENTIFIER id-ecDH 
       KEY ECPoint 
       PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 
       ecdh(12) }  

 
 
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   The algorithm identifier is: 

     id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 
       ecdh(12) }  

   The ECMQV is defined as follows: 

     pk-ecMQV PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
       IDENTIFIER id-ecMQV 
       KEY ECPoint 
       PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
     }  

   The algorithm identifier is: uses the following object identifier: 

     id-ecMQV OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 
       ecmqv(13) }  

2.2. Subject Public Key 

   The subjectPublicKey from SubjectPublicKeyInfo is the ECC public key.  
   ECC public keys have the following syntax: 

     ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 

   Implementations of elliptic curve cryptography according to this 
   document MUST support the uncompressed form and MAY support the 
   compressed form of the ECC public key.  The hybrid form from [X9.62] 
   MUST NOT be used.  As specified in [SEC1]: 

      o The elliptic curve public key (a value of type ECPoint which is 
        an OCTET STRING) is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a value of 
        type BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the 
        OCTET STRING value becomes the most significant bit of the BIT 
        STRING value, and so on; the least significant bit of the OCTET 
        STRING becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING.  
        Conversion routines are found in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of 
        [SEC1]. 

      o The first octet of the OCTET STRING indicates whether the key 
        is compressed or uncompressed.  The uncompressed form is 
        indicated by 0x04 and the compressed form is indicated by 
        either 0x02 or 0x03 (see 2.3.3 in [SEC1]). 



 
 
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        rejected if any other value is included in the first octet.  

3. Key Usage Bits 

   If the keyUsage extension is present in a CA certificate that 
   indicates id-ecPublicKey in subjectPublicKeyInfo, then any 
   combination of the following values MAY be present: 

     digitalSignature; 
     nonRepudiation; 
     keyAgreement; 
     keyCertSign; and 
     cRLSign. 

   If the CA certificate keyUsage extension asserts keyAgreement, then 
   it MAY assert either encipherOnly or decipherOnly.  However, this 
   specification RECOMMENDS that if keyCertSign or cRLSign is 
 
 
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   specification RECOMMENDS that if keyCertSign or cRLSign is present, 
   then keyAgreement, encipherOnly, and decipherOnly SHOULD NOT be 
   present. 

   If the keyUsage extension is present in an EE certificate that 
   indicates id-ecPublicKey in subjectPublicKeyInfo, then any 
   combination of the following values MAY be present: 

     digitalSignature; 
     nonRepudiation; and 
     keyAgreement. 

   If the EE certificate keyUsage extension asserts keyAgreement, then 
   it MAY assert either encipherOnly or decipherOnly. 

   If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates 
   id-ecDH or id-ecMQV in subjectPublicKeyInfo, then the following MUST 
   be present: 

     keyAgreement; 

   the following MUST NOT be present: 

     digitalSignature; 
     nonRepudiation; 
     keyTransport; 
     keyCertSign; and, 
     cRLSign; 

   the following MAY be present: 

     encipherOnly; or, 
     decipherOnly. 
 
 
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4. Security Considerations 

   The security considerations in [PKI-ALG] apply. 

   When implementing ECC in X.509 Certificates, there are three 
   algorithm related choices that need to be made: 

   1) What is the public key size? 

   2) What is the hash algorithm [FIPS180-3]? 

   3) What is the curve? 

 
 
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   Consideration must be given by the CA to the strength of the security 
   provided by each of these choices.  Security is measured in bits, 
   where a strong symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to 
   provide X bits of security.  It is recommended that the bits of 
   security provided by each choice are roughly equivalent.  The 
   following table provides comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-
   57] for the ECDSA key sizes and message digest algorithms.  It also 
   lists curves (see Section 2.1.1.1) for the key sizes. 


























 
 
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   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message    | Curves 
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest     | 
   Security |          | Algorithms | 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   80       | 160-223  | SHA-1      | sect163k1 
            |          | SHA-224    | secp163r2 
            |          | SHA-256    | secp192r1 
            |          | SHA-384    | 
            |          | SHA-512    | 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   112      | 224-255  | SHA-224    | secp224r1 
            |          | SHA-256    | sect233k1 
            |          | SHA-384    | sect233r1 
            |          | SHA-512    | 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   128      | 256-383  | SHA-256    | secp256r1 
            |          | SHA-384    | sect283k1 
            |          | SHA-512    | sect283r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   192      | 384-511  | SHA-384    | secp384r1 
            |          | SHA-512    | sect409k1 
            |          |            | sect409r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   256      | 512+     | SHA-512    | secp521r1 
            |          |            | sect571k1 
            |          |            | sect571r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 











 
 
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   To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED: 

   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message    | Curves 
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest     | 
   Security |          | Algorithms | 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   80       | 192      | SHA-256    | secp192r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   112      | 224      | SHA-256    | secp224r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   128      | 256      | SHA-256    | secp256r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   192      | 384      | SHA-384    | secp384r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+----------- 
   256      | 512      | SHA-512    | secp521r1 
   ---------+----------+------------+-----------  

   Using a larger hash value and then truncating it, consumes more 
   processing power than is necessary.  This is more important on 
 
 
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   constrained devices.  Since the signer does not know the environment 
   that the recipient will use to validate the signature, it is better 
   to use a hash function that provides the desired hash value output 
   size, and no more. 

   There are security risks with using keys not associated with well 
   known and widely reviewed curves. For example, the curve may not 
   satisfy the MOV condition or the curve may be vulnerable to the 
   Anomalous attack [X9.62]. Additionally, either a) all of the 
   arithmetic properties of a candidate ECC public key must be validated 
   to ensure that it has the unique correct representation in the 
   correct (additive) subgroup (and therefore is also in the correct EC 
   group) specified by the associated ECC domain parameters or b) some 
   of the arithmetic properties of a candidate ECC public key must be 
   validated to ensure that it is in the correct group (but not 
   necessarily the correct subgroup) specified by the associated ECC 
   domain parameters [SP800-56A]. 

   As noted in [PKI-ALG], the use of MD2 and MD5 for new applications is 
   discouraged.  It is still reasonable to use MD2 and MD5 to verify 
   existing signatures. 

5. ASN.1 Considerations 

   [X9.62] defines additional options for ECParameters and ECDSA-Sig-
   Value.   If an implementation needs to use these options, then use 
   the [X9.62] ASN.1 module. This RFC contains a conformant subset of 
   the ASN.1 module defined in [X9.62]. 
 
 
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   If an implementation generates a PER [X.691] encoding using the ASN.1 
   module found in this specification it might not achieve the same 
   encoded output as one that uses the [X9.62] module.  PER is not 
   required by either the PKIX or S/MIME environments.  If an 
   implementation environment requires PER, then implementation concerns 
   are less likely with the use of the [X9.62] module. 

6. IANA Considerations 

   This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register 
   public key types, elliptic curves, and algorithms. Most are 
   registered in the ANSI X9.62 arc with the exception of the hash 
   algorithms, which are in NIST's arc, and many of the curves, which 
   are in the Certicom Inc. arc (these curves have been adopted by ANSI 
   and NIST). Additionally, object identifiers are used to identify the 
   ASN.1 modules found in Appendix A. These are defined in an arc 
   delegated by IANA to the PKIX Working Group.  No further action by 
   IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates. 
 
 
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7. Acknowledgements 

   The authors wish to thank Stephen Farrell, Alfred Hoenes, Johannes 
   Merkle, Jim Schaad, and Carl Wallace for their valued input. 

8. References 

8.1. Normative References 

   [FIPS180-3]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
                FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October 
                2008. 

   [FIPS186-3]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
                FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature Standard, 
                (draft) March 2006. November 2008. 

   [PKI]        Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S. 
                Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 
                Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 
                List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 

   [PKI-ALG]    Polk, W., Housley, R. and L. Bassham, "Algorithm 
                Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key 
                Infrastructure", RFC 3279, April 2002. 

   [MUSTSHOULD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 
 
 
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   [RSAOAEP]    Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 
                Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use 
                in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
                Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
                Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. 

   [SEC1]       Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC 1: Elliptic 
                Curve Cryptography", Version 1.0, September 2000. 

   [X9.62]      American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ANS 
                X9.62-2005: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
                Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005. 

   [X.208] 

   [X.680]      ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                1:1988. Specification of
                1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                Notation One 
                (ASN.1). 


 
 
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8.2. Informative References 

   [PKI-ADALG]  Dang, Q., Santesson, S., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., and 
                T. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 
                Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and 
                ECDSA", draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-04, draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-05.txt, work-in-
                progress, June 2008. 

   [PKI-ASN]    Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 
                PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1-01, work-in-progress, 
                July October 2008. 

   [SP800-56A]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
                Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-
                Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 
                Cryptography (Revised), March 2007. 

   [SP800-57]   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
                Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key 
                Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007. 

   [X.680]      ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                Notation One. 

   [X.681]      ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                Notation One: Information Object Specification. 

   [X.682]      ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                Notation One: Constraint Specification. 

   [X.683]      ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax 
                Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications. 

   [X.691]      ITU-T Recommendation X.691 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-
                2:2002. Information Technology - ASN.1 Encoding Rules: 
                Specification of Packed Encoding Rules. 

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules 

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the named 
   elliptic curves. 










 
 
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Appendix A.2 provides the normative A. ASN.1 definitions Module 

   NOTE: The values for the 
   algorithms, keys, and parameters (minus the ECParameters).  This 
   module includes ASN.1 from [PKI-ALG] because this document updates 
   the entire ASN.1 module. Additionally, it includes ASN.1 for DSA with 
   SHA-224 and SHA-256 [PKI-ADALG]. 

   Appendix A.3 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the 
   ECParameters structures described in this specification using ASN.1 
   as defined in [X.208]. 

   Appendix A.4 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the 
   ECParameters structures described in TBA1-3 will be included during AUTH48. 

   //** RFC Editor: Remove this specification using ASN.1 
   as defined in [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683]. This appendix 
   contains the same information as Appendix A.2 and A.3 in a more 
   recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix A.2 and A.3 
   take precedence in case of conflict. 

A.1. Curve Object Identifiers 

   PKIXCurves-2008 note prior to publication **// 

   PKIX1Algorithms2008 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 
     internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA TBA1 } 

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORTS ALL 

   -- ALL; 

   IMPORTS NOTHING 

   -- Note that in [X9.62] the curves are referred to as 'ansiX9' as 

   -- opposed to 'sec'. For example secp192r1 is the same curve as From RFC 4055 [RSAOAEP] 

   id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 
     FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 
         id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } 

   ; 

   -- ansix9p192r1. 
   -- Note that in [PKI-ALG] the secp192r1 curve was referred to as Message Digest Algorithms 
   -- prime192v1 and the secp256v1 curve was referred to as secp256r1. 

   -- Note that [FIPS186-3] refers to secp192r1 as P-192, secp224r1 as MD-2 
   -- P-224, secp384r1 as P-384, and secp521r1 as P-521. 

   secp192r1 Parameters are NULL 

   id-md2  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
     prime(1) 1 rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } 

   sect163k1 

   -- MD-5 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   id-md5  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 1 member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } 





 
 
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   sect163r2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 15 } 

   secp224r1 
    

   -- SHA-1 
   -- Parameters are preferred absent 

   id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 oiw(14) secsig(3) 
     algorithm(2) 26 } 

   sect233k1 

   -- SHA-224 
   -- Parameters are absent 

   -- id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 26 
   --   joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --   csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } 

   sect233r1 

   -- SHA-256 
   -- Parameters are absent 

   -- id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 27 } 

   secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) 
   --   joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
     prime(1) 7 } 

   sect283k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 16 } 

   sect283r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 17 } 

   secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } 

   sect409k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 36 } 

   sect409r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 37 } 

   secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 organization(1) gov(101) 
   --   csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } 

   sect571k1 

   -- SHA-384 
   -- Parameters are absent 

   -- id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 38 
   --   joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --   csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } 

   sect571r1 

   -- SHA-512 
   -- Parameters are absent 

   -- id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 39 
   --   joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --   csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } 

   END 













 
 
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A.2. Algorithm Identifiers 

   PKIXAlgIDs-2008 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 
     internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORTS ALL 

   IMPORTS 

   -- From [RSAOAEP] 

   id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 
     FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 
         id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } 

   ; 
    

   -- 
   -- Public Key (pk-) (PK) Algorithms 
   -- 

   -- RSA PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys 

   rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 } 

   RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 
     modulus         INTEGER, -- n 
     publicExponent  INTEGER  -- e 
   } 

   -- DSA PK Algorithm and Parameters 

   id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 } 

   DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER --  public key, y 




 
 
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   DSS-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { 
     p  INTEGER, 
     q  INTEGER, 
     g  INTEGER 
   } 

   -- Diffie-Hellman PK Algorithm, Keys, and Parameters 

   dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } 

   DHPublicKey ::= INTEGER  -- public key, y = g^x mod p 

   DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { 
     p                INTEGER,           -- odd prime, p=jq +1 
     g                INTEGER,           -- generator, g 
     q                INTEGER,           -- factor of p-1 
     j                INTEGER OPTIONAL,  -- subgroup factor, j>= 2 
     validationParms  ValidationParms OPTIONAL 
   } 

   ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { 
     seed         BIT STRING, 
     pgenCounter  INTEGER 
   } 

 
 
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   -- KEA PK Algorithm and Parameters 

   id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 } 

   KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING 

   -- Sec 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithm ID, Parameters, and Keys 
   -- (ECDSA keys use id-ecPublicKey) 

   id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } 

   -- Parameters are ECParameters.  1988 ASN.1 for both Restricted and Unrestricted 

   ECParameters is found ::= CHOICE { 
     namedCurve         OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
     -- implicitCurve   NULL 
     -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain 
   } 
     -- implicitCurve and specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in Appendix A.3.  2004 ASN.1 syntax PKIX. 
     -- Details for ECParameters is SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 
     -- Appendix A.4. Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 
     -- with ANSI X9. 

   ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 



 
 
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   -- Sec 2.1.2 Restricted Algorithm IDs, Parameters, and Keys:ECDH Keys: ECDH 

   id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 
     ecdh(12) } 

   -- Parameters are ECParameters.  1988 ASN.1 for ECParameters is found 
   -- in Appendix A.3.  2004 ASN.1 syntax for ECParameters is found in 
   -- Appendix A.4. 

   -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 

   -- Sec 2.1.2 Restricted Algorithm IDs, Parameters, and Keys: ECMQV 

   id-ecMQV OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) 
     ecmqv(13) } 

   -- Parameters are ECParameters.  1988 ASN.1 for ECParameters is found 
   -- in Appendix A.3.  2004 ASN.1 syntax for ECParameters is found in 
   -- Appendix A.4. 

   -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING 
 
 
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   -- 
   -- Signature Algorithms (sa) 
   -- 

   -- RSA with MD-2 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 2 } 

   -- RSA with MD-5 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 4 } 

   -- RSA with SHA-1 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 } 


 
 
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   -- DSA with SHA-1 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } 

   -- DSA with SHA-224 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   id-dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { 
     joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
     csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1 } 

   -- DSA with SHA-256 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { 
     joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
     csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-1 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } 
 
 
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   -- ECDSA with SHA-224 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-256 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-384 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } 

 
 
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   -- ECDSA with SHA-512 
   -- Parameters are ABSENT 

   ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } 

   -- 
   -- Signature Values 
   -- 

   -- DSA 

   DSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 
     r  INTEGER, 
     s  INTEGER 
   } 

   -- ECDSA 

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { 
     r  INTEGER, 
     s  INTEGER 
   } 

   -- 
   -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)  
   -- 

   -- MD-2 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   id-md2  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } 

   -- MD-5 
   -- Parameters are NULL 

   id-md5  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } 

   -- SHA-1 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) 
     algorithm(2) 26 } 


 
 
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   -- SHA-224 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
   --  joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } Named Elliptic Curves 
   -- SHA-256 

   -- Parameters Note that in [X9.62] the curves are preferred ABSENT 

   -- id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
   --  joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) referred to as 'ansiX9' as 
   --  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } opposed to 'sec'. For example secp192r1 is the same curve as 
   -- SHA-384 ansix9p192r1. 

   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
   --  joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } 

   -- SHA-512 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
   --  joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) 
   --  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } 

   END 

A.3. 1988 ASN.1 Module for ECParameters 

   PKIXAlgs-1988ECParams { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 
     internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORTS ALL 

   IMPORTS 





 
 
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   -- From Appendix A.1 

   secp192r1, sect163k1, sect163r2, secp224r1, sect233k1, sect233r1, 
   secp256r1, sect283k1, sect283r1, secp384r1, sect409k1, sect409r1, 
   secp521r1, sect571k1, sect571r1 
     FROM PKIXCurves 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)  
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   ; 

   -- Parameters for both Restricted and Unrestricted 

   ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 
     namedCurve      OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
     implicitCurve   NULL 
     -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain 
     -- Extensible 
   } 
     -- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 
     -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found in [X9.62]. 
     -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated 
     -- with ANSI X9. 

   END 

A.4. 2004 ASN.1 Module 

   PKIXAlgs-2008 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 
     internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 

   BEGIN 

   -- EXPORTS ALL 

   IMPORTS 

   -- FROM [PKI-ASN] 

   PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM 
     FROM AlgorithmInformation 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 
         id-mod-algorithInformation(TBA) } 

 
 
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   -- From [PKI-ASN] 

   mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 
     FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   -- From Appendix A.1 

   secp192r1, sect163k1, sect163r2, secp224r1, sect233k1, sect233r1, 
   secp256r1, sect283k1, sect283r1, secp384r1, sect409k1, sect409r1, 
   secp521r1, sect571k1, sect571r1 
     FROM PKIXCurves 
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)  
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   -- From Appendix A.2 

   rsaEncryption, RSAPublicKey, id-dsa, DSAPublicKey, DSS-Parms, 
   dhpublicnumber, DHPublicKey, DomainParameters, 
   id-keyExchangeAlgorithm, KEA-Parms-Id, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, 
   ECParameters, id-ecDH, id-ecMQV, md2WithRSAEncryption, 
   md5WithRSAEncryption, sha1WithRSAEncryption, id-dsa-with-sha1, 
   id-dsa-with-sha224, id-dsa-with-sha256, ecdsa-with-SHA1, 
   ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, 
   ecdsa-with-SHA512, DSA-Sig-Value, ECDSA-Sig-Value, id-md2, id-md5, 
   id-sha1 
     FROM PKIXAlgKeyParams-2004  
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)  
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBA } 

   ; 

   -- 
   -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms 
   -- 

   PKIXAlgs-PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     pk-rsa  | 
     pk-dsa  | 
     pk-dh   | 
     pk-kea  | 
     pk-ec   | 
     pk-ecDH | 
     pk-ecMQV, 
     ... -- Extensible 
   } 
 
 
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   -- RSA PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys 

   pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 
     KEY RSAPublicKey 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 

   -- DSA PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys 

   pk-dsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-dsa 
     KEY DSAPublicKey 
     PARAMS TYPE DSS-Parms ARE inheritable 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 

   -- Diffie-Hellman PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys 

   pk-dh PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER dhpublicnumber 
     KEY DHPublicKey 
     PARAMS TYPE DomainParameters ARE inheritable 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 

   -- KEA PK Algorithm and Parameters 

   pk-kea PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-keyExchangeAlgorithm  
     -- key is not encoded --  
     PARAMS TYPE KEA-Parms-Id ARE required 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 

   -- Sec 2.1.1 Unrestricted Algorithms ID, Parameters, and Keys 
   -- (ECDSA uses pk-ec) 

   pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey 
     KEY ECPoint 
     PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 


 
 
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   -- Sec 2.1.2 Restricted Algorithm IDs, Parameters, and Keys: ecDH 

   pk-ecDH PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-ecDH 
     KEY ECPoint 
     PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   } 

   -- Sec 2.1.2 Restricted Algorithm IDs, Parameters, and Keys: ecMQV 

   pk-ecMQV PUBLIC-KEY ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-ecMQV 
     KEY ECPoint 
     PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required 
     -- Private key format not in this document -- 
   }  

   -- Parameters for both Restricted and Unrestricted 

   ECParameters ::= CHOICE { 
     namedCurve      CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}), 
     implicitCurve   NULL, 
     -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain 
     ... -- Extensible 
   } 
     -- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX. 
     -- Details for SpecifiedECDomain can be found Note that in [X9.62]. 
     -- Any future additions [PKI-ALG] the secp192r1 curve was referred to this CHOICE should be coordinated as 
   -- with ANSI X.9. prime192v1 and the secp256v1 curve was referred to as secp256r1.   

   -- Sec 2.1.1.1 Named Curve 

   CURVE ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE } 
     WITH SYNTAX { ID &id } 

   NamedCurve CURVE ::= { 
    { ID Note that [FIPS186-3] refers to secp192r1 } | { ID sect163k1 } | { ID sect163r2 } | 
    { ID as P-192, secp224r1 } | { ID sect233k1 } | { ID sect233r1 } | 
    { ID secp256r1 } | { ID sect283k1 } | { ID sect283r1 } | 
    { ID as 
   -- P-224, secp384r1 } | { ID sect409k1 } | { ID sect409r1 } | 
    { ID as P-384, and secp521r1 } | { ID sect571k1 } | { ID sect571r1 }, 
    ... -- Extensible 
   } 



 
 
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   -- 
   -- Signature Algorithms (sa-) 
   -- 

   PKIXAlgs-Signature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     sa-rsaWithMD2      | 
     sa-rsaWithMD5      | 
     sa-rsaWithSHA1     | 
     sa-dsawithSHA1     | 
     sa-dsawithSHA224   | 
     sa-dsawithSHA256   | 
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA1   | 
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | 
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | 
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | 
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, 
     ... -- Extensible 
   } 

   -- RSA with MD-2 

   sa-rsaWithMD2 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER md2WithRSAEncryption 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE present 
     HASHES { mda-md2 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-rsa } 
   } 

   -- RSA with MD-5 

   sa-rsaWithMD5 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER md5WithRSAEncryption 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE present 
     HASHES { mda-md5 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-rsa } 
   } 

   -- RSA with SHA-1 

   sa-rsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER sha1WithRSAEncryption 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE present 
     HASHES { mda-sha1 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-rsa } 
   } 


 
 
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   -- DSA with SHA-1 

   sa-dsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha1 
     VALUE DSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS ARE absent 
     HASHES { mda-sha1 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-dsa } 
   } 

   -- DSA with SHA-224 

   sa-dsaWithSHA224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha224 
     VALUE DSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS ARE absent 
     HASHES { mda-sha224 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-dsa } 
   } 

   -- DSA with SHA-256 

   sa-dsaWithSHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha256 
     VALUE DSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS ARE absent 
     HASHES { mda-sha256 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-dsa } 
   } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-1 

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA1 
     VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     HASHES { mda-sha1 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS { pk-ec } 
   } 








 
 
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   -- ECDSA with SHA-224 

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { as P-521. 

   secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA224 
     VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     HASHES { mda-sha224 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS ::= { pk-ec } 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
     prime(1) 1 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-256 

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM 

   sect163k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 1 } 

   sect163r2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA256 
     VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     HASHES ::= { mda-sha256 
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 15 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS 

   secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pk-ec }  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-384 

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM 

   sect233k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 26 } 

   sect233r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA384 
     VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     HASHES ::= { mda-sha384  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 27 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS 

   secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pk-ec } 
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) 
     prime(1) 7 } 

   -- ECDSA with SHA-512 

   sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM 

   sect283k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 16 } 

   sect283r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA512 
     VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent 
     HASHES ::= { mda-sha512  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 17 } 
     PUBLIC KEYS 

   secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pk-ec }  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } 


 
 
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   -- 
   -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) 
   -- 

   HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM 
    

   sect409k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     mda-md2    | 
     mda-md5    | 
     mda-sha1   | 
     mda-sha224 | 
     mda-sha256 | 
     mda-sha384 | 
     mda-sha512, 
     ... -- Extensible  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 36 } 

   -- MD-2 

   mda-md2 DIGEST-ALGORITHM 

   sect409r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-md2 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 37 } 

   -- MD-5 

   mda-md5 DIGEST-ALGORITHM 

   secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 
     IDENTIFIER id-md5 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } 

   -- SHA-1 

   mda-sha1 DIGEST-ALGORITHM 

   sect571k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 38 } 

   sect571r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-sha1 
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent ::= {  
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 39 } 

   -- SHA-224 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- mda-sha224 







 
 
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   -- SHA-256 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- mda-sha256 

   -- SHA-384 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- mda-sha384 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- SHA-512 
   -- Parameters are preferred ABSENT 

   -- mda-sha512 

   END 































 
 
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   Authors' Addresses 

   Sean Turner 

   IECA, Inc. 
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 
   Fairfax, VA 22031 
   USA 

   EMail: turners@ieca.com 

   Kelvin Yiu 

   Microsoft 
   One Microsoft Way 
   Redmond, WA 98052-6399 
   USA 

   Email: kelviny@microsoft.com 

   Daniel R. L. Brown 

   Certicom Corp 
   5520 Explorer Drive #400 
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 
   CANADA 

   EMail: dbrown@certicom.com 

   Russ Housley 

   Vigil Security, LLC 
   918 Spring Knoll Drive 
   Herndon, VA 20170 
   USA 

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com 

   Tim Polk 

   NIST 
   Building 820, Room 426 
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899 
   USA 

   EMail: wpolk@nist.gov 

 
 
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Full Copyright Statement 

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   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 
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Acknowledgment 

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   Administrative Support Activity (IASA). 



 
 
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