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Internet Draft W. Polk (NIST)
P. Gloeckner (GMD)
expires (SECUDE)
Expires February, 2000 August 3, 1999                                  February 3, 6, 1999

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure

Qualified Certificates

                      <draft-ietf-pkix-qc-00.txt> Profile

<draft-ietf-pkix-qc-01.txt>

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

This Internet-Draft forms a certificate profile for Qualified
Certificates, based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet. In this
   document the The term
Qualified Certificate is used to describe a certificate which is aimed with a
certain qualified status within applicable governing law. Further
Qualified Certificates are issued exclusively to support digital signatures in physical persons
represented by a context
   which registered unmistakable identity.

The goal of this document is considered functionally equivalent to the use define a general syntax independent
of handwritten
   signatures.

   This local legal requirements. The profile is the first official PKIX WG draft; two unofficial drafts
   labeled <draft-ietf-santesson-qc-0x.txt> were previously distributed
   on the list for comments. however designed to allow
further profiling in order to meet specific local needs.

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It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal
requirements for Qualified Certificates.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

This is the second official PKIX WG draft.

Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mail
list.

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction ................................................ 4
2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 4
2.1 Properties ................................................ 5
2.2  Legal Framework ...........................................    5
   2.3 Statement of Purpose ......................................    6
   2.4 5
2.3 Policy Issues ............................................. 6
   2.5
2.4 Uniqueness of names ........................................    7 ....................................... 6
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ..............    7 6
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields .................................. 7
3.1.1 Issuer ..................................................    8 7
3.1.2 Subject .................................................    8 7
3.2 Certificate Fields ........................................   10 Extensions .................................... 9
3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name ................................   10 9
3.2.2 Certificate Policies .................................... 13
3.2.3 Key Usage ............................................... 13
3.2.4 Biometric Information ................................... 13
3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements ........................ 14
4 Security Considerations .....................................   13 15
5 References ..................................................   14 16
6 Intellectual Property Right ..................................   14 16
Appendix A. ASN.1 definitions .................................   15 17
A.1 1988 ASN.1 definitions ....................................   15 Module ......................................... 17
A.2  1998 1993 ASN.1 definitions ....................................   17 Module ......................................... 20
Appendix B. Example Certificate ............................... 24
B.1 ASN.1 Structure ........................................... 24
B.2 Structured Hex Dump ....................................... 27
B.3 Unstructured Hex Dump ..................................... 30
Appendix C. Author Addresses ..................................   19 32
Appendix C. D. Full Copyright Statement ..........................   20 32

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1 Introduction

This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. The standard is
based on RFC 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and
semantics needed for full implementation of this standard.

The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates
named Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates, its
   functional relations to legal frameworks Certificates and the
assumptions that affects the scope of this document are defined discussed in
section 2.

Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified
Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic certi-
ficate as well as three five certificate extensions. The certificate
fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions
are subject alternative name, certificate policies, and key usage. usage, a
private extension for storage of biometric data and a private exten-
sion for storage of statements related to Qualified Certificates.

In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are
assumed to be utilized. Section 5 contains the references.

Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 structures which that are not
already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B contains an example certifi-
cate. Appendix C contains Authors Addresses and Appendix C D contains
the IETF Copyright Statement.

It should be noted that this specification does not define the
specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the
policies that should be used with them. That is, this document
defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but
not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified Certi-
ficates must define its own semantics for the information in Quali-
fied Certificates. It is expected that laws and corporate policies
will make these definitions.

2 Requirements and Assumptions

The term Qualified Certificates "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European Com-
mission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific
relevance for European legislation. This specification is defined in intended
to support this section with the
   only purpose class of certificates, but its scope is not limited
to clarify this application.

Within this standard the scope term "Qualified Certificate" is used more
generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary

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purpose is identifying a person with high level of this standard. assurance in pub-
lic non-repudiation services. The actual mechanisms that will decide
whether a certificate should or should not be considered qualified to meet this definition or whether this
   definition is relevant for be a particular certificate or service,
"Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside the
scope of this standard.

   In this context the term Qualified Certificate defines a certificate
   which has the properties defined in section 2.1, fall within the
   legal assumptions in section 2.2, and have the primary purpose of
   identifying a person with high level of assurance in non-repudiation



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   services, which may protect considerable values.

Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential
within several aspects that falls outside the scope of RFC 2459. The
most important aspects that affects the scope of this specification
are:

- Definition of names and identity information in order to identify iden-
tify the associated subject in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the jurisdiction CA and the jur-
isdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular
certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified Certifi-
cates.
- Definition of information structure for storage of biometric
information.
- Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements
with relevance for Qualified Certificates.
- Requirements for critical extensions.

2.1 Properties

A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to
have the following properties:

- Issued The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement
that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, Certifi-
cate, as discussed in sec-
   tion 2.3 section 2.2
- Indicate The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with
liabilities, prac-
   tices practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as
discussed in 2.4 2.3
- Be The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human
being).
- Contain The certificate contains an unmistakable identity based on a
pseudonym name or a real name of the subject.
   - Exclusively indicates non-repudiation key usage for the certified
   public key.
   - Fully complies with the certificate profile defined in RFC 2459

2.2  Legal framework

   The evidence value and thereby the expected legal status Statement of Purpose

For a digital
   signature is highly dependent on the quality of the signers certifi-
   cate as well as the properties of the signature service used certificate to
   create and verify the signature.

   Current national and local laws in general covers serve the area of agree-
   ments and signatures, regardless purpose of whether they appear in being a physical
   or digital context. There Qualified Certifi-
cate, it is however a great uncertainty how tradi-
   tional law assumed that the CA will be applied have to the relatively new digital techniques.
   A key factor for the legal status of digital signatures is whether
   they are used include in the certifi-
cate a context where they are to be considered "function-
   ally equivalent" to handwritten signatures.

   A common characteristic for emerging legal frameworks regarding digi-
   tal signatures public statement that explicitly defines this intent.

The function of this statement is thus to identify some minimum requirements on assist any concerned entity
in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting

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   certificates which are qualified to support digital August 6, 1999

signatures in a
   context which is considered to be "functional equivalent" with
   handwritten signatures. These requirements may emphasize different
   aspects of certificate issuance and maintenance such as the routines
   for identifying the key holder, revocation routines, liabilities of
   key holders and CAs, accreditation of CAs and information content in
   certificates.

2.3  Statement of Purpose

   For a certificate to serve the purpose of supporting digital signa-
   tures that are legally compatible with handwritten signatures, it is
   assumed that the CA will have to make a public statement which states
   this purpose, presumably published in a CPS.

   The shape of this statement may depend on the governing law under
   which the CA is operating but in general it is assumed that the CA at
   least will have to include in its statement that the certificate:

   - is aimed to be used for verification of digital signatures in a
   context where they are considered "functional equivalent" to hand
   written signatures and;
   - meets all requirements, according to the law under which the CA is
   operating, necessary to support this "functional equivalence".

   The legal effects of this statement will be dependent on the applica-
   ble governing law under which the CA is operating. Within locales
   with no specific regulations concerning digital signatures, the
   statement will only be a declaration of the suitable area of use of
   the certificate. In locales where regulations are extensive and
   specific the statement will be a declaration that the certificate
   complies with all these regulations.

   The function of the statement is thus to assist any concerned entity
   in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting signa-
   tures based on a particular certificate.

2.4 Qualified Certificate.

2.3 Policy Issues

Certain policy aspects defines define the context in which the this profile is to
be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this pro-
file to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern ser-
vices that issues or utilizes certificates according to this profile.

It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a
publicly available certificate policy which that is consistent with its
liabilities, practices and procedures.




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2.5

2.4 Uniqueness of names

In this draft requirements on name uniqueness are specified by the
terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the
following meaning:

Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that iden-
tifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An
object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented
by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its
object entry would could have had if it were represented in the Directory.
In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name
denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is
unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a
virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501]. In the case of sub-
ject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain of
the CA.

An unmistakable identity denotes a set of attributes and/or data ele-
   ments
ments, which forms an identity which that by unmistakable means relates to
a specific entity. The unmistakable connection between the identity
and the entity may be dependent on the context within which the name
is formed. This context should though however be evident for any relying
party given the information in the certificate. Some contexts, such
as when identities are based on pseudonym names, pseudonyms, may require assis-
   tance assistance
from the CA or a registration authority, to obtain a corresponding
officially registered identity under some predefined circumstances,
such as investigation of criminal offence.

3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The pro-
file is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which in
turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full implementation

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of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying
formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.

ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix B. A.

3.1 Basic Certificate Fields

This specification provides additional detail details regarding the contents
of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer
and subject fields.





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3.1.1 Issuer

The issuer field SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the organ-
ization responsible for the certificate which certificate, and SHALL include a
registered name of the organization.

The unmistakable identity SHOULD be evident through examination of the present values issuer SHALL be specified using an
appropriate subset of the following attribute types: attributes:

domainComponent;
countryName;
stateOrProvinceName;
organizationName;
      commonName;
localityName;
commonName and
dNQualifier.

Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
to identify the issuing organization.

The legal jurisdiction for the issuing CA SHOULD be consistent with
the issuer name.

It should be noted, however, that a relying party MAY have to consult
identified certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to
determine the semantics of name fields and legal jurisdiction.

3.1.2 Subject

The subject field SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject
(see 2.5 2.4 for definition of distinguished name) name).

An unmistakable identity (see 2.5) 2.4) of the subject(based subject (based on a
registered name or a pseudonym name) pseudonym) SHALL be present in the certificate
in the subject field and/or the PersonalData field in the subjectAltName subjectAlt-
Name extension (see 3.2.1.) 3.2.1.).

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If the PersonalData field is empty, the unmistakable identity of the
subject is determined solely by just the subject field. If the PersonalData Personal-
Data field is present, it SHALL contain a complete unmistakable identity iden-
tity of the subject. In this case the subject field SHALL still contain con-
tain a complete distinguished name.

The subject field SHALL include at least one of the following choices of sets
   of mandatory manda-
tory attributes:

Choice I:  countryName commonName
Choice II:  countryName givenName surname




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Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName in the
DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the subject
field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the countryName
attribute SHOULD always be present.

The distinguished name of the subject MAY also be specified by contain the following
additional attributes:

countryName;
surname;
dNQualifier;
organizationName; organiza-
   tionalUnitName;
organizationalUnitName;
localityName and
postalAddress.

Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish distin-
guish the subject name from other subject names within the issuer
domain.

The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily match indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country
of residence, nor does it have to match indicate the country of issuance.

The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, SHALL contain a name of
the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation for-
mat, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format. Pseu-
donyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by the
registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name
presented in commonName, complying applications may MAY have to examine
present values of the givenName and surname attributes and if neces-
sary, the personal data field in the subjectAltName extension.

The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
the registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which

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the CA prepares the certificate. These attributes SHALL be present used in
the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present. In
cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the given-
Name attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be omit-
ted.

The organizationName attribute type, the localityName attribute type
and the organizationalUnitName attribute type SHALL, when present, be
used to store the name and relevant information of an organization
with which the subject is associated. The type of association between
the organization and the subject is beyond the scope of this document. docu-
ment.

The postalAddress attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
store an address with which the subject is associated. If an organ-
izationName value also is present then the postalAddress attribute
value SHALL be associated with the specified organization. The asso-
ciation between the postalAddress and either the subject or the
organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.

The dNQualifier attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to dif-
ferentiate between two people names where the subject field would otherwise be
identical. This qualifier has no defined semantics beyond ensur-
   ing ensuring
uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or code
assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or civil
authority. It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the dNQual-
ifier is sufficient to resolve any subject name ambiguities. collisions.

Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
named in this section.



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3.2 Certificate Extensions

This specification provides additional detail details regarding the contents
of three five certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject
alternative name, certificate policies, and key usage extensions. extension, private
extension for biometric information and private extension for Quali-
fied Certificate statements.

3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name

This section defines a new Object Identifier and data structure in
the form of a PersonalData field to be contained in the OtherName
subfield of the subjectAltName extension. This field may be used to
construct a unique name from personal attributes of the subject.
This data may be useful to a relying party in identifying the person
that is the subject of the certificate.

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If the subjectAltName extension contain contains this PersonalData field, it
SHALL contain the an unmistakable identity of the subject (see 2.5). 2.4). The
subject field is still required to hold contain a distinguished name
(within issuer domain) as defined in section 3.1.2.

-- OtherName is reproduced here (from RFC 2459) for clarity
-- only. It does not appear in the ASN.1 modules at the end
-- of this specification.

-- 1988 ASN.1 Syntax:
-- OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-- value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }

-- 1993 ASN.1 Syntax:
-- OtherName ::= TYPE-IDENTIFER

id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-on 1}

-- id-on-personalData defines the ASN.1 structure
-- PersonalData according to this standard

PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
    registrationAuthority
nameRegistrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }

PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
    registrationAuthority
nameRegistrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}

Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue }

AttributeType ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id

AttributeValue ::= ATTRIBUTE.&Type

ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
&derivation ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
&single-valued BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type }

WITH SYNTAX {
SUBTYPE OF &derivation
    WITH SYNTAX      &Type

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WITH SYNTAX &Type
SINGLE VALUE &single-valued
ID &id }

The optional registrationAuthority nameRegistrationAuthority component SHALL when present, be
   used to hold at least one
contain a name of the an authority within which attri-
   bute associated attribute
values are registered.

The registrationAuthority nameRegistrationAuthority component in the PersonalData and the Per-
   sonalDataRecord
PersonalDataRecord structure allow to specify specifying multiple registration name registra-
tion authorities, responsible for different attributes. If the registra-
   tionAuthority nam-
eRegistrationAuthority field of the PersonalData structure is set, it
serves as the default value for subordinate PersonalDataRecord structures struc-
tures with an empty registrationAuthority absent nameRegistrationAuthority value.

The optional attributeSemantics component SHALL SHALL, when present, be used
   to hold at least one con-
tain an OID which that defines the semantics of present
   attribute values. Each for associated attributes. The OID may
MAY define any set of rules and semantics for any set of attributes.
The attributeSemantics value may MAY guide applications how to understand
and present display different attribute values. This value may MAY also serve to provide define
the context within which certain attribute values are meant to be unique, unique and
thereby providing a provide means to achieve guaranteed uniqueness for the whole PersonalData structure.
present set of attribute values

The optional attributeSemantics component in the PersonalData and the
PersonalDataRecord structure allow to specify allows specifying multiple object iden-
tifiers, describing the semantics for different attribute values. If
the attributeSemantics field of the PersonalData structure is set, it
serves as the default value for subordinate PersonalData structures PersonalDataRecord struc-
tures with an empty absent attributeSemantics value.

Complying applications SHALL expect any subset of the following
defined attribute types within a PersonalDataRecord:

countryName;
givenName;
surname;
pseudonym;
dNQualifier;
dateOfBirth;
placeOfBirth;
gender;
postalAddress;
countryOfCitizenship; and
countryOfResidence.

The PersonalData field may also contain any additional attributes,
subject to local definitions, but they shall not be necessary to
   determine an unmistakable identity of the subject.

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specify the unmistakable identity of the subject.

Attribute values SHALL be consistent with attribute values stored in
the subject field. (I.e., the subject field and the PersonalData
field may contain different values as long as these values are not in
conflict.)

The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily match indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country
of residence, nor does it have to match indicate the country of issuance.

The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
a registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which
the CA prepares the certificate.

The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
   name
of the subject. The pseudonym name SHALL be a registered by a registration
authority, responsible for holding the identity of the real physical
person related to the pseudonym. When this attribute is used the CA
is the default registration authority if no other regis-
   trationAuthority nameRegistrationAu-
thority value, related to the pseudonym attribute, is present in the
PersonalData field.

The dNQualifier attribute SHALL, when present, be used to store contain a local registration regis-
tration identifier of the subject, such as a drivers license or
government aid registration. Note that the value of this field may
contain digits, alphabetic characters, and punctuation.

The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, hold contain the value of
the date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date of
birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
document.

The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, hold contain the value of
the place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the place of
birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
document.

The gender attribute SHALL, when present, hold contain the value of the
gender of the subject. For females the value "F" and for males the
value "M" have to be used. The manner in which the gender is associ-
ated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.

The postalAddress attribute SHALL, when present, hold contain the value of
an address with which the subject is associated. This value SHALL be
associated with the subject as a private address even if the pos-
talAddress attribute value in the subject field is associated with an

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organization. The manner in which the postalAddress is associated
with the subject is outside the scope of this document.

The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, be used to



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   hold contain the
identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed country of
citizenship at the time that the certificate is created. was issued. If the
   subject sub-
ject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country MAY
be present. Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and is
outside the scope of this document.

The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, hold contain the
value of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If
the sub-
   ject subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one
country MAY be present. Determination of residence is a matter of
law and is outside the scope of this document.

3.2.2 Certificate Policies

The certificate policies extension SHALL contain at least one certi-
ficate policy which reflects the practices and procedures undertaken
by the CA. The certificate policy extension MAY be marked critical.

A statement by the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate as
discussed in 2.3 2.2 SHOULD be evident through an indicated policies.

In order to enhance path validation based on policy or
   through its associated CPS. OIDs any state-
ment related to Qualified Certificates, as defined in 3.2.5, SHOULD
also be defined by included certificate policies.

Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
RFC 2459.

3.2.3 Key usage extension Usage

The key usage extension SHALL be present and SHALL exclusively assert present. If the key usage nonRepudiation (1). No nonRepudi-
ation (1) is asserted then it SHALL NOT be combined with any other
key usage, i.e. if set, the key usage values are
   allowed to non-repudiation SHALL be asserted. set
exclusively.

The key usage extension MAY be marked criti-
   cal.

4  Security Considerations

   The legal value critical.

3.2.4 Biometric Information

This section defines an extension for storage of a digital signature which biometric informa-
tion. Biometric information is validated with a
   Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
   governing stored in the use form of the associated private key. Both the private key
   holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the private
   key is used only with the consent a hash of the legitimate key holder and
   only after the key holders conscious acceptance a
biometric template.

The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication

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of biometric information. The biometric information that corresponds
to the signed message
   content.

   Since stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the public keys will extension
MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can
be obtained. If included, this URI does not imply that this is the
only way to access this information.

This extension SHALL only be used to verify digital signatures as store a
   substitute hash of biometric infor-
mation suitable for handwritten signatures, certain conditions should
   exist before CAs recognize certificates as qualified certificates.
   The signatures must be unique human verification, i.e. where decision whether
this information is an accurate representation of the subject, is
performed by a physical person. This implies a usage where the
biometric information is represented by for example a graphical
image, displayed to the signer, and must relying party, which MAY be generated
   under used by the signer's sole control.  That is, a CA should not issue a
   qualified certificate if rely-
ing party to enhance identification of the private key subject.

biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }

id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature,...)

The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
that the source picture is shared among entities, or in the signature generation form of a displayable graphical
image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be
calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the
image type.

The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
SHALL identify that the source data is not performed under in the form of a displayable
graphical image of the subject's con-
   trol.  This implies handwritten signature. The hash of
the CA must perform proof-of-possession. In addi-
   tion, graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the CA should have some knowledge about image data
excluding any labels defining the subject's image type.

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   cryptographic module.

   CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
   indicating August 6, 1999

3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements

This section defines an extension for inclusion of predefined state-
ments related to Qualified Certificates.

A typical statement suitable for this extension is a CA may issue qualified certificates unless these condi-
   tions are met.

   Finally, matching rules are not specified statement by the
issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified Certificate
according to some predefined requirements (as discussed in 2.2).

Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
statements related to the new attrributes
   defined applicable legal jurisdiction within which
the certificate is issued. As an example this MAY include a maximum
reliance limit for use the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
liability.

Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the PersonalData field. It sta-
tementInfo parameter.

If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier
of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the seman-
tics of this parameter. If the object identifier does not expected that
   two qualified certificates would be compared to determine if they
   represent define the same physical entity.  Such
semantics, a comparison relying party may provide
   misleading results and should not be performed.

   This specification is have to consult a profile of RFC 2459. relevant certificate
policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.

qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}
-- To be assigned

QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF Statement

Statement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY StatementId OPTIONAL}

4 Security Considerations

The security considera-
   tions section legal value of a digital signature that document applies to this specification as well.

5 References

   [RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", March is validated with a Qual-
ified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy governing
the use of the associated private key. Both the private key holder as
well as the relying party should make sure that the private key is
used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder.

Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issues

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certificates as Qualified Certificates. The signatures must be unique
to the signer, and must be maintained under the signer's sole con-
trol. That is, a CA should not issue a qualified certificate if the
private key is shared among entities, or the private key is not used
under the subject's control. This implies that the CA must perform
proof-of-possession. In addition, it implies that the CA have some
knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.

CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
are met.

Finally, matching rules are not specified for the new attributes
defined in the PersonalData field. It is not expected that two quali-
fied certificates would be compared to determine if they represent
the same physical entity. Such a comparison may provide misleading
results and should not be performed.

This specification is a profile of RFC 2459. The security considera-
tions section of that document applies to this specification as well.

5 References

[RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.

[RFC 2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D.Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", January
1999.

[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1997 E): Information Technology
- Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June 1997.

[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology
- Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, Frame-
work, June 1997.

[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open
Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected Attribute Types,
1993.

6 Intellectual Property Rights

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might
or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made
   any effort

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any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's
procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-
   related standardsre-
lated documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of
rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses
to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a



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   general
ageneral license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights
by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from
the IETF Secretariat.

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.

Appendix A. ASN.1 definitions

As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
of the ASN.1 syntax.

Section A.1 is basically in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.
The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in
the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of
the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. However,
the UniversalString and UTF8String choices in DirectoryString were
defined in the 1993 and 1998 versions respectively. As a result, it
was necessary to import definitions for these UNIVERSAL types from
the PKIX1 modules. This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by
replacing the definitions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988
catch-all "ANY".

Section A.2 is in the 1998 syntax; it may be converted into the is in the 1993 syntax; it may be converted into the 1998
syntax by removing the 1998 UNIVERSAL Type UTF8String from the
IMPORTS statement.

A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module

PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
Attribute, AlgorithmIdentifier, UniversalString,

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UTF8String, id-pkix
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(1)};

id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 8}
id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-on 1}

-- id-on-personalData defines the ASN.1 structure
-- PersonalData according to this standard

PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }

PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}

id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 4 }

id-at-commonName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 3}
id-at-surname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 4}
id-at-countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 6}
id-at-localityName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 7}
id-at-stateOrProvinceName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 8}
id-at-organizationName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 10}
id-at-organizationalUnitName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 11}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 16}
id-at-givenName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 42}
id-at-dnQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 46}

domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25}

-- Personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 9}

id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 6 }

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-- New Attributes for Qualified Certificates

dateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
-- identified by id-pda-dateOfBirth --

placeOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
-- identified by id-pda-placeOfBirth --

pseudonym ::= DirectoryString
-- identified by id-pda-pseudonym --

gender ::= PrintableString
-- identified by id-pda-gender --

countryOfCitizenship ::=
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2))
-- IS 3166 codes only
-- identified by id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }

countryOfResidence ::=
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2))
-- IS 3166 codes only
-- identified by id-pda-countryOfResidence --

DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX))
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX))
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX))
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }

-- Biometric Info Extension

biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }

id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 1}
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }

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TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature,...)

-- Qualified Statements Extension

qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}

QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF Statement

Statement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}

END

A.2 1993
   syntax by inserting a definition for the UNIVERSAL Type UTF8String.



A.1 1988 ASN.1

PKIXqualified88 Module

PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) to be assigned(?) id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
        Attribute, UniversalString, UTF8String, id-pkix
id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(1)}; id-pkix1-explicit93(3)};

-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of legal certificate extensions.

ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= { authorityKeyIdentifier |
subjectKeyIdentifier |

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keyUsage |
extendedKeyUsage |
privateKeyUsagePeriod |
certificatePolicies |
policyMappings |
subjectAltName |
issuerAltName |
basicConstraints |
nameConstraints |
policyConstraints |
cRLDistributionPoints |
subjectDirectoryAttributes |
authorityInfoAccess |
biometricInfo |
qCStatements }

id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 8}
id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-on 1}

-- id-on-personalData defines the ASN.1 structure
-- PersonalData according to this standard

PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }

PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}

Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue }

AttributeType ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id

AttributeValue ::= ATTRIBUTE.&Type

ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
&derivation ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
&single-valued BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type }

WITH SYNTAX {

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SUBTYPE OF &derivation
WITH SYNTAX &Type
SINGLE VALUE &single-valued
ID &id }

id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 4 }

id-at-countryName

id-at-commonName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 6} 3}
id-at-surname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 4}
id-at-countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 6}
id-at-localityName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 7}
id-at-stateOrProvinceName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 8}
id-at-organizationName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 10}
id-at-organizationalUnitName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 11}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 16}
id-at-givenName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 42}
id-at-dnQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 46}

domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25}

-- These OIDs still need to be assigned:
id-qat Personal Data Attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix xx}

id-qat-dateOfBirth 9}

id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-placeOfBirth { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-pseudonym { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-gender { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfCitizenship { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfResidence { id-pda 5 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=   {id-qat xx}

-- New Attributes for Qualified Certificates { id-pda 6 }

dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
-- identified by id-qat-dateOfBirth --
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }

placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString
-- identifed by          id-qat-placeOfBirth --
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }

pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString
-- identifed by          id-qat-pseudonym --
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-pda-pseudonym }

gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString
-- identifed by          id-qat-gender --
SINGLE VALUE

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ID id-pda-gender }

countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
SUBTYPE OF name
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2))
-- IS 3166 codes only
-- identifed by          id-qat-countryOfCitizenship

ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }

countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::=



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SUBTYPE OF name
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2))
-- IS 3166 codes only
-- identifed by          id-qat-countryOfResidence --
ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }

DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX)) (1..maxSize))
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX)) (1..maxSize))
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX)) (1..maxSize))
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) (1..maxSize))
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)) (1..maxSize)) }

-- Biometric Info Extension

biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }

id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 1}
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature,...)

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-- Qualified Statements Extension

qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}

QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF Statement

Statement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QCStatements.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QCStatements.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId) OPTIONAL}

QCStatements ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL
}
WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }

-- Definition of the following object is deferred. This set
-- is required to specify a table constraint on the satetementInfo
-- component of Statement
--
-- SupportedStatements ::= {...|...}

END

A.2 1998

Appendix B. Example Certificate

This section contains the ASN.1

PKIXqualified98 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
           dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
           id-mod(0) structure and a hex dump of a 817
byte version 3 qualified certificate. The certificate contains the
following information

1. The serial number is 1
2. The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algo-
rithm
3. The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
4. The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M. Gloeckner,
O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
5. The certificate was issued on July 6, 1999 and will expire on
July 6, 2000
6. The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
7. The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
exclusively indicating non-repudiation
8. The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier

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indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the issuing CA
(OID 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate policy OID is defined by
TeleTrust, Germany. It is required to be assigned(?) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --
   IMPORTS
        id-pkix
        FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
        dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
        id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit93(3)}; set in a certificate confor-
mant to the german digital signature law.
9. The certificate includes one subject alternative name - a
PersonalData        ::= structure (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.1) in the OtherName sub-
field containing the following attributes:
Registered by: municpality@seeheim.de
surname: Gloeckner
given name: Petra
date of birth: October, 14th 1971 (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.1)
place of birth: Darmstadt (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.2)
country of citizenship:DE (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.5)
gender: female (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.4)
10. The certificate includes a qualified statement (OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3) indicating a maximum reliance limit of DM 5000,-.
Therefore the monetary value has been used which has been defined by
ISO (OID 1.2.840.10052.1.1)
currency: 280 (=DEM)
amount: 5
exponent: 3

B.1 ASN.1 Structure

SEQUENCE length = 813 {
 registrationAuthority      GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
 attributeSemantics         OBJECT IDENTIFIER    OPTIONAL,
 personalDataRecord
SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord length = 666 {
[0] (constructed) length = 3 {
INTEGER 2
}

PersonalDataRecord  ::=
INTEGER 1
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
 registrationAuthority      GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
 attributeSemantics
OBJECT IDENTIFIER    OPTIONAL,
 personalDataAttributes     SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}

Attribute  ::= 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29)
NULL
}
SEQUENCE length = 72 {
 type           AttributeType,
 values
SET OF AttributeValue length = 11 {
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.countryName(6)
PrintableString "DE"
}

AttributeType  ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id

AttributeValue ::= ATTRIBUTE.&Type

ATTRIBUTE      ::= CLASS
}
SET length = 57 {
SEQUENCE length = 55 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.organizationName(10)
PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
}

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 &derivation     ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
 &single-valued  BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
 &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
 &Type August 6, 1999

}

WITH SYNTAX
SEQUENCE length = 30 {
 SUBTYPE OF       &derivation
 WITH SYNTAX      &Type
 SINGLE VALUE     &single-valued
 ID           &id
UTCTime "990706153122Z"
UTCTime "000706153122Z"
}

id-at                      OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
SEQUENCE length = 101 {
SET length = 11 {
SEQUENCE length = 9 { 2 5 4 }

id-at-countryName          OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-at 6}
id-at-surname              OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-at 4}
id-at-postalAddress        OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-at 16}
id-at-givenName
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-at 42}
id-at-dnQualifier 2.5.4.countryName(6)
PrintableString "DE"
}
}
SET length = 57 {
SEQUENCE length = 55 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-at 46}

-- These OIDs still need to be assigned:
id-qat 2.5.4.organizationName(10)
PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
}
SET length = 27 {
SEQUENCE length = 25 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-pkix xx}

id-qat-dateOfBirth 2.5.4.commonName(3)
PrintableString "Petra M. Gloeckner"
}
}
}
SEQUENCE length = 159 {
SEQUENCE length = 13 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-placeOfBirth 1.2.840.113549.1.1.rsaEncryption(1)
NULL
}
BIT STRING number of bits = 1120
content: 30818902818100ff 0524ce2d11337f8c
ccfb8211faa33088 f53c244ca3155ba5
6ad181f54ab6b1f8 4d1d7298623907f6
3956b392d700bf09 9c6ffeca8ac96622
dcbe2d7ff88f40d8 4f561b34c70e3e6e
32f2aa68e7ed2a21 202ff858fc5f42bf
b25864b2c0e9e8c3 21f66adcbad87a8c
a754fce448e1e507 8906fb8a81b7fe27
9ec35794ca20e502 03010001
}
[3] (constructed) length = 272 {
SEQUENCE length = 268 {
SEQUENCE length = 14 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-pseudonym 2.5.29.keyUsage(15)
BOOLEAN TRUE
OCTET STRING length = 4 content: 03020640

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}
SEQUENCE length = 18 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-gender 2.5.29.certificatePolicies(32)
OCTET STRING length = 11
content: 3009300706052b24 080101
}
SEQUENCE length = 190 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfCitizenship 2.5.29.subjectAltName(17)
OCTET STRING length = 182
content: 3081b3a081b00608 2b06010505070801
a081a33081a03081 9d30819a16176d75
6e69636970616c69 7479407365656865
696d2e6465307f30 120603550404310b
1309676c6f65636b 6e6572300e060355
042a310713055065 747261301d06082b
0601050507090131 11180f3139373131
3031343030303030 305a301706082b06
010505070905310b 13094461726d7374
616474301006082b 0601050507090331
0413024445300f06 082b060105050709
043103130146
}
SEQUENCE length = 37 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfResidence 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3
OCTET STRING length = 25
content: 3017301506072a86 48ce440101300a02
0201180201050201 03
}
}
}
}
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=   {id-qat xx}

dateOfBirth           ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX              GeneralizedTime
SINGLE VALUE
ID                       id-qat-dateOfBirth 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29)
NULL
}

placeOfBirth          ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX              DirectoryString
SINGLE VALUE
ID                       id-qat-placeOfBirth
BIT STRING number of bits = 1024
content: 3858d00a57281748 98923f8968cd8c7f
561a531472a34d1a 189d836d66e42104
ac126ffe52d1f1bc f15c17076df75860
c4ad6fa850d2a6c7 0bfbf6f7816f5a8b
1e74a08ce6db0d81 2e5fdda0a0ece8b1
6ad5e6c2acc225a5 4cfe1965f44706c8
0dd854d82ff80de5 4c03ab63eeb2664c
8326f3d54bf15027 c7bc22c79ebf46c8
}

pseudonym             ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX              DirectoryString
SINGLE VALUE
ID                       id-qat-pseudonym

B.2 Structured hexdump:

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 27]

INTERNET DRAFT August 6, 1999

0x00000000 T: 30 L: 82 03 2d{
0x00000004 T: 30 L: 82 02 9a{
0x00000008 T: a0 L: 03{
0x0000000a T: 02 L: 01 C: 02
}

gender                ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX              PrintableString
SINGLE VALUE
ID                       id-qat-gender
0x0000000d T: 02 L: 01 C: 01
0x00000010 T: 30 L: 09{
0x00000012 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d
0x00000019 T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
0x0000001b T: 30 L: 48{
0x0000001d T: 31 L: 0b{
0x0000001f T: 30 L: 09{
0x00000021 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06
0x00000026 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45
}
}
0x0000002a T: 31 L: 39{
0x0000002c T: 30 L: 37{
0x0000002e T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a
0x00000033 T: 13 L: 30
C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f
72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73
7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20
49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74
69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68
6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48
}
}
}
0x00000065 T: 30 L: 1e{
0x00000067 T: 17 L: 0d C: 39 39 30 37 30 36 31 35
33 31 32 32 5a
0x00000076 T: 17 L: 0d C: 30 30 30 37 30 36 31 35
33 31 32 32 5a
}
0x00000085 T: 30 L: 65{
0x00000087 T: 31 L: 0b{
0x00000089 T: 30 L: 09{
0x0000008b T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06
0x00000090 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45
}
}
0x00000094 T: 31 L: 39{
0x00000096 T: 30 L: 37{
0x00000098 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a
0x0000009d T: 13 L: 30
C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 18] 28]

INTERNET DRAFT                                          February 3, 1998


countryOfCitizenship  ATTRIBUTE ::= {
SUBTYPE OF               name
WITH SYNTAX              PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
ID                       id-qat-countryOfCitizenship August 6, 1999

72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73
7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20
49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74
69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68
6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48
}

countryOfResidence    ATTRIBUTE ::= {
SUBTYPE OF               name
WITH SYNTAX              PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
ID                       id-qat-countryOfResidence
}

DirectoryString   ::= CHOICE {
printableString       PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
teletexString         TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
bmpString             BMPString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
utf8String            UTF8String (SIZE (1..maxSize))
universalString       UniversalString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
0x000000cf T: 31 L: 1b{
0x000000d1 T: 30 L: 19{
0x000000d3 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 03
0x000000d8 T: 13 L: 12
C: 50 65 74 72 61 20 4d 2e
20 47 6c 6f 65 63 6b 6e
65 72
}

END
}
}
0x000000ec T: 30 L: 81 9f{
0x000000ef T: 30 L: 0d{
0x000000f1 T: 06 L: 09 C: 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01
01
0x000000fc T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
0x000000fe T: 03 L: 81 8d
C: 00 30 81 89 02 81 81 00
ff 05 24 ce 2d 11 33 7f
8c cc fb 82 11 fa a3 30
88 f5 3c 24 4c a3 15 5b
a5 6a d1 81 f5 4a b6 b1
f8 4d 1d 72 98 62 39 07
f6 39 56 b3 92 d7 00 bf
09 9c 6f fe ca 8a c9 66
22 dc be 2d 7f f8 8f 40
d8 4f 56 1b 34 c7 0e 3e
6e 32 f2 aa 68 e7 ed 2a
21 20 2f f8 58 fc 5f 42
bf b2 58 64 b2 c0 e9 e8
c3 21 f6 6a dc ba d8 7a
8c a7 54 fc e4 48 e1 e5
07 89 06 fb 8a 81 b7 fe
27 9e c3 57 94 ca 20 e5
02 03 01 00 01
}
0x0000018e T: a3 L: 82 01 10{
0x00000192 T: 30 L: 82 01 0c{
0x00000196 T: 30 L: 0e{
0x00000198 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 0f
0x0000019d T: 01 L: 01 C: ff

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 29]

INTERNET DRAFT August 6, 1999

0x000001a0 T: 04 L: 04 C: 03 02 06 40
}
0x000001a6 T: 30 L: 12{
0x000001a8 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 20
0x000001ad T: 04 L: 0b
C: 30 09 30 07 06 05 2b 24
08 01 01
}
0x000001ba T: 30 L: 81 be{
0x000001bd T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 11
0x000001c2 T: 04 L: 81 b6
C: 30 81 b3 a0 81 b0 06 08
2b 06 01 05 05 07 08 01
a0 81 a3 30 81 a0 30 81
9d 30 81 9a 16 17 6d 75
6e 69 63 69 70 61 6c 69
74 79 40 73 65 65 68 65
69 6d 2e 64 65 30 7f 30
12 06 03 55 04 04 31 0b
13 09 67 6c 6f 65 63 6b
6e 65 72 30 0e 06 03 55
04 2a 31 07 13 05 50 65
74 72 61 30 1d 06 08 2b
06 01 05 05 07 09 01 31
11 18 0f 31 39 37 31 31
30 31 34 30 30 30 30 30
30 5a 30 17 06 08 2b 06
01 05 05 07 09 05 31 0b
13 09 44 61 72 6d 73 74
61 64 74 30 10 06 08 2b
06 01 05 05 07 09 03 31
04 13 02 44 45 30 0f 06
08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09
04 31 03 13 01 46
}
0x0000027b T: 30 L: 25{
0x0000027d T: 06 L: 08
C: 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 03
0x00000287 T: 04 L: 19
C: 30 17 30 15 06 07 2a 86
48 ce 44 01 01 30 0a 02
02 01 18 02 01 05 02 01
03
}
}
}
}
0x000002a2 T: 30 L: 09{

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 30]

INTERNET DRAFT August 6, 1999

0x000002a4 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d
0x000002ab T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
0x000002ad T: 03 L: 81 81 C: 00 38 58 d0 0a 57 28 17
48 98 92 3f 89 68 cd 8c
7f 56 1a 53 14 72 a3 4d
1a 18 9d 83 6d 66 e4 21
04 ac 12 6f fe 52 d1 f1
bc f1 5c 17 07 6d f7 58
60 c4 ad 6f a8 50 d2 a6
c7 0b fb f6 f7 81 6f 5a
8b 1e 74 a0 8c e6 db 0d
81 2e 5f dd a0 a0 ec e8
b1 6a d5 e6 c2 ac c2 25
a5 4c fe 19 65 f4 47 06
c8 0d d8 54 d8 2f f8 0d
e5 4c 03 ab 63 ee b2 66
4c 83 26 f3 d5 4b f1 50
27 c7 bc 22 c7 9e bf 46
c8
0x00000331 }

B.3 Hex Dump

0 3082032D 3082029A A0030201 02020101 |0..-0...........|
10 30090605 2B0E0302 1D050030 48310B30 |0...+......0H1.0|
20 09060355 04061302 44453139 30370603 |...U....DE1907..|
30 55040A13 30474D44 202D2046 6F727363 |U...0GMD - Forsc|
40 68756E67 737A656E 7472756D 20496E66 |hungszentrum Inf|
50 6F726D61 74696F6E 73746563 686E696B |ormationstechnik|
60 20476D62 48301E17 0D393930 37303631 | GmbH0...9907061|
70 35333132 325A170D 30303037 30363135 |53122Z..00070615|
80 33313232 5A306531 0B300906 03550406 |3122Z0e1.0...U..|
90 13024445 31393037 06035504 0A133047 |..DE1907..U...0G|
A0 4D44202D 20466F72 73636875 6E67737A |MD - Forschungsz|
B0 656E7472 756D2049 6E666F72 6D617469 |entrum Informati|
C0 6F6E7374 6563686E 696B2047 6D624831 |onstechnik GmbH1|
D0 1B301906 03550403 13125065 74726120 |.0...U....Petra |
E0 4D2E2047 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 30819F30 |M. Gloeckner0..0|
F0 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010101 05000381 |...*.H..........|
100 8D003081 89028181 00FF0524 CE2D1133 |..0........$.-.3|
110 7F8CCCFB 8211FAA3 3088F53C 244CA315 |........0..<$L..|
120 5BA56AD1 81F54AB6 B1F84D1D 72986239 |[.j...J...M.r.b9|
130 07F63956 B392D700 BF099C6F FECA8AC9 |..9V.......o....|
140 6622DCBE 2D7FF88F 40D84F56 1B34C70E |f"..-...@.OV.4..|
150 3E6E32F2 AA68E7ED 2A21202F F858FC5F |>n2..h..*! /.X._|
160 42BFB258 64B2C0E9 E8C321F6 6ADCBAD8 |B..Xd.....!.j...|
170 7A8CA754 FCE448E1 E5078906 FB8A81B7 |z..T..H.........|

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 31]

INTERNET DRAFT August 6, 1999

180 FE279EC3 5794CA20 E5020301 0001A382 |.'..W.. ........|
190 01103082 010C300E 0603551D 0F0101FF |..0...0...U.....|
1A0 04040302 06403012 0603551D 20040B30 |.....@0...U. ..0|
1B0 09300706 052B2408 01013081 BE060355 |.0...+$...0....U|
1C0 1D110481 B63081B3 A081B006 082B0601 |.....0.......+..|
1D0 05050708 01A081A3 3081A030 819D3081 |........0..0..0.|
1E0 9A16176D 756E6963 6970616C 69747940 |...municipality@|
1F0 73656568 65696D2E 6465307F 30120603 |seeheim.de0.0...|
200 55040431 0B130967 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 |U..1...gloeckner|
210 300E0603 55042A31 07130550 65747261 |0...U.*1...Petra|
220 301D0608 2B060105 05070901 3111180F |0...+.......1...|
230 31393731 31303134 30303030 30305A30 |19711014000000Z0|
240 1706082B 06010505 07090531 0B130944 |...+.......1...D|
250 61726D73 74616474 30100608 2B060105 |armstadt0...+...|
260 05070903 31041302 4445300F 06082B06 |....1...DE0...+.|
270 01050507 09043103 13014630 2506082B |......1...F0%..+|
280 06010505 07010304 19301730 1506072A |.........0.0...*|
290 8648CE44 0101300A 02020118 02010502 |.H.D..0.........|
2A0 01033009 06052B0E 03021D05 00038181 |..0...+.........|
2B0 003858D0 0A572817 4898923F 8968CD8C |.8X..W(.H..?.h..|
2C0 7F561A53 1472A34D 1A189D83 6D66E421 |.V.S.r.M....mf.!|
2D0 04AC126F FE52D1F1 BCF15C17 076DF758 |...o.R......m.X|
2E0 60C4AD6F A850D2A6 C70BFBF6 F7816F5A |`..o.P........oZ|
2F0 8B1E74A0 8CE6DB0D 812E5FDD A0A0ECE8 |..t......._.....|
300 B16AD5E6 C2ACC225 A54CFE19 65F44706 |.j.....%.L..e.G.|
310 C80DD854 D82FF80D E54C03AB 63EEB266 |...T./...L..c..f|
320 4C8326F3 D54BF150 27C7BC22 C79EBF46 |L.&..K.P'.."...F|
330 C8 |. |

Appendix B. C. Author Addresses

Stefan Santesson
Accurata Systems kerhet Systemsaekerhet AB
   Lotsgatan 27d
   216 42 Malm
Slagthuset
211 20 Malmoe
Sweden
stefan@accurata.se

Tim Polk
NIST
Building 820, Room 426
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
USA
wpolk@nist.gov

Petra Gloeckner
   GMD
SECUDE - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH
   GMD-TKT, Dolivostrasse 15
   D-64293 Darmstadt
   Germany
   gloeckner@darmstadt.gmd.de
Landwehrstrasse 50a

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 19] 32]

INTERNET DRAFT                                          February 3, 1998 August 6, 1999

D-64293 Darmstadt
Germany
gloeckner@secude.com

Appendix C. D. Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the
ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or
in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of develop-
ing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
defined in the Internet Standards process shall be followed, or as
required to translate it into languages other than English.

The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Santesson, Polk, Gloeckner [Page 20] 33]
----