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PKIX Working Group R. Housley (SPYRUS) Internet Draft W. Ford(Verisign)(VeriSign) W. Polk (NIST) D. Solo (Citicorp) expires in six monthsMarch 25,June 16, 1998 Internet X.509 Public Key InfrastructureX.509Certificate and CRL Profile<draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-07.txt><draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-08.txt> Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Toviewlearn theentire list ofcurrentInternet-Drafts,status of any Internet-Draft, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in theInternet-DraftsInternet- Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa),ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe),nic.nordu.net (Europe), munnari.oz.au(PacificPacific Rim),ftp.ietf.orgds.internic.net (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This is theseventheighth draft of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile. This draft is a complete specification. This text includes minor modifications over the previous draft. This draftintroduces UTF8 support,clarifies name encoding and comparison issues, updates the path validation process to conform with the current X.509 specification,forbids wildcarding in subject alternative names,specifies performance enhancements for path building, and clarifies conformance requirements. The Entrust patent statement in section 9.5 is a placeholder. Recent negotiations have produced new licensing terms; a new statement aligned with those terms will be inserted when available. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 1] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@tandem.com mail list. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page1]2] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 Table of Contents 1Executive Summary ........................................... 5Introduction ................................................ 6 2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................67 2.1 Communication and Topology ................................67 2.2 Acceptability Criteria ....................................78 2.3 User Expectations .........................................78 2.4 Administrator Expectations ................................78 3 Overview of Approach ........................................78 3.1 X.509 Version 3 Certificate ...............................910 3.2 Certification Paths and Trust .............................1011 3.3 Revocation ................................................1213 3.4 Operational Protocols .....................................1314 3.5 Management Protocols ...................................... 14 4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .............. 15 4.1 Basic Certificate Fields ..................................1516 4.1.1 Certificate Fields ......................................1617 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate ........................................1617 4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm .................................... 17 4.1.1.3signature ............................................. 17signatureValue ........................................ 18 4.1.2 TBSCertificate ..........................................1718 4.1.2.1 Version ............................................... 18 4.1.2.2 Serial number ......................................... 18 4.1.2.3 Signature .............................................1819 4.1.2.4 IssuerName ........................................... 18................................................ 19 4.1.2.5 Validity ..............................................2021 4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime .............................................2021 4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime .....................................2021 4.1.2.6 SubjectName .......................................... 21............................................... 22 4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info ...............................2123 4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers ....................................2123 4.1.2.9 Extensions .............................................2223 4.2 Certificate Extensions ....................................2223 4.2.1 Standard Extensions .....................................2324 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier ..............................2325 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier ................................2425 4.2.1.3 Key Usage .............................................2426 4.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period ..............................2627 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies ..................................2628 4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings .......................................2830 4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name ..............................2930 4.2.1.8 Issuer Alternative Name ...............................3132 4.2.1.9 Subject Directory Attributes ..........................3133 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page2]3] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints ....................................3133 4.2.1.11 Name Constraints .....................................3233 4.2.1.12 Policy Constraints ...................................3335 4.2.1.13CRL Distribution Points .............................. 34 4.2.1.14Extended key usage field .............................3536 4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points .............................. 38 4.2.2PrivateInternet Certificate Extensions............................. 36......................... 38 4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access ..........................3739 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile ..............................3940 5.1 CRL Fields ................................................3941 5.1.1 CertificateList Fields ..................................4041 5.1.1.1 tbsCertList ...........................................4042 5.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm ....................................4142 5.1.1.3signature ............................................. 41signatureValue ........................................ 42 5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" .........................4142 5.1.2.1 Version ...............................................4142 5.1.2.2 Signature .............................................4243 5.1.2.3 Issuer Name ...........................................4243 5.1.2.4 This Update ...........................................4243 5.1.2.5 Next Update ...........................................4243 5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates ..................................4344 5.1.2.7 Extensions ............................................4344 5.2 CRL Extensions ............................................4344 5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier ................................4445 5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name .................................4445 5.2.3 CRL Number ..............................................44 5.2.4 Issuing Distribution Point ..............................455.2.55.2.4 Delta CRL Indicator ..................................... 455.2.6 Certificate Issuer .......................................5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point .............................. 46 5.3 CRL Entry Extensions ......................................4647 5.3.1 Reason Code ............................................. 47 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code ...................................4748 5.3.3 Invalidity Date ......................................... 48 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer ...................................... 49 6 Certificate Path Validation .................................4849 6.1 Basic Path Validation ..................................... 50 6.2 Extending Path Validation ................................. 54 7 Algorithm Support ...........................................5354 7.1 One-way Hash Functions ....................................5355 7.1.1 MD2 One-way Hash Function ...............................5355 7.1.2 MD5 One-way Hash Function ...............................5455 7.1.3 SHA-1 One-way Hash Function .............................5455 7.2 Signature Algorithms ......................................5456 7.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithm .................................5556 7.2.2 DSA Signature Algorithm .................................5657 7.3 Subject Public Key Algorithms .............................5758 7.3.1 RSA Keys ................................................5758 7.3.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Key.......................... 58......................... 59 7.3.3 DSA Signature Keys....................................... 59 References ........................................................................................... 60Patent Statements .............................................. 62 Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs .......................... 668 References .................................................. 61 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page3]4] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 9 Patent Statements ........................................... 63 9.1 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) ......................... 64 9.2 RSA Signature and Encryption .............................. 64 9.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement .............................. 65 9.4 Hellman-Merkle Public Key Cryptography .................... 65 9.5 CRL Distribution Points and Related Mechanisms ............ 65 10 Security Considerations .................................... 66 Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs ......................... 69 A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax ...................... 69 A.1 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1988 Syntax ...................... 83 Appendix B. 1993 ASN.1 Structures and OIDs..................... 83.................... 90 B.1 Explicitly Tagged Module, 1993 Syntax ...................... 90 B.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, 1993 Syntax ...................... 107 Appendix C. ASN.1 Notes........................................ 100....................................... 114 Appendix D. Examples........................................... 101.......................................... 115 D.1 Certificate................................................ 102............................................... 115 D.1.1 ASN.1 Dump of "Self-Signed" Certificate.................. 102................. 116 D.1.2 Pretty Print of "Self-Signed" Certificate................ 104............... 118 D.2 Certificate................................................ 106............................................... 119 D.2.1 Basic ASN.1 Dump of "End Entity" Certificate............. 106............ 119 D.2.2 Pretty Print of "End Entity" Certificate................. 108................ 121 D.3 End-Entity Certificate Using RSA........................... 110.......................... 122 D.4 Certificate Revocation List................................ 114 Security Considerations ........................................ 111............................... 127 Appendix E. Author Addresses............................................... 116.................................. 128 Appendix F. Full Copyright Statement .......................... 128 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page4]5] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 1Executive SummaryIntroduction This specification is one part of amultipart standardfamily of standards for the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. This specification is a standalone document; implementations of this standard may proceed independent from the other parts. This specification profiles the format and semantics of certificates and certificate revocation lists for the Internet PKI. Procedures are described for processing of certification paths in the Internet environment. Encoding rules are provided for popular cryptographic algorithms. Finally, ASN.1 modules are provided in the appendices for all datastructurestructures defined or referenced. The specification describes the requirements which inspire the crea- tion of this document and the assumptions which affect its scope in Section 2. Section 3 presents an architectural model and describes its relationship to previous IETF andISOISO/IEC/ITU standards. Inparticular,par- ticular, this document's relationship with the IETF PEMspecificationsspecifica- tions and theISOISO/IEC/ITU X.509 documents are described. The specification profiles the X.509 version 3 certificate in Section 4, and the X.509 version 2 certificate revocation list (CRL) in Sec- tion 5. The profiles include the identification ofISOISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI extensions which may be useful in the InternetPKI and definition of new extensions to meet the Internet's requirements.PKI. The profiles are presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the19931994 syntax used in theISOISO/IEC/ITU standards.The ASN.1 notation assumes implict tagging throughout.This specification also includes path validation procedures in Sec- tion 6. These procedures are based upon theISOISO/IEC/ITU definition, but the presentation assumes a self-signedroottrusted CA certificate. Implementations are required to derive the same results but are not required to use the specified procedures.Finally,Section 7 of the specification describes procedures foridentificationidentifica- tion and encoding of public key materials and digitalsig- natures.signatures. Implementations are not required to use any particular cryptographic algorithms. However, conforming implementations which use theidentifiediden- tified algorithms are required to identify and encode the public key materials and digital signatures as described. Finally, four appendices are provided to aid implementers. Appendix A contains all ASN.1 structures defined or referenced within this specification. As above, the material is presented in the 1988 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) rather than the19931994 syntax. Appendix B contains the same information in the19931994 ASN.1notation.notation as a service to implementers using updated toolsets. However, Appen- dix A takes precedence in case of conflict. Appendix C containsnotes on less familiar features of the ASN.1Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page5]6] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 notes on less familiar features of the ASN.1 notation used within this specification. Appendix D containsexam- plesexamples of a conforming certificate and a conforming CRL. 2 Requirements and AssumptionsGoalThe goal of this specification is to develop a profileand associated management structureto facilitate theadoption/useuse of X.509 certificates within Internet applications for those communities wishing to make use of X.509tech- nology.technology. Suchapplicationsapplica- tions may include WWW, electronic mail, user authentication, andIPSEC, as well as others.IPsec. In order to relieve some of the obstacles to using X.509certificates,cer- tificates, this document defines a profile to promote the development of certificatemanage- mentmanagement systems; development of application tools; and interoperability determined bypolicy, as opposed to syntax.policy. Some communities will need to supplement, or possibly replace, this profile in order to meet the requirements of specialized application domains or environments with additional authorization, assurance, or operational requirements. However, for basic applications, common representations of frequently used attributes are defined so that application developers can obtain necessary information without regard to the issuer of a particular certificate or certificate revo- cation list (CRL). A certificate user should review thecertification practice Statement (CPS)certificate policy generated by theCAcertification authority (CA) before relying on the authentication or non-repudiation services associated with the public key in aparticu- larpar- ticular certificate. To this end, this standard does not prescribe legally binding rules or duties. As supplemental authorization and attribute management tools emerge, such as attribute certificates, it may be appropriate to limit the authenticated attributes that are included in a certificate. These other management tools maybeprovide more appropriatemethodmethods ofconveyingcon- veying many authenticated attributes. 2.1 Communication and Topology The users of certificates will operate in a wide range of environ- ments with respect to their communication topology, especially users of secure electronic mail. This profile supports users without high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connectionavailablity.availabil- ity. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of firewall or other filtered communication. This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory system. The profile does not prohibit the use of an X.500 Directory, but other means of distributing certificates and certificate Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page6]7] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 revocation lists (CRLs)are supported.may be used. 2.2 Acceptability Criteria The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, access control, and authorization functions. Support for these ser- vices determines the attributes contained in the certificate as well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as pol- icy data and certification path constraints. 2.3 User Expectations Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client software and are the subjects named in certificates. These uses include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager forIPSECIPsec within a router. This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users employ and thesophistication/attentivenesslimitations in sophistication and attentiveness of the users themselves. This manifests itself in minimal userconfigurationconfigura- tion responsibility (e.g.,roottrusted CA keys, rules), explicit platform usage constraints within the certificate, certification pathconstraintscon- straints which shield the user from many malicious actions, and applications which sensibly automate validation functions. 2.4 Administrator Expectations As withusers,user expectations, the Internet PKI profile is structured to support the individuals who generally operateCertification Authorities (CAs).CAs. Providing administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broadcomprom- ise.compromise. Also, unbounded choices greatlycomplicatescomplicate the software that must process and validate the certificates created by the CA. 3 Overview of Approach Following is a simplified view of the architectural model assumed by the PKIX specifications. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page7]8] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 +---+ | C | +------------+ | e | <-------------------->| End entity | | r | Operational +------------+ | t | transactions ^ | | and management | Management | / | transactions | transactions | | | PKI users | C |PKI usersv | R |-------+-------+--------+-------------------------+--+-----------+---------------- | L |PKI management^ ^ | |entities| | PKI management | | v | entities | R | +------+ | | e |<-------------- |<---------------------| RA |<-----+<---+ | | p | Publish certificate| |+------+ | | | o |publish +------+| | | s | | | | I | v v | t | +------------+ | o |<--------------------------|<------------------------------| CA | | r | Publish certificatepublish+------------+ | y | Publish CRLpublish^ | | | +---+|Management | transactions | v +------+ | CA | +------+ Figure 1 - PKI Entities The components in this model are: end entity: user of PKI certificates and/or end user system that is the subject of a certificate; CA: certification authority; RA: registration authority, i.e., an optional system to which a CA delegates certain management functions; repository: a system or collection of distributed systems that store certificates and CRLs and serves as a means of distributing these certificates and CRLs to end entities. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page8]9] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 3.1 X.509 Version 3 CertificateApplication of public key technology requires the userUsers of a public keytomust be confident that thepublicassociated private keybelongs tois owned by the correct remote subject (person or system) with which an encryption or digitalsigna- turesignature mechanism will be used. This confidence is obtained through the use of public keycertificates,certifi- cates, which are data structures that bind public key values tosubjects.sub- jects. The binding is achieved by having a trustedcertification authority (CA)CA digitally sign each certificate. A certificate has a limited valid lifetime which is indicated in its signed contents. Because a certificate'ssignaturesigna- ture and timeliness can be independently checked by acertificate-usingcertificate- using client,certifi- catescertificates can be distributed via untrustedcommunicationscommuni- cations and serversys- tems,systems, and can be cached in unsecured storage in certificate-using systems.The standard known asITU-T X.509 (formerly CCITT X.509) orISO/IECISO/IEC/ITU 9594-8, which was first published in 1988 as part of the X.500Direc- tory recommendations,Directory recommenda- tions, defines a standard certificateformat.format [X.509]. Thecer- tificatecertificate format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1) format. When X.500 was revised in 1993, two more fields were added, resulting in the version 2 (v2) format. These two fieldsaremay be used to support directory access control. The Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)proposals,RFCs, published in 1993, include specifications for a public key infrastructure based on X.509 v1 certificates [RFC 1422]. The experience gained in attempts to deploy RFC 1422 made it clear that the v1 and v2 certificatefor- matsformats are deficient in several respects. Most importantly, more fields were needed to carry information which PEM design andimple- mentationimplementation experience has proven necessary. In response to these newrequirements, ISO/IECrequire- ments, ISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 developed the X.509 version 3 (v3) certificate format. The v3 format extends the v2 format by adding provision for additional extension fields. Particular extension field types may be specified in standards or may be defined and registered by any organization or community. In June 1996, standardi- zation of the basic v3 format was completed [X.509].ISO/IECISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 have also developed standard extensions for use in the v3 extensions field [X.509][X9.55]. These extensions cancon- veyconvey such data as additional subject identification information, key attribute information, policy information, and certification path constraints. However, theISO/IECISO/IEC/ITU and ANSI X9 standard extensions are very broad in their applicability. In order to develop interoperableimplementa- tionsimplementations of X.509 v3 systems for Internet use, it is necessary to specify a profile for use of the X.509 v3 extensions tailored for theHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 9] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998Internet. It is one goal of this document to specify a profile Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 10] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 for Internet WWW, electronic mail, andIPSECIPsec applications.EnvironmentsEnviron- ments with additional requirements may build on this profile or may replace it. 3.2 Certification Paths and Trust A user of a security service requiring knowledge of a public key gen- erally needs to obtain and validate a certificate containing the required public key. If the public-key user does not already hold an assured copy of the public key of the CA that signed the certificate, then it might need an additional certificate to obtain that public key. In general, a chain of multiple certificates may be needed, comprising a certificate of the public key owner (the end entity) signed by one CA, and zero or more additional certificates of CAs signed by other CAs. Such chains, called certification paths, are required because a public key user is only initialized with a limited number of assured CA public keys. There are different ways in which CAs might be configured in order for public key users to be able to find certification paths. For PEM, RFC 1422 defined a rigid hierarchical structure of CAs. There are three types of PEM certification authority: (a) Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA): This author- ity, operated under the auspices of the Internet Society, acts as the root of the PEM certification hierarchy at level 1. It issues certificates only for the next level of authorities, PCAs. All certification paths start with the IPRA. (b) Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs): PCAs are at level 2 of the hierarchy, each PCA being certified by the IPRA. A PCA must establish and publish a statement of its policy with respect to certifying users or subordinate certification authorities. Distinct PCAs aim to satisfy different user needs. For example, one PCA (an organizational PCA) might support the general elec- tronic mail needs of commercial organizations, and another PCA (a high-assurance PCA) might have a more stringent policy designed for satisfying legally binding digital signature requirements. (c) Certification Authorities (CAs): CAs are at level 3 of the hierarchy and can also be at lower levels. Those at level 3 are certified by PCAs. CAs represent, for example, particular organi- zations, particular organizational units (e.g., departments, groups, sections), or particular geographical areas. RFC 1422 furthermore has a name subordination rule which requires that a CA can only issue certificates for entities whose names areHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 10] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998subordinate (in the X.500 naming tree) to the name of the CA itself. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 11] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The trust associated with a PEM certification path is implied by the PCA name. The name subordination rule ensures that CAs below the PCA are sensibly constrained as to the set of subordinate entities they can certify (e.g., a CA for an organization can only certify entities in that organization's name tree). Certificate user systems are able to mechanically check that the name subordination rule has been fol- lowed. The RFC 1422was based uponuses the X.509 v1 certificate formats. The limitations of X.509 v1 required imposition of several structural restrictions to clearly associate policy information or restrict the utility ofcertificates.cer- tificates. These restrictions included: (a) a pure top-down hierarchy, with all certification paths start- ing fromthe root;IPRA; (b) a naming subordination rule restricting the names of a CA's subjects; and (c) use of the PCA concept, which requires knowledge of individual PCAs to be built into certificate chain verification logic. Knowledge of individual PCAs was required to determine if a chain could be accepted. With X.509 v3, most of the requirements addressed by RFC 1422 can be addressed using certificate extensions, without a need to restrict the CA structures used. In particular, the certificate extensions relating to certificate policies obviate the need for PCAs and the constraint extensions obviate the need for the name subordination rule. As a result, this document supports a more flexible architec- ture, including: (a) Certification paths may start with a public key of a CA in a user's own domain, or with the public key of the top of a hierar- chy. Starting with the public key of a CA in a user's own domain has certain advantages. Inmanysome environments, the local domain isoftenthe most trusted.Initialization and key-pair-update opera- tions can often be more effectively conducted between an end entity and a local management system.(b) Name constraints may be imposed through explicit inclusion of a name constraints extension in a certificate, but are not required. (c) Policy extensions and policy mappings replace the PCA con- cept, which permits a greater degree of automation. The applica- tion can determine if the certification path is acceptable basedHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 11] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998on the contents of the certificates instead of a priori knowledge of PCAs. This permitsthe full processautomation of certificate chainpro- cessing to be implemented in software.processing. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 12] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 3.3 Revocation When a certificate is issued, it is expected to be in use for its entire validity period. However, various circumstances may cause a certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity period. Such circumstancesmightinclude change of name, change ofassociationassocia- tion between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected compromise of the corresponding private key. Under suchcir- cumstances,circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate. X.509 defines one method of certificate revocation. This method involves each CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called a certificate revocation list (CRL). A CRL is a time stamped list identifying revoked certificates which is signed by a CA and made freely available in a public repository. Each revoked certificate is identified in a CRL by its certificate serial number. When a certificate-using system uses a certificate (e.g., for verifying a remote user's digital signature), that system not only checks the certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably- recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on that CRL. The meaning of "suitably-recent" may vary with local pol- icy, but it usually means the most recently-issued CRL. A CA issues a new CRL on a regular periodic basis (e.g., hourly, daily, or weekly).Entries areAn entry is added toCRLs as revocations occur, and an entry may be removed whenthecertificate expiration date is reached.CRL as part of the next update following notification of revocation. An entry may be removed from the CRL after appearing on one regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's validity period. An advantage of this revocation method is that CRLs may be distri- buted by exactly the same means as certificates themselves, namely, via untrusted communications and server systems. One limitation of the CRL revocation method, using untrusted communi- cations and servers, is that the time granularity of revocation is limited to the CRL issue period. For example, if a revocation is reported now, that revocation will not be reliably notified to certificate-using systems until the next periodic CRL is issued -- this may be up to one hour, one day, or one week depending on the frequency that the CA issues CRLs.Another potential problem with CRLs is the risk of a CRL growing to an entirely unacceptable size. In the 1988 and 1993 versions of X.509, the CRL for the end-user certificates needed to cover the entire population of end-users for one CA. It is desirable to allow such populations to be in the range of thousands, tens of thousands, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 12] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 or possibly even hundreds of thousands of users. The end-user CRL is therefore at risk of growing to such sizes, which present major com- munication and storage overhead problems. With the version 2 CRL format, introduced along with the v3 certificate format, it becomes possible to arbitrarily divide the population of certificates for one CA into a number of partitions, each partition being associated with one CRL distribution point (e.g., directory entry or URL) from which CRLs are distributed. Therefore, the maximum CRL size can be con- trolled by a CA. Separate CRL distribution points can also exist for different revocation reasons. For example, routine revocations (e.g., name change) may be placed on a different CRL to revocations resulting from suspected key compromises, and policy may specify that the latter CRL be updated and issued more frequently than the former.As with the X.509 v3 certificate format, in order to facilitate interoperable implementations from multiple vendors, the X.509 v2 CRL format needs to be profiled for Internet use. It is one goal of this document to specify that profile.Furthermore, it is recognized thatHowever, this profile does not require CAs to issue CRLs. Message formats and protocols supporting on-line revocation notification may be defined in other PKIX specifi- cations. On-line methods of revocation notification may be Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 13] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 applicable in some environments as an alternative to the X.509 CRL. On-line revocation checking may significantlyreducesreduce the latency between a revocation report and thenext issuedistribution ofa CRL.the information to relying parties. Once the CA accepts the report as authentic and valid, any query to the on-line service will correctly reflect the certificate validation impacts of the revocation. However, these methods impose newsecu- ritysecurity requirements; the certificate validator must trust the on-line validation service while the repositorydiddoes not need to be trusted.Therefore, this profile also considers standard approaches to on-line revocation notification. The PKIX series of specifications defines a set of standard message formats supporting these functions in [PKIX- OCSP]. The protocols for conveying these messages in different environments are also specified.3.4 Operational Protocols Operational protocols are required to deliver certificates and CRLs (or status information) to certificate using client systems. Provi- sion is needed for a variety of different means of certificate and CRL delivery, includingrequest/deliverydistribution procedures based onE-mail, http, X.500,LDAP, HTTP, FTP, andWHOIS++.X.500. Operational protocols supporting these functions are defined in other PKIX specifications. These specifications may include definitionsof, and/or references to,of message formats and procedures forsupport- ingsupporting all of the above operational environments, including definitions of or references to appropriate MIME content types.Operational protocols supporting these functions are defined in the PKIX specifications [PKIXLDAP], [PKIXFTP] and [PKIXOCSP]. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 13] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19983.5 Management Protocols Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions betweenPublic Key Infrastructure (PKI) components.PKI user and management entities. For example, a management protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with which a key pair is associated, or between two CAs whichcross- certifycross-certify each other. The set of functions which potentially need to be supported by management protocols include: (a) registration: This is the process whereby a user first makes itself known to a CA (directly, or through an RA), prior to that CA issuing a certificate or certificates for that user. (b) initialization: Before a client system can operate securely it is necessary to installin it necessarykey materials which have theappropriateappropri- ate relationship with keys stored elsewhere in theinfras- tructure.infrastructure. For example, the client needs to be securely initialized with the public key of a trusted CA, to be used in validating certificate paths. Furthermore, a client typically needs to be initialized with its own key pair(s). (c) certification: This is the process in which a CA issues acer- tificatecertificate for a user's public key, and returns that certificate to the user's client system and/or posts that certificate in a repository. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 14] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (d) key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials (e.g., a user's private key used for encryption purposes) may be backed up by a CA or a key backup system. If a user needs to recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of aforgotten pass- wordfor- gotten password or a lost key chain file), an on-line protocol exchange may be needed to support such recovery. (e) key pair update: All key pairs need to be updated regularly, i.e., replaced with a new key pair, and new certificates issued. (f) revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. (g) cross-certification: Two CAs exchangetheinformationnecessaryused in establishing a cross-certificate. A cross-certificate is a certi- ficate issued by one CA toestablish cross-certificates between those CAs.another CA which contains a CA signa- ture key used for issuing certificates. Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the above functions. For all functions there are off-line methods of achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate use of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are used, many of the functions may be achieved as part of the physical token delivery. Furthermore, some of the above functions may be com- bined into one protocol exchange. In particular, two or more of theHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 14] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998registration, initialization, and certification functions can be com- bined into one protocol exchange. The PKIX series of specificationsdefinesmay define a set of standardmessagemes- sage formats supporting the above functions in[PKIXMGMT]. Thefuture specifications. In that case, the protocols for conveying these messages in different environments(on-line, e- mail,(e.g., on-line, file transfer, e-mail, and WWW)arewill alsospecifiedbe described in[PKIXMGMT].those specifications. 4 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile This section presents a profile for public key certificates that will foster interoperability and a reusablepublic key infrastructure.PKI. This section is based upon the X.509V3v3 certificate format and the standard certificate extensions defined in [X.509]. TheISO docu- mentsISO/IEC/ITU documents use the 1993 version of ASN.1; while this document uses the 1988 ASN.1syntax,syn- tax, the encoded certificate and standard extensions are equivalent. This section also defines private extensions required to support apublic key infrastructurePKI for the Internetcom- munity.community. Certificates may be used in a wide range of applications and environ- ments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and a broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. The goal Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 15] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 of this document is to establish a common baseline for generic appli- cations requiring broad interoperability and limited special purpose requirements. In particular, the emphasis will be on supporting the use of X.509 v3 certificates for informalinternetInternet electronic mail,IPSEC,IPsec, and WWW applications.Other efforts are looking at certifi- cate profiles for payment systems.4.1 Basic Certificate Fields The X.509 v3 certificate basic syntax is as follows. For signature calculation, the certificate is encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER) [X.208]. ASN.1 DER encoding is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element. Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,signaturesignatureValue BIT STRING } TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity,Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 15] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL -- If present, version must be v3 } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER Validity ::= SEQUENCE { notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 16] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING } The following items describea proposed use ofthe X.509 v3certifi- catecertificate for use in the Internet. 4.1.1 Certificate Fields The Certificate is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields arearedescribed in detail in the followingsubsectionssubsections. 4.1.1.1 tbsCertificate Thefirstfieldin the sequence is the tbsCertificate. This is a itself a sequence, andcontains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key associated with thesubject an expiration date,subject, a validity period, andHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 16] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998other associated information. The fieldsof the basic tbsCertificateare described in detail in section 4.1.2; the tbscertificate may also include extensions which are described in section 4.2. 4.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm The signatureAlgorithm field contains thealgorithmidentifier for the crypto- graphic algorithm used by the CA to sign this certificate. Section 7.2 lists the supported signature algorithms. An algorithm identifier is defined by the following ASN.1 structure: AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }and itThe algorithm identifier is used to identify a cryptographicalgorithm.algo- rithm. The OBJECT IDENTIFIERalgorithmcomponent identifies the algorithm (such asRSADSA withSHA- 1). In the sigantureAlgorithm field, theSHA-1). The contents of the optional parameters fieldshall bewill vary according to thevalue NULL.algorithm identified. Section 7.2 lists thesup- portedsupported algorithms for this specification. This field must contain the same algorithm identifier as the signa- ture field in the sequence tbsCertificate (seesection 4.1.2.3)sec. 4.1.2.3). Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 17] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 4.1.1.3signaturesignatureValue ThesignaturesignatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon the ASN.1 DER encodedTBSCertificate.tbsCertificate. The ASN.1 DER encodedTBSCertifi- catetbsCer- tificate is used as the input toa one-way hash function. The one-way hash function output value is encrypted (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to formthesigned quantity. Thissignature function. This signa- ture value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the Certificate's signature field. The details of this process arespecifiedspeci- fied for each of thesup- portedsupported algorithms in Section 7.2. By generating this signature, a CA certifies the validity of the information intbscertificate.the tbsCertificate field. In particular, the CAcertifiescer- tifies the binding between the public key material and the subject of thecerti- ficate.certificate. 4.1.2 TBSCertificate The sequence TBSCertificateis a sequence whichcontains information associated with the subject of the certificate and the CA who issued it. EveryTBSCertificateTBSCerti- ficate contains the names of the subject and issuer, a public key associated with the subject,an expiration date,a validity period, a versionnumbernumber, and a serial number; some may contain optionalHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 17] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998unique identifier fields. The remainder of this section describes the syntax and semantics of these fields. A TBSCertificate may also include extensions.ExtensionsExten- sions for the Internet PKI are described in Section 4.2. 4.1.2.1 Version This field describes the version of the encoded certificate. When extensions are used, as expected in this profile, use X.509 version 3 (value is 2). If no extensions are present, but a UniqueIdentifier is present, use version 2 (value is 1). If only basic fields are present, use version 1 (the value is omitted from the certificate as the default value). Implementations should be prepared to accept any version certificate. At a minimum, conforming implementations shall recognize version 3 certificates. Generation of version 2 certificates is not expected by implementa- tions based on this profile. 4.1.2.2 Serial number The serial number is an integer assigned by thecertification author- ityCA to eachcertificate.certifi- cate. It must be unique for each certificate issued by a given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial numberiden- tifyidentify a uniquecertificate).certifi- cate). Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 18] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 4.1.2.3 Signature This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate.Section 7.2 lists the supported signature algorithms.This field must contain the same algorithm identifier as the signa- tureAlgorithm field in the sequence Certificate (seesectionsec. 4.1.1.2).As with signatureAlgorithm,The contents of the optional parameterscomponent shall containfield will vary according to thevalue NULL.algorithm identified. Section 7.2 lists the supported signature algorithms. 4.1.2.4 IssuerNameThe issuernamefield identifies the entity who has signed(andand issued thecertificate).certificate. The issueridentity may be carried in the issuer name field and/or the issuerAltName extension. If identity information is present only in the issuerAltName extension, then the issuer name may be an empty sequence and the issuerAltName extension must be criti- cal. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 18] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 Where it is non-null, the issuer namefield shall containan X.500a non-null distinguished name (DN). The issuer field is defined as the X.501 type Name. Name is defined by the following ASN.1 structures: Name ::= CHOICE { RDNSequence } RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeValue ::= ANY-- Directory string type --DEFINED BY AttributeType DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE(1..MAX),(1..MAX)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1.. MAX)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) } The Name describes a hierarchical name composed of attributes, such as country name, and corresponding values, such as US. The type of the component AttributeValue is determined by the AttributeType; in general it will be adirectoryString.DirectoryString. ThedirectoryStringDirectoryString type is defined as a choice of PrintableString, TeletexString, BMPString UTF8String and UniversalString.Conforming CAs shallWhen Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 19] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 creating a distinguished name, including their own, conforming CAs shall choose from these options as follows: (a) if the character set is sufficient, the string will be represented as a PrintableString; (b) failing (a), if thebMPStringBMPString character set is sufficient the string shall be represented as a BMPString; and (c) failing (a) and (b),if the UTF8 character set is sufficient, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 19] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998the string shall be represented as aUTF8String;UTF8String. The TeletexString and(d) failing (a), (b)UniversalString are included for backward com- patibility, and(c),should not be used for certificates for new subjects. However, these types may be used in certificates where thestring shallname was previously established. Certificate users should berepresented as a UniversalString.prepared to receive certificates with these string types. Standard sets of attributes have been defined in the X.500 series of specifications.Where CAs issue certificates with X.501 type names, it is recommendedThis specification recommends that issuer names con- tain only the following attribute types: country, organization, organizational-unit, distinguished name qualifier, title, locality, state or province name, common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), surname, given name, initials, and generationqualifier (e.g., "Jr." or "IV"). The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for theseattributesattri- bute typesbe used. 4.1.2.5 Validity This field indicates the period of validity ofare provided in thecertificate,ASN.1 modules in Appendices A andconsists of two dates,B. Certificate users must be prepared to process thefirstissuer dis- tinguished name andlast on which the certificate is valid. The certificate validity periodsubject distinguished name (see sec. 4.1.2.6) fields to perform name chaining for certification path validation (see section 6). Name chaining is performed by matching thetime interval during which the CA warrants that it will maintain information aboutissuer distinguished name in one certificate with thestatussubject name in another. This specification requires only a subset of thecertificate, i.e. publish revocation data.name comparison functionality specified in X.501. Thefield is representedrequirements for conforming implementations are asa SEQUENCE of two dates: the date on which the certi- ficate validity period beginsfollows: (a) attribute values encoded in different string types (e.g., PrintableString and BMPString) may be assumed to represent dif- ferent strings; (b) attribute values in string types other than PrintableString are case sensitive (this permits matching of attribute values as binary objects); (c) attribute values in PrintableString are not case sensitive (e.g., "Marianne Swanson" is the same as "MARIANNE SWANSON"); and Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 20] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (d) attribute values in PrintableString are compared after remov- ing leading and trailing white space and converting internal strings of one or more consecutive white space characters to a single space. These name comparison rules permit a certificate user to validate certificates issued using languages or encodings unfamiliar to the certificate user. 4.1.2.5 Validity The certificate validity period is the time interval during which the CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the certificate. The field is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates: the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) and the date on which the certificate validity period ends (notAfter). Both notBefore and notAfter may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. CAs conforming to this profile shall always encode certificate vali- dity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in 2050 or later shall be encoded as GeneralizedTime. 4.1.2.5.1 UTCTime The universal time type, UTCTime, is a standard ASN.1 type intended for international applications where local time alone is not ade- quate. UTCTime specifies the year through the two low order digits and time is specified to the precision of one minute or one second. UTCTime includes either Z (for Zulu, or Greenwich Mean Time) or a time differential. For the purposes of this profile, UTCTime values shall be expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and shall include seconds (i.e., times are YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. Conforming systems shall interpret the year field (YY) as follows: Where YY is greater than or equal to 50, the year shall be inter- preted as 19YY; and Where YY is less than 50, the year shall be interpreted as 20YY. 4.1.2.5.2 GeneralizedTime The generalized time type, GeneralizedTime, is a standard ASN.1 type for variable precision representation of time. Optionally, theHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 20] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 GeneralizedTimeGen- eralizedTime field can include a representation of the timedif- ferentialdifferen- tial between local and Greenwich Mean Time. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 21] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 For the purposes of this profile, GeneralizedTime values shall be expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and shall include seconds (i.e., times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. GeneralizedTime values shall not include fractional seconds. 4.1.2.6 SubjectNameThe subjectnamefield identifies the entity associated with the public key stored in the subject public key field. The subjectidentityname may be carried in the subject field and/or the subjectAltName extension. Ifidentitythe subject is a CA (e.g., the basic constraints extension, as dis- cussed in 4.2.1.10, is present and the value of cA is TRUE,) then the subject field must be populated with a non-null distinguished name matching the contents of the issuer field (see sec. 4.1.2.4) in all certificates issued by the subject CA. If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the subject namemaymust be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension must be critical. Where it isnon-null,non-empty, the subjectnamefield shall contain an X.500distinguisheddis- tinguished name (DN). The DN must be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field. (A CA may issue more than one certificate with the same DN to the samesubjectsub- ject entity.) The subject name field is defined as the X.501 type Name, and shall follow the encoding rules for the issuer name field (see sec. 4.1.2.4).4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info This field is used to carry the public key and identifyWhen encoding strings as thealgorithm withtype PrintableString, conform- ing CAs should use mixed case but should not include leading or trailing white space and should limit internal white space to sub- strings of a single space. Implementations of this specification should be prepared to receive the following X.501 attribute types: country, organization, organizational-unit, distinguished name qualifier, title, locality, state or province name, common name (e.g., "Susan Housley"), surname, given name, initials, and generationqualifier (e.g., "Jr." or "IV"). The syntax and associated object identifiers (OIDs) for these attri- bute types are provided in the ASN.1 modules in Appendices A and B. Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embedded in the subject distinguished name as a PKCS #9 EmailAddress attribute [PKCS #9]. Conforming implementations generating new certificates with electronic mail addresses must use the rfc822Name in the subject alternative name field (see sec. 4.2.1.7) to describe such identi- ties. Simultaneous inclusion of the EmailAddress attribute in the subject distinugished name to support legacy implementations is deprecated but permitted. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 22] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The ASN.1 syntax for EmailAddress and the corresponding OID are sup- plied below. EmailAddress ::= IA5String pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } emailAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-9 1 } 4.1.2.7 Subject Public Key Info This field is used to carry the public key and identify the algorithm with which the key is used. The algorithm is identified using thealgorithmIdentifierAlgorithmIdentifier structure specified inSectionsection 4.1.1.2. The object identifiers for the supported algorithms and the methods for encoding the public key materials (public key and parameters) are specified inSectionsection 7.3. 4.1.2.8 Unique Identifiers These fields may only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (see sec. 4.1.2.1). The subject and issuer uniqueidentifieridentifiers are present in thecertifi- catecertificate to handle the possibility of reuse of subject and/or issuer names over time. This profile recommends that names not be reused for different entities and that Internet certificates not make use of unique identifiers. CAs conforming to this profile should not generate certificates with unique identifiers. Applicationsconformingconform- ing to this profile should be capable of parsing unique identifiers and making comparisons.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 21] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19984.1.2.9 Extensions This field may only appear if the versionnumberis 3 (see4.1.2.x).sec. 4.1.2.1). If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more certificate extensions. The format and content of certificate extensions in the Internet PKI is defined inSectionsection 4.2. 4.2 Standard Certificate Extensions The extensions defined for X.509 v3 certificates provide methods for associating additional attributes with users or publickeys,keys and for managing the certificationhierarchy, and for managing CRL distribu- tion.hierarchy. The X.509 v3 certificateformatfor- mat also allows communities to define private extensions to carry information unique to thosecom- munities.communities. Each extension in acertificatecerti- ficate may be designated ascrit- icalcritical or non-critical. A certificate using system(an application validating a certificate)must reject the certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does notrecognize. A non- criticalrecognize; however, a non-critical extension Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 23] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 may be ignored if it is not recognized. Thefol- lowing presentsfollowing sections present recommended extensions used within Internetcertifi- catescertificates and standard locations for information. Communities may elect to use additional extensions; however, caution should be exercised inadoptingadopt- ing any critical extensions in certificates which mightbe usedprevent use in a general context. Each extension includes anobject identifierOID and an ASN.1 structure. When an extension appears in a certificate, theobject identifierOID appears as the field extnID and the corresponding ASN.1 encoded structure is the value of the octet string extnValue. Only one instance of a particularextensionexten- sion may appear in a particularcerti- ficate.certificate. For example, acertificatecertifi- cate may contain only one authority key identifier extension(4.2.1.1).(see sec. 4.2.1.1). An extensionmay also includeincludes theoptionalbooleancritical; critical'scritical, with a default valueisof FALSE. The text for each extension specifies the acceptable values for thecrit- icalcritical field. Conforming CAs are required to supportthekey identifiers (see sec. 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2), basicConstraints exten- sion (Sectionconstraints (see sec. 4.2.1.10),thekey usageextension (4.2.1.3)(see sec. 4.2.1.3), andcerti- ficatecertificate policiesextension (4.2.1.5).(see sec. 4.2.1.5) extensions. If the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the subject field, the CA must support thesubjectAltName extension. If the CA issues certificates with an empty sequence for the issuer field, the CA must support the issuerAltName extension.subject alternative name extension (see sec. 4.2.1.7). Support for the remaining extensions is optional. Conforming CAs may support extensions that are notidenti- fiediden- tified within this specification; certificate issuers are cautioned that marking such extensions as critical may inhibit interoperabil- ity.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 22] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998At a minimum, applications conforming to this profile shall recognize the extensions which shall or may becritical.critical in this specification. These extensions are: key usage(4.2.1.3),(see sec. 4.2.1.3), certificatepolicies (4.2.1.5),pol- icies (see sec. 4.2.1.5), thealternative sub- ject name (4.2.1.7), issuersubject alternative name(4.2.1.8),(see sec. 4.2.1.7), basiccon- straints (4.2.1.10),constraints (see sec. 4.2.1.10), name constraints(4.2.1.11),(see sec. 4.2.1.11), policy constraints(4.2.1.12),(see sec. 4.2.1.12), and extended key usage(4.2.1.14).(see sec. 4.2.1.13). In addition, this profile recommends application support for key identifiers(4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2), CRL distribution points (4.2.1.13),(see sec. 4.2.1.1 andauthority information access (4.2.2.1).4.2.1.2) extensions. 4.2.1 Standard Extensions This section identifies standard certificate extensions defined in [X.509] for use in the InternetPublic Key Infrastructure.PKI. Each extension is associated with anobject identifierOID defined in [X.509]. Theseobject identifiersOIDs are members of thecertificateExtensioncerti- ficateExtension arc, which is defined by the following: certificateExtension OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 24] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= certificateExtension 4.2.1.1 Authority Key Identifier The authority key identifier extension provides a means of identify- ing the public key corresponding to theparticularprivate key used to sign a certificate. This extensionwould beis used where an issuer has multiple signing keys (either due to multiple concurrent key pairs or due to changeover).In general, this extension should be included in certificates.The identificationcanmay be based on either the keyidentifieriden- tifier (the subject key identifier in the issuer's certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number. The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension shall be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to facil- itate chain building. This profile recommends support for the key identifier method by all certificate users. There isrecommendedone exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" certificate, the authority key identifier may be omitted. In thisprofile. Conforming CAs that generate this extension shall include or omit both authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerial- Number. If authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber are omitted,case, thekeyIdentifier field shallsubject and authority key identifiers would bepresent.identical. This extension shall not be marked critical. id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONALHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 23] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998} KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING 4.2.1.2 Subject Key Identifier The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying the particular public key used in an application.Where a reference to a public key identifier is needed (as with an Authority Key Iden- tifier) and one is notThis extension should be included in all certificates. To facilitate chain building, this extension MUST appear in all con- forming CA certificates, that is, all certificates including theassociated certificate, a SHA-1 hashbasic constraints extension (see sec. 4.2.1.10) where the value of cA is TRUE. The value of the subjectpublickey identifier shall beused. The hash shall be calculated overthe value(excluding tag and length)placed in the key identifier field of theBIT STRING subjectPublicKey inAuthority Key Identifier extension (see sec. 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. Where a key identifier has not been previously established, this specification recommends the following method for generating Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 25] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 keyIdentifiers: the keyIdentifier is composed of a four bit type field with the value 0100 followed by the least significant 60 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey. This extension should be marked non-critical. id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier 4.2.1.3 Key Usage The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, sig- nature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted. For example, when an RSA key should be used only for signing, the digitalSignatureandand/or nonRepudiation bits would be asserted. Likewise, when an RSA key should be used only for key management, the keyEncipherment bit would be asserted.The profile recommends that whenWhen used, this extension should be markedas a critical extension.criti- cal. id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6), encipherOnly (7), decipherOnly (8) } Bits in the KeyUsage type are used as follows: The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public keyHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 24] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998is used toverifyingverify digital signatures that have purposes other than non-repudiation, certificate signature, and CRL signature. For example,Thethe digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key is used to provide authentication. The nonRepudiation bit is asserted when the subject public key is used toverifyingverify digital signatures used to provide a non- repudiation service which protects against the signing entity falsely denying some action, excluding certificate or CRL signing. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 26] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The keyEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for key transport. For example, when an RSA key is to be usedexclusivelyfor key management, then this bit must asserted. The dataEncipherment bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for enciphering user data, other than cryptographic keys. The keyAgreement bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for key agreement. For example, when a Diffie-Hellman key is to be usedexclusivelyfor key management, then this bit must asserted. The keyCertSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for verifying a signature on certificates. This bit may only be asserted in CA certificates. The cRLSign bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for verifying a signature onCRLs. This bit may only be asserted in CA certificates. Whenrevocation information (e.g., a CRL). The meaning of the encipherOnly bit isasserted and theundefined in the absence of the keyAgreement bit. When the encipherOnly bit is asserted and the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be used only for enciphering data while performing key agreement. The meaning of theenci- pherOnlydecipherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of the keyAgreement bit. When the decipherOnly bit is asserted and the keyAgreement bit is also set, the subject public key may be used only for deciphering data while performing key agreement.The meaning of the deci- pherOnly bit is undefined in the absence of the keyAgreement bit.This profile does not restrict the combinationstheof bits that may be set in an instantiation of the keyUsage extension. However, appropriate values for keyUsage extensions for particularalgo- rithmsalgorithms arespecifedspecified in section 7.3.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 25] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19984.2.1.4 Private Key Usage Period This profile recommends against the use of this extension. CAs con- forming to this profile shall not generate certificates with critical private key usage period extensions. The private key usage period extension allows the certificate issuer to specify a different validity period for the private key than the certificate. This extension is intended for use with digital signa- ture keys. This extension consists of two optionalcomponents notBe- forecomponents, notBefore and notAfter. The private key associated with thecertificatecertifi- cate should not be used to sign objects before or after the timesspeci- fiedspecified by the two components, respectively. CAs conforming to thispro- fileprofile shall not generate certificates with private key usage period extensions unless at least one of the two components is present.This profile recommends against the use of this extension. CAs con- forming to this profile shall not generate certificates with critical private key usage period extensions.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 27] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 Where used, notBefore and notAfter are represented as GeneralizedTime and shall be specified and interpreted as defined inSectionsection 4.1.2.5.2. id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 } PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } 4.2.1.5 Certificate Policies The certificate policies extension contains a sequence of one or more policy information terms, each of which consists of an object iden- tifier (OID) and optional qualifiers. These policy information terms indicate the policy under which the certificate has been issued and the purposes for which the certificate may be used.This profile strongly recommends that a simple OID be present in this field.Optionalqualifiersqualif- iers, which may bepresentpresent, are not expected toprovide information about obtaining CA rules, notchange the definition of the policy. Applications with specific policy requirements are expected to have a list of those policies which they will accept and to compare the pol- icy OIDs in the certificate to that list. If this extension is crit- ical, the path validation software must be able to interpret thisextension,extension (including the optional qualifier), or must reject thecertificate. (Applications without specificcer- tificate. To promote interoperability, this profile recommends that policyrequirements are not required to list acceptable pol- icies, and may accept any valid certificate regardlessinformation terms consist ofpolicy even if the extensiononly an OID. Where an OID alone ismarked critical.)insufficient, this profile strongly recommends that use of qualifiers be limited to those identified in this section. This specification defines two policyqualifiersqualifier types for use bycertificatecer- tificate policy writers and certificateissuers at their own dis- cretion.issuers. The qualifier types are the CPS Pointerqualifier,andthe Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 26] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998User Noticequalifier.qualifiers. The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a Certification Prac- tice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. The pointer is in the form of a URI. User notice is intended for display to a relying party when a certi- ficate is used. The application software should display all user notices in all certificates of the certification path used, except that if a notice is duplicated only one copy need be displayed.It is recommended thatTo prevent such duplication, this qualifier should onlythe lowest-level certificate issued by one organizationbe present ina certification path contain a user notice. The userend-entity certificates and CA certificates issued to other organiza- tions. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 28] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The user notice has two optional fields: the noticeRef field and the explicitText field. The noticeRef field, if used, names an organization and identi- fies, by number, a particular textual statement prepared by that organization. For example, it might identify the organization "CertsRUs" and notice number 1. In a typical implementation, the application software will have a notice file containing the current set of notices for CertsRUs; the application will extract the notice text from the file and display it. Messages may be multilingual, allowing the software to select the particular language message for its own environment. An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in the certificate. The explicitText field is a string with a max- imum size of 200 characters. If both the noticeRef and explicitText options are included in the one qualifier and if the application software can locate the notice text indicated by the noticeRef option then that text should be displayed; otherwise, the explicitText string should be displayed. id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 27] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }-- pkix arc for qualifier typesid-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) Qualifier ::= CHOICE { cPSuri CPSuri, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 29] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 userNotice UserNotice } CPSuri ::= IA5String UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { organizationIA5String,DisplayText, noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } DisplayText ::= CHOICE { visibleStringVisibleString,VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), bmpStringBMPString,BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } 4.2.1.6 Policy Mappings This extension is used in CA certificates. It lists one or more pairs ofobject identifiers;OIDs; each pair includes an issuerDomainPolicy and asubjectDomainPolicy.sub- jectDomainPolicy. The pairing indicates the issuing CAcon- sidersconsiders its issuerDomainPolicy equivalent to the subject CA'ssub- jectDomainPolicy.subjectDomainPol- icy. The issuing CA's users may accept an issuerDomainPolicy for certain applications. The policy mapping tells the issuing CA's users which policies associated with the subject CA are comparable to the policy they accept. This extension may be supported by CAs and/or applications, and it is always non-critical. id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 }Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 28] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } 4.2.1.7 Subject Alternative Name The subject alternative names extension allows additional identities to be bound to the subject of the certificate. Defined options include anrfc822 name (electronicInternet electronic mailaddress),address, a DNS name, an IP address, and aURI.uniform resource indentifier (URI). Other options exist, including completely local definitions. Multipleinstances of aname forms, and multiple instances of each nameformsform, may be included. Whenever such identities are to be bound into a certificate, the subject Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 30] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 alternative name (or issuer alternative name) extension shall be used. (Note: a form of such an identifier may also be present in the subject distinguished name; however, the alternative name extension is the preferred location for finding such information.) Because the subject alternative name is considered to be defini- tiviely bound to the public key, all parts of the subject alternative name must be verified by the CA.In addition, subject alternative names shall not include wildcard characters as a placeholder for a set of names.Further, if the only subject identity included in the certificate is an alternative name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the subject distinguished name shall be empty (an empty sequence), and the subjectAltName extension shall be present. If the subject field contains an empty sequence, the subjectAltName extension shall be marked critical.WhereWhen the subjectAltName extension containsa uniformResourceIdentif- ier,an Internet mail address, theURI is a pointer to a sequence of certificates issued by this CA (and optionally other CAs) to this subject. The URI mustadress shall be included as anabsolute,rfc822Name. The format of an rfc822Name is an "addr-spec" as defined in RFC 822 [RFC 822]. An addr-spec has the form "local-part@domain". Note that an addr-spec has no phrase (such as a common name) before it, has no comment (text surrounded in parentheses) after it, and is notrelative, pathnamesurrounded by "<" andmust specify">". When thehost. This specification recognizessubjectAltName extension contains a iPAddress, thefollowing values foraddress shall be stored in theURI scheme: ftp, http, ldap, and mailto.octet string in "network byte order," as specified in RFC 791 [RFC 791]. Themailto scheme indi- cates that mail sent toleast significant bit (LSB) of each octet is thespecified address will generate an elec- tronic mail response (toLSB of thesender) containing the subject's certi- ficates. No message is required. If the URI scheme is ftp, then the information is available through anonymous ftp. If the URI scheme is http or ldap, then the information may be retrieved using that proto- col. (If the URI specifies any other scheme, contains a relative pathname, or omits the host, the semantics are not defined by this specifica- tion.) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 29] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 When the subjectAltName extension contains a iPAddress, the address shall be stored in the octet string in "network byte order," as specified in RFC791. The least significant bit (LSB) of each octet is the LSB of the corresponding byte incorresponding byte in the network address. For IPVer- sionVersion 4, as specified in RFC 791, the octet string must contain exactly four octets. For IP Version 6, as specified in RFC 1883, the octet string must contain exactly sixteenoctets. Alternativeoctets [RFC 1883]. When the subjectAltName extension contains a domain name service label, the domain name shall be stored in the dNSName (an IA5String). The string shall be in the "preferred name syntax," as specified by RFC 1034 [RFC 1034]. Note that while upper and lower case letters are allowed in domain names, no signifigance is attached to the case. In addition, while the string " " is a legal domain name, subjectAltName extensions with a dNSName " " are not permitted. Finally, the use of the DNS representation for Internet mail addresses (wpolk.nist.gov instead of wpolk@nist.gov) is not permitted; such identities are to be encoded as rfc822Name. Subject alternative names may be constrained in the same manner as subject distinguished names using the name constraints extension as described in section 4.2.1.11. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 31] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 If the subjectAltName extension is present, the sequence must contain at least one entry. Unlike the subject field, conforming CAs shall not issue certificates with subjectAltNames containing empty General- Name fields. For example, an rfc822Name is represented as an IA5String. While an empty string is a valid IA5String, such an rfc822Name is not permitted by this profile. The behavior of clients that encounter such a certificate when processing a certificication path is not defined by this profile. Finally, the semantics of subject alternative names that include wildcard characters (e.g., as a placeholder for a set of names) are not addressed by this specification. Applications with specific requirements may use such names but must define the semantics. id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralName ::= CHOICE { otherName [0] OtherName, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER} OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, partyName [1] DirectoryString }Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 30] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19984.2.1.8 Issuer AlternativeNameNames As with 4.2.1.7, this extension is used to associate Internet style identities with the certificate issuer.If the only issuer identity included in the certificate is anIssuer alternativename form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the issuer distinguished name shall be empty (an empty sequence), and the issuerAltName extension shall be present. If the subject field contains an empty sequence, the issuerAltName extension shall be marked critical. Where the issuerAltName extension contains a URI, the following semanticsnames shall beassumed: the URI is a pointer to an ASN.1 sequence of certificates issued to this CA (and optionally other CAs). The expected values for the URI are those definedencoded as in 4.2.1.7.Processing rules for other values are not defined by this specification.Wherethe issuerAltNamepresent, this extensioncontains a dNSName, rfc822Name, or a URI, wildcard characters areshould notpermitted.be marked critical. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 32] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } IssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames 4.2.1.9 Subject Directory Attributes The subject directory attributes extension is not recommended as an essential part of this profile, but it may be used in local environ- ments. This extension is always non-critical. id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute 4.2.1.10 Basic Constraints The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and how deep a certification path may exist through that CA. The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if cA is set to TRUE. In this case, it gives the maximum number of CA certificates that may follow this certificate in a certification path. A value of zero indicates that only an end-entity certificate may follow in the path. Where it appears, the pathLenConstraint field must be greater than or equal to zero. Where pathLenConstraint does not appear, there is no limit to the allowed length of the certification path. Thisprofile requires the use of this extension, and itextension shallalways Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 31] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 beappear as a criticalforextension in all CA certi- ficates. This extension should not appear in other certificates. id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } 4.2.1.11 Name Constraints The name constraints extension, which shall be used only in a CA cer- tificate, indicates a name space within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in a certification path must be located. Restrictions may apply to the subject distinguished name or subject alternative names. Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present. If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is acceptable. Restrictions are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 33] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 subtrees. Any name matching a restriction in the excludedSubtrees field is invalid regardless of information appearing in thepermittedSubtrees.permit- tedSubtrees. This extension must be critical. Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with any name forms, thus minimum is always zero, and maximum is always absent. Restrictions for therfc822, dNSName,rfc822 and uri name forms are all expressed in terms of strings with wild card matching. An "*" is the wildcard character. Foruris and rfc822 names,URIs, therestrictionconstraint applies to the host part of the name.ExamplesExam- ples would be foo.bar.com; www*.bar.com; and *.xyz.com.Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embeded in the subject distinguished name as a PKCS #9 e-mail attribute, which has the ASN.1 type EmailAddress.Whenrfc822 names are constrained, but the certificate does not includeasubject alternative name,wild- card appears as the leftmost subdomain, it may be matched with one or more subdomains. That is, the constraint "*.xyz.com" is satisfied by both abc.xyz.com and abc.def.xyz.com. However, the constraint "*.xyz.com" is not satisfied by "xyz.com". Otherwise, the wildcard may only be expanded within a single subdomain. That is, www*.bar.com is satisfied by www1.bar.com but not www.foo.bar.com. To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the "*" character is used. For example, "*@xyz.com" indicates all mail addresses at the host "xyz.com". Note that although "*" is a valid character in Internet mail addresses, it is very rarely used on the Internet, and thus is appropriated by this specification for the email wildcard. Internet mail addresses may also be constrained by the host part of the name, as with URIs. For example, "root@*.xyz.com" indicates all the Internet mail addresses root in the domain "xyz.com". As above, "*" is a valid character in the host part of the name, but it is very rarely used on the Internet, and thus is appropriated by this specif- ication for the mail address wildcard. To indicate all Internet mail addresses in a particular domain, these mechanisms may be combined. For example, "*@*.xyz.com" indicates all email addresses in the domain "xyz.com". DNS name restrictions are expressed as foo.bar.com. Any DNS name that can be constructed by simply adding to the left hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example, www.foo.bar.com would satisfy the constraint but foo1.bar.com would not. Legacy implementations exist where an RFC 822 name is embedded in the subject distinguished name as a PKCS #9 e-mail attribute, which has the ASN.1 type EmailAddress [PKCS #9] (see sec. 4.1.2.6). When rfc822 names are constrained, but the certificate does not include a subject Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 34] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 alternative name, the rfc822 name constraint must be applied to PKCS #9 e-mail attributes in the subject distinguished name. The ASN.1 syntax for EmailAddress and the corresponding OID are suppliedbelow. EmailAddress ::= IA5String pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } emailAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-9 1 }in 4.1.2.6. Restrictions of the form directoryName shall be applied to the sub- ject field in the certificate and to the subjectAltName extensions of type directoryName. Restrictions of the form x400Address shall be applied to subjectAltName extensions of type x400Address.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 32] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998The syntax of iPAddress shall be as described in section 4.2.1.7 with the following additions specifically for Name Constraints. For IPv4 addresses, the ipAddress field of generalName shall contain eight (8) octets, encoded in the style of RFC 1519 (CIDR) to represent an address range. For IPv6 addresses, the ipAddress field shall contain 32 octets similarly encoded. For example, a name constraint for "class C" subnet 10.9.8.0 shall be represented as the octets 0A 09 08 00 FF FF FF 00, representing the CIDR notation 10.9.8.0/255.255.255.0. The syntax and semantics for name constraints for otherName, ediPar- tyName,iPAddress,and registeredID are not defined by thisspecifi- cation.specification. id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) 4.2.1.12 Policy Constraints The policy constraints extension can be used in certificates issued to CAs. The policy constraints extension constrains path validation in two ways. It can be used to prohibit policy mapping or require that each certificate in a path contain an acceptable policy identif- ier. If the inhibitPolicyMapping field is present, the value indicates the number of additional certificates that may appear in the path before Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 35] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 policy mapping is no longer permitted. For example, a value of one indicates that policy mapping may be processed in certificates issued by the subject of this certificate, but not in additional certifi- cates in the path. If the requireExplicitPolicy field is present, subsequent certifi- cates must include an acceptable policy identifier. The value of requireExplicitPolicy indicates the number of additional certificates that may appear in the path before an explicit policy is required. An acceptable policy identifier is the identifier of a policy required by the user of the certification path or the identifier of a policy which has been declared equivalent through policy mapping. Conforming CAs shall not issue certificates where policy constraints is a null sequence. That is, at least one of the inhibitPolicyMapping field or the requireExplicitPolicy field must be present. The behavior of clients that encounter a null policy constraints field is not addressed in this profile.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 33] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998This extension may be critical or non-critical. id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) 4.2.1.13CRL Distribution Points The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information is obtained. The extension should be non-critical, but this profile recommends supportExtended key usage field This field indicates one or more purposes forthis extension by CAs and applications. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. If the cRLDistributionPoints extension contains a Distribution- PointName of type URI,which thefollowing semantics shallcertified public key may beassumed: the URI is a pointerused, in addition to or in place of thecurrent CRL for the associated reasons and will be issued by the associated cRLIssuer. The expected values forbasic pur- poses indicated in theURI are thosekey usage extension field. This field is definedin 4.2.1.7. Processing rules for other values are not defined by this specification. If the distribution- Point omits reasons, the CRL shall include revocations for all rea- sons. If the distributionPoint omits cRLIssuer, the CRL shall be issued by the CA that issued the certificate. id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } cRLDistributionPoints ::= { CRLDistPointsSyntax } CRLDistPointsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { unused (0), Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 34] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6) } 4.2.1.14 Extended key usage field This field indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic pur- poses indicated in the key usage extension field. This field is defined as follows: id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER Key purposes may beas follows: id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER Key purposes may be defined by any organization with a need. Object identifiers used to identify key purposes shall be assigned in accor- dance with IANA or ITU-T Rec. X.660 |ISO/IECISO/IEC/ITU 9834-1. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 36] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 This extension may, at the option of the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. If the extension is flagged critical, then the certificate shall be used only for one of the purposes indicated. If the extension is flagged non-critical, then it indicates the intended purpose or purposes of the key, and may be used in finding the correct key/certificate of an entity that has multiple keys/certificates. It is an advisory field and does not imply that usage of the key is restricted by the certification authority to the purpose indicated.(UsingCertificate using applications may nevertheless require that a particular purpose be indicated in order for thecertificatecer- tificate to be acceptable to thatapplication.)application. If a certificate contains both a critical key usage field and a crit- ical extended key usage field, then both fields shall be processed independently and the certificate shall only be used for a purpose consistent with both fields. If there is no purpose consistent with both fields, then the certificate shall not be used for any purpose. The following key usage purposes are defined by this profile: id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 }Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 35] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 1} -- TLS Web server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement -- id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 2} -- TLS Web client authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature and/or -- keyAgreement -- id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 3} -- Signing of downloadable executable code -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 4} -- E-mail protection -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- nonRepudiation, and/or (keyEncipherment -- or keyAgreement) --id-kp-ipsecEndSystemid-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={id-kp 5}{ id-kp 8 } --IP security end system (host or router)Binding the hash of an object to a time from an agreed-upon time -- source. Key usage bits that may be consistent:digitalSignature and/or -- (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement) -- id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 6} -- IP security tunnel termination -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature and/or -- (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement) -- id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-kp 7} -- IP security user -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature and/or -- (keyEncipherment or keyAgreement) id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } -- Binding the hash of an object to a time from an agreed-upon time -- source. Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,digitalSignature, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 37] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 -- nonRepudiation4.2.2 Private Internet Extensions This section defines one new4.2.1.14 CRL Distribution Points The CRL distribution points extension identifies how CRL information is obtained. The extension should be non-critical, but this profile recommends support forusethis extension by CAs and applications. Further discussion of CRL management is contained in section 5. If theInternet Public Key Infrastructure. ThiscRLDistributionPoints extensionmay be used to direct applica- tions to identify an on-line validation service supporting the issu- ing CA. Ascontains a Distribution- PointName of type URI, theinformation mayfollowing semantics shall beavailable in multiple forms, each extensionassumed: the URI is asequence of IA5String values, each of which represents a URI. The URI implicitly specifiespointer to thelocation and format ofcurrent CRL for theinformationassociated reasons and will be issued by themethodassociated cRLIssuer. The expected values forobtainingtheinformation. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 36] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 An object identifier isURI are those defined in 4.2.1.7. Processing rules forthe private extension. The object identifier associated with the private extension isother values are not definedunderby this specification. If thearc id-pedistribution- Point omits reasons, the CRL shall include revocations for all rea- sons. If the distributionPoint omits cRLIssuer, the CRL shall be issued by the CA that issued the certificate. id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } cRLDistributionPoints ::= { CRLDistPointsSyntax } CRLDistPointsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { unused (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6) } 4.2.2 Private Internet Extensions This section defines one new extension for use in the Internet Public Key Infrastructure. This extension may be used to direct Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 38] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 applications to identify an on-line validation service supporting the issuing CA. As the information may be available in multiple forms, each extension is a sequence of IA5String values, each of which represents a URI. The URI implicitly specifies the location and for- mat of the information and the method for obtaining the information. An object identifier is defined for the private extension. The object identifier associated with the private extension is defined under the arc id-pe within the id-pkix name space. Any future exten- sions defined for the Internet PKI will also be defined uder the arc id-pe. id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } 4.2.2.1 Authority Information Access The authority information access extension indicates how to access CA information and services for the issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears. Information and services may include on-line validation services and CA policy data. (The location of CRLs is not specified in this extension; that information is provided by the cRLDistributionPoints extension.) This extension may be included in subject or CA certificates, and it is always non-critical. id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessLocation GeneralName } id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 }id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } Each entry in the sequence AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax describes the format and location of additional information about the CA who issued the certificate in which this extension appears.This profile defines an object identifier forThe type and format of theOn-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that will be defined in [PKIXOCSP]. When id- ad-ocsp appears as accessMethod,information is specified by the accessMethod field; the accessLocation fielddescribesspecifies theon-line status server andlocation of theaccess protocol to obtain current certificate status information forinformation. The retrieval mechanism may be implied by thecertificate containing this extension.accessMethod or specified by accessLocation. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page37]39] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 This profile definesan object identifier to obtain a description ofone OID for accessMethod. The id-ad-caIssuers OID is used when the additional information lists CAs that have issued certificates superior to the CA that issued the certificate containing this extension. The referenced CA Issuers description is intended to aid certificate users in the selection of a certification path that terminates at a point trusted by thecerti- ficatecertificate user. When id-ad-caIssuers appears asaccessMethod,accessInfoType, the accessLocation field describes the referenced description server and the accessprotocolpro- tocol to obtain the referenced description.Additional access descriptors will likely beThe accessLocation field is definedinas a GeneralName, which can take several forms. Where thefuture. The authorityInfoAccess extension mayinformation is available via http, ftp, or ldap, accessLocation shall beincluded inaPKCS 7 encap- sulation as an X.501 ATTRIBUTE. This attribute can thenuniformResourceIdentifier. Where the information is available via the directory access protocol (dap), accessLocation shall beused to locate certificates automatically rather than includea directoryName. When thecertifi- cates directly.information is available via electronic mail, accessLocation shall be an rfc822Name. Theintended effectsemantics of other name forms of accessLocation (when accessMethod is id-ad-caIssuers) are not defined by this specification. Additional access descriptors may be defined in other PKIX specifica- tions. 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile As described above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is toreducefoster thesizecreation ofthe encapsulated message or object. PKCS 9 identifies attributesan interoperable and reusable Internet PKI. To achieve this goal, guidelines forinclusion in PKCS 7, referencing X.520 standard attributesthe use of extensions are speci- fied, anddefining additional attributes unique to PKCS 9. The attributes defined in X.520some assumptions arebased onmade about thedefini- tionnature ofATTRIBUTEinformation included inITU-T X.501 | ISO/IEC 9594-2. The following syntax defines authorityInfoAccess as an ATTRIBUTE suitable for inclusion in a PKCS #7 message: authorityInfoAccess ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX authorityInfoAccessSyntax, ID id-pe-authorityInfoAccess } Other parts of the PKIX specifications [PKIXOCSP] [PKIXLDAP] estab- lish requirements on certificate retrieval mechanisms. It is expected that applications using the URI form of the authorityInfo field for such a purpose will: 1. Prepend a suitable HTTP retrieval primitive to the URL (e.g. "GET"). 2. Append a filename to the URL. 3. Use the result to retrieve a file containing the requested certi- ficate. 4. Use the authorityInfoAccess extension in that and subsequent cer- tificates to complete a certificate path. The filename will be formed as the IA5string representation of SHA1(Issuer DN | certificate serial number) concatenated with ".cer." The IA5String representation will display the SHA1 result as a Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 38] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 hexidecimal number using digits and the lowercase letters 'a' through 'f.' The SignerInfo syntax of PKCS 7 provides the necessary informa- tion as issuerAndSerialNumber. The specified file will contain a single DER encoded certficate. 5 CRL and CRL Extensions Profile As described above, one goal of this X.509 v2 CRL profile is to foster the creation of an interoperable and reusable Internet PKI. To achieve this goal, guidelines for the use of extensions are speci- fied, and some assumptions are made about the nature of information included in the CRL. CRLs may be usedthe CRL. CRLs may be used in a wide range of applications and environments covering a broad spectrum of interoperability goals and an even broader spectrum of operational and assurance requirements. This profile establishes a common baseline for generic applications requiring broad interoperability.Emphasis is placed on support for X.509 v2 CRLs.The profile defines a baseline set of information that can be expected in every CRL. Also, the profile defines common locations within the CRL for frequently usedattributes, andattri- butes as well as common representations for these attributes. This profile does not define any private Internet CRL extensions or CRL entry extensions. Environments with additional or special purpose requirements may build on this profile or may replace it. Conforming CAs are not required to issue CRLs if other revocation or certificate status mechanisms are provided. Conforming CAs that issue CRLs are required to issue version 2 CRLs, and CAs must include Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 40] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 the date by which the next CRL will be issued in the nextUpdate field(Section(see sec. 5.1.2.5). Conforming applications are required to process version 1 and 2 CRLs. 5.1 CRL Fields The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is as follows. For signature calculation, the data that is to be signed is ASN.1 DER encoded. ASN.1 DER encod- ing is a tag, length, value encoding system for each element. CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertList TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,signaturesignatureValue BIT STRING }Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 39] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { version Version OPTIONAL, -- if present, must be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, must be v2 } OPTIONAL, crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, must be v2 } -- Version, Time,CertificateSerialNumberCertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions -- are all defined in the ASN.1 in section 4.1AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }--contains a value ofAlgorithmIdentifier is defined in section 4.1.1.2 The following items describe thetype -- registered for use with the -- algorithm object identifier value The following items describe the proposeduse of the X.509 v2 CRL in the Internet PKI. 5.1.1 CertificateList Fields The CertificateList is a SEQUENCE of three required fields. The fields arearedescribed in detail in the followingsubsectionssubsections. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 41] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 5.1.1.1 tbsCertList The first field in the sequence is the tbsCertList. This field is itself a sequence containing the name of the issuer, issue date, issue date of the next list, the list of revoked certificates, and optional CRL extensions. Further, each entry on the revoked certifi- cate list is defined by a sequence of user certificate serial number, revocation date, and optional CRL entry extensions.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 40] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19985.1.1.2 signatureAlgorithm The signatureAlgorithm field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the CertificateList.In the sigantureAlgorithm field, the contents of the optional parametersThe fieldshall be the value NULL.is of type AlgorithmIdentifier, which is defined in section 4.1.1.2. Section 7.2 lists the supportedalgo- rithmsalgorithms for this specification. Conforming CAs shall use thealgo- rithmalgorithm identifiers presented inSectionsec- tion 7.2 when signing with asup- portedsupported signature algorithm. This field must contain the same algorithm identifier as the signa- ture field in the sequence tbsCertList (see sec. 5.1.2.2). 5.1.1.3signaturesignatureValue ThesignaturesignatureValue field contains a digital signature computed upon the ASN.1 DER encodedTBSCertList.tbsCertList. The ASN.1 DER encodedTBSCertListtbsCertList is used as the input toa one-way hash function. The one-way hash func- tion output value is encrypted (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to formthesigned quantity.signature function. This signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the CRL'ssignaturesig- natureValue field. The details of this process are specified for each of the supported algorithms inSectionsection 7.2. 5.1.2 Certificate List "To Be Signed" The certificate list to be signed, ortBSCertList,TBSCertList, is a SEQUENCE of required and optional fields. The required fields identify the CRL issuer, the algorithm used to sign the CRL, the date and time the CRL was issued, and the date and time by which the CA will issue the next CRL. Optional fields include lists of revoked certificates and CRL exten- sions. The revoked certificate list is optional to support thespe- cialcase where a CA has not revoked any unexpired certificates that it has issued.It is expected that nearly all CRLs issued in the Inter- net PKI will contain one or more lists of revoked certificates. Similarly, theThe profile requires conforming CAs to use the CRLexten- sionextension cRLNumber in all CRLs issued. 5.1.2.1 Version This optional field describes the version of the encoded CRL. When extensions are used, asexpected inrequired by this profile, this field shall be Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 42] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 present and shall specify version 2 (the integer value is 1).If neither CRL extensions nor CRL entry extensions are present, version 1 CRLs are recommended. In this case, the field shall be ommitted. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 41] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19985.1.2.2 Signature This field contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm used to sign the CRL. Section 7.2 lists OIDs for the most popular signa- ture algorithms used in the Internet PKI. This field must contain the same algorithm identifier as the signa- tureAlgorithm field in the sequence CertificateList (see section 5.1.1.2).As with signatureAlgorithm, the parameters component shall contain the value NULL.5.1.2.3 Issuer Name The issuer name identifies the entity who has signed(andand issued theCRL).CRL. The issuer identitymay beis carried in the issuer namefield and/or the issuerAltName extension. If identity information is present only in the issuerAltName extension, then the issuerfield. Alter- native name forms maybe an empty sequence andalso appear in the issuerAltName extensionmust be criti- cal. Where it is non-null, the(see sec. 5.2.2). The issuer name field shall contain an X.500distinguisheddis- tinguished name (DN). The issuer name field is defined as the X.501 type Name, and shall follow the encoding rules for the issuer name field in the certificate (see sec. 4.1.2.4). 5.1.2.4 This Update This field indicates the issue date of this CRL. ThisUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs shall encode thisUp- date as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs shall encode thisUpdate as Generalized- Time for dates in the year 2050 or later. Where encoded as UTCTime, thisUpdate shall be specified and inter- preted as defined inSectionsection 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as General- izedTime, thisUpdate shall be specified and interpreted as defined inSectionsection 4.1.2.5.2. 5.1.2.5 Next Update This field indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will not be issued any later than the indicated date. nextUpdate may be encoded as UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. This profile requires inclusion of nextUpdate in all CRLs issued byHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 42] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998conforming CAs. Note that the ASN.1 syntax of TBSCertList describes this field as OPTIONAL, which is consistent with the ASN.1 structure defined in [X.509]. The behavior of clients processing CRLs which Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 43] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 omit nextUpdate is not specified by this profile. CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs shall encode nextUp- date as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049. CAs conforming to this profile that issue CRLs shall encode nextUpdate as Generalized- Time for dates in the year 2050 or later. Where encoded as UTCTime, nextUpdate shall be specified and inter- preted as defined inSectionsection 4.1.2.5.1. Where encoded as General- izedTime, nextUpdate shall be specified and interpreted as defined inSectionsection 4.1.2.5.2. 5.1.2.6 Revoked Certificates Revoked certificates are listed. The revoked certificates are named by their serial numbers. Certificates are uniquely identified by the combination of the issuer name or issuer alternative name along with the user certificate serial number. The date on which the revocation occurred is specified. The time for revocationDate shall be expressed as described in section 5.1.2.4. Additional information may be supplied in CRL entry extensions; CRL entry extensions are dis- cussed in section 5.3. 5.1.2.7 Extensions This field may only appear if the versionnumberis 2 (see sec. 5.1.2.1). If present, this field is a SEQUENCE of one or more CRL extensions. CRL extensions are discussed in section 5.2. 5.2 CRL Extensions The extensions defined by ANSI X9 andISOISO/IEC/ITU for X.509 v2 CRLs [X.509] [X9.55] provide methods for associating additional attributes with CRLs. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define private extensions to carry information unique to those communities. Each extension in a CRL may be designated as critical or non- critical. A CRL validation must fail if it encountersana critical extension which it does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non-critical extension may be ignored. The followingpresentssubsections present those extensions used within Internet CRLs.CommunitiesCom- munities may elect to include extensions in CRLs which are not defined in this specification. However, caution should be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRLs which might be used in a general context. Conforming CAs that issue CRLs are required tosupportinclude the authority key identifier (see sec. 5.2.1) and the CRL number (see sec. 5.2.3) extensions in all CRLs issued. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page43]44] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998extension (5.2.3), and include it in all CRLs issued. Conforming applications are required to support the critical and optionally critical CRL extensions issuer alternative name (5.2.2), issuing dis- tribution point (5.2.4) and delta CRL indicator (5.2.5).5.2.1 Authority Key Identifier The authority key identifier extension provides a means of identify- ing theparticularpublic key corresponding to the private key used to sign a CRL. The identification can be based on either the key identifier (the subject key identifier in the CRL signer's certificate) or on the issuer name and serial number.The key identifier method is recommended in this profile.This extensionwould be usedis especially use- ful where an issuer hasmultiplemore than one signingkeys,key, either due tomultiplemul- tiple concurrent key pairs or due tochange- over. In general,changeover. Conforming CAs shall use the key identifier method, and shall include thisnon-criticalextensionshould be includedincertificates.all CRLs issued. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined inSectionsection 4.2.1.1. 5.2.2 Issuer Alternative Name The issuer alternative names extension allows additional identities to be associated with the issuer of the CRL. Defined options include an rfc822 name (electronic mail address), a DNS name, an IP address, and a URI. Multiple instances of a name and multiple name forms may be included. Whenever such identities are used, the issuer alterna- tive name extension shall be used.Further, if the only issuer identity included in the CRL is an alter- native name form (e.g., an electronic mail address), then the issuer distinguished name should be empty (an empty sequence), theThe issuerAltName extension shouldbe used, and the issuerAltName exten- sion mustnot be marked critical. Theobject identifierOID and syntax for this CRL extension are defined inSectionsection 4.2.1.8. 5.2.3 CRL Number The CRL number is a non-critical CRL extension which conveys a mono- tonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by agiven CA through a specific CA X.500 Directory entry or CRL distribution point.CA. This extension allows users to easily determine when apar- ticularparticular CRL supersedes another CRL. CAs conforming to this profile shall include this extension in all CRLs. id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 44] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998cRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) 5.2.4Issuing Distribution PointDelta CRL Indicator Theissuing distribution pointdelta CRL indicator is a critical CRL extension thatiden- tifies the CRL distribution pointidentifies a delta-CRL. The use of delta-CRLs can significantly improve process- ing time for applications which store revocation information in aparticular CRL, and itformat other than the CRL structure. This allows changes to be added to the local database while ignoring unchanged information that is Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 45] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 already in the local database. When a delta-CRL is issued, the CAs shall also issue a complete CRL. The value of BaseCRLNumber identifies the CRL number of the base CRL that was used as the starting point in the generation of this delta- CRL. The delta-CRL contains the changes between the base CRL and the current CRL issued along with the delta-CRL. It is the decision of a CA as to whether to provide delta-CRLs. Again, a delta-CRL shall not be issued without a corresponding complete CRL. The value of CRLNumber for both the delta-CRL and the corresponding complete CRL shall be identical. A CRL user constructing a locally held CRL from delta-CRLs shall con- sider the constructed CRL incomplete and unusable if the CRLNumber of the received delta-CRL is more that one greater that the CRLnumber of the delta-CRL last processed. id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } deltaCRLIndicator ::= BaseCRLNumber BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber 5.2.5 Issuing Distribution Point The issuing distribution point is a critical CRL extension that iden- tifies the CRL distribution point for a particular CRL, and it indi- cates whether the CRL covers revocation for end entity certificates only, CA certificates only, or a limitied set of reason codes.Since thisAlthough the extension is critical,all certificate users must be preparedconforming implementations are not required toreceive CRLs withsupport this extension. The CRL is signed using the CA's private key. CRL Distribution Points do not have their own key pairs. If the CRL is stored in the X.500 Directory, it is stored in the Directory entry corresponding to the CRL distribution point, which may be different than the Directory entry of the CA. CAs may use CRL distribution points to partition the CRL on the basis of compromise and routine revocation. In this case, the revocations with reason code keyCompromise (1) shall appear in one distribution point, and the revocations with other reason codes shall appear in another distribution point. The reason codes associated with a dis- tribution point must be specified in onlySomeReasons. If onlySomeRea- sons does not appear, the distribution point must contain revocations for all reason codes. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 46] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 Where the issuingDistributionPoint extension contains a URL, the fol- lowing semantics shall be assumed: the object is a pointer to the most current CRL issued by this CA. The URI schemes ftp, http, mailto [RFC1738] and ldap [RFC1778] are defined for this purpose. The URI must be an absolute, not relative, pathname and must specify the host. id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } issuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE }5.2.5 Delta5.3 CRLIndicatorEntry Extensions Thedelta CRL indicator is a criticalCRLextension that identifies a delta-CRL. The use of delta-CRLs can significantly improve process- ing timeentry extensions already defined by ANSI X9 and ISO/IEC/ITU forapplications which store revocation information in a format other than theX.509 v2 CRLs provide methods for associating additional attri- butes with CRLstructure. Thisentries [X.509] [X9.55]. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allowschangescommunities tobe added Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 45] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998define private CRL entry extensions tothe local database while ignoring unchangedcarry informationthat is alreadyunique to those communities. Each extension inthe local database. When a delta-CRL is issued, the CAs shall also issueacomplete CRL. The value of BaseCRLNumber identifies the CRL number of the baseCRLthat was usedentry may be designated asthe starting point in the generation of this delta- CRL. The delta-CRL contains the changes between the base CRL and the currentcritical or non-critical. A CRLissued along with the delta-CRL. It is the decision of a CA as to whether to provide delta-CRLs. Again,valida- tion must fail if it encounters adelta-CRL shallcritical CRL entry extension which it does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non- critical CRL entry extension may beissued without a corresponding CRL.ignored. Thevalue of CRLNumber for both the delta-CRLfollowing subsec- tions present recommended extensions used within Internet CRL entries andthe correspondingstandard locations for information. Communities may elect to use additional CRLshallentry extensions; however, caution should beidentical. Aexercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRLuser constructingentries which might be used in alocally held CRL from delta-CRLs shall con- sider the constructedgeneral context. All CRLincomplete and unusable if the CRLNumber of the received delta-CRLentry extensions used in this specification are non-critical. Support for these extensions ismoreoptional for conforming CAs and applications. However, CAs thatone greaterissue CRLs are strongly encouraged to include reason codes (see sec. 5.3.1) and invalidity dates (see sec. 5.3.3) whenever this information is available. 5.3.1 Reason Code The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies theCRLnumberreason for the certificate revocation. CAs are strongly encouraged to include meaningful reason codes in CRL entries; how- ever, the reason code CRL entry extension should be absent instead of using thedelta-CRL last processed. id-ce-deltaCRLIndicatorunspecified (0) reasonCode value. id-ce-cRLReason OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce2721 }deltaCRLIndicatorHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 47] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 -- reasonCode ::=BaseCRLNumber BaseCRLNumber{ CRLReason } CRLReason ::=CRLNumber 5.2.6 Certificate Issuer ThisENUMERATED { unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8) } 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code The hold instruction code is a non-critical CRL entry extensionidentifiesthat provides a registered instruction identifier which indicates thecertificate issuer associated with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e.action to be taken after encountering aCRLcertificate that hasthe indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. Ifbeen placed on hold. id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } holdInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The following instruction codes have been defined. Conforming appli- cations that process this extensionis not present on the first entry in an indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults toshall recognize theCRL issuer. On subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry. This field is defined as follows: id-ce-certificateIssuerfollowing instruction codes. holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 29iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) 2 }certificateIssuerid-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=GeneralNames If used by conforming CAs that issue CRLs, this extension is always critical.{holdInstruction 1} id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3} Conforming applicationsifwhich encounter animplementation ignored this extension it could not correctly attribute CRL entries toid-holdinstruction- callissuer must call the certificate issuer or reject the certifi-cates. 5.3 CRL Entry Extensionscate. Conforming applications which encounter an id- holdinstruction-reject shall reject the certificate. TheCRL entry extensions already defined by ANSI X9hold instruction id-holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent to the absence of a holdInstructionCode, andISO for X.509 v2 CRLs [X.509] [X9.55] provide methodsits use is strongly deprecated forassociating additionalthe Internet PKI. 5.3.3 Invalidity Date The invalidity date is a non-critical CRL entry extension that pro- vides the date on which it is known or suspected that the private key was compromised or that the certificate otherwise became invalid. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page46]48] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998attributes with CRL entries. The X.509 v2 CRL format also allows communities to define private CRL entry extensions to carry informa- tion unique to those communities. Each extension in a CRL entryThis date may bedesignated as critical or non-critical. A CRL validation must fail if it encounters a criticalearlier than the revocation date in the CRLentry extensionentry, whichit does not know how to process. However, an unrecognized non-critical CRL entry extension may be ignored. The following presents recommended extensions used within Internet CRL entries and standard locations for information. Communities may elect to use additional CRL entry extensions; however, caution should be exercised in adopting any critical extensions in CRL entriesis the date at whichmight be used inthe CA processed the revocation. When ageneral context. All CRL entry extensions are non-critical; support for these exten- sionsrevocation isoptional for conforming CAs and applications. However, CAs thatfirst posted by a CA in a CRL, the invalidity date may precede the date of issueCRLs are strongly encouraged to include reason codes (5.3.1) wheneverof earlier CRLs, but the revocation date should not precede the date of issue of earlier CRLs. Whenever this information isavailable. 5.3.1 Reason Code The reasonCode is a non-critical CRL entry extension that identifies the reason for the certificate revocation.available, CAs are strongly encouraged toinclude reason codes in CRL entries; however, the rea- son codeshare it with CRLentry extension shouldusers. The GeneralizedTime values included in this field shall beabsent instead of using the unspecified (0) reasonCode value. id-ce-cRLReasonexpressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and shall be specified and interpreted as defined in section 4.1.2.5.2. id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce21 } -- reasonCode ::= { CRLReason24 }CRLReasoninvalidityDate ::=ENUMERATED { unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8) } 5.3.2 Hold Instruction Code The hold instruction code is a non-criticalGeneralizedTime 5.3.4 Certificate Issuer This CRL entry extensionthat provides a registered instruction identifier which indicatesidentifies theaction to be taken after encountering acertificate issuer associated with an entry in an indirect CRL, i.e. a CRL that hasbeen placedthe indirectCRL indicator set in its issuing distribution point extension. If this extension is not present onhold. id-ce-holdInstructionCodethe first entry in an indirect CRL, the certificate issuer defaults to the CRL issuer. On subsequent entries in an indirect CRL, if this extension is not present, the certificate issuer for the entry is the same as that for the preceding entry. This field is defined as follows: id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce2329 } certificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames If used by conforming CAs that issue CRLs, this extension is always critical. If an implementation ignored this extension it could not correctly attribute CRL entries to certificates. This specification recommends that implementations recognize this extension. 6 Certification Path Validation Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are based on section 12.4.3 of [X.509]. Certification path processing verifies the binding between the subject distinguished name and/or subject alternative name and subject public key. The binding is lim- ited by constraints which are specified in the certificates which comprise the path. The basic constraints and policy constraints extensions allow the certification path processing logic to automate the decision making process. This section describes an algorithm for validating certification Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page47]49] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998holdInstructionCode ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The following instruction codes have been defined.paths. Conformingappli- cations that processimplementations of thisextensionspecification are not required to implement this algorithm, but shallrecognizebe functionally equivalent to thefollowing instruction codes. holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) 2 } id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 1} id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3} Conforming applications which encounterexternal behaviour resulting from this procedure. Any algorithm may be used by aid-holdinstruction- callissuer must callparticular implementation so long as it derives thecertificate issuer or rejectcorrect result. In section 6.1, thecertifi- cate. Conforming applications which encountertext describes basic path validation. This text assumes that all valid paths begin with certificates issued by aid-holdinstruction- reject ID shall rejectsin- gle "most-trusted CA". The algorithm requires thetransaction. id-holdinstruction-none is semantically equivalent topublic key of theabsenceCA, the CA's name, the validity period ofa holdInstructionCode. Its use is strongly deprecated fortheInternet PKI. 5.3.3 Invalidity Datepublic key, and any constraints upon the set of paths which may be validated using this key. Theinvalidity date"most-trusted CA" is anon-critical CRL entry extension that pro- vides the date on whichmatter of policy: itis known or suspectedcould be a root CA in a hierarchical PKI; the CA that issued theprivate key was compromisedverifier's own certificate(s); orthatany other CA in a network PKI. The path valida- tion procedure is thecertificate otherwise became invalid. This date may be earlier thansame regardless of therevocation date inchoice of "most-trusted CA." section 6.2 describes extensions to theCRL entry, but it must be later thanbasic path validation algo- rithm. Two specific cases are discussed: theissue datecase where paths may begin with one of several trusted CAs; and where compatibility with thepreviously issued CRL. RememberPEM architecture is required. 6.1 Basic Path Validation The text assumes that therevocation datetrusted public key (and related informa- tion) is contained in a "self-signed" certificate. This simplifies theCRL entry specifiesdescription of thedatepath processing procedure. Note that theCA revokedsig- nature on thecertificate. Whenever this informa- tionself-signed certificate does not provide any security services. The public key it contains isavailable, CAs are strongly encouragedtrusted because of other procedures used toshare it with CRL users. The GeneralizedTime values included in this field shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu), and shall be specifiedobtain andinterpreted as defined in Section 4.1.2.5.2. id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } invalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime 6 Certificate Path Validation Certification path validation procedures for the Internet PKI are based on Section 12.4.3protect it. The goal of[X.509]. Certificationpathprocessing verifiesvalidation is to verify the binding betweenthe subjecta sub- ject distinguished name or subject alternative name andsub- jectsubject pub- lic key, as represented in the "end entity" certificate, based on the publickey.key of the "most-trusted CA". This requires obtaining a sequence of certificates that support that binding. Thebindingprocedures performed to obtain this sequence islimited by constraints which are specified inoutside the scope of this sec- tion. The following text also assumes that certificateswhich comprisedo not use subject or unique identifier fields or private critical extensions, as recom- mended within this profile. However, if these components appear in certificates, they must be processed. Finally, policy qualifiers are also neglected for thepath. The basicsake of clarity. A certification path is a sequence of n certificates where: Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page48]50] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998constraints and policy constraints extensions allow* for all x in {1,(n-1)}, thecertification path processing logic to automatesubject of certificate x is thedecision making process.issuer of certificate x+1. * certificate x=1 is the the self-signed certificate, and * certificate x=n is the end entity certificate. This sectiondescribes an algorithm for validating certification paths. Conforming implementations of this specificationassumes the following inputs arenot required to implement this algorithm, but shall be functionally equivalentprovided to theexternal behaviour resulting from this procedure. Any algorithm may be used bypath processing logic: (a) aparticular implementation so long as it derives the correct result. The following text assumes that all valid paths begin with the public keycertification path of length n; (b) asingle "most-trusted CA". The "most-trusted CA" is a matterset ofpolicy: it could be a root CA ininitial policy identifiers (each comprising ahierarchical PKI; the CA that issued the verifier's own certificate(s);sequence of policy element identifiers), which identifies one or more certificate policies, anyother CA in a net- work PKI. The path validation procedure is the same regardless of the choiceone of"most-trusted CA." The text assumes that this public key is contained in a "self-signed" certificate. This simplifieswhich would be acceptable for thedescriptionpurposes ofthecertification pathprocessing procedure. Note thatprocessing, or thesignature onspecial value "any-policy"; (c) theself-signed certificate doescurrent date/time (if notprovide any security services. The public key it contains is trusted because of other procedures usedavailable internally toobtainthe certification path processing module); andprotect it. The goal(d) the time, T, for which the validity of the pathvalidation is to verify the binding between a sub- ject distinguished name and subject public key, as represented in the "end entity" certificate, based on the public key of the "most- trusted CA". This requires obtaining a sequence of certificates that support that binding. The procedures performed to obtain this sequence is outside the scope of this section. The following text also assumes that certificates do not use subject or unique identifier fields or private critical extensions, as recom- mended within this profile. However, if these components appear in certificates, they mustshould beprocessed. Finally, policy qualifiers are also neglected for the sake of clarity. A certification path is a sequence of n certificates where: * for all x in {1,(n-1)}, the subject of certificate x is the issuer of certificate x+1. * certificate x=1 is the the self-signed certificate, and * certificate x=n is the end entity certificate. This section assumes the following inputs are provided to the path processing logic: (a) a certification path of length n; Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 49] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 (b) a set of initial policy identifiers (each comprising a sequence of policy element identifiers), which identifies one or more certificate policies, any one of which woulddetermined. (This may beacceptable for the purposes of certification path processing, or the special value "any-policy"; and (c)the currentdate/time (if not available internally todate/time, or some point in thecertification path processing module).past.) From the inputs, the procedure intializes five state variables: (a) acceptable policy set: A set of certificate policy identif- iers comprising the policy or policies recognized by the public key user together with policies deemed equivalent through policy mapping. The initial value of the acceptable policy set is the special value "any-policy". (b) constrained subtrees: A set of root names defining a set of subtrees within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in the certification path shall fall. The initial value is "unbounded". (c) excluded subtrees: A set of root names defining a set of subtrees within which no subject name in subsequent certificates in the certification path may fall. The initial value is "empty". (d) explicit policy: an integer which indicates if an explicit policy identifier is required. The integer indicates the first certificate in the path where this requirement is imposed. Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not be increased. (That is, if a certificate in the path requires explicit policy identifiers, a later certificate can not remove this requirement.) The initial value is n+1. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 51] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (e) policy mapping: an integer which indicates if policy mapping is permitted. The integer indicates the last certificate on which policy mapping may be applied. Once set, this variable may be decreased, but may not be increased. (That is, if a certificate in the path specifies policy mapping is not permitted, it can not be overriden by a later certificate.) The initial value is n+1. The actions performed by the path processing software for each certi- ficate i=1 through n are described below. The self-signed certifi- cate is certificate i=1, the end entity certificate is i=n. The pro- cessing is performed sequentially, so that processing certificate i affects the state variables for processing certificate (i+1). Note that actions (h) through(l)(m) are not applied to the end entity certi- ficate (certificate n).Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 50] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998The path processing actions to be performed are: (a) Verify the basic certificate information, including: (1) the certificate was signed using the subject public key from certificate i-1 (in the special case i=1, this step may be omitted; if not, use the subject public key from the same cer- tificate), (2) the certificateis not expired, and (if present) the private key usagevalidity periodis satisfied,includes time T, (3) the certificatehashad not been revoked at time T and is not currently on hold status that commenced before time T, (this may bedeter- mineddetermined by obtainingcurrent CRL, currentthe appropriate CRL or status information, or by out-of-band mechanisms), and (4) the subject and issuer names chaincorrectly. (Ifcorrectly (that is, the issuer of this certificate was the subject of the previous cer-tificatetificate.) If the certificate has an empty sequence in the name field, name chaining will use the critical subjectAltNames and issuerAltNamesfields.)fields. (b) Verify that the subject nameor criticaland subjectAltName extension (critical or noncritical) is consistent with the constrainedsubtreessub- trees statevari- ables; andvariables. (c) Verify that the subject nameor criticaland subjectAltName extension (critical or noncritical) is consistent with the excluded subtrees statevari- ables.variables. (d) Verify that policy information is consistent with the initial policy set: Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 52] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (1) if the explicit policy state variable is less than or equal to i, a policy identifier in the certificate must be in the initial policy set; and (2) if the policy mapping variable is less than or equal to i, the policy identifier may not be mapped. (e) Verify that policy information is consistent with the accept- able policy set: (1) if the certificate policies extension is marked critical, the intersection of the policies extension and the acceptable policy set must be non-null; (2) the acceptable policy set is assigned the resulting inter- section as its new value. (g) Verify that the intersection of the acceptable policy set andHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 51] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998theintialinitial policy set is non-null. (h) Recognize and process any other critical extension present in the certificate. (i) Verify that the certificate is a CA certificate (as specified in a basicConstraints extension or as verified out-of-band). (j) If permittedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the constrained subtrees state variable to the intersection of its previous value and the value indicated in the extension field. (k) If excludedSubtrees is present in the certificate, set the excluded subtrees state variable to the union of its previous value and the value indicated in the extension field. (l) If a policy constraints extension is included in the certifi- cate, modify the explicit policy and policy mapping state vari- ables as follows: (1) If requireExplicitPolicy is present and has value r, the explicit policy state variable is set to the minimum of(a)its current value and(b)the sum of r and i (the currentcertifi- catecertificate in the sequence). (2) If inhibitPolicyMapping is present and has value q, the policy mapping state variable is set to the minimum of(a)its current value and(b)the sum of q and i (the currentcertifi- catecertificate in the sequence). Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 53] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (m) If a key usage extension is marked critical, ensure the key- CertSign bit is set. If any one of the above checks fail, the procedure terminates, returning a failure indication and an appropriate reason. If none of the above checks fail on the end-entity certificate, the procedure terminates, returning a success indication together with the set of all policy qualifier values encountered in the set of certificates.Notes:6.2 Extending Path Validation The path validation algorithm presented in 6.1 is based on several simplifying assumptions (e.g., a single trusted CA that starts all valid paths). This algorithm may be extended for cases where the assumptions do not hold. This procedure may be extended for multiple trusted CAs by providing a set of self-signed certificates to the validation module. In this case, a valid path could begin with any one of the self-signed certi- ficates. Limitations in the trust paths for any particular key may be incorporated into the self-signed certificate's extensions. In this way, the self-signed certificates permit the path validation module to automatically incorporate local security policy and requirements. It is also possible to specify an extended version of the abovecertificationcer- tification path processing procedure which results in default behaviour identical to the rules ofPrivacy Enhanced MailPEM [RFC 1422]. In this extended version, additional inputs to the procedure are a list of one or more Policy CertificationAuthoritysAuthorities (PCAs) names and an indicator of the position in the certification path where the PCA is expected. At the nominated PCA position, the CA name is compared against this list. If a recognized PCA name is found, then acon- straintconstraint ofSubordinateToCASubordina- teToCA is implicitly assumed for the remainder of the certification path and processing continues. If no valid PCA name is found, and if the certification path cannot be validated on the basis of identified policies, then the certification path isHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 52] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998considered invalid. 7 Algorithm Support Thisprocedure may also be extended by providing a set of self-signed certificates to the validation module. In this case, a valid path could begin with any one of the self-signed certificates. These self-signed certificates permit the path validation module to automatically incorporate local security policy and requirements. 7 Algorithm Support This section describes cryptographic algorithms whichsection describes cryptographic algorithms which may be used with thisstandard.profile. The section describes one-way hash functions and digital signature algorithms which may be used to sign certificates and CRLs, and identifiesobject identifiersOIDs for public keys contained in acertificate.certifi- cate. Conforming CAs and applications are not required to support the algo- rithms or algorithm identifiers described in this section. However,this profile requiresHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 54] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 conforming CAs and applicationsto conform when theythat use the algorithms identifiedhere.here shall support them as specified. 7.1 One-way Hash Functions This section identifies one-way hash functions for use in the Inter- net PKI. One-way hash functions are also called message digest algo- rithms. SHA-1 is the preferred one-way hash function for the Internet PKI. However, PEM uses MD2 for certificates [RFC 1422] [RFC 1423] and MD5 is used in other legacy applications. For this reason, MD2 and MD5 are included in this profile. 7.1.1 MD2 One-way Hash Function MD2 was developed by RonRivest, butRivest for RSA DataSecuritySecurity. RSA Data Secu- rity has not placed the MD2 algorithm in the public domain. Rather, RSA Data Security has granted license to use MD2 for non-commercial InternetPrivacy- EnhancedPrivacy-Enhanced Mail. For this reason, MD2 may continue to be used with PEM certificates, but SHA-1 is preferred. MD2 produces a 128-bit "hash" of the input. MD2 is fully described in RFC 1319 [RFC 1319]. At the Selected Areas in Cryptography '95 conference in May 1995, Rogier and Chauvaud presented an attack on MD2 that can nearly find collisions [RC95]. Collisions occur when one can find two different messages that generate the same message digest. A checksum operation in MD2 is the only remaining obstacle to the success of the attack. For this reason, the use of MD2 for new applications is discouraged. It is still reasonable to use MD2 to verify existing signatures, as the ability to find collisions in MD2 does not enable an attacker to find new messages having a previously computed hash value.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 53] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 << More information on the attack and its implications can be obtained from a RSA Laboratories security bulletin. These bulletins are available from <http://www.rsa.com/>. >>7.1.2 MD5 One-way Hash Function MD5 was developed by Ron Rivestin 1991. Thefor RSA Data Security. RSA Data Secu- rity has placed the MD5 algorithmtakes as input a message of arbitrary length andin the public domain. MD5 producesas outputa 128-bit"fingerprint" or "message digest""hash" of the input.TheMD5message dig- est algorithmisspecified byfully described in RFC1321, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"[RFC1321].1321 [RFC 1321]. Den Boer and Bosselaers [DB94] have found pseudo-collisions for MD5, but there are no other known cryptanalytic results. The use of MD5 for new applications is discouraged. It is still reasonable to use MD5 to verify existing signatures. 7.1.3 SHA-1 One-way Hash Function SHA-1 was developed by the U.S. Government.The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length andSHA-1 producesas outputa 160-bit "hash" of the input. SHA-1 is fully described in FIPS 180-1 [FIPS Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 55] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 180-1]. SHA-1 is the one-way hash function of choice for use with both the RSA and DSA signature algorithms (seeSectionsec. 7.2). 7.2 Signature Algorithms Certificates and CRLs described by this standard may be signed with any public key signature algorithm. The certificate or CRL indicates the algorithm through analgorithmidentifieralgorithm identifier which appears in the signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate or CertificateList. Thisalgorithmidentifieralgorithm identifier is an OID and has optionally associated parame- ters. This section identifies algorithm identifiers and parameters that shall be used in the signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate orCertifi- cateList.CertificateList. RSA and DSA are the most popular signature algorithms used in the Internet. Signature algorithms are always used in conjunction with a one-way hash function identified inSectionsection 7.1. The signature algorithm(andand one-way hashfunction)function used to sign acertificatecer- tificate or CRL is indicated by use of an algorithm identifier. An algorithm identifier is anobject identifier,OID, and may include associatedparameters.parame- ters. This section identifies OIDS for RSA and DSA. The contents of the parameters componentin signatureAlgorithm field of a Certificate or CertificateList shall always be present with a value of NULL. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 54] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998for each algorithm vary; details are pro- vided for each algorithm. The data to be signed (e.g., the one-way hash function output value) is formatted for the signature algorithm to be used. Then, a private key operation (e.g., RSA encryption) is performed to generate the signature value. This signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the Certificate or CertificateList(inin thesignature field).sig- nature field. 7.2.1 RSA Signature Algorithm A patent statement regarding the RSA algorithm can be found at the end of this profile. The RSA algorithm is named for its inventors: Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. This profile includes three signature algorithms based on the RSA asymmetric encryption algorithm. The signature algorithms combine RSA with either the MD2, MD5, or the SHA-1 one-way hash func- tions. The signature algorithm with MD2 and the RSA encryption algorithm is defined in PKCS #1[PKCS#1].[RFC 2313]. As defined inPKCS #1,RFC 2313, the ASN.1object identifierOID used to identify this signature algorithm is: Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 56] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 2 } The signature algorithm with MD5 and the RSA encryption algorithm is defined in PKCS #1[PKCS#1].[RFC 2313]. As defined inPKCS #1,RFC 2313, the ASN.1object identifierOID used to identify this signature algorithm is: md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 4 } The signature algorithm with SHA-1 and the RSA encryption algorithm isdefined in byimplemented using theOSI Interoperability Workshop in [OIW]. Paddingpadding and encoding conventions described in PKCS#1, section 8.1, must be used. As defined in [OIW],#1 [RFC 2313]. The message digest is computed using the SHA-1 hash algorithm. The ASN.1 object identifier used to identify this signature algorithm is:sha1WithRSASignaturesha-1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 29member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 } When any of these threeobject identifiersOIDs appears within the ASN.1 typeAlgorithmIdentifier,Algorith- mIdentifier, the parameters component of that type shall be the ASN.1 type NULL.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 55] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998Thedata to be signed (e.g., the one-way hash function output value) is first ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET STRING and the result is encrypted (e.g., using RSA Encryption) to form the signed quantity. When sign- ing, theRSAalgorithm generates an integer y. This signature value is then ASN.1 encoded as a BIT STRING, such that the most significant bit in y is the first bit in the bit string and the least significant bit in y is the last bit in the bit string, and included in the Cer- tificate or CertificateList (in thesignaturefield). (In general the conversion to a bit string occurs in two steps. The integer y is converted to an octet string such that the first octet has the most significance and the last octet has the least signifi- cance. The octet string is converted into a bit string such that the most significant bit of the first octet shall become the first bit in the bit string,generation process and theleast significant bitencoding of thelast octetresult isthe last bitdescribed inthe BIT STRING.)detail in RFC 2313. 7.2.2 DSA Signature Algorithm A patent statement regarding the DSA can be found at the end of this profile. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is also called the Digital Sig- nature Standard (DSS). DSA was developed by the U.S. Government, and DSA is used in conjunction with the the SHA-1 one-way hash function. DSA is fully described in FIPS 186 [FIPS 186]. The ASN.1object identifiersOIDs used to identify this signature algorithm are: id-dsa-with-sha1 ID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 }TheWhere the id-dsa-with-sha1 algorithmsyntax has NULL parameters. The DSA parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field ofidentifier appears as thecertificate ofalgo- rithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, theissuerencoding shallapply to the verification ofomit thesignature. Ifparameters field. That is, thesubjectPublicKeyInfoAlgorithmIdentifierfield has NULL param- eters and the CA signed the subject certificate using DSA, then the certificate issuer's parameters apply toshall be a SEQUENCE of one component - thesubject'sOBJECT IDENTIFIER id-dsa-with-sha1. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 57] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 The DSAkey. Ifparameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfoAlgorithmIdentifierfieldhas NULL parame- ters andof theCA signedcertifi- cate of thesubject with a signature algorithm other than DSA, then clientsissuer shallnot validateapply to thecertificate.verification of the signature. When signing, the DSA algorithm generates two values. These values are commonly referred to as r and s. To easily transfer these two values as one signature, they shall be ASN.1 encoded using the fol- lowing ASN.1 structure:Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 56] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998Dss-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } 7.3 Subject Public Key Algorithms Certificates described by thisstandardprofile may convey a public key for any public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm through analgorithmidentifier.algorithm identifier. This algorithmidentfieieridentifier is an OID and optionally associated parameters. This section identifies preferred OIDs and parameters for the RSA, DSA, and Diffie-Hellman algorithms. Conforming CAs shall use the identified OIDs when issuing certificates containing public keys for these algorithms. Conforming applications supporting any of these algorithms shall, at a minimum, recognize the OID identified in this section. 7.3.1 RSA Keys Theobject identifierOID rsaEncryption identifies RSA public keys. pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1} The rsaEncryptionobject identifierOID is intended to be used in the algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. Theparame- tersparameters field shall have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier. ThersaRSA public key shall be encoded using the ASN.1 type RSAPub- licKey: RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { modulus INTEGER, -- n publicExponent INTEGER -- e -- } where modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public exponent e. The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is the value of the BIT Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 58] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 STRINGsubjectPubliKey.subjectPublicKey. Thisobject identifierOID is used in public key certificates for both RSA signature keys and RSA encryption keys. The intended application for the key may be indicated in the key usage field (seeSectionsec. 4.2.1.3). The use of a single key for both signature and encryption purposes is not recommended, but is not forbidden.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 57] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998If the keyUsage extension is present in an end entity certificate which conveys an RSA public key, any combination of the following values may be present: digitalSignature; nonRepudiation;keyEncipherment;keyEnci- pherment; and dataEncipherment. If the keyUsage extension is present in a CA certificate whichcon- veysconveys an RSA public key, any combination of the following values may be present: digitalSignature;nonRepudiation;nonRepudi- ation; keyEncipherment; dataEncipherment; keyCertSign; and cRLSign. However, this specification recommends that if keyCertSign or cRLSign is present, both keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment should not be present. 7.3.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange KeyThis diffie-hellman object identifierThe Diffie-Hellman OID supported by thisstandardprofile is defined by ANSIX9.42.X9.42 [X9.42]. dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } The dhpublicnumberobject identifierOID is intended to be used in the algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. Theparame- tersparameters field of that type, which has the algorithm-specific syntax ANY DEFINED BYalgorithm, wouldalgo- rithm, have the ASN.1 typeDHParameterGroupParameters for this algorithm.DHParameterDomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE {primep INTEGER, --p baseodd prime, p=jq +1 g INTEGER, -- generator, g q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL } ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { seed BIT STRING, pgenCounter INTEGER } The fields of typeDHParameterDomainParameters have the following meanings:prime isp identifies the primep. base isp defining thebase g. The Diffie-Hellman public key shall be ASN.1 encoded as an INTEGER;Galois field; g specifies the generator of the mutiplicative subgroup of order Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page58]59] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e.,g; q specifies thevalue)prime factor of p-1; j optionally specifies thesubjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) ofvalue that satisfies the equation p=jq+1 to support the optional verification of group parameters; seed optionally specifies the bit string parameter used as the seed for the system parameter generation process; and pgenCounter optionally specifies the integer value output as part of the of the system parameter prime generation process. If either of the parameter generation components (pgencounter or seed) is provided, the other must be present as well. The Diffie-Hellman public key shall be ASN.1 encoded as an INTEGER; this encoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the subjectPublicKeyInfo data element. DHPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- publickeykey, y = g^x mod p If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate which conveys a DH public key, the following values may be present: keyAgreement; encipherOnly; and decipherOnly. At most one of encipherOnly and decipherOnly shall be asserted in keyUsage extension. 7.3.3 DSA Signature Keys Theobject identifierDigital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is also known as the Digitial Signature Standard (DSS). The DSA OID supported by thisstandardprofile is id-dsa ID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 } The id-dsa algorithm syntax includes optional parameters. These parameters are commonly referred to as p, q, and g. When omitted, the parameters component shall be omitted entirely. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier shall be a SEQUENCE of one component - the OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-dsa. If the DSA algorithm parameters are presentand havein thevalue NULL.subjectPublicKey- Info AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters are included using the fol- lowing ASN.1 structure: Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 60] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 q INTEGER, g INTEGER } If the DSA algorithm parameters are absent from the subjectPublicKey- Info AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using DSA, then the certificate issuer's DSA parameters apply to the subject's DSA key. If the DSA algorithm parameters are absent from the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using a signature algorithm other than DSA, then the subject's DSA parameters are distributed by other means.The parameters are included using the following ASN.1 structure: Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, q INTEGER, g INTEGER }If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier fieldhas NULL param- eters and the CA signed the subject certificate using DSA, thenomits thecertificate issuer'sparametersapply to the subject's DSA key. If the subjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier field has NULL parame- terscomponent and the CA signed the subject with a signature algorithm other than DSA, then clients shallnot validatereject the certificate.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 59] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998When signing, DSA algorithm generates two values. These values are commonly referred to as r and s. To easily transfer these two values as one signature, they are ASN.1 encoded using the following ASN.1 structure: Dss-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } The encoded signature is conveyed as the value of the BIT STRING sig- nature in a Certificate or CertificateList. The DSA public key shall be ASN.1 DER encoded as an INTEGER; thisencod- ingencoding shall be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the sub- jectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element. DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- publickeykey, Y If the keyUsage extension is present in an end entity certificate which conveys a DSA public key, any combination of the following values may be present: digitalSignature; and nonRepudiation. If the keyUsage extension is present in an CA certificate which con- veys a DSA public key, any combination of the following values may be present: digitalSignature; nonRepudiation; keyCertSign; and cRLSign. 8 References [FIPS 180-1] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 180-1, Secure Hash Standard, 17 April 1995. [Supersedes FIPS PUB 180 dated 11 May 1993.] Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 61] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 [FIPS 186] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 186, Digital Signature Standard, 18 May 1994.[OIW] Stable Implementation Agreements for Open Systems Interconnection Protocols: Part 12 - OS Security, Output from the June 1995 Open Systems Environment Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 60] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 Implementors' Workshop (OIW). [PKCS#1][PKCS #9] PKCS#1: RSA Encryption Standard,#9: Selected Attribute Types, Version1.4,1.1, RSA Data Security, Inc.,3 June 1991.November 1, 1993. [RC95] Rogier, N. and Chauvaud, P., "The compression function of MD2 is not collision free," Presented at Selected Areas in Cryptography '95,Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 18-19May 1995. [RFC 791] J. Postel, "Internet Protocol", September 1981. [RFC 822] D. Crocker, "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text messages", August 1982. [RFC 1034] P.V. Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and facili- ties", November 1987. [RFC 1319] Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC 1319, RSA Laboratories, April 1992. [RFC 1422] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," RFC 1422, BBN Communications, February 1993. [RFC 1423] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers," RFC 1423, Trusted Information Systems, February 1993. [RFC1738] T. Berners-Lee, L. Masinter & M. McCahill, "Uniform Resource Locators (URL)," December 1994. [RFC 1777] W. Yeong, T. Howes & S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol," March 1995. [RFC 1778]1519] V. Fuller, T.Howes, S. Kille, W. Yeong, C. Robbins, "The String Representation of Standard Attribute Syntaxes", March 1995.Li, J. Yu, and K. Varadhan. "Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): an Address Assignment and Aggregation Strategy", September 1993. [RFC 1883] S.Deering,Deering and R.Hinden,Hinden. "Internet Protocol, Version 6(IPv6),"(IPv6) Specification", December 1995. [RFC1959] T. Howes, M. Smith, "An LDAP URL Format", RFC 1959, June 1996. [RFC2044] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and ISO 10646", October 1996. [RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. [RFC 2277] H. Alvestrand, "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages", January 1998. [RFC 2279] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", January 1998.[PKIXMGMT] C. Adams, S. Farrell, "Internet Public Key InfrastructureHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page61]62] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998Certificate Management Protocols", draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-07.txt, February 1998. [PKIXLDAP] S. Boyeun, T. Howes and P. Richard "Internet Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols - LDAP", draft-ietf-pkix-ipki2opp-07.txt,[RFC 2313] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5", March 1998.[PKIXOCSP] M. Myers, in "Internet Public Key Infrastructure Part 2: Operational Protocols", draft-ietf-pkix-ocsp-02.txt, February 1998. [PKIXFTP] R. Housley, "Internet Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", draft-ietf-pkix-opp-ftp-http-02.txt, November 1997. [SDN.701R][SDN.701] SDN.701, "Message SecurityProtocol",Protocol 4.0", Revision4.0 1996-06-07 with "Corrections to Message Security Protocol, SDN.701, Rev 4.0, 96-06-07." August 30, 1996.A 1997-02-06. [X.208] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988. [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509(1197(1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997. [X9.42] ANSI X9.42-199x, Public Key Cryptography for The Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Algorithm Keys Using Diffie-Hellman (Working Draft), December 1997. [X9.55] ANSI X9.55-1995, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Extensions To Public Key Certificates And Certificate Revocation Lists, 8 December, 1995. [X9.57] ANSI X9.57-199x, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Certificate Management (Working Draft), 21 June, 1996. 9 Patent Statements The Internet PKI relies on the use of patented public key technology and secure hash technology for digital signature services. This specification references public key encryption technology for provi- sioning key exchange services.This specification also permits the use of the cRLDistributionPoints extension to assist in the manage- ment of certificate revocation lists.The Internet Standards Process as defined in RFC 1310 requires a written statement from the Patent holder that a license will be made available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions prior to approving a specification as a Proposed, Draft or Internet Stan- dard.Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 62] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998Patent statements for DSA, RSA,Diffie-HellmanDiffie-Hellman, andone method for managing CRLsHellman-Merkle follow. These statements have been supplied by the patent holders, not the authors of this profile. The Internet Society, Internet Architecture Board, Internet Engineer- ing Steering Group and the Corporation for National Research Initia- tives take no position on the validity or scope of the following patents and patent applications, nor on the appropriateness of the terms of the assurance. The Internet Society and other groups men- tioned above have not made any determination as to any otherintel- lectualHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 63] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 intellectual property rights which may apply to the practice of thisstan- dard.standard. Any further consideration of these matters is the user'sownresponsibility. 9.1 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) The U.S. Government holds patent 5,231,668 on the DigitalSigna- tureSignature Algorithm (DSA), which has been incorporated into Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186. The patent was issued on July 27, 1993. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a long tradition of supplying U.S. Government-developed techniques tocommitteescom- mittees and working groups for inclusion into standards on a royalty-free basis. NIST has made the DSA patent availableroyalty-freeroyalty- free to users worldwide. NIST has provided the following statement with regard to this patent: Regarding patent infringement, FIPS 186 summarizes our position; the Department of Commerce is not aware of any patents that would be infringed by the DSA. Questions regarding this matter may be directed to the Deputy Chief Counsel for NIST. 9.2 RSA Signature and Encryption The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has granted RSA DataSecurity,Secu- rity, Inc., exclusive sub-licensing rights to the following patent issued in the United States: Cryptographic Communications System and Method ("RSA"), No. 4,405,829 RSA Data Security, Inc. has provided the following statement with regard to this patent: It is our understanding that the proposed PKIX CertificatePro- fileProfile (PKIX-1) standard currently under review contemplates the use of U.S Patent 4,405,829 entitled "CryptographicCommunica- tionCommunication System and Method" (the "RSA patent") which patent isHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 63] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998controlled by RSA. It is RSA's business practice to make licenses to its patents available on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.Accord- ingly,Accordingly, if the foregoing identified IETF standard is adopted, RSA iswilling,wil- ling, upon request, to grant non-exclusive licenses to such patent on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions to those who respect RSA's intellectual property rights and subject to RSA's then current royalty rate for the patent licensed. Theroyaltyroy- alty rate for the RSA patent is presently set at 2% of thelicensee'sHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 64] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 licensee's selling price for each product covered by the patent. Any requests for licenseinfor- mationinformation may be directed to: Director of Licensing RSA Data Security, Inc. 100 Marine Parkway, Suite 500 Redwood City, CA 94065 A license under RSA's patent(s) does not include any rights to know-how or other technical information or license under other intellectual property rights. Such license does not extend to any activities which constitute infringement or inducement thereto. A licensee must make his own determination as to whether a license is necessary under patents of others. 9.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreementand Hellman-Merkle Public Key Cryptogra- phyPatent No. 4,200,770: Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie- Hellman") expired on August 19, 1997. 9.4 Hellman-Merkle Public Key Cryptography Patent No. 4,218,582: Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Hellman-Merkle") expired on April 29, 1997.Method for Efficient Management of Certificate Revocation Lists9.5 CRL Distribution Points and Related Mechanisms Entrust TechnologiesLimitedIncorporated has provided the following state- ment with regard to this patent: Entrust Technologies Incorporated advises the IETF that it holds the Patent (as defined herein) which may relate to the IETF. Inaccor- danceaccordance with the Intellectual Property rights procedures of the IETF standards process, Entrust TechnologiesLimited,Incorporated, for itself and its subsidiaries (hereinafter calledEntrust)"Entrust") will offer licenses under its Patent on a perpetual, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis and onnon- discriminatory,non-discriminatory, fair andreasonableequitable terms to all parties solely for their use in complying with the Standard, but on condition that any such party offers to Entrust and its corporate affiliates similar licenses under suchpartysparty's patents, if any, for use in complying with theStandard and related IETF standards.Standard. Any application for a license underEntrustsEntrust's Patent pursuant to this Patent Disclosure Statement should be made to:Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 64] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998Stephen Samson Entrust Technologies Limited8th Floor,750 Heron Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1V 1A7 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 65] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 voice: (613) 247 3725 As used herein: "Patent" means US Patent 5,699,431 issued on 16 December, 1997 for an invention known as a "Method for Efficient Management of Certi- ficate Revocation Lists and Update Information", which invention is owned or controlled by Entrust and the use of which may be required in conjunction with the Standard. "Standard" means a specification progressing through the Standard Track of the IETF and relating to the Public Key Infrastructure (X.509)specifications. GRANT OF RIGHTS FOR US PATENT 5,699,431 Purpose This grant is made to help facilitate inclusionspecification for certificate update and revocation. 10 Security Considerations The majority ofcertain patented technology covered under US Patent 5,699,431 (herein called the Technology) in the Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) Standard (herein called the Standard). Entrust Technologies Lim- ited (herein called Entrust) offers the Technologythis specification is devoted to theIETF as a method for efficient managementformat and con- tent ofCertificate Revocation Listscertificates andUpdate Information. It should be noted that the confirmatory license mentionedCRLs. Since certificates and CRLs are digi- tally signed, no additional integrity service isoptional, sincenecessary. Neither certificates nor CRLs need be kept secret, and unrestricted and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security implica- tions. However, security factors outside thegrant of rights is automatic. Grantscope ofRightsthis specification will affect the assurance provided toEntrust Technologies US Patent 5,699,431 Entrust hereby covenantscertificate users. This sec- tion highlights critical issues thatit will not assert any claims in US Patent 5,699,431 any continuations, divisions, or continuations- in-part of either, or any non-US counterpartsshould be considered by imple- mentors, administrators, and users. The procedures performed by CAs and RAs to validate the binding ofanythe subject's identity of their public key greatly affect thefore- going against any partyassurance thatmakes, uses, or offers a non- commercial implementation of an IETF specification that includesshould be placed in theTechnology, or any continuation, division or continuation-in- part of that contribution, provided that contribution is employedcertificate. Relying parties may wish toimplementreview thePublic Key Infrastructure (X.509) Standard. Such grantCA's certificate practice statement. This may be particularly important when issuing certificates to other CAs. The use ofrights is limited in that it does not include rightsa single key pair forcommercializationboth signature and other purposes is strongly discouraged. Use ofthe Technology, including incorporating such Technology into commercial products. A licenseseparate key pairs forcommercial uses ofsignature and key management provides several benefits to theTechnology mustusers. The ramifications associated with loss or disclosure of a signature key are different from loss or disclosure of a key management key. Using separate key pairs permits a balanced and flexible response. Similarly, different validity periods or key lengths for each key pair may beappliedappropriate in some application environments. Unfortunately, some legacy applica- tions (e.g., SSL) use a single key pair forat the address written below. This grantsignature and key manage- ment. The protection afforded private keys is a critical factor in main- taining security. On a small scale, failure ofrightsusers to protect their private keys willpermanently terminate with respectpermit an attacker to masquerade as them, or Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page65]66] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998any party (and to any affiliate of the party) that assertsdecrypt their personal information. On apatent it owns or controls, either directly or indirectly, against Entrust or any of its affiliates for implementation of, or opera- tionlarger scale, compromise ofany system utilizinga CA's private signing key may have a catastrophic effect. If an attacker obtains theTechnology. The terminationprivate key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and CRLs. Existence ofrightsbogus certificates and CRLs willoccur as ofundermine confidence in thedatesystem. If thepatentcompromise isasserted against Entrust. Confirmatory License A written confirmation of this grant, and/or a license under any other patent under Entrust's then-current terms, conditions,detected, all certificates issued to the CA must be revoked, prevent- ing services between its users androyalty rates, canusers of other CAs. Rebuilding after such a compromise will beobtained by sendingproblematic, so CAs are advised to implement arequest to: Stephen Samson Entrust Technologies Limited 8th Floor, 750 Heron Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1V 1A7 Appendix A. Psuedo-ASN.1 Structurescombination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper- resistant cryptographic modules) andOIDs This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components inappropriate management pro- cedures (e.g., separation of duties) to avoid such an"ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax isincident. Loss of ahybridCA's private signing key may also be problematic. The CA would not be able to produce CRLs or perform normal key rollover. CAs are advised to maintain secure backup for signing keys. The security of the1988 and 1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntaxkey backup procedures isaugmented with 1993 UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String.a critical factor in avoid- ing key compromise. TheASN.1 syntax does not permitavailability and freshness of revocation information will affect theinclusiondegree oftype statementsassurance that should be placed in a certificate. While certificates expire naturally, events may occur during its natural lifetime which negate theASN.1 module,binding between the subject and public key. If revocation information is untimely or unavailable, the1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit useassurance associated with the binding is clearly reduced. Simi- larly, implementations of thenew UNIVERSAL typesPath Validation mechanism described inmodules usingsection 6 that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that support it. The path validation algorithm depends on the1988 syntax. As a result, this module does not conform to either versioncertain knowledge of theASN.1 standard. This appendix maypublic keys (and other information) about one or more trusted CAs. The decision to trust a CA is an important decision as it ultimately determines the trust afforded a certificate. The authenticated dis- tribution of trusted CA public keys (usually in the form of a "self- signed" certificate) is a security critical out of band process that is beyond the scope of this specification. In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs will make the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand, selection of only one trusted CA may limit users to a closed community of users until a global PKI emerges. The quality of implementations that process certificates may also affect the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algo- rithm described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA information, and especially the integrity of the public keys asso- ciated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for which Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 67] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the user into accepting false certificates. Finally, the binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to generate the signature. Short key lengths or weak hash algo- rithms will limit the utility of a certificate. CAs are encouraged to note advances in cryptology so they can employ strong crypto- graphic techniques. In addition, CAs should decline to issue certi- ficates to CAs or end entities that generate weak signatures. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 68] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 Appendix A. Psuedo-ASN.1 Structures and OIDs This section describes data objects used by conforming PKI components in an "ASN.1-like" syntax. This syntax is a hybrid of the 1988 and 1993 ASN.1 syntaxes. The 1988 ASN.1 syntax is augmented with 1993 UNIVERSAL Types UniversalString, BMPString and UTF8String. The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. As a result, this module does not conform to either version of the ASN.1 standard. This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the defintions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY". A.1 Explicitly Tagged Module PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- -- IMPORTS NONE -- -- UNIVERSAL Types defined in '93 and '98 ASN.1 -- but required by this specification UniversalString ::= [UNIVERSAL 28] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- UniversalString is defined in ASN.1:1993 BMPString ::= [UNIVERSAL 30] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- BMPString is the subtype of UniversalString and models -- the Basic Multilingual Plane of ISO/IEC/ITU 10646-1 UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- The content of this type conforms to RFC 2044. -- -- PKIX specific OIDs id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 69] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } -- PKIX arcs id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } -- arc for private certificate extensions id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } -- arc for policy qualifier types id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } -- arc for extended key purpose OIDS id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } -- arc for access descriptors -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } -- OID for CPS qualifier id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } -- OID for user notice qualifier -- attribute data types -- Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, values SET OF AttributeValue -- at least one value is required -- } AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeValue ::= ANY AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } -- suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following -- information object set may be augmented to meet local -- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may -- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations. -- presented in pairs: the AttributeType followed by the -- type definition for the corresponding AttributeValue --Arc for standard naming attributes id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} -- Attributes of type NameDirectoryString id-at-name AttributeType ::= {id-at 41} id-at-surname AttributeType ::= {id-at 4} id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= {id-at 42} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 70] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 id-at-initials AttributeType ::= {id-at 43} id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= {id-at 44} X520name ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-name)) } -- id-at-commonName AttributeType ::= {id-at 3} X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-common-name)) } -- id-at-localityName AttributeType ::= {id-at 7} X520LocalityName ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-locality-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-locality-name)) } -- id-at-stateOrProvinceName AttributeType ::= {id-at 8} X520StateOrProvinceName ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-state-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-state-name)) } -- id-at-organizationName AttributeType ::= {id-at 10} X520OrganizationName ::= CHOICE { Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 71] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-organization-name)) } -- id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType ::= {id-at 11} X520OrganizationalUnitName ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-organizational-unit-name)) } -- id-at-title AttributeType ::= {id-at 12} X520Title ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-title)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-title)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..ub-title)) } -- id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType ::= {id-at 46} X520dnQualifier ::= PrintableString id-at-countryName AttributeType ::= {id-at 6} X520countryName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes -- Legacy attributes pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } Pkcs9email ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..ub-emailaddress-length)) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 72] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 -- naming data types -- Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- rdnSequence RDNSequence } RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Directory string type -- DirectoryString ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..MAX)) } -- certificate and CRL specific structures begin here Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING } TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 extensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL -- If present, version must be v3 -- } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER Validity ::= SEQUENCE { Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 73] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING } -- CRL structures CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertList TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING } TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { version Version OPTIONAL, -- if present, must be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, must beconverted into 1988 ASN.1 by replacing the defintions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988 catch-all "ANY". PKIX1 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS::= BEGINv2 } OPTIONAL, crlExtensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL --UNIVERSAL Types defined in '93 ASN.1if present, must be v2 --but required by this specification UniversalString ::= [UNIVERSAL 28] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING} -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were --UniversalString isdefined earlier for use inASN.1:1993 BMPString ::= [UNIVERSAL 30] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- BMPString is the subtype of -- UniversalString and modelstheBasic Multilingual Plane -- of ISO/IEC 10646-1certificate structure AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page66]74] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } --UNIVERSAL Type defined in draft '98 ASN.1 -- but required by this specification UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING -- The contentcontains a value ofthisthe typeconforms to RFC 2044.-- registered for use with the -- algorithm object identifier value --PKIXAlgorithm OIDsid-pkixand parameter structures pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 } md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 } sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 } id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } Dss-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, --PKIX arcsodd prime, p=jq +1 g INTEGER, -- generator, g q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 j INTEGER OPTIONAL, --arc for private certificate extensions id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIERsubgroup factor, j>= 2 validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL } ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE {id-pkix 1seed BIT STRING, pgenCounter INTEGER }-- arc for policy qualifier types id-qtid-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 2iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 }-- arc for extended key purpose OIDS id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIERDss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE {id-pkix 3p INTEGER, q INTEGER, g INTEGER } --arc for access descriptors id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIERx400 address syntax starts here Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 75] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 -- OR Names ORAddress ::= SEQUENCE {id-pkix 48built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-domain-defined-attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL } --pkix private extensions id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIERThe OR-address is semantically absent from the OR-name if the -- built-in-standard-attribute sequence is empty and the -- built-in-domain-defined-attributes and extension-attributes are -- both omitted. -- Built-in Standard Attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {id-pe 1 }country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, --policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIERsee also extended-network-address terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-organization-name numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-personal-name organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names -- } CountryName ::= [APPLICATION 1] CHOICE {id-qt 1x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) }id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIERAdministrationDomainName ::= [APPLICATION 2] CHOICE {id-qt 2numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) } NetworkAddress ::= X121Address --extended key purpose OIDs id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIERsee also extended-network-address X121Address ::={ id-kp 1 } id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIERNumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) TerminalIdentifier ::={ id-kp 2 } id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIERPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE {id-kp 3numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 76] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) }id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIEROrganizationName ::={ id-kp 4 } id-kp-ipsecEndSystem OBJECT IDENTIFIERPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) -- see also teletex-organization-name NumericUserIdentifier ::={ id-kp 5 } id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIERNumericString (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) PersonalName ::= SET {id-kp 6surname [0] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL }id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER-- see also teletex-personal-name OrganizationalUnitNames ::={ id-kp 7 } id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIERSEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF OrganizationalUnitName -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names OrganizationalUnitName ::={ id-kp 8 }PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) --access descriptors for authority info access extension id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIERBuilt-in Domain-defined Attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::={ id-ad 1 } id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIERSEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {id-ad 2 } -- attribute data typestype PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))} --AttributeExtension Attributes ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF ExtensionAttribute ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {type AttributeValue,extension-attribute-type [0] INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes), extension-attribute-value [1] ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-type } -- Extension types and attribute values Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page67]77] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998values SET OF AttributeValue--at least one value is required -- } AttributeTypecommon-name INTEGER ::=OBJECT IDENTIFIER AttributeValue1 CommonName ::=ANY AttributeTypeAndValuePrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-common-name INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE2 TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-organization-name INTEGER ::= 3 TeletexOrganizationName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) teletex-personal-name INTEGER ::= 4 TeletexPersonalName ::= SET {type AttributeType, value AttributeValuesurname [0] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL }-- naming data types -- Nameteletex-organizational-unit-names INTEGER ::=CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- rdnSequence RDNSequence } RDNSequence5 TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCEOF RelativeDistinguishedName DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SETSIZE(1 .. MAX)(1..ub-organizational-units) OFAttributeTypeAndValue -- Directory string type -- DirectoryStringTeletexOrganizationalUnitName TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::=CHOICE { teletexStringTeletexString (SIZE(1..MAX)), printableString(1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) pds-name INTEGER ::= 7 PDSName ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1..MAX)), universalString UniversalString(1..ub-pds-name-length)) physical-delivery-country-name INTEGER ::= 8 PhysicalDeliveryCountryName ::= CHOICE { x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE(1..MAX)), utf8String UTF8String(ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE(1..MAX)) bmpString BMPString (SIZE(1..MAX))(ub-country-name-alpha-length)) }-- certificate and CRL specific structures begin here Certificatepostal-code INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING } TBSCertificate9 PostalCode ::=SEQUENCECHOICE {version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page68]78] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998issuerUniqueID [1] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 subjectUniqueID [2] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- If present, version must be v2 or v3 extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL -- If present, version must be v3printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) }Versionphysical-delivery-office-name INTEGER ::= 10 PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-office-number INTEGER ::= 11 PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter extension-OR-address-components INTEGER{ v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber::= 12 ExtensionORAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-personal-name INTEGERValidity::=SEQUENCE { notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time13 PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::=CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } UniqueIdentifierPDSParameter physical-delivery-organization-name INTEGER ::=BIT STRING SubjectPublicKeyInfo14 PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::=SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } ExtensionsPDSParameter extension-physical-delivery-address-components INTEGER ::= 15 ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter unformatted-postal-address INTEGER ::= 16 UnformattedPostalAddress ::= SET { printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX)(1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OFExtension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRINGPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL }-- Extensionstreet-address INTEGER ::={ {id-ce 15}, ... , keyUsage } ID17 StreetAddress ::=OBJECT IDENTIFIER joint-iso-ccitt IDPDSParameter post-office-box-address INTEGER ::={ 2 } ds ID18 PostOfficeBoxAddress ::={joint-iso-ccitt 5} id-ce IDPDSParameter poste-restante-address INTEGER ::={ds 29} AuthorityKeyIdentifier19 PosteRestanteAddress ::=SEQUENCE { keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } ( WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer PRESENT, authorityCertSerialNumber PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer ABSENT,PDSParameter unique-postal-name INTEGER ::= 20 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page69]79] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998authorityCertSerialNumber ABSENT} ) KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING -- subjectKeyIdentifierUniquePostalName ::=KeyIdentifier KeyUsagePDSParameter local-postal-attributes INTEGER ::=BIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) } id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER21 LocalPostalAttributes ::={ id-ce 16 } PrivateKeyUsagePeriodPDSParameter PDSParameter ::=SEQUENCESET {notBefore [0] GeneralizedTimeprintable-string PrintableString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL,notAfter [1] GeneralizedTimeteletex-string TeletexString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL }( WITH COMPONENTS {..., notBefore PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., notAfter PRESENT} ) id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } CertificatePoliciesextended-network-address INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyInformation22 ExtendedNetworkAddress ::=SEQUENCECHOICE {policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifierse163-4-address SEQUENCESIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo{ number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), sub-address [1] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL }, psap-address [0] PresentationAddress }CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER PolicyQualifierInfoPresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE {policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierIdpSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING }PolicyQualifierIdterminal-type INTEGER ::=OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER23 TerminalType ::= INTEGER {id-ce 33telex (3), teletex (4), g3-facsimile (5), g4-facsimile (6), ia5-terminal (7), videotex (8) }PolicyMappings(0..ub-integer-options) -- Extension Domain-defined Attributes teletex-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 6 TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX)(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OFSEQUENCE { issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIERTeletexDomainDefinedAttribute TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {id-ce 17 }type TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value TeletexString Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page70]80] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998SubjectAltName(SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } -- specifications of Upper Bounds must be regarded as mandatory -- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 Reference Definition of MTS Parameter -- Upper Bounds -- Upper Bounds ub-name INTEGER ::=GeneralNames GeneralNames32768 ub-common-name INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralName64 ub-locality-name INTEGER ::=CHOICE { -- OTHER-NAME128 ub-state-name INTEGER ::=TYPE-IDENTIFIER note: not supported in '88 ASN.1 otherName [0] AnotherName, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } AnotherName128 ub-organization-name INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } EDIPartyName64 ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, partyName [1] DirectoryString } id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-title INTEGER ::={ id-ce 18 } IssuerAltName64 ub-match INTEGER ::= 128 ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-domain-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-extension-attributes INTEGER ::= 256 ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGER ::= 15 ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER ::= 40 ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-given-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-initials-length INTEGER ::= 5 ub-integer-options INTEGER ::=GeneralNames id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER256 ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER ::={ id-ce 9 } SubjectDirectoryAttributes32 ub-organization-name-length INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER ::={ id-ce 19 } BasicConstraints32 ub-organizational-units INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint4 ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER(0..MAX) OPTIONAL } id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER::={ id-ce30} NameConstraintsub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } GeneralSubtrees6 ub-postal-code-length INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree16 ub-surname-length INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE {40 ub-terminal-id-length INTEGER ::= 24 ub-unformatted-address-length INTEGER ::= 180 ub-x121-address-length INTEGER ::= 16 -- Note - upper bounds on string types, such as TeletexString, are -- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a -- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page71]81] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } SkipCerts-- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upper -- bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for TeletexString. -- For UTF8String or UniversalString at least four times the upper -- bound should be allowed. END Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 82] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 A.2 Implicit Module 88-style ASN.1 PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=INTEGER (0..MAX)BEGIN --cRLDistributionPoints CRLDistPointsSyntaxEXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS id-pe, id-qt, id-kp, id-ad, id-qt-unotice, id-qt-cps, ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName, CertificateSerialNumber, CertificateList, AlgorithmIdentifier, ub-name, Attribute, DirectoryString FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(1)}; -- ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} --SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint CRLDistPointsSyntaxauthority key identifier OID and syntax id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint{ id-ce 35 } AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {distributionPointkeyIdentifier [0]DistributionPointNameKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,reasonsauthorityCertIssuer [1]ReasonFlagsGeneralNames OPTIONAL,cRLIssuerauthorityCertSerialNumber [2]GeneralNamesCertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags-- authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber must both -- be present or both be absent KeyIdentifier ::=BITOCTET STRING{ unused (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6) } id-ce-extKeyUsage-- subject key identifier OID and syntax id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId{ id-ce 14 } SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier -- key usage extension OID and syntax id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIERAuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription AccessDescription::=SEQUENCE{accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER,id-ce 15 } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page72]83] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998accessLocation GeneralName } -- CRL structures CertificateListKeyUsage ::=SEQUENCE { tbsCertList TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureBIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) }TBSCertList-- private key usage period extension OID and syntax id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{version Version OPTIONAL, -- if present, must be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OFid-ce 16 } PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, must be v2 } OPTIONAL, crlExtensionsnotBefore [0]EXPLICIT ExtensionsGeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL-- if present, must be v2} --Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions wereeither notBefore or notAfter must be present --defined earlier for use in thecertificatestructure AlgorithmIdentifierpolicies extension OID and syntax id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {algorithmpolicyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } CertPolicyId ::= OBJECTIDENTIFIER, parametersIDENTIFIER PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, qualifier ANY DEFINED BYalgorithm OPTIONALpolicyQualifierId } --contains a value of the typeImplementations that recognize additional policy qualifiers must --registered for use withaugment the-- algorithm object identifier value id-ce-cRLNumberfollowing definition for PolicyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= { id-ce 20 } CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) -- CPS pointer qualifier id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 28id-qt 1 }IssuingDistributionPointCPSuri ::=SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,IA5String -- user notice qualifier Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page73]84] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicatorid-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 27id-qt 2 }-- deltaCRLIndicator ::= BaseCRLNumber id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIERUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {id-ce 20 } BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIERnoticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {id-ce 21organization DisplayText, noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }CRLReasonDisplayText ::=ENUMERATEDCHOICE {unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8)visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }id-ce-certificateIssuer-- policy mapping extension OID and syntax id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce2933 }CertificateIssuer ::= GeneralNames id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIERPolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {id-ce 23issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId }HoldInstructionCode ::=-- subject alternative name extension OID and syntax id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER-- ANSI x9 arc holdinstruction arc member-body ID::= {iso 2id-ce 17 }us IDSubjectAltName ::={ member-body 840 } x9cm IDGeneralNames GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralName ::= CHOICE {us 10040otherName [0] AnotherName, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }holdInstruction ID ::= {x9cm 2}--ANSI X9 holdinstructions referenced by this standard id-holdinstruction-none ID ::= {holdInstruction 1} id-holdinstruction-callissuer ID ::= {holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject IDAnotherName replaces OTHER-NAME ::={holdInstruction 3} id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIERTYPE-IDENTIFIER, as -- TYPE-IDENTIFIER is not supported in the '88 ASN.1 syntax AnotherName ::= SEQUENCE {id-ce 24type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTimeHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page74]85] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998-- Algorithm structures md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIEREDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 2nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, partyName [1] DirectoryString }md5WithRSAEncryption-- issuer alternative name extension OID and syntax id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 4id-ce 18 }sha1WithRSASignatureIssuerAltName ::= GeneralNames id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 29id-ce 9 }id-dsa-with-sha1 IDSubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute -- basic constraints extension OID and syntax id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9algorithm(4) 3id-ce 19 }Dss-Sig-ValueBasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {r INTEGER, scA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }pkcs-1-- name constraints extension OID and syntax id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1id-ce 30 }rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1} dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIERNameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }DHParameterGeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE {prime INTEGER, -- pbase GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) --g } id-dsa IDpolicy constraints extension OID and syntax id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1id-ce 36 }Dss-ParmsPolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {p INTEGER, q INTEGER, g INTEGER } id-keyEncryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL }KEA-Parms-IdSkipCerts ::=OCTET STRINGINTEGER (0..MAX) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page75]86] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier-- CRL distribution points extension OID and syntax id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 31} CRLDistPointsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {id-ce 14distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }id-ce-keyUsageDistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { unused (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6) } -- extended key usage extension OID and syntax id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- extended key purpose OIDs id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 15id-kp 1 }id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifierid-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 35id-kp 2 }CPSuri ::= IA5String UserNoticeid-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=CHOICE{visibleString VisibleString, bmpString BMPStringid-kp 3 }PresentationAddressid-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{pSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING} -- x400 address syntax starts here -- OR Names ORAddressAndOrDirectoryNameid-kp 4 } id-kp-ipsecEndSystem OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=ORName ORAddressAndOptionalDirectoryName{ id-kp 5 } id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=ORName ORName{ id-kp 6 } id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=[APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE{-- address -- COMPONENTS OF ORAddress, directory-name [0] Name OPTIONALid-kp 7 }ORAddressid-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-domain-defined-attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONALid-kp 8 } --The OR-address is semantically absent from the OR-name if the -- built-in-standard-attribute sequence is empty and the -- built-in-domain-defined-attributesCRL number extension OID andextension-attributes are -- both omitted. -- Built-in Standard Attributes BuiltInStandardAttributessyntax id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, -- see also extended-network-address terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL,id-ce 20 } CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page76]87] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 --see also teletex-organization-name numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifierissuing distribution point extension OID and syntax id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,personal-name [5] PersonalNameonlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } --see also teletex-personal-name organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-namesdeltaCRLIndicator ::= BaseCRLNumber BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber --} CountryNameCRL reasons extension OID and syntax id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=[APPLICATION 1] CHOICE{x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length))id-ce 21 }AdministrationDomainNameCRLReason ::=[APPLICATION 2] CHOICEENUMERATED {numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length))unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8) } -- certificate issuer CRL entry extension OID and syntax id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 }NetworkAddressCertificateIssuer ::=X121AddressGeneralNames --see also extended-network-address X121Address ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) TerminalIdentifier ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) PrivateDomainNamehold instruction extension OID and syntax id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=CHOICE{numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length))id-ce 23 }OrganizationNameHoldInstructionCode ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length))OBJECT IDENTIFIER --see also teletex-organization-name NumericUserIdentifierANSI x9 holdinstructions -- ANSI x9 arc holdinstruction arc holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) PersonalNameHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 88] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 {joint-iso-itu-t(2) member-body(2) us(840) x9cm(10040) 2} -- ANSI X9 holdinstructions referenced by this standard id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SET { surname [0] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL}{holdInstruction 1} --see also teletex-personal-name OrganizationalUnitNamesdeprecated id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF OrganizationalUnitName{holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3} --see also teletex-organizational-unit-namesinvalidty date CRL entry extension OID and syntax id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } InvalidityDate ::= GeneralizedTime END Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page77]89] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998OrganizationalUnitNameAppendix B. 1993 ASN.1 Structures and OIDs B.1 1993 Explicitly Tagged Module PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length))BEGIN --Built-in Domain-defined Attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributesEXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage,privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies, policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints, nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints, subjectDirectoryAttributes, cRLNumber, reasonCode, instructionCode, invalidityDate, issuingDistributionPoint, certificateIssuer, deltaCRLIndicator, authorityInfoAccess, id-ce FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)} ; -- -- Locally defined OIDs -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } -- PKIX arcs -- arc for private certificate extensions id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } -- arc for policy qualifier types id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{type PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))}id-pkix 2 } --Extension Attributes ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF ExtensionAttribute ExtensionAttributearc for extended key purpose OIDS id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE{ id-pkix 3 } -- arc for access descriptors id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE{extension-attribute-type [0] INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes), extension-attribute-value [1] ANY DEFINED BY extension-attribute-typeid-pkix 48 }extensionAttributeTable EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {common-name | teletex-common-name | teletex-organization-name | teletex-personal-name | teletex-organizational-unit-names | teletex-domain-defined-attributes | pds-name | physical-delivery-country-name | postal-code | physical-delivery-office-name | physical-delivery-office-number | extension-OR-address-components | physical-delivery-personal-name | physical-delivery-organization-name | extension-physical-delivery-address-components | unformatted-postal-address | street-address | post-office-box-address | poste-restante-address | unique-postal-name | local-postal-attributes | extended-network-address | terminal-typeid-qt 1 } -- OID for CPS qualifier Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page78]90] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998-- Extension Standard Attributes common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {CommonName IDENTIFIED BY 1} CommonName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={TeletexCommonName IDENTIFIED BY{ id-qt 2 } -- OID for user notice qualifier -- based on excerpts from AuthenticationFramework -- {joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) modules(1) authenticationFramework(7) 2}TeletexCommonName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexOrganizationName IDENTIFIED BY 3} TeletexOrganizationName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) teletex-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY 4} TeletexPersonalName-- Public Key Certificate -- Certificate ::=SETSIGNED {surnameSEQUENCE { version [0]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-nameVersion DEFAULT v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, issuerUniqueIdentifier [1]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length))IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,initials---if present, version must be v2 or v3-- subjectUniqueIdentifier [2]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length))IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,generation-qualifier---if present, version must be v2 or v3-- extensions [3]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length))Extensions OPTIONAL --if present, version must be v3--} }teletex-organizational-unit-names EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEUniqueIdentifier ::={TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames IDENTIFIED BY 5} TeletexOrganizationalUnitNamesBIT STRING Version ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName TeletexOrganizationalUnitNameINTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber ::=TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) pds-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEINTEGER Validity ::={PDSName IDENTIFIED BY 7} PDSNameSEQUENCE { notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) physical-delivery-country-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTECHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::={PhysicalDeliveryCountryName IDENTIFIED BY 8} PhysicalDeliveryCountryNameSEQUENCE{ algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING} Extensions ::=CHOICESEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE {x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length))extnId EXTENSION.&id ({ExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING } -- contains a DER encoding of a value of type Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page79]91] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998postal-code EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PostalCode IDENTIFIED BY 9} PostalCode-- &ExtnType for the -- extension object identified by extnId -- -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of legal certificate extensions. ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::=CHOICE{numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length))authorityKeyIdentifier | subjectKeyIdentifier | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | privateKeyUsagePeriod | certificatePolicies | policyMappings | subjectAltName | issuerAltName | basicConstraints | nameConstraints | policyConstraints | cRLDistributionPoints | subjectDirectoryAttributes | authorityInfoAccess }physical-delivery-office-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName IDENTIFIED BY 10} PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-office-number EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber IDENTIFIED BY 11} PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter extension-OR-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {ExtensionORAddressComponents IDENTIFIED BY 12} ExtensionORAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY 13} PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName IDENTIFIED BY 14} PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::= PDSParameter extension-physical-delivery-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents IDENTIFIED BY 15} ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter unformatted-postal-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEEXTENSION ::={UnformattedPostalAddressCLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &ExtnType } WITH SYNTAX { SYNTAX &ExtnType IDENTIFIED BY16} UnformattedPostalAddress&id } -- Certificate Revocation List -- CertificateList ::=SETSIGNED {printable-addressSEQUENCESIZE (1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OF PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)){ version Version OPTIONAL,teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length))-- if present, must be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, crlEntryExtensions EntryExtensions OPTIONAL }street-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEOPTIONAL, crlExtensions [0] CRLExtensions OPTIONAL }} CRLExtensions ::={StreetAddress IDENTIFIED BY 17}SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLExtension CRLExtension ::= SEQUENCE { extnId EXTENSION.&id ({CRLExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page80]92] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998StreetAddress ::= PDSParameter post-office-box-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PostOfficeBoxAddress IDENTIFIED BY 18} PostOfficeBoxAddress ::= PDSParameter poste-restante-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PosteRestanteAddress IDENTIFIED BY 19} PosteRestanteAddress ::= PDSParameter unique-postal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {UniquePostalName IDENTIFIED BY 20} UniquePostalName ::= PDSParameter local-postal-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEextnValue OCTET STRING } -- contains a DER encoding of a value of type -- &ExtnType for the -- extension object identified by extnId -- -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of legal CRL extensions. CRLExtensionSet EXTENSION ::={LocalPostalAttributes IDENTIFIED BY 21} LocalPostalAttributes{ authorityKeyIdentifier | issuerAltName | cRLNumber | deltaCRLIndicator | issuingDistributionPoint } -- EXTENSION defined above for certificates EntryExtensions ::=PDSParameter PDSParameterSEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF EntryExtension EntryExtension ::=SETSEQUENCE {printable-string PrintableString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONALextnId EXTENSION.&id ({EntryExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING }extended-network-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {ExtendedNetworkAddress IDENTIFIED BY 22} ExtendedNetworkAddress-- contains a DER encoding of a value of type -- &ExtnType for the -- extension object identified by extnId -- -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the -- set of legal CRL entry extensions. EntryExtensionSet EXTENSION ::=CHOICE{e163-4-address SEQUENCEreasonCode | instructionCode | invalidityDate | certificateIssuer } -- information object classes used in the defintion -- -- of certificates and CRLs -- -- Parameterized Type SIGNED -- SIGNED {number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), sub-address [1] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL }, psap-address [0] PresentationAddressToBeSigned }terminal-type EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TerminalType IDENTIFIED BY 23} TerminalType::=INTEGERSEQUENCE {telex (3), teletex (4), g3-facsimile (5), g4-facsimile (6), ia5-terminal (7), videotex (8)toBeSigned ToBeSigned, algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING }(0..ub-integer-options)-- Definition of AlgorithmIdentifier -- ISO definition was: -- Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page81]93] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 --Extension Domain-defined Attributes teletex-domain-defined-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes IDENTIFIED BY 6} TeletexDomainDefinedAttributesAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCESIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute{ -- algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({SupportedAlgorithms}), -- parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({SupportedAlgorithms} -- { @algorithm}) OPTIONAL } -- Definition of ALGORITHM -- ALGORITHM ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- The following PKIX definition replaces the X.509 definition -- AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {type TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))algorithm ALGORITHM-ID.&id({SupportedAlgorithms}), parameters ALGORITHM-ID.&Type({SupportedAlgorithms} { @algorithm}) OPTIONAL } --specificationsDefinition ofUpper BoundsALGORITHM-ID ALGORITHM-ID ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &Type OPTIONAL } WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] } --mustThe definition of SupportedAlgorithms may beregardedmodified asmandatorythis --from Annex B of ITU-T X.411document does not specify a mandatory algorithm set. In addition, --Reference Definition of MTS Parameter Upper Boundsthe set is specified as extensible, since additional algorithms --Upper Bounds ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-domain-name-length INTEGERmay be supported SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM-ID ::=16 ub-extension-attributes INTEGER{ ..., -- extensible RsaPublicKey | RsaSHA-1 | RsaMD5 | RsaMD2 | DssPublicKey | DsaSHA-1 | Dhpublicnumber } -- OIDs and parameter structures for ALGORITHM-IDs used -- in this specification RsaPublicKey ALGORITHM-ID ::=256 ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGER{ OID rsaEncryption PARMS NULL } RsaSHA-1 ALGORITHM-ID ::=15 ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER{ OID sha1WithRSAEncryption PARMS NULL } RsaMD5 ALGORITHM-ID ::=40 ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER{ OID md5WithRSAEncryption PARMS NULL } RsaMD2 ALGORITHM-ID ::=3 ub-given-name-length INTEGER{ OID md2WithRSAEncryption PARMS NULL } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 94] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 DssPublicKey ALGORITHM-ID ::=16 ub-initials-length INTEGER{ OID id-dsa PARMS Dss-Parms } DsaSHA-1 ALGORITHM-ID ::=5 ub-integer-options INTEGER{ OID id-dsa-with-sha1 PARMS NULL } DhPublicKey ALGORITHM-ID ::=256 ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER{OID dhpublicnumber PARMS DomainParameters} -- algorithm identifiers and parameter structures pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=32 ub-organization-name-length INTEGER{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=64 ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER{ pkcs-1 1 } md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=32 ub-organizational-units INTEGER{ pkcs-1 2 } md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER ::= 30 ub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::= 6 ub-postal-code-length INTEGER} sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=16 ub-surname-length INTEGER{ pkcs-1 5 } id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=40 ub-terminal-id-length INTEGER{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } Dss-Sig-Value ::=24 ub-unformatted-address-lengthSEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=180 ub-x121-address-length INTEGER{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } DomainParameters ::=16 -- Note - upper bounds on TeletexString are measured in characters. Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 82] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 -- A significantly greater number of octets will be required to holdSEQUENCE { p INTEGER, --such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upperodd prime, p=jq +1 g INTEGER, --bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed. END Appendix B. 1993 ASN.1 Structures and OIDs PKIX1 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS::= BEGINgenerator, g q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 j INTEGER OPTIONAL, --Proposed PKIX OIDs id-pkixsubgroup factor, j>= 2 validationParms ValidationParms OPTIONAL } ValidationParms ::= SEQUENCE { seed BIT STRING, pgenCounter INTEGER } id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 } Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, q INTEGER, g INTEGER } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 95] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 --PKIX arcsThe ASN.1 in this section supports the Name type --arc for private certificate extensions id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIERand the directoryAttribute extension -- attribute data types -- Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {id-pkix 1 }type ATTRIBUTE.&id ({SupportedAttributes}), values SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({SupportedAttributes}{@type})} AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id ({SupportedAttributes}), value ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({SupportedAttributes}{@type})} --arc for policy qualifiernaming data typesid-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER-- Name ::= CHOICE {id-pkix 2 }--arconly one possibility forextended key purpose OIDS id-kpnow -- rdnSequence RDNSequence } RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue ID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= { id-pkix 3 }--arcATTRIBUTE information object class specification -- Note: This has been greatly simplified foraccess descriptors id-adPKIX !! ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS { &Type, &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER::=UNIQUE } WITH SYNTAX {id-pkix 48WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id } --pkix private extensions id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIERsuggested naming attributes -- Definition of the following information object set may be -- augmented to meet local requirements. Note that deleting -- members of the set may prevent interoperability with -- conforming implementations. SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-pe 1name | commonName | surname | givenName | initials | generationQualifier | dnQualifier | countryName | localityName | stateOrProvinceName | organizationName | organizationalUnitName | title | pkcs9email }-- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIERname ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-qt 1Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 96] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIERID id-at-name } commonName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-qt 2WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-common-name} ID id-at-commonName }-- extended key purpose OIDs id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIERsurname ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 1WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name} ID id-at-surname }id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIERgivenName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 2WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name} ID id-at-givenName }id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIERinitials ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 3WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name} ID id-at-initials }id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIERgenerationQualifier ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 4WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name} ID id-at-generationQualifier} dnQualifier ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PrintableString ID id-at-dnQualifier }id-kp-ipsecEndSystem OBJECT IDENTIFIERcountryName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 5WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only ID id-at-countryName }id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIERlocalityName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 6WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-locality-name} ID id-at-localityName }id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIERstateOrProvinceName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 7WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-state-name} ID id-at-stateOrProvinceName }id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIERorganizationName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-kp 8WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-organization-name} ID id-at-organizationName }-- access descriptors for authority info access extension id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIERorganizationalUnitName ATTRIBUTE ::= {id-ad 1WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-organizational-unit-name} ID id-at-organizationalUnitName } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page83]97] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998id-ad-caIssuerstitle ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-title} ID id-at-title } -- Legacy attributes pkcs9email ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX PHGString, ID emailAddress } PHGString ::= IA5String (SIZE(1..ub-emailaddress-length)) pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ad 2iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } emailAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-9 1 } -- object identifiers for Name type and directory attributedata typessupport --AttributeObject identifier assignments -- id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE { type AttributeValue, values SET OF AttributeValue{joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} --at least one value is requiredAttributes --} AttributeTypeid-at-commonName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 3} id-at-surname OBJECT IDENTIFIERAttributeValue::=ANY AttributeTypeAndValue{id-at 4} id-at-countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } AttributeValueAssertion{id-at 6} id-at-localityName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 7} id-at-stateOrProvinceName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 8} id-at-organizationName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 10} id-at-organizationalUnitName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 11} id-at-title OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 12} id-at-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE {AttributeType, AttributeValue} -- naming data types -- Name{id-at 41} id-at-givenName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- rdnSequence RDNSequence } RDNSequence{id-at 42} id-at-initials OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName DistinguishedName{id-at 43} id-at-generationQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=RDNSequence RelativeDistinguishedName{id-at 44} id-at-dnQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue{id-at 46} -- Directory stringtypetype, used extensively in Name types -- DirectoryString { INTEGER:maxSize } ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..maxSize)), bmpStringBMPString (SIZE(1..maxSIZE)) } -- from AuthenticationFramework -- {joint-iso-ccitt ds(5) modules(1) authenticationFramework(7) 2} -- note this module was defined with EXPLICIT TAGS -- types -- Certificate ::= EXPLICIT SIGNED {SEQUENCE{ version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 84] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo} issuerUniqueIdentifier [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, ---if present, version must be v1 or v2-- subjectUniqueIdentifier [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, ---if present, version must be v1 or v2-- extensions [3] Extensions Optional --if present, version must be v3--} } Version ::= INTEGER {v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER Algorithmidentifier ::= SEQUENCE{ algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({SupportedAlgorithms}), parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({SupportedAlgorithms} { @algorithm}) OPTIONAL } -- Definition of the following information object is deferred. -- SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ...|... } Validity ::= SEQUENCE{ notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE{ algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING} Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnId EXTENSION.&id ({ExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING -- contains a DER encoding of a value of type -- &ExtnType for the -- extension object identified by extnId -- -- Definition of the following information object set is deferred,BMPString (SIZE(1..maxSize)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE(1..maxSize)) } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page85]98] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 -- End of ASN.1 for Name type and directory attribute support -- -- Theset is required to specify a table constraint on the criticalASN.1 in this section supports X.400 style names -- -- for implementations that use the x400Address component -- -- ofExtension.GeneralName. --ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= { ... | ... } EXTENSION ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &ExtnType } WITH SYNTAX { SYNTAX &ExtnType IDENTIFIED BY &id } CertificateListORAddress ::=EXPLICIT SIGNED {SEQUENCE {version Versionbuilt-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-domain-defined-attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, --if present, must be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, crlEntryExtensions Extensionssee also teletex-domain-defined-attributes extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL }OPTIONAL, crlExtensions [0] Extensions OPTIONAL }}--information object classesThe OR-address is semantically absent from the OR-name if the --ALGORITHM ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIERbuilt-in-standard-attribute sequence is empty and the --Parameterized Typesbuilt-in-domain-defined-attributes and extension-attributes are -- both omitted. --HASHED {ToBeHashed}Built-in Standard Attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes ::=OCTET STRING ( CONSTRAINED-BYSEQUENCE {--must be the result of applying a hashing procedure to thecountry-name CountryName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, ----DER-encoded octets of a value ofsee also extended-network-address terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL, --ToBeHashed }) ENCRYPTED { ToBeEnciphered} := BIT STRING ( CONSTRAINED BY { --must be the result of applying an encipherment procedure to thesee also teletex-organization-name numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL, ----BER-encoded octets of a value ofsee also teletex-personal-name organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names --ToBeEnciphered }) SIGNED { ToBeSigned} CountryName ::=SEQUENCE{ ToBeSigned, COMPONENTS OF SIGNATURE { ToBeSigned }), SIGNATURE[APPLICATION 1] CHOICE {OfSignaturex121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } AdministrationDomainName ::=SEQUENCE[APPLICATION 2] CHOICE {AlgorithmIdentifier,numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) } NetworkAddress ::= X121Address -- see also extended-network-address Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page86]99] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998ENCRYPTED { HASHED { OfSignature }}} -- Key and policy information extensions -- authorityKeyIdentifier EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AuthorityKeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 35 } } AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } ( WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer PRESENT, authorityCertSerialNumber PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer ABSENT, authorityCertSerialNumber ABSENT} ) KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING subjectKeyIdentifier EXTENSIONX121Address ::={ SYNTAX SubjectKeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 14 } } SubjectKeyIdentifierNumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) TerminalIdentifier ::=KeyIdentifier keyUsage EXTENSIONPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE {SYNTAX KeyUsage IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 15 }numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) }KeyUsageOrganizationName ::=BIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) } privateKeyUsagePeriod EXTENSIONPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) -- see also teletex-organization-name NumericUserIdentifier ::={ SYNTAX PrivateKeyUsagePeriod IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 16 } } PrivateKeyUsagePeriodNumericString (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) PersonalName ::=SEQUENCESET {notBeforesurname [0]GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notAfterPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1]GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } ( WITH COMPONENTS {..., notBefore PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., notAfter PRESENT} ) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 87] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998 certificatePolicies EXTENSIONPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL} -- see also teletex-personal-name OrganizationalUnitNames ::={ SYNTAX CertificatePoliciesSyntax IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 32 } } CertificatePoliciesSyntaxSEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF OrganizationalUnitName -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names OrganizationalUnitName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) -- Built-in Domain-defined Attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX)(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OFPolicyInformation PolicyInformationBuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONALtype PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) }CertPolicyId-- Extension Attributes ExtensionAttributes ::=OBJECT IDENTIFIER PolicyQualifierInfoSET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF ExtensionAttribute ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {policyQualifierId CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers}), qualifier CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers} {@policyQualifierId})OPTIONAL } SupportedPolicyQualifiers CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { ...Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 100] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 extension-attribute-type [0] EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE.&id ({ExtensionAttributeTable}), extension-attribute-value [1] EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({ExtensionAttributeTable} {@extension-attribute-type}) }CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIEREXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS { &idOBJECT IDENTIFIERINTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes) UNIQUE,&Qualifier OPTIONAL&Type } WITH SYNTAX {&Type IDENTIFIED BY &id} ExtensionAttributeTable EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID &id [QUALIFIER-TYPE &Qualifier]common-name | teletex-common-name | teletex-organization-name | teletex-personal-name | teletex-organizational-unit-names | teletex-domain-defined-attributes | pds-name | physical-delivery-country-name | postal-code | physical-delivery-office-name | physical-delivery-office-number | extension-OR-address-components | physical-delivery-personal-name | physical-delivery-organization-name | extension-physical-delivery-address-components | unformatted-postal-address | street-address | post-office-box-address | poste-restante-address | unique-postal-name | local-postal-attributes | extended-network-address | terminal-type }policyMappings EXTENSION-- Extension Standard Attributes common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX PolicyMappingsSyntax{CommonName IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 33 } } PolicyMappingsSyntax1} CommonName ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } supportedAlgorithms ATTRIBUTEPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ WITH SYNTAX SupportedAlgorithm EQUALITY MATCHING RULE algorithmIdentifierMatch ID { id-at 52 } } SupportedAlgorithm{TeletexCommonName IDENTIFIED BY 2} TeletexCommonName ::=SEQUENCE { algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, intendedUsage [0] KeyUsage OPTIONAL, intendedCertificatePolicies [1] CertificatePoliciesSyntax OPTIONAL }TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexOrganizationName IDENTIFIED BY 3} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page88]101] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998-- Certificate subject and certificate issuer attributes extensions -- subjectAltName EXTENSIONTeletexOrganizationName ::={ SYNTAX GeneralNamesTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) teletex-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 17 } } GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralName4} TeletexPersonalName ::=CHOICESET {otherNamesurname [0]INSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME, rfc822NameTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1]IA5String, dNSNameTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2]IA5String, x400AddressTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3]ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIERTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL }OTHER-NAMEteletex-organizational-unit-names EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::=TYPE-IDENTIFIER EDIPartyName{TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames IDENTIFIED BY 5} TeletexOrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE{ nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString {ub-name} OPTIONAL, partyName [1] DirectoryString {ub-name} } issuerAltName EXTENSIONSIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::={ SYNTAX GeneralNamesTeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) pds-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSName IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 18 } } subjectDirectoryAttributes EXTENSION7} PDSName ::={ SYNTAX AttributesSyntaxPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) physical-delivery-country-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryCountryName IDENTIFIED BY 8} PhysicalDeliveryCountryName ::= CHOICE {id-ce 9 }x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) }AttributesSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute -- Certification path constraints extensions -- basicConstraints EXTENSIONpostal-code EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX BasicConstraintsSyntax{PostalCode IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 19 } } BasicConstraintsSyntax9} PostalCode ::=SEQUENCECHOICE {cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONALnumeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) }nameConstraints EXTENSIONphysical-delivery-office-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX NameConstraintsSyntax{PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName IDENTIFIED BY 10} PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-office-number EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber IDENTIFIED BY 11} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page89]102] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter extension-OR-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {ExtensionORAddressComponents IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 30 } } NameConstraintsSyntax12} ExtensionORAddressComponents ::=SEQUENCE { permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } GeneralSubtreesPDSParameter physical-delivery-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree{PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY 13} PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName ::=SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } BaseDistancePDSParameter physical-delivery-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName IDENTIFIED BY 14} PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::=INTEGER (0..MAX) policyConstraints EXTENSIONPDSParameter extension-physical-delivery-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX PolicyConstraintsSyntax{ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 36 } } PolicyConstraints Syntax15} ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameter unformatted-postal-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {UnformattedPostalAddress IDENTIFIED BY 16} UnformattedPostalAddress ::= SET { printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX)(1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OFSEQUENCE { requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCertsPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL,inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCertsteletex-string TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL }SkipCertsstreet-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::=INTEGER (0..MAX) -- Basic CRL extensions -- cRLNumber EXTENSION{StreetAddress IDENTIFIED BY 17} StreetAddress ::={ SYNTAX CRLNumberPDSParameter post-office-box-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PostOfficeBoxAddress IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 20 } } CRLNumber18} PostOfficeBoxAddress ::=INTEGER (0..MAX) reasonCode EXTENSIONPDSParameter poste-restante-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX CRLReason{PosteRestanteAddress IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 21 } } CRLReason19} PosteRestanteAddress ::=ENUMERATED { unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8) } instructionCode EXTENSIONPDSParameter unique-postal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={{UniquePostalName IDENTIFIED BY 20} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page90]103] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998SYNTAX HoldInstruction IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 23 } } HoldInstructionUniquePostalName ::=OBJECT IDENTIFIER invalidityDate EXTENSIONPDSParameter local-postal-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX GeneralizedTime{LocalPostalAttributes IDENTIFIED BY 21} LocalPostalAttributes ::= PDSParameter PDSParameter ::= SET {id-ce 24 }printable-string PrintableString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL }-- CRL distribution points and delta-CRL extensions -- cRLDistributionPoints EXTENSIONextended-network-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX CRLDistPointsSyntax{ExtendedNetworkAddress IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 31 } } CRLDistPointsSyntax22} ExtendedNetworkAddress ::= CHOICE { e163-4-address SEQUENCESIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint{ number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), sub-address [1] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL}, psap-address [0] PresentationAddress } PresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE {distributionPointpSelector [0]DistributionPointNameEXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,reasonssSelector [1]ReasonFlagsEXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,cRLIssuertSelector [2]GeneralNames OPTIONAL } DistributionPointNameEXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING} terminal-type EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::=CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags{TerminalType IDENTIFIED BY 23} TerminalType ::=BIT STRINGINTEGER {unused (0), keyCompromise (1), caCompromise (2), affiliationChangedtelex (3),supersededteletex (4),cessationOfOperationg3-facsimile (5),certificateHold (6)g4-facsimile (6), ia5-terminal (7), videotex (8) }issuingDistributionPoint EXTENSION(0..ub-integer-options) -- Extension Domain-defined Attributes teletex-domain-defined-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::={ SYNTAX IssuingDistPointSyntax{TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes IDENTIFIED BY{ id-ce 28 } } IssuingDistPointSyntax6} TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE{ distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } certificateIssuer EXTENSION ::= {SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page91]104] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 29 } } deltaCRLIndicator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BaseCRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce 27 } } BaseCRLNumber ::= CRLNumber deltaRevocationList ATTRIBUTETeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {WITH SYNTAX CertificateList EQUALITY MATCHING RULE certificateListExactMatch ID {id-at 53 }type TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } --Object identifier assignmentsspecifications of Upper Bounds --id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIERmust be regarded as mandatory -- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 -- Reference Definition of MTS Parameter Upper Bounds -- Upper Bounds ub-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 9} id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER32768 ub-common-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 14} id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-locality-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 15} id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER128 ub-state-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 16} id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER128 ub-organization-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 17} id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::={id-ce 18} id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-title INTEGER ::= 64 ub-match INTEGER ::= 128 ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-domain-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-extension-attributes INTEGER ::= 256 ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 19} id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER15 ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 20} id-ce-reasonCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER40 ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 21} id-ce-instructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER3 ub-given-name-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 23} id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER16 ub-initials-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 24} id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER5 ub-integer-options INTEGER ::={id-ce 27} id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER256 ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 28} id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER32 ub-organization-name-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 29} id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER64 ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 30} id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER32 ub-organizational-units INTEGER ::={id-ce 31} id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER4 ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 32} id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER16 ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 33} id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER30 ub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::={id-ce 36} id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER6 ub-postal-code-length INTEGER ::={id-ce 35} -- PKIX 1 extensions id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER16 ub-surname-length INTEGER ::={ id-pe 1 } AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax40 ub-terminal-id-length INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription AccessDescription24 ub-unformatted-address-length INTEGER ::=SEQUENCE { accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessLocation GeneralName }180 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page92]105] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998CPSuriub-x121-address-length INTEGER ::=IA5String UserNotice16 -- Note - upper bounds on TeletexString are measured in characters. -- A significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upper -- bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed. END Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 106] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 B.2 1993 Implicitly Tagged Module PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS::= BEGIN --EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS id-pe, id-qt, id-kp, id-ad, id-qt-unotice, ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName, CertificateSerialNumber, CertificateList, AlgorithmIdentifier, ub-name, DirectoryString, Attribute, EXTENSION FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)}; -- Key and policy information extensions -- authorityKeyIdentifier EXTENSION ::=CHOICE{visibleString VisibleString, bmpString BMPStringSYNTAX AuthorityKeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier }-- misc missing ASN.1 PresentationAddressAuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {pSelectorkeyIdentifier [0]EXPLICIT OCTET STRINGKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,sSelectorauthorityCertIssuer [1]EXPLICIT OCTET STRINGGeneralNames OPTIONAL,tSelectorauthorityCertSerialNumber [2]EXPLICITCertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } ( WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer PRESENT, authorityCertSerialNumber PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., authorityCertIssuer ABSENT, authorityCertSerialNumber ABSENT} ) KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRINGOPTIONAL, nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING} -- The following OBJECT IDENTIFIERS are not used by this specification: -- {id-ce 2}, {id-ce 3}, {id-ce 4}, {id-ce 5}, {id-ce 6}, {id-ce 7}, -- {id-ce 8}, {id-ce 10}, {id-ce 11}, {id-ce 12}, {id-ce 13}, -- {id-ce 22}, {id-ce 25}, {id-ce 26} -- X.400, Algorithm Identifier, and maximum values Module ORAddressAndOrDirectoryName ::= ORName ORAddressAndOptionalDirectoryName ::= ORName ORNamesubjectKeyIdentifier EXTENSION ::=[APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE{-- address -- COMPONENTS OF ORAddress, directory-name [0] Name OPTIONALSYNTAX SubjectKeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier }ORAddressSubjectKeyIdentifier ::=SEQUENCE { built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-domain-defined-attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL } -- The OR-address is semantically absent from the OR-name if the -- built-in-standard-attribute sequence is empty and the -- built-in-domain-defined-attributes and extension-attributes are -- both omitted. -- Built-in Standard Attributes BuiltInStandardAttributesKeyIdentifier keyUsage EXTENSION ::=SEQUENCE{country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL,SYNTAX KeyUsage IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-keyUsage } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page93]107] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998network-address [0] NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, -- see also extended-network-address terminal-identifier [1] TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] OrganizationName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-organization-name numeric-user-identifier [4] NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, personal-name [5] PersonalName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-personal-name organizational-unit-names [6] OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-namesKeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) } extendedKeyUsage EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-extKeyUsage } KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- PKIX-defined extended key purpose OIDs id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }CountryNameid-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=[APPLICATION 1] CHOICE{x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length))id-kp 2 }AdministrationDomainNameid-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=[APPLICATION 2] CHOICE{numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length))id-kp 3 }NetworkAddressid-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=X121Address -- see also extended-network-address X121Address{ id-kp 4 } id-kp-ipsecEndSystem OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) TerminalIdentifier{ id-kp 5 } id-kp-ipsecTunnel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) PrivateDomainName{ id-kp 6 } id-kp-ipsecUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=CHOICE{numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length))id-kp 7 }OrganizationNameid-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) -- see also teletex-organization-name NumericUserIdentifier{ id-kp 8 } privateKeyUsagePeriod EXTENSION ::=NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) PersonalName{ SYNTAX PrivateKeyUsagePeriod IDENTIFIED BY { id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod } } PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::=SETSEQUENCE {surnamenotBefore [0]PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length))GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,generation-qualifier [3] PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL}notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } ( WITH COMPONENTS {..., notBefore PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., notAfter PRESENT} ) certificatePolicies EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CertificatePoliciesSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-certificatePolicies } CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page94]108] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998-- see also teletex-personal-name OrganizationalUnitNamesPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCESIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF OrganizationalUnitName -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names OrganizationalUnitName{ policyQualifierId CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers}), qualifier CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier ({SupportedPolicyQualifiers} {@policyQualifierId})OPTIONAL } SupportedPolicyQualifiers CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { noticeToUser | pointerToCPS } CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &Qualifier OPTIONAL } WITH SYNTAX { POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID &id [QUALIFIER-TYPE &Qualifier] } policyMappings EXTENSION ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) -- Built-in Domain-defined Attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes{ SYNTAX PolicyMappingsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-policyMappings } PolicyMappingsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes)(1..MAX) OFBuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::=SEQUENCE {type PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } --Extension Attributes ExtensionAttributesCertificate subject and certificate issuer attributes extensions -- subjectAltName EXTENSION ::=SET{ SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectAltName } GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..ub-extension-attributes)(1..MAX) OFExtensionAttribute ExtensionAttributeGeneralName GeneralName ::=SEQUENCECHOICE {extension-attribute-typeotherName [0]EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE.&id ({ExtensionAttributeTable}), extension-attribute-valueINSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME, rfc822Name [1]EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({ExtensionAttributeTable} {@extension-attribute-type})IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEOTHER-NAME ::=CLASS { &id INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes) UNIQUE, &Type } WITH SYNTAX {&Type IDENTIFIED BY &id} ExtensionAttributeTable EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTETYPE-IDENTIFIER EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {common-name | teletex-common-name | teletex-organization-name | teletex-personal-name | teletex-organizational-unit-names | teletex-domain-defined-attributes | pds-name | physical-delivery-country-name | postal-code | physical-delivery-office-name | physical-delivery-office-number | extension-OR-address-components |nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString {ub-name} OPTIONAL, Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page95]109] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998physical-delivery-personal-name | physical-delivery-organization-name | extension-physical-delivery-address-components | unformatted-postal-address | street-address | post-office-box-address | poste-restante-address | unique-postal-name | local-postal-attributes | extended-network-address | terminal-typepartyName [1] DirectoryString {ub-name} }-- Extension Standard Attributes common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEissuerAltName EXTENSION ::={CommonName{ SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY1} CommonNameid-ce-issuerAltName } subjectDirectoryAttributes EXTENSION ::=PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-common-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE{ SYNTAX AttributesSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes } AttributesSyntax ::={TeletexCommonNameSEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute -- Certification path constraints extensions -- basicConstraints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BasicConstraintsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY2} TeletexCommonNameid-ce-basicConstraints } BasicConstraintsSyntax ::=TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) teletex-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTESEQUENCE { cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } nameConstraints EXTENSION ::={TeletexOrganizationName{ SYNTAX NameConstraintsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY3} TeletexOrganizationNameid-ce-nameConstraints } NameConstraintsSyntax ::=TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) teletex-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTESEQUENCE { permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } GeneralSubtrees ::={TeletexPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY 4} TeletexPersonalNameSEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree ::=SETSEQUENCE {surnamebase GeneralName, minimum [0]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-nameBaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1]TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length))BaseDistance OPTIONAL }teletex-organizational-unit-names EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEBaseDistance ::={TeletexOrganizationalUnitNamesINTEGER (0..MAX) policyConstraints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX PolicyConstraintsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY5} TeletexOrganizationalUnitNamesid-ce-policyConstraints } PolicyConstraintsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..ub-organizational-units)(1..MAX) OFTeletexOrganizationalUnitName TeletexOrganizationalUnitNameSEQUENCE { requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } SkipCerts ::=TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length))INTEGER (0..MAX) Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page96]110] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998pds-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE-- Basic CRL extensions -- cRLNumber EXTENSION ::={PDSName{ SYNTAX CRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY7} PDSName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) physical-delivery-country-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-ce-cRLNumber } CRLNumber ::={PhysicalDeliveryCountryName IDENTIFIED BY 8} PhysicalDeliveryCountryNameINTEGER (0..MAX) reasonCode EXTENSION ::=CHOICE{x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } postal-code EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PostalCodeSYNTAX CRLReason IDENTIFIED BY9} PostalCodeid-ce-reasonCode } CRLReason ::=CHOICEENUMERATED {numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length))unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8) }physical-delivery-office-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName IDENTIFIED BY 10} PhysicalDeliveryOfficeName ::= PDSParameter physical-delivery-office-number EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEinstructionCode EXTENSION ::={PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber{ SYNTAX HoldInstruction IDENTIFIED BY11} PhysicalDeliveryOfficeNumber ::= PDSParameter extension-OR-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-ce-instructionCode } HoldInstruction ::={ExtensionORAddressComponents IDENTIFIED BY 12} ExtensionORAddressComponentsOBJECT IDENTIFIER -- holdinstructions described in this specification, from ANSI x9 -- ANSI x9 arc holdinstruction arc holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=PDSParameter physical-delivery-personal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE{ joint-iso-ccitt(2) member-body(2) us(840) x9cm(10040) 2} -- ANSI X9 holdinstructions referenced by this standard id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName IDENTIFIED BY 13} PhysicalDeliveryPersonalName{holdInstruction 1} id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=PDSParameter physical-delivery-organization-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE{holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName{holdInstruction 3} invalidityDate EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX GeneralizedTime IDENTIFIED BY14} PhysicalDeliveryOrganizationName ::= PDSParameter extension-physical-delivery-address-components EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-ce-invalidityDate } -- CRL distribution points and delta-CRL extensions -- cRLDistributionPoints EXTENSION ::={ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents{ SYNTAX CRLDistPointsSyntax IDENTIFIED BY15} ExtensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents ::= PDSParameterid-ce-cRLDistributionPoints } Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page97]111] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998unformatted-postal-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {UnformattedPostalAddress IDENTIFIED BY 16} UnformattedPostalAddressCRLDistPointsSyntax ::=SET { printable-addressSEQUENCE SIZE(1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines)(1..MAX) OFPrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length))DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length))reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL }street-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEDistributionPointName ::={StreetAddress IDENTIFIED BY 17} StreetAddressCHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags ::=PDSParameter post-office-box-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEBIT STRING { unused (0), keyCompromise (1), caCompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6) } issuingDistributionPoint EXTENSION ::={PostOfficeBoxAddress{ SYNTAX IssuingDistPointSyntax IDENTIFIED BY18} PostOfficeBoxAddressid-ce-issuingDistributionPoint } IssuingDistPointSyntax ::=PDSParameter poste-restante-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTESEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } certificateIssuer EXTENSION ::={PosteRestanteAddress{ SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY19} PosteRestanteAddress ::= PDSParameter unique-postal-name EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-ce-certificateIssuer } deltaCRLIndicator EXTENSION ::={UniquePostalName{ SYNTAX BaseCRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY20} UniquePostalNameid-ce-deltaCRLIndicator } BaseCRLNumber ::=PDSParameter local-postal-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTECRLNumber -- Object identifier assignments for ISO certificate extensions -- id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={LocalPostalAttributes IDENTIFIED BY 21} LocalPostalAttributes{joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=PDSParameter PDSParameter{id-ce 9} id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=SET { printable-string PrintableString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL } extended-network-address EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE{id-ce 14} id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={ExtendedNetworkAddress IDENTIFIED BY 22} ExtendedNetworkAddress{id-ce 15} id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=CHOICE { e163-4-address SEQUENCE { number [0] NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), sub-address [1] NumericString{id-ce 16} Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page98]112] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998(SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL}, psap-address [0] PresentationAddress } terminal-type EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEid-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::={TerminalType IDENTIFIED BY{id-ce 17} id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 18} id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 19} id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 20} id-ce-reasonCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 21} id-ce-instructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 23}TerminalTypeid-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=INTEGER { telex (3), teletex (4), g3-facsimile (5), g4-facsimile (6), ia5-terminal (7), videotex (8) } (0..ub-integer-options){id-ce 24} id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 27} id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 28} id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 29} id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 30} id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 31} id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 32} id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 33} id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 36} id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 35} id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} --Extension Domain-defined Attributes teletex-domain-defined-attributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTEPKIX 1 extensions authorityInfoAccess EXTENSION ::={TeletexDomainDefinedAttributes{ SYNTAX AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax IDENTIFIED BY6} TeletexDomainDefinedAttributesid-pe-authorityInfoAccess } AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..ub-domain-defined-attributes)(1..MAX) OFTeletexDomainDefinedAttribute TeletexDomainDefinedAttributeAccessDescription AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE {type TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length))accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessLocation GeneralName }-- specifications of Upper Bounds -- must be regarded as mandatory -- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 -- Reference Definition of MTS Parameter Upper Bounds -- Upper Bounds ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-domain-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-extension-attributes INTEGER ::= 256 ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGERid-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=15 ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER{ id-pe 1 } id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=40 ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER{ id-ad 2 } -- PKIX policy qualifier definitions noticeToUser CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::=3 ub-given-name-length INTEGER{ POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-qt-cps QUALIFIER-TYPE CPSuri} pointerToCPS CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::=16 ub-initials-length INTEGER{ POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-qt-unotice QUALIFIER-TYPE UserNotice} id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=5 ub-integer-options INTEGER{ id-qt 1 } id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=256 ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER{ id-qt 2 } CPSuri ::=32IA5String Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page99]113] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998ub-organization-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER ::= 32 ub-organizational-units INTEGER ::= 4 ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER ::= 30 ub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::= 6 ub-postal-code-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-surname-length INTEGER ::= 40 ub-terminal-id-length INTEGERUserNotice ::=24 ub-unformatted-address-length INTEGERSEQUENCE { noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} NoticeReference ::=180 ub-x121-address-lengthSEQUENCE { organization DisplayText, noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } DisplayText ::=16 -- Note - upper bounds on TeletexString are measured in characters. -- A significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets, or twice the specified upper -- bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed.CHOICE { visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } END Appendix C. ASN.1 Notes The constructSEQUENCE"SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX)OFOF" appears in several ASN.1 constructs. A valid ASN.1 sequence will have zero or more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the sequence to have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.ImplementationsImplementa- tions are free to choose an upper bound that suits their environment. The constructpositiveInt"positiveInt ::= INTEGER(0..MAX)(0..MAX)" defines positiveInt as a subtype of INTEGER containing integers greater than or equal to zero. The upper bound is unspecified. Implementations are free to select an upper bound that suits their environment. The character string type PrintableString supports a very basic Latin character set: the lower case letters 'a' through 'z', upper case letters 'A' through 'Z', the digits '0' through '9', eleven special characters ' " ( ) + , - . / : ? and space. The character string type TeletexString is a superset of Printable- String. TeletexString supports a fairly standard (ascii-like) Latin character set, Latin characters with non-spacing accents and JapaneseHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 100] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998characters. The character string type UniversalString supports any of the charac- ters allowed by ISO 10646-1. ISO 10646 is the Universal multiple- octet coded Character Set (UCS). ISO 10646-1 specifes the architec- ture and the "basic multilingual plane" - a large standard character set which includes all major world character standards. The character string type UTF8String will be introduced in the 1998 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 114] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 version of ASN.1. UTF8String is a universal type and has been assigned tag number 12. The content of UTF8String was defined by RFC 2044 and updated in RFC 2279, "UTF-8, a transformation Format of ISP 10646." ISO is expected to formally add UTF8String to the list of choices for DirectoryString in 1998 as well. In anticipation of these changes, and in conformance with IETF Best Practices codified in RFC 2277, IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages, this document includes UTF8String as a choice in Directo- ryString and the CPS qualifier extensions. Appendix D. Examples This section contains fourexamples;examples: three certificates and a CRL. The first two certificates and the CRL comprise a minimal certifica- tion path. Section D.1 contains two annotated hex dumps of a "self-signed" cer- tificate issued by a CA whose distinguished name is cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist. The certificate contains a DSA public key with parameters, and is signed by the corresponding DSA private key. The first hex dump is a basic dump of the ASN.1 encoding and does not not reflect the fact that the object is a certificate. The second dump identfies the values of the various certificate fields. Section D.2 contains an annotated hex dump of an end-entity certifi- cate. The end entity certificate contains a DSA public key, and is signed by the private key corresponding to the "self-signed" certifi- cate in section D.1. The first hex dump is a basic dump of the ASN.1 encoding and does not not reflect the fact that the object is a certificate. The second dump identfies the values of the various cer- tificate fields. Section D.3 contains a dump of an end entity certificate which con- tains an RSA public key and is signed with RSA and MD5.(ThisThis certi- ficate is not part of the minimal certificationpath.)path. Section D.4 contains an annotated hex dump of a CRL. The CRL is issued by the CA whose distinguished name is cn=us,o=gov,ou=nist andHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 101] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998the list of revoked certifcates includes the end entity certificate presented in D.2. The hex dump is a basic dump of the ASN.1 encod- ing. D.1 Certificate This section contains an annotated hex dump of a 662 byte version 3 certificate. The certificate contains the following information: (a) the serial number is 17 (11 hex); Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 115] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=nist;O=gov;C=US (d) and the subject's distinguished name is OU=nist;O=gov;C=US (e) the certificate was issued on June 30, 1997 and will expire on December 31, 1997; (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA publickey;key with parame- ters; and (g) the certificate is a CA certificate (as indicated through the basic constraints extension.) D.1.1 ASN.1 Dump of "Self-Signed" Certificateget 0, len=662 (662 bytes in file)0000 30 82 02 92 658: SEQUENCE 0004 30 82 02 52 594: . SEQUENCE 0008 a0 03 3: . . [0] 0010 02 01 1: . . . INTEGER 2 0013 02 01 1: . . INTEGER 17 0016 30 09 9: . . SEQUENCE 0018 06 07 7: . . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.3: dsa-with-sha 0027 30 2a 42: . . SEQUENCE 0029 31 0b 11: . . . SET 0031 30 09 9: . . . . SEQUENCE 0033 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.6: C 0038 13 02 2: . . . . . PrintableString 'US' 0042 31 0c 12: . . . SET 0044 30 0a 10: . . . . SEQUENCE 0046 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.10: O 0051 13 03 3: . . . . . PrintableString 'gov' 0056 31 0d 13: . . . SET 0058 30 0b 11: . . . . SEQUENCE 0060 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.11: OU 0065 13 04 4: . . . . . PrintableString 'nist' 0071 30 1e 30: . . SEQUENCE 0073 17 0d 13: . . . UTCTime '970630000000Z' 0088 17 0d 13: . . . UTCTime '971231000000Z' 0103 30 2a 42: . . SEQUENCE 0105 31 0b 11: . . . SET 0107 30 09 9: . . . . SEQUENCE 0109 06 03 3: .. . . . OID 2.5.4.6: C Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 102] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998. . . . OID 2.5.4.6: C 0114 13 02 2: . . . . . PrintableString 'US' 0118 31 0c 12: . . . SET 0120 30 0a 10: . . . . SEQUENCE 0122 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.10: O 0127 13 03 3: . . . . . PrintableString 'gov' 0132 31 0d 13: . . . SET 0134 30 0b 11: . . . . SEQUENCE 0136 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.11: OU 0141 13 04 4: . . . . . PrintableString 'nist' Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 116] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 0147 30 82 01 b4 436: . . SEQUENCE 0151 30 82 01 29 297: . . . SEQUENCE 0155 06 07 7: . . . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.1: dsa 0164 30 82 01 1c 284: . . . . SEQUENCE 0168 02 81 80 128: . . . . . INTEGER : d4 38 02 c5 35 7b d5 0b a1 7e 5d 72 59 63 55 d3 : 45 56 ea e2 25 1a 6b c5 a4 ab aa 0b d4 62 b4 d2 : 21 b1 95 a2 c6 01 c9 c3 fa 01 6f 79 86 83 3d 03 : 61 e1 f1 92 ac bc 03 4e 89 a3 c9 53 4a f7 e2 a6 : 48 cf 42 1e 21 b1 5c 2b 3a 7f ba be 6b 5a f7 0a : 26 d8 8e 1b eb ec bf 1e 5a 3f 45 c0 bd 31 23 be : 69 71 a7 c2 90 fe a5 d6 80 b5 24 dc 44 9c eb 4d : f9 da f0 c8 e8 a2 4c 99 07 5c 8e 35 2b 7d 57 8d 0299 02 14 20: . . . . . INTEGER : a7 83 9b f3 bd 2c 20 07 fc 4c e7 e8 9f f3 39 83 : 51 0d dc dd 0321 02 81 80 128: . . . . . INTEGER : 0e 3b 46 31 8a 0a 58 86 40 84 e3 a1 22 0d 88 ca : 90 88 57 64 9f 01 21 e0 15 05 94 24 82 e2 10 90 : d9 e1 4e 10 5c e7 54 6b d4 0c 2b 1b 59 0a a0 b5 : a1 7d b5 07 e3 65 7c ea 90 d8 8e 30 42 e4 85 bb : ac fa 4e 76 4b 78 0e df 6c e5 a6 e1 bd 59 77 7d : a6 97 59 c5 29 a7 b3 3f 95 3e 9d f1 59 2d f7 42 : 87 62 3f f1 b8 6f c7 3d 4b b8 8d 74 c4 ca 44 90 : cf 67 db de 14 60 97 4a d1 f7 6d 9e 09 94 c4 0d 0452 03 81 84 132: . . . BIT STRING (0 unused bits) : 02 81 80 aa 98 ea 13 94 a2 db f1 5b 7f 98 2f 78 : e7 d8 e3 b9 71 86 f6 80 2f 40 39 c3 da 3b 4b 13 : 46 26 ee 0d 56 c5 a3 3a 39 b7 7d 33 c2 6b 5c 77 : 92 f2 55 65 90 39 cd 1a 3c 86 e1 32 eb 25 bc 91 : c4 ff 80 4f 36 61 bd cc e2 61 04 e0 7e 60 13 ca : c0 9c dd e0 ea 41 de 33 c1 f1 44 a9 bc 71 de cf : 59 d4 6e da 44 99 3c 21 64 e4 78 54 9d d0 7b ba : 4e f5 18 4d 5e 39 30 bf e0 d1 f6 f4 83 25 4f 14 : aa 71 e1 0587 a3 0d 13: . . [3] 0589 30 0b 11: . . . SEQUENCE 0591 30 09 9: . . . . SEQUENCE 0593 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.29.19: basicConstraintsHousley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 103] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 19980598 04 02 2: . . . . . OCTET STRING : 30 00 0602 30 09 9: . SEQUENCE 0604 06 07 7: . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.3: dsa-with-sha 0613 03 2f 47: . BIT STRING (0 unused bits) : 30 2c 02 14 a0 66 c1 76 33 99 13 51 8d 93 64 2f : ca 13 73 de 79 1a 7d 33 02 14 5d 90 f6 ce 92 4a : bf 29 11 24 80 28 a6 5a 8e 73 b6 76 02 68------- extensions ---------- printber -s 456 pkix-ex1.ber get 0, len=131 (662 bytes in file) 0000 02 81 80 128: INTEGER : aa 98 ea 13 94 a2 db f1 5b 7f 98 2f 78 e7 d8 e3 : b9 71 86 f6 80 2f 40 39 c3 da 3b 4b 13 46 26 ee : 0d 56 c5 a3 3a 39 b7 7d 33 c2 6b 5c 77 92 f2 55 : 65 90 39 cd 1a 3c 86 e1 32 eb 25 bc 91 c4 ff 80 : 4f 36 61 bd cc e2 61 04 e0 7e 60 13 ca c0 9c dd : e0 ea 41 de 33 c1 f1 44 a9 bc 71 de cf 59 d4 6e : da 44 99 3c 21 64 e4 78 54 9d d0 7b ba 4e f5 18 : 4d 5e 39 30 bf e0 d1 f6 f4 83 25 4f 14 aa 71 e1Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 117] INTERNET DRAFT June 16, 1998 D.1.2 Pretty Print of "Self-Signed" Certificate---------- decode: 0-OK, len=662 (662 bytes in file)Version: v3 Serial Number: 17 Signature Alg: dsa-with-sha (1.2.840.10040.4.3) Issuer: C=US, O=gov, OU=nist Validity: from 970630000000Z to 971231000000Z Subject: OU=nist, O=gov, C=US SubjectPKInfo: dsa (1.2.840.10040.4.1) params: 02 81 80 d4 38 02 c5 35 7b d5 0b a1 7e 5d 72 59 63 55 d3 45 56 ea e2 25 1a 6b c5 a4 ab aa 0b d4 62 b4 d2 21 b1 95 a2 c6 01 c9 c3 fa 01 6f 79 86 83 3d 03 61 e1 f1 92 ac bc 03 4e 89 a3 c9 53 4a f7 e2 a6 48 cf 42 1e 21 b1 5c 2b 3a 7f ba be 6b 5a f7 0a 26 d8 8e 1b eb ec bf 1e 5a 3f 45 c0 bd 31 23 be 69 71 a7 c2 90 fe a5 d6 80 b5 24 dc 44 9c eb 4d f9 da f0 c8 e8 a2 4c 99 07 5c 8e 35 2b 7d 57 8d 02 14 a7 83 9b f3 bd 2c 20 07 fc 4c e7Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 104] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 1998e8 9f f3 39 83 51 0d dc dd 02 81 80 0e 3b 46 31 8a 0a 58 86 40 84 e3 a1 22 0d 88 ca 90 88 57 64 9f 01 21 e0 15 05 94 24 82 e2 10 90 d9 e1 4e 10 5c e7 54 6b d4 0c 2b 1b 59 0a a0 b5 a1 7d b5 07 e3 65 7c ea 90 d8 8e 30 42 e4 85 bb ac fa 4e 76 4b 78 0e df 6c e5 a6 e1 bd 59 77 7d a6 97 59 c5 29 a7 b3 3f 95 3e 9d f1 59 2d f7 42 87 62 3f f1 b8 6f c7 3d 4b b8 8d 74 c4 ca 44 90 cf 67 db de 14 60 97 4a d1 f7 6d 9e 09 94 c4 0d Public Key: 00 02 81 80 aa 98 ea 13 94 a2 db f1 5b 7f 98 2f 78 e7 d8 e3 b9 71 86 f6 80 2f 40 39 c3 da 3b 4b 13 46 26 ee 0d 56 c5 a3 3a 39 b7 7d 33 c2 6b 5c 77 92 f2 55 65 90 39 cd 1a 3c 86 e1 32 eb 25 bc 91 c4 ff 80 4f 36 61 bd cc e2 61 04 e0 7e 60 13 ca c0 9c dd e0 ea 41 de 33 c1 f1 44 a9 bc 71 de cf 59 d4 6e da 44 99 3c 21 64 e4 78 54 9d d0 7b ba 4e f5 18 4d 5e 39 30 bf e0 d1 f6 f4 83 25 4f 14 aa 71 e1 issuerUID: subjectUID: 1 extensions: Exten 1: basicConstraints (2.5.29.19) 30 00 Signature Alg: dsa-with-sha (1.2.840.10040.4.3) Sig Value: 368 bits: 30 2c 02 14 a0 66 c1 76 33 99 13 518d 93 64 2f ca 13 73 de 79 1a 7d 33 02 14 5d 90 f6 ce 92 4a bf 29 11 24 80 28 a6 5a 8e 73 b6 76 02 68 ------- extensions ---------- printber -s 616 pkix-ex1.ber get 0, len=46 (662 bytes in file) 0000 30 2c 44: SEQUENCE 0002 02 14 20: . INTEGER : 9d 2d 0c 75 ec ce 018d 93 64 2f ca 13 73 de 7925 4c cd 7b dc fc 17 0e : 0f 2a 22 ef 00241a 7d 33 02 1420: . INTEGER : 80 61 6f fb dc 71 cf 3f 09 62 b4 aa ad 4b 8c 28 : 68 d7 60 fe5d 90 f6 ce 92 4a Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page105]118] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 bf 29 11 24 80 28 a6 5a 8e 73 b6 76 02 68 D.2 Certificate This section contains an annotated hex dump of axxx697 byte version 3 certificate. The certificate contains the following information: (a) the serial number is 18 (12 hex); (b) the certificate is signed with DSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm; (c) the issuer's distinguished name is OU=nist;O=gov;C=US (d) and the subject's distinguished name is CN=Tim Polk;OU=nist;O=gov;C=US (e) the certificate was valid from July 30, 1997and will expire onthrough December 1, 1997; (f) the certificate contains a 1024 bit DSA public key; (g) the certificate is an end entitycertificate unless external information is provided,certificate, as the basicconstraintscon- straints extension is not present; (h) the certificate includes one alternative name - an RFC 822 address. D.2.1 Basic ASN.1 Dump of "End Entity" Certificate ----------get 0, len=697 (697 bytes in file)0000 30 82 02 b5 693: SEQUENCE 0004 30 82 02 75 629: . SEQUENCE 0008 a0 03 3: . . [0] 0010 02 01 1: . . . INTEGER 2 0013 02 01 1: . . INTEGER 18 0016 30 09 9: . . SEQUENCE 0018 06 07 7: . . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.3: dsa-with-sha 0027 30 2a 42: . . SEQUENCE 0029 31 0b 11: . . . SET 0031 30 09 9: . . . . SEQUENCE 0033 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.6: C 0038 13 02 2: . . . . . PrintableString 'US' 0042 31 0c 12: . . . SET 0044 30 0a 10: . . . . SEQUENCE 0046 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.10: O 0051 13 03 3: . . . . . PrintableString 'gov' 0056 31 0d 13: . . . SET 0058 30 0b 11: . . . . SEQUENCE 0060 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.11: OU 0065 13 04 4: . . . . . PrintableString 'nist' 0071 30 1e 30: . . SEQUENCE 0073 17 0d 13: . . . UTCTime '970730000000Z' 0088 17 0d 13: . . . UTCTime '971201000000Z' 0103 30 3d 61: . . SEQUENCE Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page106]119] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 0105 31 0b 11: . . . SET 0107 30 09 9: . . . . SEQUENCE 0109 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.6: C 0114 13 02 2: . . . . . PrintableString 'US' 0118 31 0c 12: . . . SET 0120 30 0a 10: . . . . SEQUENCE 0122 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.10: O 0127 13 03 3: . . . . . PrintableString 'gov' 0132 31 0d 13: . . . SET 0134 30 0b 11: . . . . SEQUENCE 0136 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.11: OU 0141 13 04 4: . . . . . PrintableString 'nist' 0147 31 11 17: . . . SET 0149 30 0f 15: . . . . SEQUENCE 0151 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.4.3: CN 0156 13 08 8: . . . . . PrintableString 'Tim Polk' 0166 30 82 01 b4 436: . . SEQUENCE 0170 30 82 01 29 297: . . . SEQUENCE 0174 06 07 7: . . . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.1: dsa 0183 30 82 01 1c 284: . . . . SEQUENCE 0187 02 81 80 128: . . . . . INTEGER : d4 38 02 c5 35 7b d5 0b a1 7e 5d 72 59 63 55 d3 : 45 56 ea e2 25 1a 6b c5 a4 ab aa 0b d4 62 b4 d2 : 21 b1 95 a2 c6 01 c9 c3 fa 01 6f 79 86 83 3d 03 : 61 e1 f1 92 ac bc 03 4e 89 a3 c9 53 4a f7 e2 a6 : 48 cf 42 1e 21 b1 5c 2b 3a 7f ba be 6b 5a f7 0a : 26 d8 8e 1b eb ec bf 1e 5a 3f 45 c0 bd 31 23 be : 69 71 a7 c2 90 fe a5 d6 80 b5 24 dc 44 9c eb 4d : f9 da f0 c8 e8 a2 4c 99 07 5c 8e 35 2b 7d 57 8d 0318 02 14 20: . . . . . INTEGER : a7 83 9b f3 bd 2c 20 07 fc 4c e7 e8 9f f3 39 83 : 51 0d dc dd 0340 02 81 80 128: . . . . . INTEGER : 0e 3b 46 31 8a 0a 58 86 40 84 e3 a1 22 0d 88 ca : 90 88 57 64 9f 01 21 e0 15 05 94 24 82 e2 10 90 : d9 e1 4e 10 5c e7 54 6b d4 0c 2b 1b 59 0a a0 b5 : a1 7d b5 07 e3 65 7c ea 90 d8 8e 30 42 e4 85 bb : ac fa 4e 76 4b 78 0e df 6c e5 a6 e1 bd 59 77 7d : a6 97 59 c5 29 a7 b3 3f 95 3e 9d f1 59 2d f7 42 : 87 62 3f f1 b8 6f c7 3d 4b b8 8d 74 c4 ca 44 90 : cf 67 db de 14 60 97 4a d1 f7 6d 9e 09 94 c4 0d 0471 03 81 84 132: . . . BIT STRING (0 unused bits) : 02 81 80 a8 63 b1 60 70 94 7e 0b 86 08 93 0c 0d : 08 12 4a 58 a9 af 9a 09 38 54 3b 46 82 fb 85 0d : 18 8b 2a 77 f7 58 e8 f0 1d d2 18 df fe e7 e9 35 : c8 a6 1a db 8d 3d 3d f8 73 14 a9 0b 39 c7 95 f6 : 52 7d 2d 13 8c ae 03 29 3c 4e 8c b0 26 18 b6 d8 : 11 1f d4 12 0c 13 ce 3f f1 c7 05 4e df e1 fc 44 Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page107]120] INTERNET DRAFTMarch 25,June 16, 1998 : fd 25 34 19 4a 81 0d dd 98 42 ac d3 b6 91 0c 7f : 16 72 a3 a0 8a d7 01 7f fb 9c 93 e8 99 92 c8 42 : 47 c6 43 0606 a3 1d 29: . . [3] 0608 30 1b 27: . . . SEQUENCE 0610 30 19 25: . . . . SEQUENCE 0612 06 03 3: . . . . . OID 2.5.29.17: subjectAltName 0617 04 12 18: . . . . . OCTET STRING : 30 10 81 0e 77 70 6f 6c 6b 40 6e 69 73 74 2e 67 : 6f 76 0637 30 09 9: . SEQUENCE 0639 06 07 7: . . OID 1.2.840.10040.4.3: dsa-with-sha 0648 03 2f 47: . BIT STRING (0 unused bits) : 30 2c 02 14 3c 02 e0 ab d9 5d 05 77 75 15 71 58 : 92 29 48 c4 1c 54 df fc 02 14 5b da 53 987f c5 : 33 df c6 09 b2 7a e3 6f 97 70 1e 14 ed 94 -------- extensions ---------- printber -s 475 pkix-ex2.ber get 0, len=131 (697 bytes in file) 0000 02 81 80 128: INTEGER : a8 63 b1 60 70 94 7e 0b 86 08 93 0c 0d 08 12 4a : 58 a9 af 9a 09 38 54 3b 46 82 fb 85 0d 18 8b 2a : 77 f7 58 e8 f0 1d d2 18 df fe e7 e9 35 c8 a6 1a : db 8d 3d 3d f8 73 14 a9 0b 39 c7 95 f6 52 7d 2d : 13 8c ae 03 29 3c 4e 8c b0 26 18 b6 d8 11 1f d4 : 12 0c 13 ce 3f f1 c7 05 4e df e1 fc 44 fd 25 34 : 19 4a 81 0d dd 98 42 ac d3 b6 91 0c 7f 16 72 a3 : a0 8a d7 01 7f fb 9c 93 e8 99 92 c8 42 477f c5 : 33 df c64309 b2 7a e3 6f 97 70 1e 14 ed 94 D.2.2 Pretty Print of "End Entity" Certificate---------- decode: 0-OK, len=697 (697 bytes in file)Version: v3 Serial Number: 18 Signature Alg: dsa-with-sha (1.2.840.10040.4.3) Issuer: C=US, O=gov, OU=nist Validity: from 970730000000Z to 971201000000Z Subject: CN=Tim Polk, OU=nist, O=gov, C=US SubjectPKInfo: dsa (1.2.840.10040.4.1) params: 02 81 80 d4 38 02 c5 35 7b d5 0b a1 7e 5d 72 59 63 55 d3 45 56 ea e2 25 1a 6b c5 a4 ab aa 0b d4Housley, Ford, Polk, & Solo [Page 108] INTERNET DRAFT March 25, 199862 b4 d2 21 b1 95 a2 c6 01 c9 c3 fa 01 6f 79 86 83 3d 03 61 e1 f1 92 ac bc 03 4e 89 a3 c9 53 4a f7 e2 a6 48 cf 42 1e 21 b1 5c 2b 3a 7f ba be 6b 5a f7 0a 26 d8 8e 1b eb ec bf 1e 5a 3f 45 c0 bd 31 23 be 69 71 a7 c2 90 fe a5 d6 80 b5 24 dc 44 9c eb 4d f9 da f0 c8 e8 a2 4c 99 07 5c 8e 35 2b 7d 57 8d 02 14 a7 83 9b f3 bd 2c 20 07 fc 4c e7 e8 9f f3 39 83 51 0d dc dd 02 81 80 0e 3b 46 31 8a 0a 58 86 40 84 e3 a1 22 0d 88 ca 90 88 57 64 9f 01 2