Domain Keys Identified Mail (dkim) Internet Drafts
| DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview | |||||||||||||||||
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This document provides an overview of the DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) service and describes how it can fit into a messaging service. It also describes how DKIM relates to other IETF message signature technologies. It is intended for those who are adopting, developing, or deploying DKIM. DKIM allows an organization to take responsibility for transmitting a message, in a way that can be validated by a recipient. The organization can be the author's, the originating sending site, an intermediary, or one of their agents. An organization may use one or more domain names to accomplish this. DKIM defines a domain-level digital signature authentication framework for email, using public-key cryptography and key server technology [RFC4871]. This permits verification of a message source, an intermediary, or one of their agents, as well as the integrity of its contents. DKIM will also provide a mechanism that permits potential email signers to publish information about their email signing practices; this will permit email receivers to make additional assessments about messages. Such protection of email identity can assist in the global control of "spam" and "phishing". | ||||||||||||||||
| DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) | |||||||||||||||||
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DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a domain-level authentication framework for email to permit verification of the source and contents of messages. This document specifies an adjunct mechanism to aid in assessing messages that do not contain a DKIM signature for the domain used in the author's address. It defines a record that can advertise whether they sign their outgoing mail, and how other hosts can access those records. | ||||||||||||||||
| DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Development,Deployment and Operations | |||||||||||||||||
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DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) associates a "responsible" identity with a message and provides a means of verifying that the association is legitimate. [RFC4871] DKIM defines a domain-level authentication framework for email using public-key cryptography and key server technology. This permits verifying the source or intermediary for a message, as well as the contents of messages. The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a signing domain to assert responsibility for sending a message, thus proving and protecting the identity associated with the message and the integrity of the messages itself, while retaining the functionality of Internet email as it is known today. Such protection of email identity may assist in the global control of "spam" and "phishing". This document provides implementation, deployment, operational and migration considerations for DKIM. | ||||||||||||||||
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Domain Keys Identified Mail (dkim)
In addition to this official charter maintained by the IETF Secretariat, there is additional information about this working group on the Web at:
Additional DKIM Web Page
Last Modified: 2008-04-23
Additional information is available at tools.ietf.org/wg/dkim
Chair(s):
Security Area Director(s):
Security Area Advisor:
Mailing Lists:
General Discussion: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.orgTo Subscribe: http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
Archive: http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/
Description of Working Group:
The Internet mail protocols and infrastructure allow mail sent from onedomain to purport to be from another. While there are sometimes
legitimate reasons for doing this, it has become a source of general
confusion, as well as a mechanism for fraud and for distribution of
spam (when done illegitimately, it's called "spoofing"). The DKIM
working group will produce standards-track specifications that allow a
domain to take responsibility, using digital signatures, for having
taken part in the transmission of an email message and to
publish "policy" information about how it applies those signatures.
Taken together, these will assist receiving domains in detecting (or
ruling out) certain forms of spoofing as it pertains to the signing
domain.
The DKIM working group will produce a summary of the threats that are
addressed by the proposed standards-track specifications, while
acknowledging their limitations and scope. The DKIM working group will
also produce security requirements to guide their efforts, and will
analyze the impact on senders and receivers who are not using DKIM,
particularly any cases in which mail may be inappropriately labeled as
suspicious or spoofed.
While the techniques specified by the DKIM working group will not
prevent fraud or spam, they will provide a tool for defense against
them by assisting receiving domains in detecting some spoofing of
known domains. The standards-track specifications will not mandate any
particular action by the receiving domain when a signature fails to
validate. That said, with the understanding that guidance is necessary
for implementers, the DKIM documents should discuss a reasonable set
of possible actions and strategies, and analyze their likely effects
on attacks and on normal email delivery. The DKIM working group will
not attempt to establish requirements for trust relationships between
domains nor to specify reputation or accreditation systems.
The DKIM working group will consider mailing-list behaviour that is
currently deemed acceptable, will make every effort to allow such
mailing lists to continue to operate in a DKIM environment, and will
provide a plan for smooth transition of mailing lists that fail to
operate. The specifications will also advise mailing lists on how to
take advantage of DKIM if they should choose to do so.
The signatures will use public-key cryptography and will be based on
domain name identifiers. Public keys needed to validate the signatures
will be stored in the responsible identity's DNS hierarchy. The
specifications will be based on the following Internet Drafts:
* draft-fenton-dkim-threats
* draft-allman-dkim-base
* draft-allman-dkim-ssp
These documents represent experimentation and consensus from a number
of designers and early implementors.
Experimentation has resulted in Internet deployment of these
specifications. Although not encouraged, non-backwards-compatible
changes to these specifications will be acceptable if the DKIM working
group determines that the changes are required to meet the group's
technical objectives.
The resulting protocols must meet typical criteria for success. In
addition to security, these include usability, scalability, ease of
deployment, and cryptographic algorithm independence.
To prevent this task from becoming unwieldy, several related topics are
considered out of scope for the DKIM working group. These topics
include:
* Reputation and accreditation systems. While we expect these to add
value to what is defined by the DKIM working group, their development
will be separate, and is out of scope for the DKIM working group.
* Message content encryption.
* Additional key management protocols or infrastructure.
* Signatures that are intended to make long-term assertions beyond the
expected transit time of a message from originator to recipient,
which is normally only a matter of a few days at most.
* Signatures that attempt to make strong assertions about the identity
of the message author, and details of user-level signing of messages
(as distinguished from domain-level keys that are restricted to
specific users).
* Duplication of prior work in signed email, including S/MIME and
OpenPGP.
Once the primary goals are met, the DKIM working group may also study
whether to adopt a work item for specifying a common mechanism to
communicate the results of message verification to the message
recipient. The generation of a standards-track specification on this
topic will require an update to the DKIM working group charter.
The deliverables for the DKIM working group are these:
* An informational RFC presenting a detailed threat analysis of, and
security requirements for, DKIM. IESG approval of this document is
a prerequisite for the submission of the standards-track
specifications.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM signature and verification.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM policy handling.
* A standards-track specification for DKIM DNS Resource Record(s).
* An informational RFC providing an overview of DKIM and how it can
fit into overall messaging systems, how it relates to other IETF
message signature technologies, implementation and migration
considerations, and outlining potential DKIM applications and
future extensions.
Goals and Milestones:
| Done | WG last call on DKIM threats and security requirements | |
| Done | WG last call on DKIM signature specification | |
| Done | WG last call on SSP requirements | |
| Done | WG adoption of SSP protocol draft | |
| Nov 2007 | WG last call on SSP protocol | |
| Nov 2007 | WG last call on overview document |
Internet-Drafts:
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview (51381 bytes)DKIM Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP) (39963 bytes)
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Development, Deployment and Operations (46503 bytes)
Request For Comments:
Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) (RFC 4686) (70382 bytes)DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures (RFC 4871) (166054 bytes) obsoletes RFC 4870
Requirements for a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signing Practices Protocol (RFC 5016) (33710 bytes)
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