Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-inch-requirements

draft-ietf-inch-requirements









INCH Working Group                                        Glenn M Keeni
Internet-Draft                                     Cyber Solutions Inc.
Category: Informational                                   Roman Danyliw
Expires: December 24, 2006                                      CERT/CC
                                                         Yuri Demchenko
                                                University of Amsterdam


                                                          June 25, 2006




  Requirements for the Format for Incident Information Exchange (FINE)
                 <draft-ietf-inch-requirements-08.txt>

Status of this Memo


   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress".

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   This document is a product of the inch Working Group. Comments should
   be addressed to the authors or the mailing list at
   inch@nic.surfnet.nl

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 24, 2006

   Copyright Notice

      Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  All Rights Reserved.



Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 1]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


Abstract

   This document describes the high-level functional requirements of an
   abstract format, the Format for Incident information Exchange (FINE),
   which will facilitate the exchange of incident information among
   computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) and involved
   parties.  A common and well-defined format will help in the exchange
   of incident related information across different administrative
   domains such as organizations, regions, and countries.
   Implementations of FINE will also be useful for reactionary analysis
   of current threats and support the proactive identification of trends
   that can lead to incident prevention.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction ...............................................  3
   2.  Incident Handling Framework ................................  3
   3.  General Requirements .......................................  5
   4.  Format Requirements ........................................  6
   5.  Communication Mechanism Requirements .......................  7
   6.  Content Requirements .......................................  7
   7.  Security Considerations ....................................  8
   8.  IANA Considerations ........................................  8
   9.  References .................................................  9
  10.  Acknowledgements ........................................... 10
  11.  Authors' Addresses ......................................... 10
  Full Copyright Statement .......................................  11
  Appendix: History of Changes






















Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 2]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


1. Introduction

   Computer security incidents occur across administrative domains,
   often spanning different organizations and national borders.  Hence,
   a response requires coordination and collaboration between the
   involved parties and the responsible computer security incident
   response teams (CSIRTs).  The basis for this interaction is often
   data and statistics describing the nature of the incident.  This
   information, referred to as an incident report in this document, will
   not only support response activity to the specific incident, but may
   also be used for historical analysis or proactive responses.

   This document defines the high-level functional requirements for a
   format that can support the exchange of incident reports. The
   abstract format being discussed is referred to as the Format for
   INcident information Exchange (FINE). The implementation of the
   requirements, the format itself, is out of the scope of this
   document.

   The intent of FINE is to enable rapid and effective response to
   incidents by improving the ability of  CSIRTs to exchange and process
   incident reports.  This will be achieved by ensuring that
   implementations of FINE require:
         +  unambiguous semantics for the data;
         +  a well-defined syntax for the data; and
         +  support end-user processing (e.g., categorization and
            statistical analysis).

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14, RFC 2119 [1].

2. Incident Handling Framework

2.1. Descriptive Terms
   For the purpose of clarity, certain commonly used terms from the
   operational domain of CSIRTs are defined here. These are based on
   related documents [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]

2.1.1. Event
   An event is an occurrence in a system or network that may be of
   interest and warrant attention. An event is not necessarily malicious
   or deliberate.







Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 3]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


2.1.2. Attack
   An attack is a series of events caused either directly or indirectly
   by a source that violates the security policy of the target.  These
   violations may include a compromise of a user account, denial of
   service, information theft, etc.

2.1.3. Source
   The origin of an attack as described by a host, user account,
   computer program, network address, person, or organization.

2.1.4. Target
   The target of an attack as described by a host, user account,
   computer program, network address, person, or organization.

2.1.5. Computer security incident
   A computer security incident, referred to as an incident, is a set of
   one or more related attacks.

2.1.6. Incident report
   An incident report is the collection of information describing an
   incident.  In this document the terms "incident report" and "incident
   information" are used interchangeably.

2.1.7. CSIRT
   A computer security incident response team, CSIRT, is an individual
   or a group of individuals that has the responsibility to coordinate
   and support the response to incidents in a defined constituency [6].
   A CSIRT creates, receives, processes, and maintains incident reports.

2.1.8. Impact
   An impact describes the consequence of an incident on a target
   expressed in terms relevant to a user community.


2.2 The Operational Model

   Incident reports are an important subset of information exchanged
   between a CSIRT and its constituency or other CSIRTs. These reports
   form the basis for resolving and understanding activity in a
   constituency. A CSIRT may create an incident report when an incident
   is reported, receive a report from another CSIRT, or send a report to
   a CSIRT. As investigation into the incident progresses, new
   information about an incident may be discovered. New information may
   trigger subsequent information exchange.

   The creation and exchange of incident reports is often driven by a
   work-flow process that prioritizes and manages the information flow
   in a CSIRT.  These systems often associate CSIRT personnel with



Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 4]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


   particular incidents or maintain status onto a given investigation.
   FINE does not provide a representation for these internal processes.

   FINE is a representation for the data exchanged between different
   parties. In order to integrate FINE into the operational processes of
   CSIRTS, the parties will have to use an interface to convert to and
   from the internal data representation (of a propriety work-flow
   application or database) and FINE. Hence, the sender of an incident
   report must convert from the local format to FINE, while the
   recipient must translate FINE back into its own local format.  The
   communicating CSIRTs need not have the same local format for storing
   incident reports.  This information exchange is depicted in Figure 1.





                  CSIRT                          CSIRT
   +------------------+                          +------------------+
   |                  |                          |                  |
   | +--------+   +---------+              +---------+   +--------+ |
   | |        |<--|Interface|<--Incident-->|Interface|-->|        | |
   | |Incident|   +---------+    Report    +---------+   |Incident| |
   | | Report |       |                          |       | Report | |
   | |Database|       |     |===  FINE  ===|     |       |Database| |
   | |        |       |                          |       |        | |
   | +--------+       |                          |       +--------+ |
   |                  |                          |                  |
   +------------------+                          +------------------+

                   Fig. 1 Operational Model for FINE



3. General Requirements

3.1 FINE SHALL reference and use previously published RFCs where
   possible.

3.2 FINE MUST have well-defined semantics and specify a standard
   mechanism for extensibility.

   The data elements of the various components of FINE should be typed,
   and the meaning should be well specified.  Likewise, there should be
   a standardized method to address representing data not defined in the
   data model.





Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 5]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


4. Format Requirements

4.1 FINE SHALL support full internationalization and localization.

   A significant part of the incident report may consist of natural
   language text. Since some incidents may involve CSIRTs from different
   countries, FINE must have provisions for using local character sets
   and encodings.

   In cases where local (non-standard) character sets and encodings are
   used, the data elements that carry encoding-sensitive information
   should be clearly indicated.

4.2 FINE MUST allow multilingual reports.

   Different parts of the incident report may be written in a different
   natural language.  FINE must support multiple translations of the
   same data element.

4.3 FINE MUST support aggregation and filtering of incident report data.

   The structure of the FINE data elements and their associated
   semantics must lend themselves to aggregation and filtering by
   applications.


4.4 FINE MUST be able to document the evolution of an incident report.

   As incidents are investigated new information may become available or
   old information may be invalidated. FINE must support the ability to
   convey this track record of an incident report.


4.5 FINE MUST support a granular access restriction policy
   on subsets of the incident report.

   Different parts of an incident report may have information of varying
   degrees of sensitivity. It must be possible to label subsets of the
   incident report with their appropriate sensitivity.  With this
   information, applications can then implement different levels of
   access restrictions for the different components of the incident
   report.

4.6 FINE SHOULD allow the application of external mechanisms to
   support authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation checks of
   incident reports.

   FINE itself need not guarantee authenticity, integrity, or non-



Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 6]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


   repudiation. However, the specification must detail a standardized
   mechanism to ensure these properties.



5. Communication Mechanism Requirements

5.1 The security properties of FINE reports SHOULD be
    independent of the communication mechanism.

   The exchange of incident reports is typically conducted using
   standard communication protocols (e.g., SMTP, HTTP, FTP, XML Web
   Services). The security properties of FINE MUST NOT be tied to a
   particular communications protocol. Provisions for authenticity,
   integrity, and confidentiality should be made in FINE.


6. Content Requirements

6.1 FINE MUST be flexible enough to support various degrees of
   completeness, while still clearly defining the minimal
   information required for describing an incident.

6.2 FINE MUST support globally unique identifiers for each incident
   report.

   It should be possible to reference an incident report unambiguously
   using a globally unique identifier. Furthermore, it should be
   possible to derive the constituency of the incident report from this
   identifier.

6.3 FINE MUST support the naming of the source and target.

6.4 FINE MUST support the description of various aspects of the
   source and target.

6.5 FINE MUST support the description of the methodology used by
   the attacker.

   Well-known classifications or enumeration schemes should be used to
   describe the attack.

6.6 FINE SHOULD support the identification of the sender of the
    incident report.

   FINE should indicate the source of each component of the incident
   report if it is different from the sender (e.g., the team handling
   the incident).



Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 7]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


6.7 FINE SHOULD support the inclusion or referencing of information
   external to the incident report.

6.8 FINE MUST support natural language descriptions of the incident.

6.9 FINE SHOULD support references to the appropriate security advisories
   from coordination and analysis centers.

6.10 FINE SHOULD support a description of the impact of the incident.

6.11 FINE SHOULD support a description of the actions taken during the
   course of handling the incident.

6.12 FINE MUST use a standardized time specification.

   Incident reports should represent time in such a way that it is
   possible to easily compare information reported from different time
   zones.


7. Security Considerations


   There are no explicit security considerations for this document,
   since no protocol or information model is specified.  However, a
   number of security relevant requirements are outlined for FINE
   implementers.  By its nature, FINE will represent sensitive
   information.  Hence, implementers should ensure support for access
   restriction (requirement 4.5), confidentiality, integrity, and non-
   repudiation (requirement 4.6) all through transport independent
   approaches (requirement 5.1).

8. IANA Considerations

   This document requires no action from IANA.
















Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 8]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


9. References

9.1 Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
   Levels." BCP 14, RFC 2119. March 1997.

9.2 Informative References

   [2]  Arvidsson, J., Cormack, A., Demchenko, Y. and Meijer J.,
   "TERENA's Incident Object Description and Exchange Format
   Requirements." RFC 3067. February 2001.

   [3]  Brownlee, N., Guttman, E., "Expectations for Computer
   Security Incident Response." BCP 21, RFC 2350. June 1998.

   [4]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary." FYI 36, RFC 2828.
   May 2000.

   [5]  "Establishing a Computer Security Incident Response Capability
   (CSIRC)." NIST Special Publication. 800-3. November 1991.

   [6] West-Brown, M., Stikvoort, D., Kossakowski, K., Killcrece G.,
   Ruefle, R., Zajicek, M., "Handbook for Computer Security Incident
   Response Teams (CSIRTs)." CMU/SEI-98-HB-002. Carnegie Mellon
   University, Pittsburgh, PA. April 2003.

   [7] Howard, J. and  Longstaff, A.,  "A Common Language for Computer
   Security Incidents." Sandia Report: SAND98-8667. Sandia National
   Laboratories. Albuquerque, NM. October 1998.





















Expires: December 24, 2006                                      [Page 9]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


10. Acknowledgments

   The precursor of this document is "RFC3067 TERENA's Incident Object
   Description Exchange Format Requirements" [2], which is based on the
   work done in the Incident Object Description Exchange Format Working
   Group at TERENA. Subsequent work and discussion have been carried
   out in the INCH-WG and in the WIDE-WG on Network Management and
   Security.

   The following individuals, in alphabetic order, have made a
   substantial contribution to this document:
         Hiroyuki Kido
         Hiroyuki Ohno
         Kathleen M. Moriarty
         Jan Meijer

11. Authors' Addresses:

   Glenn Mansfield Keeni
   Cyber Solutions Inc.
   Sendai, Japan
   Email: glenn@cysols.com

   Roman Danyliw
   CERT Coordination Center
   4500 Fifth Ave.
   Pittsburgh, PA  15213
   USA
   Email: rdd@cert.org

   Yuri Demchenko
   University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
   Email: demch@chello.nl


















Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 10]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


                        Full Copyright Statement


   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
   INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
   IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.





































Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 11]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
   to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
   described in this document or the extent to which any license
   under such rights might or might not be available; nor does
   represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
   such rights.  Information on the procedures with respect to
   rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
   of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
   at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
   any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
   proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
   to implement this standard.  Please address the information to the
   IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.























Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 12]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


Appendix - non-normative.

   Major Changes (reverse count)
   Information about changes to the document since publishing -00
   version will be documented here.

   Major changes in version-08
   1) Editorial changes

   Major changes in version-07
   1) References [4], [5] (in -06) have been removed.
   2) Editorial nits have been fixed
   3) Authors' list and contributors' list have been updated.

   Major changes in version-06
   1) Reference [3] is deleted. The reference indices are renmbered.
   2) Changed the wording in the abstract to bring it in line with the
      title
      "INcident report" => "INcident information"
   3) Added a sentence to the definition of Incident report
        In this document the terms "incident report" and "incident
        information" are used interchangeably.
   4) Modified 4.1  (clause about preserving the contents of encoding
      sensitive information when transferring is deleted).
   5) Modified 4.11 (clause for supporting different time granularities
      is deleted).
   6) Revised the requirement 5.1
   7) Editorial nits

   Major changes in version-05
   1) In 2.1 the definitions have been rearranged. Incident Report
      (earlier 2.1.8 have been moved to 2.1.6)
   2) Section 2.2, Operational model, revised
   3) Editorial nits
   4) IDnits
   5) Added Roman Danyliw to the authors list.

   Major changes in version -04
   1) Operational model rewritten
   2) Editorial nits
   3) IPR notice updated

   Major changes in version -03 (Second revision)
   1) title changed to
      Requirements for the Format for INcident information Exchange
      (FINE)
   2) editorial nits
   3) RFC2119 key words used



Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 13]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


   4) added description to 4.6
   5) reformatted 4.7 and 5.1 to have single statement requirements
      followed by description of the requirements.
   6) added an example to 4.2
   7) moved 6.13 to Format requirements as 4.8
   8) updated references #3, #5, #10
   9) updated section 2.2

   Major changes in version -03 (First revision)
   1) editorial nits
   2) in Security Considerations section an example is added to explain
      the impact of the contents of the IR on the security and privacy
      of individuals of organization.
   3) Section 3 is deleted

   Major changes in version -02

   1) clarified definitions of some terms. Added a few definitions.

   2) in 5.1, added requirement for handling non-standard/local
      encoding and/or character codes.

   3) in 5.7, added requirement that multiple versions of the report
      should be consistent

   4) in 7.5, added requirement that the source of each component of
      the Incident report must be identified (if different from the
      creator of the Incident report).

   5) some editorial nits are fixed.

   Major changes in version -01

   1) clarified definition of some terms - still in the process, needs
   more discussion with concerned parties.

   2) re-written section 2. Operational model

   3) added text about multilingual support for non-utf-8 character sets

   to item "5.1 FINE shall support full internationalization and
   localization" - results of discussion at IETF-56

   4) included clear statement about unique identification of the
   Incident report to item "5.1 FINE shall support full
   internationalization and localization."

   5) added item about the possibility of Incident description in



Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 14]






Internet Draft                                             June 25, 2006


   natural language:

   7.7 The FINE may contain a description of the Incident or comprising
   security events in a natural language.

   6) requirement about describing impact of the Incident extended (item
   7.9) with recommendation to provide guidelines to describe the impact
   on the target to ensure a uniform interpretation of the description.

   7) item 7.11 about time normalization extended with the possibility
   to describe time offset when normalization is not possible.








































Expires: December 24, 2006                                     [Page 15]