Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts
KITTEN WORKING GROUP N. Williams
Internet-Draft Sun
Intended status: Standards Track L. Johansson
Expires: September 9, 2009 Stockholm university
March 8, 2009
GSS-API Naming Extensions
draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-04.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2009.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
The Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) provides a simple naming
architecture that supports name-based authorization. This document
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
introduces new APIs that extend the GSS-API naming model to support
name attribute transfer between GSS-API peers.
Table of Contents
1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Name Attribute Sources and Criticality . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes . . . . . 4
5.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. PKIX Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.1. PKIX EKUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2.2. PKIX Certificate Alternative Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2.3. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes . . . . . 6
5.2.4. SAML attribute assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. GSS_Display_name_ext() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. GSS_Inquire_name() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. GSS_Get_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. GSS_Set_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. GSS_Delete_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. GSS_Export_name_composite() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. GSS_Map_name_to_any() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
As described in [I-D.GSS-NAMING] the GSS-API's naming architecture
suffers from certain limitations. This document proposes concrete
GSS-API extensions as outlined in [I-D.GSS-NAMING].
A number of extensions to the GSS-API [RFC2743] and its C Bindings
[RFC2744] are described herein with the goal of making authorization
information, and other information that can be modeled as "name
attributes" available as such to applications. For example, Kerberos
V authorization data elements, both, in their raw forms as well as
mapped to more useful value types, can be made available to GSS-API
applications through these interfaces.
The model is that GSS names have attributes. The attributes of a
name may be authenticated by the credential whence the name comes, or
may have been set locally on a GSS name for the purpose of
"asserting" the attribute during credential acquisition or security
context exchange. Name attributes' values are network
representations thereof (e.g., the actual value octets of the
contents of an X.509 certificate extension, for example) and are
intended to be useful for constructing portable access control
facilities. Applications may often require language- or platform-
specific data types, rather than network representations of name
attributes, so a function is provided to obtain objects of such types
associated with names and name attributes.
3. Name Attribute Sources and Criticality
A given GSS name object's name attributes may be authenticated,
mapped and/or critical. These flags are explained below.
An attribute is 'authenticated' iff there is a secure association
between the attribute (and its values) and the trusted source of the
peer credential. Examples of authenticated attributes are (any part
of) the signed portion of an X.509 certificate or AD-KDCIssued
authorization-data elements in Kerberos V Tickets. Note that the
fact that an attribute is authenticated does not imply anything about
the semantics of the attribute nor that the trusted credential source
authorized any one semantic of the attribute. Such interpretations
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
MAY be the result of applying local policy to the attribute.
That a given name's given attribute is 'mapped' means that it was
obtained through some mapping mechanism applied to another attribute
of the name that was not, itself, mapped. For example, such
attributes as platform-specific internal identifiers may sometimes be
mapped from other name attributes.
Name attributes may be "critical," meaning that applications that do
not understand them MUST reject security contexts where the peer has
such unknown, critical attributes.
[NOTE(leifj): The criticality flag seems to have limited
applicability in practice. As written the security context should
not be established unless all critically marked naming attributes are
supported and understood. But what happens if the peer doesn't
understand naming extensions at all. It seems more reasonable to
state that name attribute extensions MUST only be used to as a basis
for authorization decisions.]
[NOTE(leifj): The mapped flag also seems to have limited
applicability in practice - interpretation of the attribute will be
entierly up to the peer anyway which will need to know much more
about the attribute than the fact than its value is derived.]
4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects
Some name attributes (e.g., numeric user or group identifiers) may be
useful as subjects of access control list (ACL) entries, some may not
(e.g., time of day login restrictions). The
GSS_Inquire_name_attribute() function indicates this.
To facilitate the development of portable applications that make use
of name attributes to construct and evaluate portable ACLs the GSS-
API makes name attribute values available in canonical network
encodings thereof.
To facilitate the development of platform- or language-specific
applications that need access to native types of representations of
name attributes an optional facility is provided,
GSS_Map_name_to_any().
5. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes
[NOTE: This entire section should probably be split into one or more
separate Internet-Drafts. It is here in the -00 of this I-D to help
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
readers understand how to mechanism-specific name attributes would be
accessed through these GSS-API extensions.]
Kerberos V [I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications] and the Simple
Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism, SPKM [RFC2025], both support the
concept and encoding of containers of "authorization-data" as
described in [I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications].
PKIX [RFC3280] supports a number of authorization-data-like features,
like Extended Key Usage values (EKUs) and certificate extensions.
The authorization data can be accessed through the GSS-API name
attributes facility defined herein.
5.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data
Authorization-data non-container elements asserted in Kerberos V AP-
REQ Authenticators MUST be mapped into *asserted* GSS-API name
attributes; if not contained in AD-IF-RELEVANT then they MUST be
mapped into *critical* GSS-API name attributes. AD-AND-OR
authorization-data elements MUST be mapped into a single *critical*
attribute, (TBD).
Authorization-data included in Kerberos V Tickets that is not
contained in AD-KDCIssued (with valid signature) MUST be mapped into
*asserted* GSS-API name attributes. Conversely, authorization-data
elements in Kerberos V Tickets contained by AD-KDCIssued MUST be
mapped into *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes
As with authorization-data elements in Authenticators, authorization-
data elements in Tickets not contained in AD-IF-RELEVANT are to be
mapped to *critical* name attributes, and similarly with AD-AND-OR
(see above).
The OIDs for authorization-data elements are to be the authorization-
data element's 'ad-type' positive integer ID, relative to the base
OID <TBD> Negative values are reserved for local experiments. [NOTE:
what about negative ad-type's? OID arcs are positive integers... ad-
type is an Int32, so clearly something can be done.]
5.2. PKIX Certificate Extensions
PKI certificate extensions MAY/SHOULD/MUST (see comment above) be
represented as *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes with the
_same_ OIDs, and if they be marked critical in the certificate then
they MUST be mapped as *critical* GSS-API name attributes.
SubjectAltNames and EKUs, specifically, MUST be represented as
*authenticated* GSS-API name attributes; see below. Certificate
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
extensions MUST be represented as GSS-API name attributes whose OIDs
are the same as the extensions'
5.2.1. PKIX EKUs
Extended Key Usage extensions, specifically, MUST be mapped as
described above, except that GSS-API name attributes for EKUs MUST
have NULL values (i.e., zero-length OCTET STRINGs).
PKI certificate key usages (KUs, but not EKUs), MUST NOT be
represented as GSS-API name attributes.
5.2.2. PKIX Certificate Alternative Names
PKI certificate subjectAltNames MUST be mapped as *authenticated*,
*non-critical* GSS-API name attributes.
PKI certificate extensions MUST be represented as *authenticated*
GSS-API name attributes with the _same_ OIDs, and if they be marked
critical in the certificate then they MUST be mapped as *critical*
GSS-API name attributes.
Extended Key Usage extensions, specifically, MUST be mapped as
described above, except that GSS-API name attributes for EKUs MUST
have NULL values (i.e., zero-length OCTET STRINGs).
5.2.3. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes
Any X.509 certificate extension not covered above SHOULD be
represented as GSS-AOI name attributes with the OID of the X.509
extension and with OCTET STRING values containing the encoded value
of the extension.
5.2.4. SAML attribute assertions
Attributes contained in SAML attribute assertions are mapped to GSS-
API name attributes with OIDs derived from the SAML attributes:
If the SAML attribute is an OID the same OID is used.
If the SAML attribute is a URN or a URI then the name MUST be
mapped to a corresponding OID by means of an IANA registry.
6. GSS_Display_name_ext()
Inputs:
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
o name NAME,
o display_as_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o display_name STRING
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given name could not be
displayed using the syntax of the given name type.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function displays a given name using the given name syntax, if
possible. This operation may require mapping MNs to generic name
syntaxes or generic name syntaxes to mechanism-specific name
syntaxes; such mappings may not always be feasible and MAY be inexact
or lossy, therefore this function may fail.
6.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 GSS_Display_name_ext(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
gss_OID display_as_name_type,
gss_buffer_t display_name
);
7. GSS_Inquire_name()
Inputs:
o name NAME
Outputs:
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o name_is_MN BOOLEAN,
o mn_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o asserted_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o authenticated_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o critical_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o all_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function outputs the sets of attributes of a name, that are
authenticated, asserted or critical. It also indicates if a given
NAME is an MN or not and, if it is, what mechanism it's an MN of.
7.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_inquire_name(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
int name_is_MN,
gss_OID *MN_mech,
gss_OID_set *authenticated,
gss_OID_set *asserted,
gss_OID_set *critical,
gss_OID_set *all_attrs
);
8. GSS_Get_name_attribute()
Inputs:
o name NAME,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE iff authenticated by the trusted
peer credential source.
o negative BOOLEAN,
o mapped BOOLEAN,
o critical BOOLEAN,
o values SET OF OCTET STRING,
o display_values SET OF STRING
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not
known or set.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function outputs the value(s) associated with a given GSS name
object for a given name attribute.
NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing
for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG
mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was
always the intention. It should be noted however that the order
presented does not always reflect an underlying order of the
mechanism specific source of the attribute values.
8.1. C-Bindings
The C-bindings of GSS_Get_name_attribute() requires one function call
per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes. This is done
by using a single gss_buffer_t for each value and an input/output
integer parameter to distinguish initial and subsequent calls and to
indicate when all values have been obtained.
The 'more' input/output parameter should point to an integer variable
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
whose value, on first call to gss_name_attribute_get() MUST be -1,
and whose value upon function call return will be non-zero to
indicate that additional values remain, or zero to indicate that no
values remain. The caller should not modify this parameter after the
initial call.
OM_uint32 gss_get_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
gss_OID attr,
int *authenticated,
int *negative,
int *mapped,
int *critical,
gss_buffer_t value,
gss_buffer_t display_value,
int *more
);
9. GSS_Set_name_attribute()
Inputs:
o name NAME,
o critical BOOLEAN,
o negative BOOLEAN,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o values SET OF OCTET STRING
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not
known or could not be set.
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing
for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG
mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was
always the intention. It should be noted that underlying mechanisms
may not respect the given order.
9.1. C-Bindings
The C-bindings of GSS_Set_name_attribute() requires one function call
per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes -- each call
adds one value. To replace an attribute's every value delete the
attribute's values first with GSS_Delete_name_attribute().
OM_uint32 gss_set_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
int critical,
int negative,
gss_OID attr,
gss_buffer_t value
);
10. GSS_Delete_name_attribute()
Inputs:
o name NAME,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not
known.
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that a forbidden delete operation was
attempted eg deleting a negative attribute.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
Deletion of negative authenticated attributes from NAME objects MUST
NOT be allowed and must result in a GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED.
10.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_delete_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
gss_OID attr
);
11. GSS_Export_name_composite()
Inputs:
o name NAME
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o exp_composite_name OCTET STRING
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function outputs a token which can be imported with
GSS_Import_name(), using GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT as the name type
and which preserves any name attribute information associated with
the input name (which GSS_Export_name() may well not). The token
format is no specified here as this facility is intended for inter-
process communication only; however, all such tokens MUST start with
a two-octet token ID, hex 04 02, in network byte order.
The OID for GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT is <TBD>.
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
11.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_export_name_composite(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
gss_buffer_t exp_composite_name
);
12. GSS_Map_name_to_any()
Inputs:
o name NAME,
o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- if TRUE only authenticated attributes
will be included
o type_id OBJECT IDENTIFIER
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o output ANY DEFINED BY type_id
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the mapping or conversion could
not be done. The minor status code may provide additional
information.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code
may provide additional information.
Whereas name attribute's values are encoded in some network
representation applications often require native, language- and/or
platform-specific data types. This function provides access to such
types.
12.1. C-Bindings
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t;
OM_uint32 gss_map_name_to_any(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
int authenticated,
gss_OID type_id,
gss_any_t output
);
Note the new C bindings type, gss_any_t. We define it as a pointer
to an incompletely declared struct.
13. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping()
Inputs:
o name NAME,
o type_id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o input ANY DEFINED BY type_id
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the mapping or conversion could
not be done. The minor status code may provide additional
information.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code
may provide additional information.
This function releases, if possible, the objects of language- and/or
platform-specific types output by GSS_Map_name_to_any(). If such
types have native release functions applications MAY use either those
or this function to release the given object.
13.1. C-Bindings
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t;
OM_uint32 gss_release_any_name_mapping(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name,
gss_OID type_id,
gss_any_t *input
);
14. IANA Considerations
This document creates a namespace of GSS-API name attributes.
Attributes are named by OID, so no single authority might be needed
for allocation, however, in the interest of providing the community
with an authority for name attribute OID allocation and a way to find
the existing set of name attributes, the IANA should establish both,
a single OID off of which name attributes could be allocated, and a
registry of known GSS name attributes.
GSS-API name attribute registry entries should contain all the
information that GSS_Inquire_name_attribute() may return about the
given name attributes and their OIDs:
o a name attribute OID (this is a unique key)
o a name attribute symbolic name, starting with "GSS_C_NA_" (this is
a unique key)
o a brief description, in English
o whether the attribute is useful as the subject of access control
list entries
o whether the attribute is useful as an indicator of trust
o an optional normative reference to documentation for the given
name attribute
The allocation and registration policy should be first come, first
served. Registry entries' OIDs need not be based on the base OID
given above.
15. Security Considerations
This document extends the GSS-API naming model to include support for
name attributes. The intention is that name attributes are to be
used as a basis for (among other things) authorization decisions or
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
application personalization for applications relying on GSS-API
security contexts.
The security of the application may be critically dependent on the
security of the attributes. This document classifies attributes as
asserted or authenticated. Only authenticated attributes MUST be
used if the attribute has security implications for the application
(eg authorization decisions) since asserted attributes may easily be
controlled by the peer directly.
It is important to understand the meaning of 'authenticated' in this
setting. It does not mean that any semantic of the attribute is
claimed to be true. The only implication is that a trusted third
party has asserted the attribute as opposed to the attribute being
asserte by the peer itself. Any additional semantics is always the
result of applying policy. For instance in a given deployment the
mail attribute of the subject may be authenticated and sourced from
an email system where 'correct' values are kept. In another setting
users may be allowed to modify their mail addresses freely. In both
cases the 'mail' attribute may be authenticated by virtue of being
included in signed SAML attribute assertions lor by other means
authenticated by the underlying mechanism.
When the underlying security mechanism does not provide a permanent
unique identity (eg anonymous kerberos) the GSS-API naming extensions
may be used to provide a replacement permanent unique identity
attribute which in this case may be unique for each relying party.
This is analogous to the Liberty Alliance targetedID attribute and
has similar security implications.
16. Normative References
[I-D.GSS-NAMING]
Hartman, S., "Desired Enhancements to GSSAPI Naming",
draft-ietf-kitten-gss-naming-01.txt (work in progress),
February 2005.
[I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications]
Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service
(V5)", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-07 (work
in progress), September 2004.
[RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
[RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism
(SPKM)", RFC 2025, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2203] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997.
[RFC2478] Baize, E. and D. Pinkas, "The Simple and Protected GSS-API
Negotiation Mechanism", RFC 2478, December 1998.
[RFC2623] Eisler, M., "NFS Version 2 and Version 3 Security Issues
and the NFS Protocol's Use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5",
RFC 2623, June 1999.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
[RFC3008] Wellington, B., "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC)
Signing Authority", RFC 3008, November 2000.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC3530] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R.,
Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System
(NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.
Authors' Addresses
Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct
Austin, TX 78727
US
Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
Leif Johansson
Stockholm university
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft GSS-API Naming Extensions March 2009
Avdelningen foer IT och Media
Stockholm SE-106 91
Email: leifj@it.su.se
URI: http://people.su.se/~leifj/
Williams & Johansson Expires September 9, 2009 [Page 18]
